Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-Claimant Nancy Bertrand injured her right foot when she slipped on a wet floor while employed as a child care worker for Respondent Laura Dester Center (Employer). She sought certiorari review of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) which sustained the Workers' Compensation Court's (WCC) denial of her request for travel costs to and from a vocational rehabilitation facility. Claimant contended that her allowance for travel expenses was effectively eliminated under the new Workers' Compensation Code, enacted August 26, 2011, which set a minimum for reimbursement of twenty miles round-trip. Claimant's total round-trip mileage was fourteen miles for which she was previously paid prior to the effective date of the Code. The trial court ordered the new law was procedural and could be applied retroactively. But after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCC ordered vocational rehabilitation before August 26, 2011, and the treatment facility was outside the city limits of Claimant's hometown. As such, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Bertrand v. Laura Dester Center" on Justia Law

Petitioner, Miami Business Services LLC (Miami), and Real Parties in Interest were involved in a joint venture. The law firm of Phillips Murrah, P.C. (Phillips) served as general counsel for Miami as well as Real Parties in Interest and their joint venture. Over the course of that joint venture, Jennifer Fogg, one of the defendants, acted as the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Miami and acted as the principal in the real party in interest business entities. While COO of Miami, Fogg sought counsel from Phillips regarding issues affecting Miami's operations and for work undertaken by Real Parties in Interest and the joint venture. Miami terminated Fogg from her role as its COO in October, 2010. Subsequent to Fogg's termination, Miami brought suit against Real Parties in Interest, including Fogg, for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, and civil conspiracy. Phillips entered its appearance in the suit on behalf of the Real Parties in Interest. Miami then filed a motion to disqualify Phillips, claiming that Phillips had a conflict of interest which violated Rules 1.7 and 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, stemming from Phillips' involvement with both Miami and Real Party in Interest Asset Group, Inc. The trial judge denied Miami's motion and Miami appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court recast Miami's appeal as an application for original jurisdiction and petition for mandamus. In granting the petition, the Court held that denial of a motion to disqualify was immediately appealable as a final order affecting the substantial rights of a party pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 953 and that the addition of Comment 3 to Rule 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct did not alter the requirement for an evidentiary hearing on motions to disqualify counsel for conflicts of interest based upon possession of confidential information. View "Miami Business Services, LLC v. Davis" on Justia Law

Frank George, a student at the University of Oklahoma, was charged by the University with violating five provisions of the University's student code. The Campus Disciplinary Board (CDB) found that he was guilty of violating three provisions of the Code: 16.4 (Failing to Comply with Directions of Institutional Officials), 16.65 (Public Drunkenness), and 16.25 (Violating Applicable Local, State, or Federal Laws). He appealed to the University's Campus Disciplinary Council (CDC) and alleged that the evidence was insufficient for the administrative decisions that the student code had been violated. The CDC reviewed the statements of the witnesses and the student, and in its written decision concluded that the student had failed to meet his burden to show that the evidence against him was insufficient. The decision of the CDB was sustained by the CDC. George "appealed" the decision to the district court. The University filed a motion to dismiss the petition and argued that the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act did not authorize appellate jurisdiction in the District Court. The court denied the motion to dismiss, stayed proceedings, and certified the court's order for interlocutory certiorari review on the issue of the appellate jurisdiction exercised pursuant to the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) 75 O.S. 250.4(B)(12) does not expressly provide for application of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act when a student is subject to discipline less than expulsion for an institutional rule infraction; (2) the remedy of an independent District Court civil action is an adequate remedy for an alleged violation by the University of a student's rights to due process in a University disciplinary proceeding; (3) the possibility of a subsequent institutional offense that is subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act having an enhanced punishment because of former offenses does not require the former offenses to be also subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act; and (4) absent unusual circumstances not present here, the Court declined in a supervisory writ proceeding to adjudicate constitutional arguments that were not adjudicated in the District Court. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. Lucas" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified questions of Oklahoma Law to the Supreme Court: (1) does the Okla. Const. art. 2, section 30 provide a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act?; (2) if such a right exists, is the cause of action recognized retrospectively? and (3) are the standards of municipal liability coterminous with a Federal section 1983 action or does the common law theory of respondeat superior apply to such action? The questions in this case arose from an altercation at the Cherokee County Detention Center (a facility operated by the Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority) whereby plaintiff Daniel Bosh was attacked while he was standing at the booking desk of the Detention Center with his hands secured in restraints behind his back. Video surveillance of the events captured images of one of the jailers, defendant Gordon Chronister, Jr., approaching the plaintiff and grabbing him behind his back. Plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of the altercation. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court against the Authority, the assistant jail administrator and the jailers who initiated the attack. He asserted federal Civil Rights claims against the individuals and state law claims against the Authority. The Authority removed the case to the United States District Court then filed a motion to dismiss the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the OGTCA). Upon review, the Supreme Court answered the questions: (1) the Okla. Const. art 2, section 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act; (2) the action is recognized retrospectively; and (3) the common law theory of respondeat superior applies to municipal liability under such an action. View "Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority." on Justia Law

