Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kiefer Production Company (KPC), a non-party, appealed adverse discovery orders related to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Keetons, co-trustees and co-personal representatives of Noma Rongey's estate. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) dismissed the appeal, stating the orders were not appealable. KPC then petitioned for certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.The district court had previously denied the Owners' motion to quash the subpoena and ordered KPC to produce financial documents to determine the value of Rongey's interest in KPC. The district court also placed Rongey's interest in pay status. COCA partially affirmed the district court's order but remanded the case to address the implications of Rongey's death and the scope of the documents requested. On remand, the district court denied KPC's renewed motion to quash and granted the Keetons' motion to compel the production of documents.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the discovery orders were appealable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering KPC to produce the documents. The court found that KPC, as a non-party, had a substantial right affected by the orders and that the orders conclusively determined the issue of document production. The court also held that KPC's financial documents, including tax returns, were relevant to determining the value of Rongey's interest in KPC and were therefore discoverable.The Supreme Court vacated COCA's opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, requiring KPC to comply with the subpoena. The court also held that KPC did not have standing to appeal the order placing Rongey's interest in pay status, as this issue was not final and was subject to further proceedings. View "ROYAL HOT SHOT INVESTMENTS v. KIEFER PRODUCTION CO." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of Brandi McCubbin, the adoptive mother of a child referred to as V.J.R. (also known as F.V.M.). The child disclosed to her biological mother that she had been sexually abused by her adoptive father, Charles Allen McCubbin. The biological mother reported the abuse to the police, leading to a forensic interview with the child, where she repeated her allegations and provided additional details. The child was subsequently taken into protective custody, and the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both adoptive parents.The District Court of Oklahoma County adjudicated the child as deprived and terminated the parental rights of the adoptive mother, finding that she failed to protect the child from shocking and heinous abuse. The court determined that the adoptive mother had knowledge of at least one prior accusation of sexual abuse against the adoptive father and failed to take reasonable action to protect the child. The court also admitted a DVD recording of the child's forensic interview into evidence, despite the adoptive mother's later objections on appeal regarding the lack of a separate hearing to determine the reliability of the child's statements.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not err in applying the clear and convincing evidence standard rather than the heightened burden of proof under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), as the case did not involve a Native American child or family. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the termination of parental rights, as the adoptive mother had constructive knowledge of the abuse and failed to protect the child. Additionally, the court ruled that any error in admitting the DVD recording without a separate hearing was harmless, as the trial court had made sufficient findings regarding the credibility and reliability of the child's statements. View "IN THE MATTER OF V.J.R." on Justia Law

Melissa Evans was involved in a fatal car accident with Darrell D. Blaylock, resulting in the deaths of both Evans and George D. Blaylock, a passenger in Blaylock's car. Joshua Evans, Melissa's son, initiated probate proceedings and was named the personal representative of her estate. Joshua later sought a court order to declare Melissa's house as qualifying for the homestead exemption. The probate court denied this request, leading Joshua to file an interlocutory appeal.The District Court of Rogers County admitted Melissa's will to probate, named Joshua as the personal representative, and identified the heirs. Deborah Matlock, representing George Blaylock's estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Melissa's estate and a creditor demand for inventory. Joshua's motion to declare the house as a homestead was denied after he failed to appear at the hearing. The probate court ruled that the property did not qualify for the homestead exemption as Melissa left no surviving spouse or minor children.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the property did not qualify for either a constitutional or probate homestead exemption. The court clarified that the homestead exemption under Oklahoma law is limited to a surviving spouse and minor children, and does not extend to adult children or grandchildren. Consequently, Joshua Evans and his children were not entitled to the homestead exemption, and the property was available to satisfy the debts of Melissa Evans' estate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF EVANS" on Justia Law

Mark Glen Spencer died from sepsis two days after a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Lana Nelson at Norman Regional Medical Authority. Spencer's brother, Jimmy Wayne Spencer, acting as the Special Administrator of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against the hospital and Dr. Nelson, alleging negligent and grossly negligent treatment. The hospital delayed providing complete medical records, which were essential for evaluating the claim.The District Court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the potential claim before the statutory deadline and that Dr. Nelson, as a hospital employee, was immune from individual liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the discovery rule did not apply to wrongful death claims under the GTCA and that Dr. Nelson could not be individually sued for actions within the scope of her employment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death actions arising from medical negligence under the GTCA. It also ruled that governmental employees have no immunity under the GTCA for gross negligence or acts outside the scope of employment. The court found that the trial court erred in making factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and that it should have taken the plaintiff's allegations as true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "SPENCER v. NELSON" on Justia Law

A group of medical providers sued a former employee for breach of an employment agreement. The employee counterclaimed, alleging he was owed unpaid wages and bonuses. The providers initially raised "failure to state a claim" as their sole affirmative defense. However, after nearly four years of litigation, they attempted to argue for the first time that the contract was illegal and therefore void. The lower court found that the providers had waived this affirmative defense and issued a judgment in favor of the employee. The providers appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding that the lower court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the providers' claim of illegality.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma disagreed with the Court of Civil Appeals. It held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in striking the providers' last-minute effort to raise a new affirmative defense. The court noted that the providers had failed to raise the illegality defense in their initial responsive pleading and did not seek to amend their answer in a timely manner. Furthermore, the providers did not raise the illegality defense until after the trial court had already awarded summary judgment to the employee on the issue of breach of contract, more than ten months after the close of discovery, more than nine months after the lower court's deadline for filing dispositive motions, and almost four years after the original lawsuit was filed. The court concluded that the record was sufficient to support a finding that the providers' delay was unjustified and prejudicial. The court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, affirmed the trial court's order striking the illegality affirmative defense, and remanded the case to the Court of Civil Appeals to resolve any remaining undecided issues raised in the appeal. View "Tulsa Ambulatory Procedure Center v. Olmstead" on Justia Law

