Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The estate of an individual that died as a result of an injury incurred while being a patient of a nursing home sued the nursing home facility in a wrongful death action. The district court entered default judgment for Plaintiff after Defendant failed to file a response or appear in court multiple times. Over 200 days later, Defendant filed a petition to vacate default judgment and the petition was granted. Plaintiff appealed the ruling, and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), affirmed the trial court's decision. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded it was "patently clear" Defendant's arguments for the Petition to Vacate Judgment as to liability was without merit. "[The Nursing Home] Meeker was given a multitude of opportunities to respond to the litigation, but failed to respond to a single instance for 280 days after the initial service of process. Meeker failed to respond to any service of process or appear at any hearing, and did not have an argument with merit to support the inability to respond to the litigation." Accordingly the Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the trial court's judgment granting the Petition To Vacate Judgment as to liability, and remanded this matter for a trial on damages. View "Williams v. Meeker North Dawson Nursing, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellees, Cloudi Mornings and Austin Miller (collectively Cloudi Mornings) filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief with the District Court of Tulsa County. In the petition, Cloudi Mornings stated that it was an L.L.C. with its primary business activities located within the City of Broken Arrow and that Austin Miller was a resident of Broken Arrow, and that as a "business within city limits," they had a vested interest in City enacted medical marijuana rules related to the voter approved June 26, 2018, Initiative Petition 788 which legalized medical marijuana in the State of Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained this case to address the authority of a city, such as the City of Broken Arrow, to zone/regulate a medical marijuana establishment within city limits. However, because this case lacked any case or controversy as to these plaintiffs, and was merely a request for an advisory opinion, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Cloudi Mornings, LLC v. City of Broken Arrow" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed whether a claim of intentional interference with a prospective economic business advantage required a showing of bad faith, and whether the immunity protections provided by 36 O.S. Supp. 2012 section 363 were forfeited under the alleged facts. Plaintiff-appellant Lisa Loven, a general contractor who applied for a public adjuster license with the Oklahoma Department of Insurance (the Department), disclosed that a former client sued her for acting as an unlicensed adjuster. The Department opened an investigation and subsequently denied her application. Loven appealed. During the appeal hearing Church Mutual Insurance and its adjuster Jeffrey Hanes provided information regarding their dealings with Loven as a general contractor when she contracted for storm repair work for two churches they insured. The appellate hearing officer affirmed the denial of her application as a public adjuster because she had illegally acted as an unlicensed public adjuster. Loven sued Church Mutual and Hanes for intentional interference with a prospective economic business advantage. The trial court granted summary judgment to Church Mutual and Hanes because 36 O.S. Supp. 2012 section 363 provided civil tort immunity to insurers who provide any information of fraudulent conduct to the Department. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held: (1) 36 O.S. Supp. 2012 section 363 provided immunity for those who report or provide information regarding suspected insurance fraud as long as they, themselves, do not act fraudulently, in bad faith, in reckless disregard for the truth, or with actual malice in providing the information; and (2) the alleged tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic business advantage required a showing of bad faith. Because no proffered evidence in this case showed bad faith, the immunity provisions of 36 O.S. Supp. 2012 section 363 applied, and summary judgment was proper. View "Loven v. Church Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a child, by and through his parents, brought a Governmental Tort Claims Act action alleging he was injured through the negligence of a school bus driver. The child was taken to a hospital emergency room, given several diagnostic tests, and treated with 4 staples for one laceration and Dermabond for another. When he filed his District Court action more than one year later he alleged he had medical-related expenses in the amount of $6,209.30, and potential unknown medical expenses as a result of being hit by the bus. Further, he alleged pain and suffering and sought a sum in excess of $10,000. The three basic questions raised on application for certiorari review by the Oklahoma Supreme Court were: (1) whether an Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims notice sent by certified mail to a superintendent of a public school statutorily sufficient; (2) whether an insurance adjuster's request for more information tolled the GTCA time limits if the request also stated an intent for tolling to not occur; and (3) whether a unilateral request by plaintiff for settlement negotiations tolled the GTCA time limits. The Supreme Court held plaintiff's Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) notice of claim sent to the correct school superintendent by certified mail satisfied the requirement in 51 O.S. 156(D) for filing the GTCA notice with the office of the clerk of the school's board of education, although the superintendent did not transmit the notice to the proper clerk for filing. Further, the Court held the insurance adjuster's request for additional information did not toll the 90-day time limit for approval, denial, or deemed denial of the GTCA claim when the request expressly stated it would not extend or waive the GTCA time limits. Finally, the Court held a plaintiff's letter unilaterally seeking settlement negotiations was not an agreement pursuant to 51 O.S. 157 to toll the GTCA time limits. View "I. T. K. v. Mounds Public Schools" on Justia Law

