Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in February, 2012
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In a petition filed in the fall of 2010, Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company alleged to be the "present holder" of the note and mortgage, and initiated a foreclosure action against Defendant-Appellant Cory Richardson. A review of the note, filed as an exhibit to the Motion for Summary Judgment, revealed an undated blank indorsement. This blank indorsement was filed with the lower court for the first time in the Motion for Summary Judgment. Nowhere in the original petition did Deutsche Bank reference the undated blank indorsement. The Bank purported to have received an "Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage" from the original lender, WMC Mortgage Corporation, which was dated in 2011, claiming to be effective as of December, 2010. A summary judgment was granted in Deustche Bank's favor against Defendant, dated July 1, 2011, signed by the trial judge in September. Defendant appealed the summary judgment, arguing Deutsche Bank failed to demonstrate standing. Upon review, the Supreme Court found there was a question of fact regarding whether the Bank was a "person entitled to enforce" its note prior to the filing of the foreclosure proceeding, and as such, summary judgment was not appropriate. The Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Bank and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Richardson" on Justia Law

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In 2009, Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3 (Deutsche Bank) filed a foreclosure action against Defendant-Appellant Theron Matthews. Deutsche Bank claimed at that time to hold the note and mortgage, and that the note and mortgage were indorsed in blank. However from the face of the note attached to the Petition, no such indorsement was found. The Bank then filed a document entitled "Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage" with the County Clerk of Creek County six months after the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. A trial court granted partial summary judgment in Deutsche Bank's favor against Defendant a month later. Defendant appealed the grant of summary judgment arguing Deutsche Bank failed to demonstrate standing. Finding that the Bank did not have the proper supporting documentation in hand when it filed suit, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Matthews" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellee HSBC Bank USA, NA, claimed to be the holder of a note and mortgage on Defendants-Appellants Wesley and Pamela Lyon's house, and initiated foreclosure proceedings against them. HSBC filed a first amended petition late 2008, adding additional defendants, but continued to assert its status as the "present holder of said note and mortgage." The Lyons, noting the facial deficiencies of the unindorsed note filed in the original action, asserted HSBC's lack of standing. The trial court denied HSBC's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court allowed the bank time to file an amended petition. HSBC filed its second amended petition again asserting its status as the holder of the note by reason of an indorsement and the assignment of the mortgage. A review of the note attached to the second amended petition demonstrated a blank indorsement from the original lender "without recourse to the bearer" and signed by a vice president of the assigning bank. HSBC then filed a renewed Motion for Summary Judgment in early 2011, which was granted two months later by the trial court. Defendants argued on appeal that the bank still lacked standing to bring suit, and that the summary judgment ruling was in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly granted the bank's motion for summary judgment because it had established in its amended petition that it was the current holder of the note, and that the Lyons had not made any payments on the house since 2008. View "HSBC Bank, NA v. Lyon" on Justia Law

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Tracy Stanfield was injured in 1992. A settlement relating to his injuries resulted in an annuity providing periodic payments to Stanfield from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife). Stanfield assigned certain annuity payments, and the assignee in turn assigned them to J. G. Wentworth S.S.C. Limited Partnership (Wentworth). Stanfield later caused MetLife to ignore the assignments to Wentworth. Wentworth filed an action in a Pennsylvania state court and obtained a judgment against Stanfield. Wentworth then filed a motion for a judgment against MetLife for the same amount. A Pennsylvania court granted the motion. Soon thereafter, Stanfield's mother Mildred filed a petition in an Oklahoma district court to be appointed guardian of her son's estate. MetLife filed an interpleader action in a Pennsylvania federal district court and named Wentworth and Mildred in her capacity as guardian of her son's estate as defendants. Mildred asked attorney Loyde Warren to accept service of process on her behalf, and he agreed. Stanfield signed Warren's contingency fee agreement; Warren then engaged local counsel in Pennsylvania. At the settlement conference the parties agreed that Wentworth's judgment would be withdrawn; payments would be paid from Stanfield's annuity payments to Wentworth; the annuity assignment was rescinded; and future annuity payments from MetLife to Stanfield, as guardian, would be made payable in care of Warren. In 2009, Warren filed a motion in the open and continuing guardianship case before the Oklahoma district court for approval of both the 2001 contract for legal representation and the payment of legal fees made pursuant to that contract. Mildred objected and among her arguments, she maintained that a contingency fee for successfully defending a client from a judgment was improper, and that the fee agreement was unenforceable because it had not been approved by the guardianship court. The district court denied Warren's motion, "[b]ecause the application was not filed prior to payment of the fee and was not filed until nearly eight years after the contract was executed." The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and Warren appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that (1) the district court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate a guardianship proceeding a motion seeking court approval of a lawyer's contingent fee contract; (2) the guardian's failure to obtain court approval of a contingent fee agreement prior to payment pursuant to that agreement is not, by itself, a legally sufficient reason for a court to deny a motion to approve the agreement; and (3) the mere passage of time between creation of a contingent fee agreement and when it is presented to a court for approval in an open and continuing guardianship proceeding is not a legally sufficient reason to deny approval of that agreement. View "In the matter of the Guardianship of Stanfield" on Justia Law

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In 2005, Plaintiff Marlene Harris purchased a car from Defendant David Stanley Chevrolet. Her purchase agreement contained an arbitration provision that applied to any "controversy, claim or dispute between the Purchaser and the Dealer arising out of, or related to this sale or transaction, including but not limited to, any and all issues or disputes arising as a result of this sale or transaction whether said issues arise prior to, during or subsequent to the sale or attempted sale of a vehicle." A few days after executing the purchase agreement, Plaintiff entered into a GAP insurance contract sold to her by an employee of the dealership (acting as an agent of the insurance company). In 2009, the car was a total loss. The GAP insurance company refused to pay the total difference between the insurance proceeds and the amount owed on the car, and Plaintiff sued to compel the GAP coverage. Plaintiff maintained that the purchase of the vehicle and the purchase of the policy were separate transactions, and that the arbitration clause of the purchase contract was inapplicable to the underpayment of coverage (GAP coverage). She argued no claim was brought against the GAP insurance company which was related to the sale or financing of the vehicle, conceding the arbitration clause would have applied to claims related to the sale or financing issues. After reviewing the motions of the parties, the trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Compel arbitration without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the two contracts involved two separate subjects, executed on different dates, and the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement did not mention or reference GAP insurance or any relationship between the two contracts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the evidentiary hearing and ruling that the arbitration clause did not apply as a matter of law.View "Harris v. David Stanley Chevrolet, Inc." on Justia Law