Arbuckle Simpson Aquifier Protection Federation of Okla. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd.

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by Justia Inc
Petitioner Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Protection Federation of Oklahoma, Inc. sought writs of prohibition and mandamus to disqualify a hearing officer in an administrative proceeding conducted by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), to restart the proceeding with a new hearing officer, and to prohibit ex parte communications between the hearing officer and the OWRB and other agencies. The proceedings in question concern the Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Maximum Annual Yield (MAY) determination, made by OWRB on March 13, 2012. Upon review of the OWRB record, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner was entitled to a fair and impartial proceeding. While the Court did not find the hearing officer to be biased and would not order her disqualification, "in the interest of fairness and in order to remedy any appearance of impropriety," the Court issued a writ of mandamus to compel the hearing officer to notify the parties to the administrative proceeding of any and all ex parte communications that occurred between her and federal agencies and to include those communications in the record, so that the parties may have an opportunity to respond. The Court concluded that Petitioner satisfied the necessary requirements for a writ of mandamus, and therefore issued a writ compelling the hearing officer to provide notice of her ex parte communications to all parties, to disclose the contents of those communications to the parties, and incorporate those communications and responses to them into the record. View "Arbuckle Simpson Aquifier Protection Federation of Okla. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd." on Justia Law

Cornett v. Carr

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by Justia Inc
Plaintiff sued his former spouse, seeking rescission and damages arising out of an allegedly fraudulent real estate sales agreement. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's lawsuit for failing to issue summons or file a waiver within ninety days of bringing the action as required by Rule 9(a), Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a discord between Rule 9(a) and 12 O.S.Supp. 2002 section 2004(I), and found the two provisions were in direct conflict to the extent Rule 9(a) shortened plaintiff's allotted time for service of summons. View "Cornett v. Carr" on Justia Law

Simonson v. Schaefer

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by Justia Inc
The plaintiff-appellant sued the defendant-appellee for professional negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The appellant was a party to a divorce and child custody litigation. The appellee, a court-appointed psychologist, was to serve as an expert to conduct an evaluation of the parties and of their children. The appellant alleged that he paid the appellee for the evaluation and after several months, as a result of the inaction of the appellee, her report had not been provided as ordered. The appellant settled the divorce proceedings in a manner he claimed was injurious to him and his son. The trial court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss. The motion urged that as a court-appointed witness, the appellee was immune to liability in damages. Though after its review, the Supreme Court found that as a court-appointed expert, appellee was indeed immune to liability in damages, "her duty was to the court." However, because the appellant claimed that the appellee failed to provide any services whatsoever for the amount paid, the Court treated those allegations as true: "[a]n expert would not be entitled to claim a fee for a court-ordered service that was not provided. This does not mean the appellant must be satisfied with the fees, but the appellant has a right to have the court decide if the fees were earned, and whether there was a valid legal defense to the assertions of the appellant that the appellee neither completed the required report, nor testified." The appellant admitted that the underlying child custody was settled, so the trial court should have also considered the impact the settlement had on the appellee's opportunity to complete the report or to testify. Accordingly, the trial court's granting the appellee's motion to dismiss was reversed and remanded for further consideration. View "Simonson v. Schaefer" on Justia Law

