Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in March, 2012
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In 2007, Appellants David and Mary Eldridge executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. In both the Note and the Mortgage, "JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." was explicitly designated as the lender and payee, or entity to whom payment under the Note and Mortgage was due. Appellants voluntarily filed bankruptcy in 2009. In their amended statement of intentions, Appellants agreed to reaffirm the outstanding balance on the Note. Shortly thereafter, the Note went into default. Appellee Chase Home Finance Milwaukee initiated foreclosure proceedings in 2010, claiming to be the present holder of the Note and Mortgage. Chase Home Finance Milwaukee claimed to have acquired the Note and Mortgage by assignment from J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. in their motion for summary judgment filed several months later. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Bank, finding the Bank was the undisputed owner and holder of the Note and Mortgage. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of the Bank and Appellants' counterclaims were dismissed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellants argued the trial court erred ruling in favor of the Bank. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no evidence in the record to support the Bank's contention that it was the holder of the Note. Therefore, the Court reversed the granting of summary judgment by the trial court and remanded the case back for further proceedings. View "J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A. v. Eldridge" on Justia Law

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In 2004, Appellants Cin Kham and Ngul Liam Cing executed an adjustable rate note in favor of Encore Credit Corporation. Contemporaneously, Appellants executed a mortgage to secure the note. The mortgage named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as the mortgagee and further stated "MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." Encore was identified as the Lender in this mortgage. In 2008 Appellants defaulted on the note. Appellee CPT Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2004-EC1, by the Bank of New York Mellon (on behalf of CPT Asset Backed Certificates Series 2004-EC1) filed a foreclosure petition. Appellants failed to answer the petition and a default judgment was entered against them. A hearing to confirm the sale was set, and at that time, Appellants filed a Petition and Motion to Vacate challenging Appellee's standing to foreclose on the subject property. The trial court denied Appellants' petition to vacate judgment but granted leave to file a writ of prohibition. Appellants alleged Appellee lacked standing to commence this foreclosure action. Appellants further alleged the mortgage was a nullity because MERS could not be a mortgagee in Oklahoma and therefore the note was unsecured. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that though Appellee claimed to be the holder of the note and mortgage, the note in the record contained no indorsements. And because there was no indorsement on the note in the record, Appellee could not be a holder as defined by the statute: "[t]he trial court's granting of a default judgment in favor of Appellee could not have been rationally based upon the evidence or Oklahoma law. Therefore, [the Court found] that the trial court abused its discretion when granting the default judgment." Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "CPT Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2004-EC1 v. Kham" on Justia Law

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In a petition filed in 2010, Plaintiff-Appellee Bank of America, NA claimed to be the present holder of the note initiated a foreclosure action against Defendants Momodu Kabba and his wife. Bank of America claimed to hold the note and mortgage as Successor by Merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee under the Trust agreement for the Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust Series 2004-BNC2. A review of the note showed a blank indorsement. This blank indorsement was filed with the lower court for the first time in the motion for summary judgment. The blank indorsement was not mentioned or referenced in the original petition. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Bank of America. Defendants appealed the judgment asserting Bank of America failed to demonstrate standing. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment: "[i]t is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the note, and to have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit, showing the history of the note, so that the defendant is duly apprised of the rights of the plaintiff. . . . [the Bank] only presented evidence of an indorsed-in-blank note and an 'Assignment of Mortgage'" With nothing more, the Court concluded the Bank did not meet its burden of proving it was entitled to foreclose on Defendants' property. Accordingly, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Kabba" on Justia Law

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A jury returned verdicts in favor of all defendants on plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims. Thereafter, plaintiffs learned that a juror had voluntarily disclosed bias towards plaintiffs' cause of action and plaintiffs' race. Plaintiffs sought a new trial on this and other grounds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for new trial. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals unanimously rejected all of plaintiffs' grounds for new trial except the claim of juror bias on a majority vote. In rejecting this ground, the majority ruled the juror's post-verdict statements were impermissible impeachment of the jury verdicts. The dissenting judge concluded otherwise, noting the juror's statements were his own public, voluntary statements (not related by other jurors) and revealed the juror was intent on serving on the case with a predisposition to an outcome adverse to the plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion: "the juror in question entertained bias against the plaintiffs' race and their right to recover under the appropriate burden of proof. In reaching this conclusion, [the Court] first note[ed] that this [was] not a case where dissenting or minority jurors are attempting to impeach a verdict with which they do not agree by breaching the sanctity of the jury deliberations. This [was] a case where a juror voluntarily revealed, after verdicts were returned, that (1) the juror entertained disqualifying bias against one party's race and right to recover under the appropriate burden of proof, and (2) deliberately concealed such bias upon voir dire in order to participate in rendering verdicts consistent with such bias." The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Fields v. Saunders" on Justia Law

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The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned medical malpractice claims that Plaintiff Bob Parris brought against the medical providers who were involved in his prostate cancer diagnosis, the surgery to remove it and his subsequent treatment. The trial court twice rendered judgment in favor of the defendants; the first trial court judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On remand, Plaintiff had a jury trial on his claim against the pathologist who identified the cancerous cells. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the doctor. The remaining defendants sought and obtained summary judgments based on uncontroverted expert testimony they acted in accord with medical standards. Plaintiff's appeal of the judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the pathologist was dismissed as untimely, while Division III of the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the summary judgments for all other defendants. Upon certiorari review, the Supreme Court found the appellate court properly affirmed the summary judgments except on Plaintiff's claim against the surgeon who continued post-surgical treatment of Plaintiff without disclosing the removed prostate showed no signs of cancer. View "Parris v. Limes" on Justia Law

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Fifty-four individuals and business entities sued Appellants-Defendants Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Poultry, Inc., and Russell Adams (collectively, Tyson), in association with contracts under which they were to raise chickens owned by Tyson on feed supplied by the company. Tyson moved to sever the claims for separate trials. The trial judge denied the motion, allowing the plaintiffs to select eleven individuals and entities to proceed to trial under theories of violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and fraud. The poultry growers contended that Tyson targeted them for failure by delivering unhealthy birds and feed in retaliation for their refusal to modernize operations. The jury, in a nine to three split, awarded the growers compensatory and punitive damages approaching $10 million. Alleging evidentiary errors and juror misconduct, Tyson filed a motion for new trial. The trial judge recused and the new trial motion was heard by an assigned judge. Acknowledging concerns about the conduct of the trial, the substitute judge denied the motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, staying further proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: 1) where attorneys were advised that voir dire would be limited to questions not covered in the juror questionnaire and jurors gave incomplete, untruthful, and/or misleading answers in those documents, Appellants were entitled to a new trial; and 2) a poultry grower having no title to the chickens or feed placed with the grower for fattening and future marketing of the birds by the flock's owner is not an "aggrieved consumer" for purposes of the Consumer Protection Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "James v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law