Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a request made by an individual to the Oklahoma State Department of Health for correspondence related to the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically seeking email records sent to the Governor’s office. The requester asked for digital copies, expressing a preference for receiving the records by email. The Department produced over 11,000 pages of email correspondence in PDF format, but the requester argued that this was insufficient because the PDFs did not contain the embedded metadata present in the emails’ native file format (such as PST files from Microsoft Outlook), which he believed was necessary for fully understanding the records.After initially filing for declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court of Oklahoma County, the Department responded by providing records in PDF format and, later, some in native format. The Department moved for summary judgment, contending that the Oklahoma Open Records Act (ORA) did not require production in native file format. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment for the Department and finding substantial compliance with the ORA. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that the Department was required to provide records in their native format if it had the capability to do so. The Department then sought review from the Oklahoma Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the ORA does not require a public body to provide copies of email records in their native file format containing embedded metadata. The Court found the statute’s language clear, interpreting “data files” not to include metadata, and concluded that the Act does not obligate agencies to provide records in any specific format, so long as reasonable access is provided. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion and affirmed the District Court’s order. View "BROOKE v. REED" on Justia Law

A bail bondsman requested records from a county jail operated by a public trust after an incident involving his ex-wife at the facility. Specifically, he sought audio and video footage, communications, jail policies and procedures, and a list of employees working during a certain time frame, citing the Oklahoma Open Records Act (ORA). The jail trust denied most of the requests, asserting that as a "law enforcement agency" under the ORA, it had discretion to withhold the records except for certain mandatory disclosures.The District Court of LeFlore County granted summary judgment to the jail trust, agreeing with its argument that it qualified as a "law enforcement agency" under the ORA. The court thus found the trust had discretion to withhold the requested records and was not required to provide them to the requester.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the matter de novo and focused on whether the jail trust fit the statutory definition of a "law enforcement agency" under 51 O.S.2022, § 24A.3(5). The court concluded that, although the trust was a "public body," it was not "charged with enforcing state or local criminal laws and initiating criminal prosecutions" as required by the statute. The court emphasized that the trust merely operated the jail and was not responsible for enforcing laws or initiating prosecutions. As a result, the court held that the jail trust does not qualify as a "law enforcement agency" under the ORA. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LAWSON v. LeFLORE CO. DETENTION CENTER PUBLIC TRUST SECURITY COMM." on Justia Law

A woman with COVID-19 and multiple underlying health conditions was admitted to a hospital and then transferred to a skilled nursing facility for ongoing treatment. During her stay at the facility, she was under the care of a physician who prescribed various treatments for her COVID-19 infection. Despite these interventions, her condition deteriorated, and she developed additional complications, including pressure wounds and dehydration. After being discharged from the facility without hospice or home health arrangements, she was readmitted to the hospital, where her condition continued to decline. She was eventually discharged home under hospice care and died shortly thereafter. Her surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the facility and physician were negligent in her care.The District Court of Garfield County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they were immune from liability under both the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act and Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Limited Liability Act. The district court reasoned that the acts and omissions in question were incident to the provision of care for a COVID-19 patient and thus fell within the scope of the immunity statutes. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of immunity. The court found that the defendants failed to provide evidence establishing a causal relationship between the administration or use of covered countermeasures and the plaintiff’s injuries, as required for PREP Act immunity. Additionally, the court determined that the defendants did not meet the evidentiary burden to show the requisite impact under the state COVID-19 Act, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding gross negligence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AUSTBO v. GREENBRIAR" on Justia Law