The Tulsa County Assessor's office assessed ad valorem taxes on the Shadybrook Apartment Complex for the years 2004, 2005, and 2006. Shadybrook, under protest, timely paid the taxes each year, but appealed the Assessor's valuation to the Tulsa County Board of Tax Roll Corrections and the Tulsa County Board of Equalization. After receiving unfavorable decisions, Shadybrook appealed to the district court. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Shadybrook, determining that Shadybrook qualified for an exemption from ad valorem taxation pursuant to the Oklahoma Constitution, Article 10, sec. 6A. The Assessor appealed. On the first appeal in this case, the appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling in part but reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to determine whether Shadybrook's use of the property was for charitable purposes under Article 10, sec. 6A so as to overcome the Supreme Court's ruling in "London Square Village v. Oklahoma County Equalization and Excise Board." Neither party petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari based on that opinion. On remand, the trial court found in favor of Shadybrook and the Assessor appealed. The Supreme Court retained the appeal. After further review, the Supreme Court held that Shadybrook's operation of the low-income housing complex was a charitable use under the constitutional ad valorem tax exemption in Article 10, sec. 6A of the Oklahoma Constitution. The statutory language in 68 O.S. 2004 sec. 2887(8)(a)(2)(b) excluding property funded with proceeds from the sale of federally tax-exempt bonds from ad valorem exemption is unconstitutional. The Court overruled "London Square Village."View "AOF/Shadybrook Affordable Housing Corp. v. Yazel" on Justia Law

A commercial website operator filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of the reasonableness of the fee charged by the Rogers County Clerk for electronic copies of records and for a determination that the corporation was entitled to an electronic copy of the official tract index of county land records. Plaintiff County Records, Inc. is in the business of operating a website that provides land records to on-line subscribers, including the county clerk records for all 77 counties in Oklahoma. In April 2009, Plaintiff requested electronic copies of land records from the County Clerk's office including an electronic copy of the official tract index. The request for an electronic copy of the official tract index was denied based on Defendant's belief that she is legally prohibited from providing it to Plaintiff for its intended commercial sale of the information. The trial court granted summary judgment to the corporation and directed the Clerk to provide all the requested electronic copies at a "reasonable fee." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that Plaintiff was not legally entitled to the tract index information in electronic form and the county clerk is prohibited by a specific provision in the Open Records Act from providing information from the land records for resale.View "County Records, Inc. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether proceedings in aid of execution or judgment collection pursued within an action under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) must be preceded by registration of a foreign judgment in the county of the district court from which execution issued. In 2002, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma entered summary judgment against Debtors and denied a discharge of the debt to Bank based on Debtors' fraudulent concealment of assets. The Bank initiated various collection procedures against Debtors including garnishment and a hearing on assets in an attempt to satisfy the two judgments. The bankruptcy judgments were registered in Payne County, the location of Debtors' homestead, in July, 2002. Meanwhile, the UFTA action continued to proceed in Oklahoma County against Debtors' relatives. In September, 2007, the trial court entered an order in the UFTA action which determined that a portion of Debtors' income had been fraudulently diverted to a sham corporation for the purpose of avoiding garnishment of that income. However, it was not until November, 2007, that Bank's second amended petition in the UFTA action added Debtors and the corporation as defendants. In December, 2009, a contempt trial against Debtors generated an order filed 2010. That order expressly withdrew and superseded the September, 2007, order. It found one of the Debtors guilty of contempt for failure to obey the 2007 order. In April, 2011, Bank sought contempt to enforce the 2010 order. On August 18, 2011, Bank registered one of the bankruptcy judgments, and one for costs and attorney fees, in Oklahoma County. On March 15, 2012, a trial judge entered an order on Bank's motion to enforce the 2010 contempt order. The trial court found open and wilful violations of the withdrawn 2007 order as well as the 2010 order. The trial court acknowledged that Bank had failed to comply with the statutory requirements of registration of foreign judgments in the county of the court which issued execution, but it determined that those requirements did not apply in a UFTA action. Debtors brought then brought this original proceeding asserting the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to impose the relief granted to Bank. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the belated registration of the foreign judgment in 2011 did not authorize the trial court to retroactively enforce orders which were void for lack of jurisdiction. "When a judgment was registered in Oklahoma County in 2011, the trial court did not retroactively acquire jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the 2007 and 2010 orders that granted remedies in the nature of execution, including contempt, and threatened incarceration for failure to pay the judgments. The 2011 judgment registration did not make the void portions of the prior orders any less so." Furthermore, the Court held that a trial court may not take judicial notice of findings of fact and conclusions of law encompassed within a void judgment. New findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding any attempt to enforce the bankruptcy judgments are required. View "Vaughn v. Graves" on Justia Law

