Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An Oklahoma worker was killed at Employer's jobsite in Texas. The employer's insurer paid the worker's Widow death benefits provided by Texas workers' compensation law. The widow also recovered damages in a wrongful death tort action in Texas. When the Insurer sought subrogation from the widow's wrongful death damages as allowed by Texas law, she filed suit in Oklahoma to prevent subrogation. She sought a declaratory judgment that the rights of Oklahoma workers and their dependents were governed by Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act, notwithstanding the worker's injury or death in another state, and any benefits that may be paid under another state's workers' compensation law. In particular, Widow asked the Oklahoma court to enforce the provision in Oklahoma law that forbids subrogation in cases of death benefits. The trial court granted the declaratory relief sought by the widow. On appeal by the Insurer, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the widow had to commence a proceeding by filing a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court before Oklahoma could exercise jurisdiction over the benefits due the widow, including enforcement of the anti-subrogation provision in death benefit cases. Because she never filed a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court, the Court of Civil Appeals held subrogation was proper. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and vacated the appellate court in this case. View "Holley v. ACE American Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the district court erred in proceeding in the underlying foreclosure suit after the defendant filed a motion giving notice of the plaintiff corporation's suspension in June of 2000 for failure to pay corporate franchise taxes; for the eleven months that the plaintiff was on notice that its suspension was an issue in the suit, the corporation failed to be reinstated; and title 68, section 1212(C) of the Oklahoma Statutes denies a suspended corporation the right to sue or defend. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court did err in proceeding; the Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to vacate all orders previously entered. View "Moncrieff-Yeates v. Kane" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a Motion to Override Risk Level Classification under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). The trial court ruled it did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. The trial court record did not reflect when appellant was first required to register, but he began actual registration in the summer of 2007. Following appellant's initial registration, the State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, notified appellant that he had been assigned a numeric risk level of three and would thereafter have to register for life. Appellant claimed that prior to this determination of a level assignment he was only required to register for ten years. Appellant filed a Motion to Override Risk Level Classification and Brief in Support in 2009. Less than two weeks after appellant filed his motion, new amendments to SORA took effect. In light of the amendments, the trial court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to grant appellant relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Department could not retroactively increase his registration period. As such the trial court had jurisdiction over appellant's case. The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Burk v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joseph W. Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of the Sex Offenders Registration Act ("SORA") and its enforcement. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that applying SORA's requirements to sex offenders now residing in Oklahoma who were convicted in another jurisdiction prior to SORA's enactment but not applying the same requirements to a person convicted in Oklahoma of a similar offense prior to SORA's enactment, violates a person's equal protection guarantees. View "Hendricks v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael Bollin challenged the constitutionality of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) and its enforcement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that when Bollin entered Oklahoma in June 2004, the law did not require a person with a pre-SORA conviction in another jurisdiction to register. Therefore, Bollin should have been held to the law in effect at the time he entered Oklahoma and became subject to SORA. Therefore, Bollin was not required to register under SORA. View "Bollin v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2009, respondent Adrian Melton suffered an on-the-job accident while working for his employer, Joe Brown Company, Inc. He was awarded eleven weeks of temporary total disability, granted permanent partial disability, and a psychological overlay. The employer appealed the award, which vacated some parts and sustained others. In 2011, the employer appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) which vacated the permanent partial impairment award because it failed to comply with the AMA Guides (5th Edition), and that an "any competent evidence" standard of review was inconsistent with 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340, so the court used the "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard which had recently been revised. Respondent petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the COCA decision, arguing that the appellate court should have used the "any competent evidence" standard. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that because respondent's injury happened before the new standard went into effect, the "any competent evidence" standard should have been applied. With regard to respondent's awards of disability, the Court found that psychological overlay was not supported by appropriate expert testimony. Accordingly, the benefits as they related to the overlay were vacated. View "Joe Brown Company, Inc. v. Melton" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sedrick Courtney filed for post-conviction relief based on exonerating DNA evidence. He asked the district court to vacate his robbery conviction and to determine his actual innocence for the robbery in order to pursue a claim for wrongful conviction. The court vacated the conviction but declined to determine actual innocence. Petitioner appealed this denial with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court (unsure which court to choose). The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction over the case (because review of requests to determine actual innocence fall within the Court's original jurisdiction). Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying petitioner's request for a threshold determination of actual innocence following the vacation of his criminal conviction in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Specifically, the Court held that the trial court erred in (1) ruling that petitioner had not presented clear and convincing evidence of his actual innocence in the face of the exonerating DNA evidence that supported the vacation of the conviction, and (2) dismissing petitioner's request to determine actual innocence without prejudice to pursuing such relief in a court of general jurisdiction. View "Courtney v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Appellants are a licensed bail bondsman and several insurance companies that issue bail bonds. They filed a complaint against defendant registered professional bail bondsman Curt Pletcher violated the Ten Bond Rule of the Oklahoma Bail Bondsmen Act by using a surety bondsman to write more than ten bonds per year in Oklahoma County. Pletcher filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition failed to state a claim because the Ten Bond Rule was held to be unconstitutional by the Sequoyah County district court. The district court judge enjoined the Insurance Commissioner from enforcing the Ten Bond Rule. Appellants argued that the Sequoyah County case was not binding on the Oklahoma County District Court because it did not involve any of the same parties and the decision was not appealed. The trial judge denied Pletcher's motion to dismiss. The trial court recognized that it was in the public interest to get the matter straightened out, but he did not believe that an injunction was the way to do so. He directed the parties to brief the constitutionality of the statute, the effect of the judge's ruling and whether the Insurance Commissioner was a necessary party. He advised the parties that in order to consider constitutionality he wanted a record made for the Supreme Court's review. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a temporary injunction to enforce the statute. View "Dowell v. Pletcher" on Justia Law

The biological father of H.M.W. and K.D.W. was in prison. He refused a writ of habeas corpus to attend the trial terminating his parental rights. When the case was called, Father's counsel requested a jury trial in absentia. In response, the State requested termination by default. Without ruling on these requests, the trial court heard testimony without a jury concerning the best interests of the children and potential harm to the children from continuing Father's parental relationship. In the end, the trial court denied the request for jury trial in absentia and granted the State's request for default termination. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the termination, but ruled that Father's refusal to appear resulted in a consent termination rather than a default judgment. Father appealed that outcome. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in terminating Father's parental rights without a jury trial, and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming that judgment. Accordingly, both courts' decisions were vacated or reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "In the matter of H.M.W." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee James Starkey, Sr. petitioned the trial court for a reduction of his level assignment. He was a registered sex offender whose registration period was retroactively increased by the Department of Corrections. Plaintiff later filed a motion for summary judgment, contending he should have never been required to register. The trial court found that the Oklahoma Sex Offenders Registration Act was not meant to be applied retroactively and granted Plaintiff's motion. The Department of Corrections appealed. Upon careful review of the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed: it agreed with the result of the trial court's order finding that the level assignments were not to be retroactively applied, but disagreed with how the trial court determined what date the Act became applicable to Plaintiff. The trial court's decision was modified to apply the date of Plaintiff's entry with the intent to remain in Oklahoma following his conviction rather than the actual date of conviction in Texas as the critical point to determine which provisions of the Act would apply to him. View "Starkey v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law