Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal was the second appeal in a dispute between Taxpayer-appellant J. Clark Bundren, M.D. and appellees City of Tulsa and Tulsa Hills, LLC. The two issues in that case were: (1) whether Taxpayer should have been allowed to intervene in a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the legality of certain public expenditures and financing; and (2) whether the appeal was moot because the appellees, Tulsa Industrial Authority, City of Tulsa Oklahoma, and Tulsa Hills, L.L.C. (TIA, City, and TH, respectively), obtained a declaratory judgment after Taxpayer was prohibited by the trial court from intervening. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness and held that Taxpayer's claim for equitable relief presented by a motion to intervene was not made moot by the judgment rendered during the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order that denied Taxpayer's motion to intervene as a qui tam plaintiff, but reversed the trial court's order denying a motion to intervene in which Taxpayer sought equitable relief. The case what then remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court ordered Taxpayer to file his "Petition in Intervention" on or before August 16, 2012. On August 15, 2012, Taxpayer complied with the order by filing the petition. On September 14, 2012, the appellees each filed separate motions to dismiss, and asserted that the bondholders were necessary parties. Several months later, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss and allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition. The court included the requirement that if Taxpayer filed an amended petition seeking to enjoin the City from making payments to the bondholders who purchased the bonds used to finance the underlying transaction, then the Taxpayer must provide notice of the amended petition to the bondholders and file proof of such notice with the court. Taxpayer filed an amended petition, and the appellees responded with separate motions to dismiss. The trial court again dismissed Taxpayer's petition on the basis that Taxpayer did not provide notice to bondholders as necessary parties to the lawsuit, and that Taxpayer did not state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court found that the bondholders were necessary parties to the action and if not joined, the present parties to the action would face a substantial risk of incurring multiple and potentially inconsistent obligations. The court again dismissed without prejudice the causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief for failure to comply with the court's prior order and for failure to join all parties necessary "to a just adjudication of this matter." The court allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition, and ordered that if Taxpayer did not amend the petition within that time, the action would be dismissed with prejudice to all the claims. Instead of amending the petition, Taxpayer filed an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Mandamus to the Supreme Court. The trial court entered a final order of dismissal. The dispositive issue of this matter was whether Taxpayer had to include bondholders as necessary parties to this case. The Supreme Court concluded he did, and affirmed the trial court. View "Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

Cleo Boler was admitted to Grace Living Center - Norman, in January 2010 and was a resident there until January 2012. Judy Little, as Cleo Boler's attorney in fact, signed the admission documents which included a three-page Dispute Resolution Provision. The arbitration agreement provided that any claim, controversy, dispute or disagreement arising out of or in connection with the care rendered to Cleo Boler would be determined by submission to neutral, binding arbitration. It purported to bind not only Cleo Boler, but any future legal representatives, heirs, successors, etc., who might assert a claim against Grace. Cleo Boler, individually, and Judy Little and Johnnie Boler as attorneys in fact, sued Grace and others for negligence, violation of the Nursing Home Care Act and breach of contract regarding the care and treatment of Cleo Boler. Grace filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, asserting that the contract was one involving interstate commerce and was valid and enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which preempted contrary state law. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in denying the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration. The trial judge held that the wrongful death claim belonging to Cleo Boler's statutory claim was not subject to an agreement to arbitrate contained in her nursing home's admission contract. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held that the personal representative and the next of kin were not bound by the arbitration agreement in the contract signed on Cleo Boler's behalf. They did not sign the nursing home contract in their personal capacities and their claim was not wholly derivative of Cleo Boler's claim. View "Boler v. Security Health Care, LLC" on Justia Law

The Tulsa County Assessor assessed ad valorem taxes on portions of real property owned by the respondent-appellees (and taxpayers) William Warren Medical Research Center and Montereau, Inc. The taxpayers challenged the assessment and the County Board of Equalization determined that the properties were not taxable. The Assessor appealed to the Tulsa County District Court which found in favor of the taxpayers. The Assessor again appealed but the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal because the Assessor was not represented by the district attorney, nor the State Attorney General. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that county assessors may employ counsel to represent them in court proceedings including appeals from the Board of Equalization. Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter to the Court of Civil Appeals to address the merits of the appeal. View "Yazel v. William K. Warren Medical Research Center" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified three questions of Oklahoma law to the state Supreme Court. Plaintiff, a probationary police trainee, filed suit in the federal court pertaining his status as a probationary trainee under the terms of the municipality's collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Supreme Court reformulated the first question, and answered questions one and two in the negative. Question three was not answered because it was dependent on an affirmative answer to question two. The questions certified to the Court were: (1) whether a probationary police officer in a municipality that has entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with a recognized bargaining agent under the Fire and Police Arbitration Act,who is excluded by the terms of the CBA from having access to the grievance/arbitration process contained in the CBA in connection with the termination of his/her employment due to his/her probationary status, but who was also a member of the Police Pension and Retirement Systems, at the time of the termination of his employment, has a right to be terminated only for cause by OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, sec. 50-123(B) and, thus, was entitled to due process in connection with the termination of his/her employment; (2) whether the probationary police officer under that scenario had a statutory right to a hearing before a Police Pension Review Board as provided for by statute; and (3) if a probationary police officer had a statutory right to a hearing before a Police Pension Board of Review, must the officer request a hearing and when must the officer request a hearing, or must the municipality offer a hearing and when must the municipality offer a hearing? View "Brewer v. City of Seminole" on Justia Law