In 2005, Defendants-Appellants Robert and Shelly Heath executed a promissory note in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One) which was secured by a mortgage. Defendants defaulted on the note in 2008. Plaintiff-Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-4 (Appellee), filed its petition to foreclose. Attached to the Petition was a copy of the note, mortgage and assignment of the mortgage. The note contained neither an indorsement nor an attached allonge. The assignment of mortgage was made by Option One Mortgage Corporation to Appellee and was dated February 28, 2008. It did not purport to transfer the note. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment and Appellants did not respond. The judgment was granted in rem and in personam against Appellants. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale, and a motion to confirm the sale was filed on the same day. A day before the hearing to confirm the sale, Appellants filed for bankruptcy. In the pendency of the sale confirmation proceedings, Appellants obtained new counsel, and filed a motion to vacate the confirmation hearing. They alleged the bank did not prove it was entitled to enforce the note or to foreclose. The bank responded that because Appellants had their personal liabilities discharged in the bankruptcy, they no longer held any interest in the foreclosed property. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the bank with its unindorsed note did not prove that it was entitled to foreclose. The Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Heath" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified two questions under the Revised Uniform Certified Questions of Law Act. Plaintiff-Appellant Oklahoma Corrections Professionals Association having a membership of approximately nineteen hundred state employees, filed suit against Defendant-Appellee Oscar B. Jackson, Jr., Administrator and Cabinet Secretary for Human Resources, in federal district court. It sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the termination of voluntary payroll deductions for members of the Corrections Association scheduled to terminate on January 31, 2011 along with preservation of the "status quo" which it defined as an order requiring reinstatement of dues collection through the voluntary payroll deduction program should payroll deductions be terminated before the district court could act. The Corrections Association alleged that the 2008 amendment was designed to eliminate, by doubling the membership requirements for voluntary payroll deductions, the organization as a rival to the Oklahoma Public Employees Association. The Corrections Association contended that its very existence was dependent on collecting membership dues through the payroll deduction system. It asserted that: 1) the Public Employees Association was unfairly exempted from the numerosity requirement; and 2) the new membership requirement should be invalidated as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The federal district court issued an order dismissing the Correction Association's federal claims for lack of standing and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. Specifically, the district court held that the Correction Association had not met standing requirements of redressability. Even assuming the statutory provision's unconstitutionality, it reasoned that: 1) striking the offending statutory subsection would not restore the availability of voluntary payroll deductions; and 2) because the Legislature would not have included the provision without the numerosity provision, severing the requirement would amount to "rewriting" the law. Thus the question from the federal district court, reformulated as a question of first impression for the Oklahoma Supreme Court was: "[w]hether the two thousand (2,000) membership numerosity requirement of 62 O.S. 2011 sec. 34.70(B)(5), if determined to conflict with constitutional guarantees of free speech, may be severed pursuant to 75 O.S. 2011 sec. 11a?" The Court answered the question "yes."View "Oklahoma Corrections Professional Assoc., Inc. v. Jackso" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Ada Electric Cars, LLC filed suit against Defendants-Appellees Thomas Kemp Jr., Jerry Johnson, Dawn Cash, and Rick Miller, members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC), in their individual capacities, in response to the OTC's denial of a statutory tax credit for certain models of Tomberlin low-speed electric vehicles (LSVs) sold by the Appellant to its customers. The statutory tax credit provided for a one-time credit against income tax for investments in qualified electric motor vehicle property. The dispositive issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity from suit for their determination that LSVs sold by Appellant did not qualify for the tax credit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendants did qualify for immunity, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Ada Electric Cars, LLC v. Kemp" on Justia Law