Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in October, 2014
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Employee Chester Rouse filed a wrongful termination suit against the Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA) and Daniel S. Sullivan. The petition alleged GRDA and Mr. Sullivan terminated him in retaliation for filing an overtime complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Rouse also alleged the termination of his employment for filing this complaint violated Oklahoma public policy protecting whistleblowers who make external reports of unlawful activity by their employers. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, ruling: (1) sovereign immunity barred Rouse's claim based on the federal Fair Labor Standards Act; and (2) the Oklahoma Whistleblower Act provided employee's remedy for the alleged wrongful termination, not state tort law. Rouse appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly ruled that Rouse failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and properly dismissed this suit. View "Rouse v. Grand River Dam Authority" on Justia Law

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Glenhurst Homeowners Association ("HOA") filed an action against Xi Family Trust and Xiang Yu Ren ("homeowner"), for breach of real property covenants. The HOA's Petition argued that the covenant for the Glenhurst Addition required all houses built in the neighborhood to have roofs that were a particular weathered wood color. After a hail storm in 2010, the homeowner hired a contractor to replace his roof and told the contractor to put the most energy efficient shingles on the house. The contractor did not put weathered wood colored shingles on the house. The HOA asked the trial court for an injunction, requiring homeowner to remove the nonconforming shingles and install shingles of weathered wood color. After denying a continuance request from homeowner, the trial court granted summary judgment to the homeowners association. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's denial of the continuance deprived the homeowner of a reasonable opportunity to properly respond to the homeowners association's motion for summary judgment, and that summary judgment should not have been granted. View "Glenhurst Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Xi Family Trust" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a delay of approximately twenty months in scheduling a driver's license revocation hearing was a violation of the driver's constitutional right to a speedy trial (as guaranteed by the State Constitution). Plaintiff-driver Phillip Pierce appealed the suspension of his driver's license in an administrative proceeding for driving under the influence (DUI). The trial court agreed that plaintiff's constitutional right was violated and set aside the revocation order and reinstated Pierce's driving privileges. A divided Court of Civil Appeals reversed. Although expressing its concern related to the inordinate delay in the proceedings, the appellate court determined that Pierce had not asserted his right to a speedy resolution of his cause, was not prejudiced by the postponement, and that the Department did not abuse its discretion in waiting almost two years to finalize the charges in the cause. Knowing that its complaining witness was scheduled to be deployed to serve his country, the Department of Public Safety intentionally postponed the proceeding and did not schedule a hearing to allow the driver to be heard either on the merits or on the delay. These delays occurred despite the driver's timely request for a hearing. Under those unique facts, the Supreme Court held that the driver's right to a speedy hearing was violated and ordered reinstatement of his driving privileges. View "Pierce v. Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

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Respondent-claimant, Ben Snell was employed by petitioner-employer Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester. He alleged that while at work he slipped and fell while carrying a tray of chicken weighing approximately 40 to 50 pounds. The trial court awarded claimant temporary total disability (TTD) and reasonable and necessary medical treatment for injuries to his neck, the second finger of his right hand, and aggravation of pre-existing conditions to his left knee and low back. All other issues were reserved. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) sustained the award. In its opinion, COCA ruled the standard of review in this case was the "any competent evidence" standard because of a holding in a previous opinion by the same division, "Westoak Industries, Inc. v. DeLeon," which held 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4), setting out "against the clear weight of the evidence" as the appellate standard of review in workers' compensation cases, constituted a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Oklahoma Constitution. Westoak was completely at odds with another COCA opinion, "Harvey v. Auto Plus of Woodward." "Harvey" held section 340(D)(4) was not unconstitutional as a separation of powers violation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue as one of first impression since certiorari was not sought in either of the previous cases. The Court concluded that there was no constitutional separation of powers prohibition in in the Okla.Const., art IV, section 1 against the Legislature's adoption of the "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard of review in 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4). COCA's opinion was therefore vacated. Because "Westoak" and "Harvey" were totally inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion, they were both specifically overruled. View "Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester v. Snell" on Justia Law

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Condemned prisoners Clayton Lockett and Charles Warner filed a declaratory judgment action to challenge various practices by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections in carrying out their death penalty sentences. The district court denied most relief requested, but did declare 22 O.S.2011, section 1015(B), to be unconstitutional. The prisoners appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that part of the declaratory judgment that denied condemned prisoners relief and reversed that part that declared 22 O.S.2011, section 1015(B), to be unconstitutional. View "Lockett v. Evans" on Justia Law