A mother, acting on behalf of her mentally incapacitated adult daughter, brought suit against a hospital, its health partners, and a registered nurse after her daughter suffered an anoxic brain injury. The injury occurred when the nurse, while cleaning the patient, dislodged the patient’s cuffed tracheostomy tube, which had been placed to treat COVID-19 pneumonia. The tube was out for approximately seven minutes, resulting in cardiac arrest and brain injury. The patient had been admitted with COVID-19 and was receiving oxygen through the tracheostomy at the time of the incident.The defendants moved to dismiss the case in the District Court of Oklahoma County, arguing that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act provided them immunity from suit and liability, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court considered documentary evidence submitted by the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the district court, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the defendants were not immune from suit.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the cuffed tracheostomy was a “covered countermeasure” under the PREP Act, the claims had a causal relationship with the administration and use of that countermeasure, and the defendants qualified as “covered persons.” The court found that the PREP Act confers both immunity from liability and suit for such claims, except for willful misconduct, which must be brought exclusively in federal court. Therefore, Oklahoma courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "FRANKLIN v. OU MEDICINE" on Justia Law

Several agency heads in Oklahoma were appointed by the Governor to serve concurrently as Cabinet Secretaries. After these appointments, a state senator requested an opinion from the Attorney General regarding whether individuals could simultaneously hold multiple state offices. The Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that Cabinet Secretaries are not exempt from Oklahoma’s prohibition against holding dual office and, therefore, agency heads could not also serve as Cabinet Secretaries without violating state law.Governor Stitt then sought declaratory relief in the Oklahoma County District Court. After a hearing, the district court ruled in favor of the Attorney General, finding that Cabinet Secretaries are subject to the prohibition against holding dual office under Title 51, Section 6. The court reasoned that the expanded authority granted to Cabinet Secretaries, including the power to veto administrative rules, made them officers under Oklahoma law. As a result, the court concluded that agency heads serving as Cabinet Secretaries were unlawfully holding two offices. The district court also determined that Title 74, Section 10.3 did not create an express exception to the dual office prohibition. Governor Stitt appealed, and the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma retained the case.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that Title 74, Section 10.3 expressly authorizes agency heads to serve concurrently as Cabinet Secretaries, notwithstanding the general prohibition against holding dual office in Title 51, Section 6. The Court found that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and that both statutes can be read together without conflict. The district court’s order was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "STITT V. DRUMMOND" on Justia Law

Brightwater Capital obtained a judgment against Linzy Hill in 2012, which it renewed in 2017 but failed to renew again, causing the judgment to become dormant. After Hill’s death in 2022, his son Lenzy was appointed personal representative of the estate and published a notice to creditors, setting a deadline of September 27, 2022, for claims against the estate. Brightwater submitted its claim after this deadline, and the personal representative rejected it. Brightwater did not appeal the rejection but instead filed an ancillary petition in the probate case, seeking payment on the dormant judgment. The district court dismissed this petition without granting leave to amend.After the dismissal, Brightwater filed an amended ancillary petition, this time seeking payment from the personal representative’s bond. The district court treated this as a motion to reconsider, since Brightwater had not been granted leave to amend, and dismissed it with prejudice. Final appealable orders were entered, and Brightwater appealed only the order concerning the amended ancillary petition. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, reversed, holding that Brightwater should have been allowed to file the amended petition.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo and held that, under Oklahoma law, once a case is dismissed, a party may not file an amended petition without leave of court. The court found that the district court properly dismissed Brightwater’s ancillary petition and correctly treated the amended filing as a motion to reconsider, since no leave to amend had been granted and the defect in the original petition could not be remedied. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Hill v. Hill" on Justia Law