W.R. Allison Enterprises, Inc. v. CompSource of Oklahoma

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by Justia Inc
W.R. Allison Enterprises, Inc. was a small business operated by a sole owner. Allison hired an employee in early 2009 and secured workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance from CompSource. Allison prepaid the estimated annual premium. The employee only worked for Allison for approximately one month. Allison asked its insurance agent to cancel the workers' compensation insurance policy. CompSource acknowledged the cancellation request and advised that it would issue a ten-day notice of cancellation on a short rate basis in conformance with the insurance policy. CompSource prepared a final audit report, calculating the gross premium, short rate cancellation penalty, and a catastrophe premium. CompSource subtracted the audit amount from the estimated prepaid annual premium and refunded the remainder as the unearned premium calculated on a short rate basis. Allison took the position that the short rate penalty charge conflicted with 85 O.S.2001, section 67.1 which expressly required the insurance company to refund a pro rata share of the prepaid premium if it canceled a policy and that the policy's short rate penalty provision was changed, by operation of law, to comply with section 67.1. Allison filed suit against CompSource on behalf of itself and other similarly situated employers to recover the short rate penalties charged by CompSource, alleging CompSource's refusal to return the short rate penalty charge constituted a breach of the insurance policy as impliedly amended by law. The trial court overruled CompSource's counter motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and certified an interlocutory order that decided that when an insured employer requests that a workers' compensation insurance policy be canceled, the insurer must refund the prepaid premium on a pro rata basis pursuant to 85 O.S.2001, 67.1. The insurer filed a petition for certiorari review arguing that the pro rata refund provisions in the statute apply only when the insurer initiates the cancellation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the statute was ambiguous as to insured-initiated cancellations of workers' compensation insurance policies; (2) the state insurance department has applied the statute only to insurer-initiated cancellations; and (3) plaintiff respondent did not establish any cogent reason why the Court should not defer to the department's longstanding application. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed. Section 67.1 did not require CompSource to make a pro rata refund of unearned prepaid premium to Allison. View "W.R. Allison Enterprises, Inc. v. CompSource of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Bertrand v. Laura Dester Center

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by Justia Inc
Petitioner-Claimant Nancy Bertrand injured her right foot when she slipped on a wet floor while employed as a child care worker for Respondent Laura Dester Center (Employer). She sought certiorari review of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) which sustained the Workers' Compensation Court's (WCC) denial of her request for travel costs to and from a vocational rehabilitation facility. Claimant contended that her allowance for travel expenses was effectively eliminated under the new Workers' Compensation Code, enacted August 26, 2011, which set a minimum for reimbursement of twenty miles round-trip. Claimant's total round-trip mileage was fourteen miles for which she was previously paid prior to the effective date of the Code. The trial court ordered the new law was procedural and could be applied retroactively. But after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCC ordered vocational rehabilitation before August 26, 2011, and the treatment facility was outside the city limits of Claimant's hometown. As such, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Bertrand v. Laura Dester Center" on Justia Law

Miami Business Services, LLC v. Davis

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by Justia Inc
Petitioner, Miami Business Services LLC (Miami), and Real Parties in Interest were involved in a joint venture. The law firm of Phillips Murrah, P.C. (Phillips) served as general counsel for Miami as well as Real Parties in Interest and their joint venture. Over the course of that joint venture, Jennifer Fogg, one of the defendants, acted as the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Miami and acted as the principal in the real party in interest business entities. While COO of Miami, Fogg sought counsel from Phillips regarding issues affecting Miami's operations and for work undertaken by Real Parties in Interest and the joint venture. Miami terminated Fogg from her role as its COO in October, 2010. Subsequent to Fogg's termination, Miami brought suit against Real Parties in Interest, including Fogg, for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, and civil conspiracy. Phillips entered its appearance in the suit on behalf of the Real Parties in Interest. Miami then filed a motion to disqualify Phillips, claiming that Phillips had a conflict of interest which violated Rules 1.7 and 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, stemming from Phillips' involvement with both Miami and Real Party in Interest Asset Group, Inc. The trial judge denied Miami's motion and Miami appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court recast Miami's appeal as an application for original jurisdiction and petition for mandamus. In granting the petition, the Court held that denial of a motion to disqualify was immediately appealable as a final order affecting the substantial rights of a party pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 953 and that the addition of Comment 3 to Rule 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct did not alter the requirement for an evidentiary hearing on motions to disqualify counsel for conflicts of interest based upon possession of confidential information. View "Miami Business Services, LLC v. Davis" on Justia Law

Howard v. Zimmer, Inc.