Spencer Mathis and Jaden Fenstermaker, who worked as delivery drivers for Amazon in Tulsa, Oklahoma, were fired by their employer, James Kerr, after Mathis filed a workers' compensation claim. The plaintiffs alleged that Kerr had retaliated against them for pursuing the claim and filed a lawsuit against him. Kerr moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provisions in the plaintiffs' employment contracts. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that federal and state law exempted them from arbitration.The trial court granted Kerr's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the lawsuit until the completion of arbitration. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, but the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma granted certiorari to review the case. The court held that employees who deliver Amazon packages are exempt from arbitration under federal law. The court also found that the district court's exclusive jurisdiction over retaliatory discharge claims precluded arbitration of those claims under Oklahoma law. The court reversed the trial court's decision, vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MATHIS v. KERR" on Justia Law

The Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, on behalf of the state, sought a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board and its members. The state argued that the board's contract with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School, a religious charter school, violated state and federal law and was unconstitutional. The state contended that the contract violated the Oklahoma Constitution, which mandates that all charter schools be nonsectarian in their programs, admission policies, and other operations. The state also argued that the contract violated the federal Establishment Clause, which prohibits the state from using public money for the establishment of a religious institution.The Charter School Board had approved St. Isidore's application to become an Oklahoma virtual charter school and later approved its contract for sponsorship. The contract recognized certain rights, exemptions, or entitlements applicable to St. Isidore as a religious organization under state and federal law. The contract also stated that St. Isidore had the right to freely exercise its religious beliefs and practices consistent with its religious protections.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction over the case. The court found that the contract violated the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Charter Schools Act, and the federal Establishment Clause. The court held that St. Isidore, as a public charter school, was a governmental entity and a state actor. The court also held that the contract violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed for the use of state funds for the benefit and support of the Catholic church and required students to participate in religious curriculum and activities. The court granted the extraordinary and declaratory relief sought by the state and directed the Charter School Board to rescind its contract with St. Isidore. View "DRUMMOND v. OKLAHOMA STATEWIDE VIRTUAL CHARTER SCHOOL BOARD" on Justia Law

Survivors of the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre and representatives of the estate of a deceased survivor filed a lawsuit against the City of Tulsa, the Tulsa Regional Chamber, the Board of County Commissioners for Tulsa County, the Sheriff of Tulsa County, and the Oklahoma Military Department. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' actions and omissions, beginning with the massacre and continuing to the present day, constituted a public nuisance. They also claimed that the defendants had unjustly enriched themselves by exploiting the massacre for their own economic and political gain.The District Court of Tulsa County dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. It found that the plaintiffs had failed to state a justiciable public nuisance claim and had not proposed a legally cognizable abatement remedy. The court also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, citing a failure to correct a defective pleading.The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. They argued that the district court had erred in dismissing both their public nuisance and unjust enrichment claims. The Supreme Court retained the case for review.The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the plaintiffs' grievances did not fall within the scope of Oklahoma's public nuisance statute. The court also found that the plaintiffs' allegations did not support a claim for unjust enrichment under the equitable doctrine. The court noted that the plaintiffs' grievances were legitimate but stated that the law did not permit the court to extend the scope of the public nuisance doctrine or the doctrine of unjust enrichment to provide the plaintiffs with the justice they sought. View "Randle v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Peter Galbraith, II, the ward, and Belinda Galbraith were married in 2015. Between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and later deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. In 2022, she asked Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother to take care of him, and he was moved out of the marital home. In 2023, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship over him and filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The trial court initially held that the guardian did not have the authority to file a divorce petition on behalf of the ward. After obtaining authorization from the guardianship court, the guardian refiled the petition. However, the trial court again dismissed the petition, stating that Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The guardian appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the guardianship court from authorizing a guardian to file a divorce petition on behalf of a ward. The court found that the guardian was acting to protect the ward's rights and manage his financial resources, which aligns with the purpose of the Act. The court also held that the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The court concluded that the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Sheena Hayes and Morgan Lawrence-Hayes, and Richard Penkoski. The dispute arose from Penkoski's social media posts, which the Hayes couple claimed were harassing and stalking. Penkoski, a public figure who identifies as a pastor, activist, and street preacher, posted content on Facebook criticizing the Hayes couple's church and their organization, Oklahomans for Equality. The Hayes couple, who are also public figures, claimed that they and their minor child were pictured in the posts, which they found offensive and threatening.The Hayes couple obtained a protective order against Penkoski from the District Court of Washington County. The court issued a permanent order of protection for five years, prohibiting Penkoski from posting any pictures, images, videos, or any likenesses of the Hayes couple or their minor child on any social media, making reference to them, or coming within 500 feet of them.Penkoski appealed the decision, arguing that his actions did not meet the requirements of stalking or harassment as defined by the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, and that his posts were protected by his constitutional right to free speech.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Penkoski's actions were not directed toward an individual person, but rather were public Facebook posts that named two organizations, not individuals. The court concluded that Penkoski did not direct his posts or comments toward the Hayes couple, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in issuing the order of protection. The court vacated the order of protection. View "Hayes v. Penkoski" on Justia Law