Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff City of Jenks sought a declaration that the defendant, a probationary police trainee employed by plaintiff, was an at-will employee and that 11 O.S.2011, secs. 50-123, did not require plaintiff to provide a cause for the defendant's dismissal or provide him with a board of review hearing. The district court found that plaintiff met the exception to 50-123's requirement that it establish a board of review because it had entered into a collective bargaining agreement and that defendant was an at-will employee who was not entitled to a post-termination hearing under the statute, the collective bargaining agreement, or general principles of due process. The Supreme Court affirmed: "the Legislature did not intend to give probationary police trainees the right to be fired only for cause and a post-termination hearing before a board of review. When the Legislature enacted the 1995 amendment redefining 'member' in section 50-101(6), it must have overlooked the impact the new definition would have on section 50-123(B). This resulted in an ambiguity as to whether a probationary police trainee could be fired without cause and without a right to post-termination hearing. We resolve that ambiguity by finding that the term 'member' as it is defined in section 50-123 does not include a probationary police trainee." View "City of Jenks v. Stone" on Justia Law

Oklahoma resident Plaintiff-Appellant Samantha Guffey filed a lawsuit against Defendants Odil Ostonakulov and Motorcars of Nashville, Inc. (MNI), a resident of Tennessee and a Tennessee corporation, respectively, in the District Court of Oklahoma County. Guffey alleged fraud and violations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act in connection with her purchase of a vehicle from Defendants using eBay. The trial court dismissed the action because it determined Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over Defendants. Guffey appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because Defendants possessed sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Oklahoma, the district court possessed in personam jurisdiction over Defendants. View "Guffey v. Ostonakulov" on Justia Law

Registered Voter Delilah Gentges sued the Oklahoma State Election Board in the district court of Tulsa County to prevent implementation of SB 692, commonly known as the Voter ID Act. Gentges alleged she had standing as a taxpayer and as a registered voter in Tulsa County. The State Election Board specially appeared in the district court of Tulsa County and asked the court to dismiss this suit. The State Election Board contended Gentges lacked standing and Tulsa County was not the proper venue for a suit against a State agency. The district court of Tulsa County rejected these challenges and the State Election Board asked the Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction to prohibit the district court of Tulsa County from proceeding further. The Supreme Court granted partial relief by ordering the district court of Tulsa County to transfer the case to the district court of Oklahoma County. Gentges contended the Legislature violated the Oklahoma Constitution by submitting the Voter ID Act to a popular vote without first presenting it to the Governor for veto consideration. She also contended that requiring voters to present certain forms of identification in order to vote would "interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." After review of the parties' summary judgment paperwork, the trial court ruled: (1) the Oklahoma Constitution does not require presentment of a legislative referendum to the Governor before the referendum is placed on the ballot for a vote; and (2) Gentges lacked standing. Gentges appealed. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the trial court was correct in ruling the Voter ID Act was validly enacted, but reversed the trial court on the issue of Gentges' standing. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Gentges v. Oklahoma State Election Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Mark Muratore was arrested for driving under the influence. He submitted to a breathalyzer test, administered using the Intoxilyzer 8000. As a result of the test, the Department of Public Safety revoked plaintiff's driver's license for one year, and he appealed the revocation to the District Court of Oklahoma County on issues of the admissibility of the breathalyzer test. The trial court vacated the revocation of plaintiff's driver's license, finding that the Board of Tests had no rules in place governing maintenance procedures for the Intoxilyzer 8000 and that the manufacturer's certificate of calibration for this particular Intoxliyzer 8000 and the supplier's certificate of analysis for the gas canister used as a reference method for the Intoxilyzer 8000 were inadmissible hearsay. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the manufacturer's certificate of calibration and the supplier's certificate of analysis. Furthermore, the Court found that the Department of Public Safety did not meet its threshold burden of proving all the facts necessary to sustain the revocation of plaintiff's license, and the record supported the trial court's decision to vacate the revocation of plaintiff's license. View "Muratore v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellee, Jerry Butler pled guilty to two counts of "Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child" and received two five-year deferred sentences which ran consecutively. Sometime thereafter, Butler began registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act. The district court in Sequoyah County issued an order expunging Butler's plea from the record, deleting all references to his name from the docket sheet, deleting the public index of the filing of the charge, and providing no information concerning the file shall (unless ordered by the court). Butler filed a Petition for Injunction to permanently enjoin the Respondent-Appellant, Justin Jones ex rel., State of Oklahoma ex rel., Oklahoma Department of Corrections from requiring him to continue registering under SORA. He argued requiring him to register violated his rights to equal protection of the laws and to due process of law. The Department filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging Butler's deferred sentences and expungement were unlawful. The district court granted a permanent injunction against the Department, finding Butler's case presented an unusual and narrow circumstance and he was indeed denied equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court and reversed and remanded its decision for further proceedings. View "Butler v. Jones" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the three-day mailing rule of 12 O.S. sec. 2006(D) applied to defendants'-appellants' post-trial motions for costs and attorney fees filed in the trial court. The District Court granted appellee's motion to strike the appellants' motions for attorney fees and costs because they were not filed within thirty days of filing of the judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Defendants were to be served pursuant to 12 O.S. Sec. 696.2 and service was made by mail pursuant to 12 O.S. Sec. 2005. Section 2006(D) grants them an additional three days to file their applications for costs and attorney fees. Although the three days granted by 12 O.S. Sec. 2006(D) do not apply to time periods in the appellate rules, they will apply in computing the time to file a post-trial motion in district court after having been served with the judgment by mail as prescribed in 12 O.S. Sec. 990.2(C). Similarly, Okla. Sup. Ct. Rule 1.22(c)(1) provides that where the judgment was mailed because taken under advisement pursuant to 12 O.S. 990.2(C), three days are added to the time to file in the district court the post-trial motion pursuant to § 2006(D). Therefore, the Supreme Court found that the three-day rule of 12 O.S. Sec. 2006(D) extended the appellants' time to file their motions. View "Okla. Dept. of Transportation v. Cedars Group, LLC." on Justia Law

The Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Hedrick's driver's license for 180 days following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicants. He filed an appeal with the District Court and attached a photocopy of the order which DPS mailed to him when it revoked his license. DPS objected to the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that Hedrick had not provided the trial court with a certified copy of its revocation order. DPS refused to provide a certified copy, insisting that it was under no obligation to do so. The trial court dismissed the appeal, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a certified copy of a DPS order was required to perfect an appeal of a DPS revocation to the district court; and whether the appeal was timely. Upon review, the Court held that that 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 section 2-111 expressly deems photocopies of DPS records to be considered originals for all purposes and to be admissible as evidence in all courts. Also, pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 section 3004(3), a certified copy of the DPS order was not required. Furthermore, the appeal was timely. View "Hedrick v. Commissioner of Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Christopher Luster filed a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order, and Declaratory Relief to enjoin the State of Oklahoma ex rel., Department of Corrections, from enforcing the Sex Offenders Registration Act against him. The trial court consolidated this case with those of other plaintiffs filing similar actions and granted a permanent injunction to all the consolidated plaintiffs. On appeal the Department asserted the Legislature's intent was clear in applying the provisions of SORA retroactively. For the same reasons the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the provisions of SORA in effect upon a person being convicted in Oklahoma or entering Oklahoma were the only SORA provisions that should apply to the sex offender, the Court held the frequency of SORA verification in effect at that time was also the applicable provision. The correct registration requirements to apply are those in effect when the sex offender was either convicted in Oklahoma or when a sex offender convicted in another jurisdiction enters Oklahoma and becomes subject to those registration requirements. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's Order applying a blanket one-year registration frequency to the consolidated plaintiffs who must continue registering. View "Luster v. Oklahoma ex rel Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the United States certified two questions of Oklahoma law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The questions centered on whether H.B. No. 1970, Section 1, Chapter 216, O.S.L. 2011 prohibited: (1) the use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the use of methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies. The Oklahoma Court answered both questions in the affirmative. View "Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Mastercraft Floor Covering, filed a lawsuit against Charlotte Flooring (CFI), a North Carolina corporation, in Oklahoma. Mastercraft alleged that CFI had hired it to install carpet in a North Carolina casino, but that after the work was completed, CFI failed to pay for the labor, services, and materials. CFI entered a special entry of appearance to object to Oklahoma having jurisdiction to decide the cause because CFI lacked the requisite minimum contacts to be sued in the State of Oklahoma. The trial judge, determined that Mastercraft failed to prove that CFI had sufficient minimum contacts to permit Oklahoma to exercise jurisdiction over CFI without offending conventional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Mastercraft appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because of the totality of contacts with the Oklahoma-based corporation, the trial court had personal jurisdiction. View "Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Charlotte Flooring, Inc." on Justia Law