Shalalah Saunders (Tenant) sued her landlord Marcella Smothers (Landlord) who left Tenant's hot water heater inoperable for more than a week. Tenant leased a house from Landlord where Tenant lived with her two children, ages three and seven years old. Both Landlord and Tenant were participants in the Oklahoma Housing and Finance Agency (OHFA) program. Landlord admitted that she was subject to the rules and regulations of the OHFA and its programs with respect to the home leased by Tenant. For a hot bath, Tenant boiled water on the kitchen stove. While carrying the water from the kitchen to the tub, Tenant slipped and fell, causing the hot water to spill on her; she received third degree burns and was hospitalized for a month due to her injuries. Tenant alleged that Landlord owed her a duty of care to provide hot water, Landlord breached that duty, and this breach was the proximate cause of her subsequent injuries. Landlord denied owing any such duty to Tenant, asserting that providing running hot water in a leased home was a mere convenience. Landlord argued that because she had no legal duty to provide hot water, Landlord could not be liable to Tenant in negligence. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment finding that she owed no duty to Tenant to maintain the hot water heater and further that Landlord's failure to repair was a mere condition and not the proximate cause of Tenant's injuries. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the ground that Landlord owed no duty to Tenant under the circumstances of this case, but the appellate court did not address any other findings made by the district court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the district court, vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, and held that Landlord owed a general duty of care to Tenant to "maintain the leased premises, including areas under the tenant's exclusive control or use, in a reasonably safe condition." Under these facts, Landlord's general duty of care to Tenant specifically included maintaining a hot water heater in an operable condition. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held it was a fact question for the jury to decide: (1) whether Landlord breached that duty, and if so, (2) whether the landlord's failure to repair was the proximate cause of Tenant's accident and subsequent injuries. View "Saunders v. Smothers" on Justia Law

The daughter of a deceased employee brought a wrongful death action against the her father’s employer for intentional tort, asserting that the employer was willful, wanton, and intentional in directing the decedent-employee to perform certain tasks that the decedent's employer knew was certain or substantially certain to result in the decedent-employee's death. She sought declaratory relief that the exclusive liability provision of the Workers' Compensation Act was unconstitutional. The district court declared the Act's exclusivity provision constitutional, ultimately determined the decedent-employer's liability was exclusively governed by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, and dismissed the daughter's petition. The Court of Civil Appeals declared the statute unconstitutional as a special law in violation of Okla. Const. art. 5, sections 46, 59. The COCA reversed the district court's order of dismissal and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Based on its review of the undisputed facts, the Oklahoma Constitution, and applicable laws, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the portion of section 12 that included intentional torts was “not within the walls of the workers' compensation scheme or jurisdiction.” This analysis applied equally to subsequent iterations found in Okla. Stat. tit. 85A, section 5(B)(2)(2013),4 209(B),5 and Okla. Stat. tit. 85, section 302(B)(2011) (now repealed). Accordingly, the district court's order was reversed and the matter remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Wells v. Oklahoma Roofing & Sheet Metal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Amanda Cole was injured in an automobile accident and sued defendant Samantha Josey. Plaintiff failed to serve process on the defendant within 180 days. The trial court dismissed the suit without prejudice. Plaintiff then refiled her petition within one year of the date of the order dismissing her case. The trial court dismissed her suit for failure to refile within one year of the 181st day following the filing of her original petition. Plaintiff appealed; the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the trial court's decision. The sole issue on appeal was whether the refiling of a petition after the first petition was dismissed on the grounds that service was not made within 180 days had to take place within one year of the finality of the order dismissing the case or within one year from the 181st day of filing the petition. The Supreme Court held the day after the filing of an appealable order dismissing the case was the date from which the 12 O.S. 2011, section 100 "savings statute" one year refiling period began, if the order was not appealed. Where the dismissal order is appealed the one year period commences on the day after the appeal is final. This issue had not been specifically addressed by the Supreme Court under these facts and under the version of the statute applicable to this action. View "Cole v. Josey" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Southon was employed by Oklahoma Tire Recyclers, LLC ("Employer"). In 2016, Southon sustained an injury while on the job and filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Employer