Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants Wsbaldo Valdez and Linda Vargas owned property in joint tenancy and neglected to pay the 2005 property taxes. In 2006, Appellee Mae Ouellette purchased the property at a tax sale and later applied for a tax deed. She served notice on Vargas but not on Valdez. In 2008, Ouellette received a tax deed. Valdez and Vargas filed a petition to quiet title, for ejectment, and damages. They then filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting the tax deed was void for failure to serve Valdez, and Valdez could redeem the entire property. In Ouellette's counter-motion for summary judgment and response to Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, her two main assertions were: (1) Valdez and Vargas were either an unincorporated association or a partnership and service on Vargas was good service on Valdez; and (2) the service on Vargas was at least valid and the tax deed was effective as to her interest, thereby severing the joint tenancy. Ouellette argued she and Valdez were tenants in common. The trial court held that service on Valdez was ineffective but agreed with Ouellette that Valdez could not redeem the entire property, and Valdez and Ouellette were tenants in common. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that service of a notice for application of tax deed is mandatory and must be made on all parties according to the applicable statute. Failure to make such service will render any issued tax deed void in its entirety. Accordingly, Valdez had the right to redeem the entire property. The Court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Vargas v. Occupants of 3908 SW 24th St Oklahoma City" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Eddie Lee Howard and Shane Schneider (Employees) entered an employment contract with Defendant-Appellee Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. For two years following termination, the contract prohibited employees from: working for, leasing to, or selling equipment to competitors. The contract contained an arbitration agreement requiring application of Louisiana law with disputes to be resolved in Houston, Texas. After the employees terminated their employment with Nitro-Lift, they went to work for a competitor in Arkansas. The employer filed an arbitration proceeding in Houston. Howard and Schneider filed an application for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in Oklahoma asserting that the non-competition agreement violated public policy. The district court initially granted the employees a temporary injunction, prohibiting Nitro-Lift from continuing the arbitration proceedings in Texas. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion to dismiss. After considering the parties' briefs and arguments, the district court found the arbitration clause to be valid on its face and reasonable in its terms, lifted the temporary restraining order, and granted the motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement; and as drafted, the non-competition covenants were void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma public policy. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellee/Counter-appellant, Archie Dicksion filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of his brother. Subsequently, Thomas Powell asserted that he was a pretermitted heir of the deceased. With the family's cooperation, DNA genetic testing was conducted and the tests determined that Powell was indeed the son of the decedent. The trial court determined that Powell was an unintentionally omitted child and entitled to his statutory share of the estate. Powell and his half-sister, the decedent's daughter, also challenged the admittance of the holographic will to probate and to Appellant's appointment as the personal representative of the estate. A motion for new trial was denied. Both Powell and the Appellant appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the application of paternity testing to intestate and probate proceedings. Upon review, the Court held that: (1) under the facts presented, the objections to admission of the holographic will were not untimely; (2) the paternity statute, 84 O.S. 2001 sec. 215, applies to intestate and probate proceedings; and (3) 58 O.S. 2001 sec. 122 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a will. View "In re Estate of Dicksion" on Justia Law

Appellants Eleanor and Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer petitioned the Supreme Court to challenge the Court of Civil Appeals' decision which upheld the trial court's determination regarding Appellee-Trustee JP Morgan Chase Bank's previously-adjudicated ability to draw on the trusts's principal. The trust in question named Appellant Eleanor Reed as beneficiary, and authorized payments of up to half of its income payable quarterly, for her support and well-being. In 1998, Reed filed a Petition for Instructions in district court in Tulsa County, requesting the court determine what distributions were permitted under the Trust. Specifically, Reed sought instructions for the co-trustee, Bank One Trust Company, N.A., to pay certain of Reed's expenses from the Trust's principal. In 2007, Reed and three of her four children, Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer, filed suit to modify the terms of the trust to allow Appellee JP Morgan Chase to make payments from the remaining half of the trust's principal. Appellants stated that Reed was "an incapacitated person afflicted with Alzheimer's disease, and her condition constitutes an emergency condition which will necessitate her being housed in a nursing home. She is wheel-chair bound, 84 years old, and in precarious health." Appellants maintained that Testator would have wanted Reed, his only child, to have the use of the remaining Trust funds to provide for her well-being. Appellees objected to the suit, arguing that the Testator's intent regarding the payment from principal had been determined in a 1998 Order and, as such, the claims asserted in the Amended Petition are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Upon review, the Supreme Court saw no connection between the 1998 Order and the issue presented to it on appeal: "[w]hile we agree that the subject matter, the parties, and the capacity of the parties remain the same, we cannot agree that the cause of the action is the same as that in the 1998 matter. The focus of the 1998 lawsuit was to provide instructions to the trustee to make payments from half of the Trust corpus on behalf of Reed. This payment was expressly provided for in the Trust instrument. In the present action, Appellants [sought] due to an unforeseen medical emergency, to modify the express terms of the Trust and to show that Testator would have intended Reed's present needs be cared for even if it meant invading the remaining half of the Trust corpus." The Court vacated the appellate court's opinion in this matter and remanded the case back to the trial court for determination of whether modification should be allowed under the terms of the trust. View "Reed v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank" on Justia Law

Prospective Adoptive Parents M.B. and V.B. and Baby Boy K.B. challenged a district court decision that denied the adoptive parents' motion to terminate the biological father's parental rights and petition for adoption. The district court ordered K.B. returned to his biological father. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether K.B. was eligible for adoption without the consent of his biological father. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that K.B. was not eligible for adoption because K.B.'s biological father exercised his parental rights regarding the child, including contributing to the support of the biological mother during pregnancy. The sufficiency of the support was a fact to be determined by the trial court, so the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision but remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Adoption of Baby Boy K.B." on Justia Law