Glenhurst Homeowners Association ("HOA") filed an action against Xi Family Trust and Xiang Yu Ren ("homeowner"), for breach of real property covenants. The HOA's Petition argued that the covenant for the Glenhurst Addition required all houses built in the neighborhood to have roofs that were a particular weathered wood color. After a hail storm in 2010, the homeowner hired a contractor to replace his roof and told the contractor to put the most energy efficient shingles on the house. The contractor did not put weathered wood colored shingles on the house. The HOA asked the trial court for an injunction, requiring homeowner to remove the nonconforming shingles and install shingles of weathered wood color. After denying a continuance request from homeowner, the trial court granted summary judgment to the homeowners association. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's denial of the continuance deprived the homeowner of a reasonable opportunity to properly respond to the homeowners association's motion for summary judgment, and that summary judgment should not have been granted. View "Glenhurst Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Xi Family Trust" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a delay of approximately twenty months in scheduling a driver's license revocation hearing was a violation of the driver's constitutional right to a speedy trial (as guaranteed by the State Constitution). Plaintiff-driver Phillip Pierce appealed the suspension of his driver's license in an administrative proceeding for driving under the influence (DUI). The trial court agreed that plaintiff's constitutional right was violated and set aside the revocation order and reinstated Pierce's driving privileges. A divided Court of Civil Appeals reversed. Although expressing its concern related to the inordinate delay in the proceedings, the appellate court determined that Pierce had not asserted his right to a speedy resolution of his cause, was not prejudiced by the postponement, and that the Department did not abuse its discretion in waiting almost two years to finalize the charges in the cause. Knowing that its complaining witness was scheduled to be deployed to serve his country, the Department of Public Safety intentionally postponed the proceeding and did not schedule a hearing to allow the driver to be heard either on the merits or on the delay. These delays occurred despite the driver's timely request for a hearing. Under those unique facts, the Supreme Court held that the driver's right to a speedy hearing was violated and ordered reinstatement of his driving privileges. View "Pierce v. Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Respondent-claimant, Ben Snell was employed by petitioner-employer Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester. He alleged that while at work he slipped and fell while carrying a tray of chicken weighing approximately 40 to 50 pounds. The trial court awarded claimant temporary total disability (TTD) and reasonable and necessary medical treatment for injuries to his neck, the second finger of his right hand, and aggravation of pre-existing conditions to his left knee and low back. All other issues were reserved. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) sustained the award. In its opinion, COCA ruled the standard of review in this case was the "any competent evidence" standard because of a holding in a previous opinion by the same division, "Westoak Industries, Inc. v. DeLeon," which held 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4), setting out "against the clear weight of the evidence" as the appellate standard of review in workers' compensation cases, constituted a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Oklahoma Constitution. Westoak was completely at odds with another COCA opinion, "Harvey v. Auto Plus of Woodward." "Harvey" held section 340(D)(4) was not unconstitutional as a separation of powers violation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue as one of first impression since certiorari was not sought in either of the previous cases. The Court concluded that there was no constitutional separation of powers prohibition in in the Okla.Const., art IV, section 1 against the Legislature's adoption of the "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard of review in 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4). COCA's opinion was therefore vacated. Because "Westoak" and "Harvey" were totally inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion, they were both specifically overruled. View "Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester v. Snell" on Justia Law

Condemned prisoners Clayton Lockett and Charles Warner filed a declaratory judgment action to challenge various practices by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections in carrying out their death penalty sentences. The district court denied most relief requested, but did declare 22 O.S.2011, section 1015(B), to be unconstitutional. The prisoners appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that part of the declaratory judgment that denied condemned prisoners relief and reversed that part that declared 22 O.S.2011, section 1015(B), to be unconstitutional. View "Lockett v. Evans" on Justia Law

Appellant CDR Systems Corporation entered into a stock purchase agreement to sell all of its assets. In August 2009, CDR filed its 2008 Oklahoma Small Business Corporation Income Tax Return and claimed the Oklahoma Capital Gains Deduction for gains received from the sale. The Oklahoma Tax Commission denied the deduction claimed by CDR because CDR was not headquartered in Oklahoma for three years prior to the sale as required by state law. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and found the deduction violated the dormant commerce clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court found there was no discrimination against interstate commerce to which the dormant commerce clause applied. Furthermore, the Court held that even if the dormant commerce clause applied in this case, the deduction did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, it did not have a discriminatory purpose, and the deduction had no discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. View "CDR Systems Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

On Sept. 18, 2013, Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question 767 was filed with Secretary of State. The Initiative Petition proposes amendments to the State Constitution with an ultimate primary purpose of constructing storm shelters for schools. Proponents also filed with the Secretary of State a proposed ballot title for their proposed Initiative. The Oklahoma Attorney General disagreed with Proponents' ballot title and then prepared and filed with the Secretary of State a new ballot title for the Initiative. The Proponents disagreed with the Attorney General's version and appealed to the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that: (1) a proponent of an initiative petition must file or submit a copy of the initiative petition and a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General when the proponent files the initiative petition and ballot title with the Secretary of State; (2) the Attorney General must file a response to a ballot title within five business days from the date the ballot title is filed; (3) the Attorney General's section 9(D) response to a ballot title is statutorily effective although the Attorney General's response was filed two days late; (4) a proponent of an initiative who challenges a ballot title prepared by the Attorney General has the burden to show that the Attorney General's ballot title is legally incorrect, or is not impartial, or fails to accurately reflect the effects of the proposed initiative; (5) the Attorney General's ballot title challenged in this proceeding was legally correct, impartial, and accurately reflected the effects of the proposed initiative; (6) when a ballot title appeal has been made, a proponent's ninety-day period of time to collect signatures commences when the ballot title appeal is final. View "In re: Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question No. 767" on Justia Law