Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the three-day mailing rule of 12 O.S. sec. 2006(D) applied to defendants'-appellants' post-trial motions for costs and attorney fees filed in the trial court. The District Court granted appellee's motion to strike the appellants' motions for attorney fees and costs because they were not filed within thirty days of filing of the judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Defendants were to be served pursuant to 12 O.S. Sec. 696.2 and service was made by mail pursuant to 12 O.S. Sec. 2005. Section 2006(D) grants them an additional three days to file their applications for costs and attorney fees. Although the three days granted by 12 O.S. Sec. 2006(D) do not apply to time periods in the appellate rules, they will apply in computing the time to file a post-trial motion in district court after having been served with the judgment by mail as prescribed in 12 O.S. Sec. 990.2(C). Similarly, Okla. Sup. Ct. Rule 1.22(c)(1) provides that where the judgment was mailed because taken under advisement pursuant to 12 O.S. 990.2(C), three days are added to the time to file in the district court the post-trial motion pursuant to § 2006(D). Therefore, the Supreme Court found that the three-day rule of 12 O.S. Sec. 2006(D) extended the appellants' time to file their motions. View "Okla. Dept. of Transportation v. Cedars Group, LLC." on Justia Law

The Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Hedrick's driver's license for 180 days following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicants. He filed an appeal with the District Court and attached a photocopy of the order which DPS mailed to him when it revoked his license. DPS objected to the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that Hedrick had not provided the trial court with a certified copy of its revocation order. DPS refused to provide a certified copy, insisting that it was under no obligation to do so. The trial court dismissed the appeal, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a certified copy of a DPS order was required to perfect an appeal of a DPS revocation to the district court; and whether the appeal was timely. Upon review, the Court held that that 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 section 2-111 expressly deems photocopies of DPS records to be considered originals for all purposes and to be admissible as evidence in all courts. Also, pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 section 3004(3), a certified copy of the DPS order was not required. Furthermore, the appeal was timely. View "Hedrick v. Commissioner of Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Christopher Luster filed a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order, and Declaratory Relief to enjoin the State of Oklahoma ex rel., Department of Corrections, from enforcing the Sex Offenders Registration Act against him. The trial court consolidated this case with those of other plaintiffs filing similar actions and granted a permanent injunction to all the consolidated plaintiffs. On appeal the Department asserted the Legislature's intent was clear in applying the provisions of SORA retroactively. For the same reasons the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the provisions of SORA in effect upon a person being convicted in Oklahoma or entering Oklahoma were the only SORA provisions that should apply to the sex offender, the Court held the frequency of SORA verification in effect at that time was also the applicable provision. The correct registration requirements to apply are those in effect when the sex offender was either convicted in Oklahoma or when a sex offender convicted in another jurisdiction enters Oklahoma and becomes subject to those registration requirements. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's Order applying a blanket one-year registration frequency to the consolidated plaintiffs who must continue registering. View "Luster v. Oklahoma ex rel Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the United States certified two questions of Oklahoma law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The questions centered on whether H.B. No. 1970, Section 1, Chapter 216, O.S.L. 2011 prohibited: (1) the use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the use of methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies. The Oklahoma Court answered both questions in the affirmative. View "Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Mastercraft Floor Covering, filed a lawsuit against Charlotte Flooring (CFI), a North Carolina corporation, in Oklahoma. Mastercraft alleged that CFI had hired it to install carpet in a North Carolina casino, but that after the work was completed, CFI failed to pay for the labor, services, and materials. CFI entered a special entry of appearance to object to Oklahoma having jurisdiction to decide the cause because CFI lacked the requisite minimum contacts to be sued in the State of Oklahoma. The trial judge, determined that Mastercraft failed to prove that CFI had sufficient minimum contacts to permit Oklahoma to exercise jurisdiction over CFI without offending conventional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Mastercraft appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because of the totality of contacts with the Oklahoma-based corporation, the trial court had personal jurisdiction. View "Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Charlotte Flooring, Inc." on Justia Law

An Oklahoma worker was killed at Employer's jobsite in Texas. The employer's insurer paid the worker's Widow death benefits provided by Texas workers' compensation law. The widow also recovered damages in a wrongful death tort action in Texas. When the Insurer sought subrogation from the widow's wrongful death damages as allowed by Texas law, she filed suit in Oklahoma to prevent subrogation. She sought a declaratory judgment that the rights of Oklahoma workers and their dependents were governed by Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act, notwithstanding the worker's injury or death in another state, and any benefits that may be paid under another state's workers' compensation law. In particular, Widow asked the Oklahoma court to enforce the provision in Oklahoma law that forbids subrogation in cases of death benefits. The trial court granted the declaratory relief sought by the widow. On appeal by the Insurer, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the widow had to commence a proceeding by filing a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court before Oklahoma could exercise jurisdiction over the benefits due the widow, including enforcement of the anti-subrogation provision in death benefit cases. Because she never filed a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court, the Court of Civil Appeals held subrogation was proper. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and vacated the appellate court in this case. View "Holley v. ACE American Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the district court erred in proceeding in the underlying foreclosure suit after the defendant filed a motion giving notice of the plaintiff corporation's suspension in June of 2000 for failure to pay corporate franchise taxes; for the eleven months that the plaintiff was on notice that its suspension was an issue in the suit, the corporation failed to be reinstated; and title 68, section 1212(C) of the Oklahoma Statutes denies a suspended corporation the right to sue or defend. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court did err in proceeding; the Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to vacate all orders previously entered. View "Moncrieff-Yeates v. Kane" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a Motion to Override Risk Level Classification under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). The trial court ruled it did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. The trial court record did not reflect when appellant was first required to register, but he began actual registration in the summer of 2007. Following appellant's initial registration, the State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, notified appellant that he had been assigned a numeric risk level of three and would thereafter have to register for life. Appellant claimed that prior to this determination of a level assignment he was only required to register for ten years. Appellant filed a Motion to Override Risk Level Classification and Brief in Support in 2009. Less than two weeks after appellant filed his motion, new amendments to SORA took effect. In light of the amendments, the trial court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to grant appellant relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Department could not retroactively increase his registration period. As such the trial court had jurisdiction over appellant's case. The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Burk v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joseph W. Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of the Sex Offenders Registration Act ("SORA") and its enforcement. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that applying SORA's requirements to sex offenders now residing in Oklahoma who were convicted in another jurisdiction prior to SORA's enactment but not applying the same requirements to a person convicted in Oklahoma of a similar offense prior to SORA's enactment, violates a person's equal protection guarantees. View "Hendricks v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael Bollin challenged the constitutionality of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) and its enforcement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that when Bollin entered Oklahoma in June 2004, the law did not require a person with a pre-SORA conviction in another jurisdiction to register. Therefore, Bollin should have been held to the law in effect at the time he entered Oklahoma and became subject to SORA. Therefore, Bollin was not required to register under SORA. View "Bollin v. Jones" on Justia Law