fired Southon less than a month after he suffered the injury. Southon filed an action alleging Employer terminated him as retaliation for seeking workers' compensation benefits. Southon's petition further requested a declaratory ruling that 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 section 7 was unconstitutional. Employer moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that under section 7 Southon's exclusive, and constitutionally sufficient, remedy was before the Workers' Compensation Commission and not the district court. The district court found 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 section 7 was constitutional, and agreed that the Workers' Compensation Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over Southon's claim and sustained Employer's motion to dismiss. Southon appealed, and this matter was retained and made a companion case to another cause concerning the same statutory provision. The issues presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s review were: (1) whether 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 section 7 unconstitutionally restricted a plaintiff's right to jury trial; (2) whether section 7 denied Southon his right to due process; (3) whether section 7 wrongfully classifies workers' compensation claimants separately from other wrongful termination victims; and (4) whether a Burk tort was available to such plaintiffs in the district court. The Supreme Court concluded Southon's four assignments of error were without merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Southon v. Oklahoma Tire Recyclers, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue was the constitutionality of an Oklahoma legislative enactment, 23 O.S. 2011 section 61.2, which that statutorily limited a plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages to $350,000 unless special findings were made. Plaintiffs brought a personal-injury action, and a jury returned a verdict in their favor. The trial court reduced the amount of the actual noneconomic damages awarded by the jury to comply with the statutory cap on damages contained in 23 O.S. 2011 section 61.2, and then entered judgment on the verdict as modified. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the statutory cap on damages, as well as other matters. Defendant filed a counter-appeal, also attacking the judgment on various grounds. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held 23 O.S. 2011 section 61.2(B)--(F) was an impermissible special law that violated Article 5, Section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution because it singled out for different treatment less than the entire class of similarly situated persons who may sue to recover for bodily injury. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held none of the defendant's assignments of error in its counter-appeal were sufficient to reverse the judgment. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment to the extent it modified--and reduced--the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Beason v. I.E. Miller Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Dobson Telephone Company appealed the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's denial of its application for reimbursement from the Oklahoma Universal Services Fund for expenses incurred when it was ordered by the State Department of Transportation to relocate its telephone lines within the public right-of-way of a State construction project. The issue in this appeal concerned the Commission's legal interpretation of the Oklahoma Universal Service Fund ("OUSF") statute and the alleged arbitrary and capricious denial of funding in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. In support of its decision to deny Dobson's requested funding, the Commission's majority found that Dobson failed to produce sufficient evidence into the record. Despite acknowledging that its "Administrator was afforded, and took advantage of, the opportunity to perform a 'review of the Application, contractor's invoices, internal invoices, construction drawings, pre-engineering plans, work orders, plans and maps, timesheets, reimbursement checks, contracts, responses to data requests, relevant Oklahoma Statutes,' its own administrative rules regarding the OUSF," the Commission ignored the Administrator's finding that the documents provided by Dobson supported its request for funding. Dobson argued, and the Commission did not dispute, that the Commission's own rules and long-standing practices encouraged applicants to retain its confidential supporting materials on site, making such materials available for review and inspection as needed to support an application. In fact, Commission rule, OAC 165:59-3-72(d), specifically contemplates that "documentation not contained in the public record and not filed in the cause" may nevertheless be "relied upon by the OUSF Administrator in approving or denying an application." The Administrator disclosed that the Commission does not even have procedures in place that would allow it to handle "the responsibility or liability" of receiving such confidential materials. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined the Commission majority's disapproval of the policy behind the OUSF legislation had no bearing on the validity of an applicant's request for funding. The Court agreed with the dissenting Commissioner that it was the Court's duty to uphold legislation as it was enacted: although the Commission was not bound by the Administrator's recommendation, the Supreme Court found the record reflected ample evidence with which to support the Administrator's determination. The Administrator, as well as the dissenting Commissioner, both agreed Dobson was entitled to reimbursement of the increased costs it incurred as a result of ODOT's mandate to relocate the telephone lines. The Commission's wholesale denial of Dobson's request was in error. View "Dobson Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Comm." on Justia Law