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by Justia Inc
Plaintiff-Appellant Brian C. Howard, M.D. received a knee replacement manufactured by Defendant Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc. The implant failed and had to be removed allegedly because it did not bond to Howard's bone. Howard asserted that the implant was unsuccessful because Sulzer left oily residue on the implant in violation of federal regulations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a single question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Court in turn reformulated the question as one of first impression: "[w]hether 21 U.S.C. 337 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), [which provides] that all violations of the Act shall be prosecuted in the name of the United States, prohibits Oklahoma from recognizing a claim for negligence per se based on violation of a federal regulation under the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA?" Howard asserted that Oklahoma law would allow a claim for negligence per se to proceed based on the violation of a federal regulation, and that such a position was supported by a recent opinion promulgated by the Oklahoma Court. Sulzer argued that federal regulations are not the type of law which should give rise to negligence per se claims. The manufacturer also insisted that recognizing such a claim would contravene legislative intent where no clear standard of conduct is outlined. The Oklahoma Supreme Court was not persuaded by Sulzer's arguments and answered the single reformulated first impression question, "no." View "Howard v. Zimmer, Inc." on Justia Law

Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. Lucas

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by Justia Inc
Frank George, a student at the University of Oklahoma, was charged by the University with violating five provisions of the University's student code. The Campus Disciplinary Board (CDB) found that he was guilty of violating three provisions of the Code: 16.4 (Failing to Comply with Directions of Institutional Officials), 16.65 (Public Drunkenness), and 16.25 (Violating Applicable Local, State, or Federal Laws). He appealed to the University's Campus Disciplinary Council (CDC) and alleged that the evidence was insufficient for the administrative decisions that the student code had been violated. The CDC reviewed the statements of the witnesses and the student, and in its written decision concluded that the student had failed to meet his burden to show that the evidence against him was insufficient. The decision of the CDB was sustained by the CDC. George "appealed" the decision to the district court. The University filed a motion to dismiss the petition and argued that the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act did not authorize appellate jurisdiction in the District Court. The court denied the motion to dismiss, stayed proceedings, and certified the court's order for interlocutory certiorari review on the issue of the appellate jurisdiction exercised pursuant to the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) 75 O.S. 250.4(B)(12) does not expressly provide for application of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act when a student is subject to discipline less than expulsion for an institutional rule infraction; (2) the remedy of an independent District Court civil action is an adequate remedy for an alleged violation by the University of a student's rights to due process in a University disciplinary proceeding; (3) the possibility of a subsequent institutional offense that is subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act having an enhanced punishment because of former offenses does not require the former offenses to be also subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act; and (4) absent unusual circumstances not present here, the Court declined in a supervisory writ proceeding to adjudicate constitutional arguments that were not adjudicated in the District Court. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority.

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by Justia Inc
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified questions of Oklahoma Law to the Supreme Court: (1) does the Okla. Const. art. 2, section 30 provide a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act?; (2) if such a right exists, is the cause of action recognized retrospectively? and (3) are the standards of municipal liability coterminous with a Federal section 1983 action or does the common law theory of respondeat superior apply to such action? The questions in this case arose from an altercation at the Cherokee County Detention Center (a facility operated by the Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority) whereby plaintiff Daniel Bosh was attacked while he was standing at the booking desk of the Detention Center with his hands secured in restraints behind his back. Video surveillance of the events captured images of one of the jailers, defendant Gordon Chronister, Jr., approaching the plaintiff and grabbing him behind his back. Plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of the altercation. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court against the Authority, the assistant jail administrator and the jailers who initiated the attack. He asserted federal Civil Rights claims against the individuals and state law claims against the Authority. The Authority removed the case to the United States District Court then filed a motion to dismiss the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the OGTCA). Upon review, the Supreme Court answered the questions: (1) the Okla. Const. art 2, section 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act; (2) the action is recognized retrospectively; and (3) the common law theory of respondeat superior applies to municipal liability under such an action. View "Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority." on Justia Law

City of Choctaw v. Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group

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by Justia Inc
In a dispute over insurance coverage between the plaintiff-appellee City of Choctaw, and its insurer defendant-appellant Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group (OMAG), the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment for Choctaw. Both in the trial court and on appeal, the city argued that OMAG should cover an inverse condemnation judgment entered against the city in a suit brought by a landowner, even though the city admitted it obtained coverage from OMAG for liability imposed under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The OMAG appealed summary judgment granted in favor of the Choctaw on a claim which had been denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the summary judgment record disclosed neither a legal nor factual basis for applying any theory of estoppel to make OMAG liable for the inverse condemnation judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the city, and remanded the case with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of OMAG. View "City of Choctaw v. Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group " on Justia Law