After the death of an individual who had lived in Johnston County, Oklahoma, for several years before his final illness and death in Oklahoma County, a dispute arose over the proper county for probate and which of two purported wills should be admitted. The decedent had executed a will in 2018, naming Cheryl Moore as personal representative and leaving his estate to his neighbors, the McClendons. In 2019, he executed another will and a trust, naming Moore as personal representative and leaving his assets to a trust benefiting the Oklahoma City Community Foundation, Inc. (OCCF). At his death, he owned property in Johnston County but had spent his last months in Oklahoma County for medical reasons.The District Court of Johnston County held an evidentiary hearing and determined that venue was proper in Johnston County, as the decedent had not abandoned his Johnston County residence. The court admitted the 2018 will to probate, finding the 2019 will was not executed with the statutory formalities required under Oklahoma law and could not be admitted as a lost or destroyed will. The court also found that Moore had renounced her right to serve as personal representative by not petitioning for probate within thirty days of the decedent’s death.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the district court’s rulings that venue was proper in Johnston County and that the 2018 will should be admitted to probate, as the 2019 will was not validly executed and did not revoke the earlier will. However, the Supreme Court reversed the finding that Moore had renounced her right to serve as personal representative, holding that mere passage of time without knowledge of her nomination was insufficient for renunciation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ESTATE OF CUNNINGHAM v. MOORE" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between purchasers of a used vehicle and the seller, a car dealership, over the enforcement of a vehicle service warranty contract. The purchasers alleged that after buying the vehicle and a service contract, they repeatedly sought repairs from the dealership, paid deductibles, were denied direct communication with the repair shop, and did not receive the necessary repairs. They claimed the dealership falsely represented that repairs had been completed. As a result, they filed suit for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.The District Court for Tulsa County, presided over by Judge Damon Cantrell, reviewed the dealership’s motion for partial summary judgment. The dealership argued that Oklahoma’s Service Warranty Act, specifically Title 15, Section 141.24(B), barred tort claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in connection with service warranty contracts. The purchasers contended that this statutory provision was an unconstitutional special law. Judge Cantrell denied the dealership’s motion, finding the statute unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on a writ of prohibition. The Court held that Title 15, Section 141.24(B) is not an unconstitutional special law because it applies uniformly to all service warranty contracts, including those issued by companies with significant assets, and does not single out a particular class for disparate treatment. The Court further held that the statute abrogates the prior judicial rule allowing tort claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in this context. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, precluding enforcement of the lower court’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AMERICA'S CAR MART v. CANTRELL" on Justia Law

Petitioners, resident taxpayers and registered voters in Oklahoma County, challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill 632, which sought to create business court divisions within the district courts of Oklahoma County and Tulsa County. The Act provided for the appointment of business court judges by the Governor, with confirmation by the Senate and candidate lists supplied by the Speaker of the House. It also set forth qualifications, terms, salaries, and operational details for these judges and courts. Petitioners argued that the Act violated their constitutional rights, particularly the right to elect district judges, and would result in the unlawful expenditure of public funds.Prior to review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the Honorable Lonnie Paxton and Kyle Hilbert, legislative leaders named as respondents, moved for dismissal based on legislative immunity, which the court granted. The Governor, the remaining respondent, moved to dismiss the case, arguing he was not a proper party. The court denied this motion, finding the Governor’s role in appointing business court judges central to the dispute. The Oklahoma Association for Justice filed an amicus brief supporting Petitioners. The court assumed original jurisdiction, issued a temporary stay of the Act’s effectiveness, and heard oral arguments.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that Petitioners had standing as both taxpayers and voters. The court found Senate Bill 632 unconstitutional because it violated Article VII, Section 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution by circumventing the requirement that district judges be elected by voters. The court further determined that the unconstitutional provisions were not severable from the rest of the Act, rendering the entire Act void and unenforceable. The petition for declaratory relief was granted, and the temporary stay remained in effect pending any rehearing. View "White v. Stitt" on Justia Law

A nursing home resident’s legal representative, acting under a durable power of attorney, sued a nursing home for alleged medical negligence during the resident’s stay. Upon admission, the representative signed several documents, including an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the resident’s care. The representative later claimed not to recall signing the documents but did not dispute her signature. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on the signed agreement, which expressly stated it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. The court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed, signed by both an authorized agent of the nursing home and the legal representative. The court determined that the FAA applied due to the involvement of interstate commerce and that the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act’s (NHCA) prohibition of arbitration agreements was preempted by federal law. The court granted the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the judicial proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the FAA preempts the NHCA’s categorical prohibition of arbitration agreements in the nursing home context when interstate commerce is involved and the agreement expressly invokes the FAA. The court found the arbitration agreement was validly executed and not unconscionable, distinguishing this case from prior Oklahoma precedent and aligning with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "Thompsonl v. Heartway Corp." on Justia Law