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Appellant CDR Systems Corporation entered into a stock purchase agreement to sell all of its assets. In August 2009, CDR filed its 2008 Oklahoma Small Business Corporation Income Tax Return and claimed the Oklahoma Capital Gains Deduction for gains received from the sale. The Oklahoma Tax Commission denied the deduction claimed by CDR because CDR was not headquartered in Oklahoma for three years prior to the sale as required by state law. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and found the deduction violated the dormant commerce clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court found there was no discrimination against interstate commerce to which the dormant commerce clause applied. Furthermore, the Court held that even if the dormant commerce clause applied in this case, the deduction did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, it did not have a discriminatory purpose, and the deduction had no discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. View "CDR Systems Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

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Claimant was injured at work as she walked out a door used by employees to exit Employer's school building. A rug outside the door slipped out from under her, causing her to fall. At the time of this accident, claimant was leaving work early due to a family medical emergency. The Workers' Compensation Court found this injury to be compensable, but the Court of Civil Appeals ruled it was not. The Court of Civil Appeals held that claimant was on a personal mission at the time of the injury and vacated the award of benefits. The dispositive question for the Supreme Court's review was whether Claimant's injury while leaving work in response to a family medical emergency arose out of her employment. The Workers' Compensation Court answered this question in the affirmative. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Graham Public Schools v. Priddy" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-appellant Walter Hall was allegedly injured while being transported to a medical appointment by a private prison facility, GEO. Two years and two months later, he filed a lawsuit against it for negligence. GEO filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired and the lawsuit was untimely. Hall insisted that the limitation period was tolled due to his injury. The trial court granted GEO's motion for summary judgment and Hall appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to 57 O.S. 2011 sec. 566.4, compliance with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) is required to bring a tort action against a private correctional facility. Because Hall did not comply with the GTCA and the notice of claim requirement of the GTCA was only tolled 90 days due to incapacity from an injury. The case was appropriately dismissed as untimely filed. View "Hall v. GEO Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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On Sept. 18, 2013, Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question 767 was filed with Secretary of State. The Initiative Petition proposes amendments to the State Constitution with an ultimate primary purpose of constructing storm shelters for schools. Proponents also filed with the Secretary of State a proposed ballot title for their proposed Initiative. The Oklahoma Attorney General disagreed with Proponents' ballot title and then prepared and filed with the Secretary of State a new ballot title for the Initiative. The Proponents disagreed with the Attorney General's version and appealed to the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that: (1) a proponent of an initiative petition must file or submit a copy of the initiative petition and a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General when the proponent files the initiative petition and ballot title with the Secretary of State; (2) the Attorney General must file a response to a ballot title within five business days from the date the ballot title is filed; (3) the Attorney General's section 9(D) response to a ballot title is statutorily effective although the Attorney General's response was filed two days late; (4) a proponent of an initiative who challenges a ballot title prepared by the Attorney General has the burden to show that the Attorney General's ballot title is legally incorrect, or is not impartial, or fails to accurately reflect the effects of the proposed initiative; (5) the Attorney General's ballot title challenged in this proceeding was legally correct, impartial, and accurately reflected the effects of the proposed initiative; (6) when a ballot title appeal has been made, a proponent's ninety-day period of time to collect signatures commences when the ballot title appeal is final. View "In re: Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question No. 767" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Tulsa Stockyards, Inc. challenged the constitutionality of the CompSource Mutual Insurance Company Act (85 O.S.Supp.2013, secs. 375.1 et seq.). The Act required CompSource Oklahoma be restructured to do business as a domestic mutual insurer without capital stock or shares under the name of CompSource Mutual Insurance Company effective January 1, 2015. Petitioner contended that CompSource was a state agency and its money and other assets, valued at approximately $265,000,000.00, were assets of the people of Oklahoma. Converting CompSource from a department of the State to an independent, licensed mutual insurance company without provision for the State to retain ownership of CompSource's assets, petitioner argued, was contrary to the prohibition against gifts of public money, the prohibition against interference with contracts, and the prohibition against money being paid out of the State Treasury except by appropriation. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that CompSource's money and other assets were held in trust for the benefit of the employers and employees protected by the insurance issued by CompSource, the Court's "Moran" opinion remained sound law, and the Oklahoma Constitution did not prohibit the Legislature from placing CompSource's money and other assets in trust with a domestic mutual insurer. View "Tulsa Stockyards, Inc. v. Clark" on Justia Law