Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Defendant Cox Retirement Properties, alleging Richard Douglas died as a result of the facility's negligent care and treatment. Defendant moved to dismiss the case for Plaintiff's failure to comply with 12 O.S. Supp. 2009 19. Section 19 was enacted in 2009 as part of H.B. 1603, known as the Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform Act of 2009. Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing the CLRA of 2009 was unconstitutional logrolling in violation of the single-subject rule of Article 5, section 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial court granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and certified the dismissal order for immediate review. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's Petition for Certiorari and held that hold that H.B. 1603 violated the single-subject rule of Article 5, section 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution and was unconstitutional and void in its entirety. View "Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispositive issue in this appeal was whether the trial judge erred in issuing a temporary injunction. The substantive issue in this appeal was whether the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association (OSSAA) acted in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner when he imposed a forfeiture penalty against Wright City Public School (Wright City) for violation of OSSAA's 22-game limit baseball rule. On April 30, 2013, the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association determined that the Wright City Public School violated the Association's rules when the varsity baseball team played the Idabel junior varsity team and the Valliant varsity team. The Executive Director imposed the penalty, requiring the Wright City team to forfeit the next two games. The penalty eliminated Wright City from the 2013 Class A state tournament scheduled for May 2 and 3, 2013. On May 1, the district court entered a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. The Supreme Court concluded "[a]ll the players in this controversy" erred: (1) the Executive Director should not have decided the alleged rule violation with Wright City's request for reconsideration pending and without allowing Wright City a meeting with the investigator; (2) Wright City should not have sought district court relief before the OSSAA Board of Directors denied it any relief; and (3) the district court should not have entertained the petition for injunctive relief before it had proof that the OSSAA Board of Directors refused to rule on the alleged rule violation and refused to extend the baseball season to allow Wright City to exercise its rights under the due process procedure in the OSSAA Constitution. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dissolved the district court's temporary injunction and remanded the case to the district court with directions to stay this proceeding until Wright City had an opportunity to challenge the allegations of rule violation before the OSSAA Board of Directors pursuant to OSSAA's Constitution. View "Wright City Public Schools v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Assn." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former spouse, seeking rescission and damages arising out of an allegedly fraudulent real estate sales agreement. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's lawsuit for failing to issue summons or file a waiver within ninety days of bringing the action as required by Rule 9(a), Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a discord between Rule 9(a) and 12 O.S.Supp. 2002 section 2004(I), and found the two provisions were in direct conflict to the extent Rule 9(a) shortened plaintiff's allotted time for service of summons. View "Cornett v. Carr" on Justia Law

Petitioner Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Protection Federation of Oklahoma, Inc. sought writs of prohibition and mandamus to disqualify a hearing officer in an administrative proceeding conducted by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), to restart the proceeding with a new hearing officer, and to prohibit ex parte communications between the hearing officer and the OWRB and other agencies. The proceedings in question concern the Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Maximum Annual Yield (MAY) determination, made by OWRB on March 13, 2012. Upon review of the OWRB record, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner was entitled to a fair and impartial proceeding. While the Court did not find the hearing officer to be biased and would not order her disqualification, "in the interest of fairness and in order to remedy any appearance of impropriety," the Court issued a writ of mandamus to compel the hearing officer to notify the parties to the administrative proceeding of any and all ex parte communications that occurred between her and federal agencies and to include those communications in the record, so that the parties may have an opportunity to respond. The Court concluded that Petitioner satisfied the necessary requirements for a writ of mandamus, and therefore issued a writ compelling the hearing officer to provide notice of her ex parte communications to all parties, to disclose the contents of those communications to the parties, and incorporate those communications and responses to them into the record. View "Arbuckle Simpson Aquifier Protection Federation of Okla. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd." on Justia Law

Oklahoma Department of Corrections inmate Sonny Lauren Harmon brought an action against three employees of the John Lilley Correctional Center, Paul Cradduck, Warden Glynn Booher, and Alice Turner, following the seizure and alleged conversion of a gold wedding ring. The District Court of Oklahoma County entered summary judgment on behalf of each defendant. Harmon appealed the decision. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether summary judgment was supported by the record. After reviewing the record, the Court found that the settled-law-of-the-case-doctrine precluded reconsideration of Harmon's compliance with administrative exhaustion requirements, and it was error to hold otherwise. In addition, the existence of a factual dispute mandated the Court's reversal of summary judgment in favor of defendant Paul Cradduck on Harmon's conversion claim. However, the Court concluded the district court properly awarded summary judgment to each of the defendants for any claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Further, any claims based on the purported tortious conduct of Booher and Turner were properly disposed of by the trial judge and COCA.View "Harmon v. Cradduck" on Justia Law

The plaintiff-appellant sued the defendant-appellee for professional negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The appellant was a party to a divorce and child custody litigation. The appellee, a court-appointed psychologist, was to serve as an expert to conduct an evaluation of the parties and of their children. The appellant alleged that he paid the appellee for the evaluation and after several months, as a result of the inaction of the appellee, her report had not been provided as ordered. The appellant settled the divorce proceedings in a manner he claimed was injurious to him and his son. The trial court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss. The motion urged that as a court-appointed witness, the appellee was immune to liability in damages. Though after its review, the Supreme Court found that as a court-appointed expert, appellee was indeed immune to liability in damages, "her duty was to the court." However, because the appellant claimed that the appellee failed to provide any services whatsoever for the amount paid, the Court treated those allegations as true: "[a]n expert would not be entitled to claim a fee for a court-ordered service that was not provided. This does not mean the appellant must be satisfied with the fees, but the appellant has a right to have the court decide if the fees were earned, and whether there was a valid legal defense to the assertions of the appellant that the appellee neither completed the required report, nor testified." The appellant admitted that the underlying child custody was settled, so the trial court should have also considered the impact the settlement had on the appellee's opportunity to complete the report or to testify. Accordingly, the trial court's granting the appellee's motion to dismiss was reversed and remanded for further consideration. View "Simonson v. Schaefer" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Claimant Nancy Bertrand injured her right foot when she slipped on a wet floor while employed as a child care worker for Respondent Laura Dester Center (Employer). She sought certiorari review of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) which sustained the Workers' Compensation Court's (WCC) denial of her request for travel costs to and from a vocational rehabilitation facility. Claimant contended that her allowance for travel expenses was effectively eliminated under the new Workers' Compensation Code, enacted August 26, 2011, which set a minimum for reimbursement of twenty miles round-trip. Claimant's total round-trip mileage was fourteen miles for which she was previously paid prior to the effective date of the Code. The trial court ordered the new law was procedural and could be applied retroactively. But after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCC ordered vocational rehabilitation before August 26, 2011, and the treatment facility was outside the city limits of Claimant's hometown. As such, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Bertrand v. Laura Dester Center" on Justia Law

Petitioner, Miami Business Services LLC (Miami), and Real Parties in Interest were involved in a joint venture. The law firm of Phillips Murrah, P.C. (Phillips) served as general counsel for Miami as well as Real Parties in Interest and their joint venture. Over the course of that joint venture, Jennifer Fogg, one of the defendants, acted as the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Miami and acted as the principal in the real party in interest business entities. While COO of Miami, Fogg sought counsel from Phillips regarding issues affecting Miami's operations and for work undertaken by Real Parties in Interest and the joint venture. Miami terminated Fogg from her role as its COO in October, 2010. Subsequent to Fogg's termination, Miami brought suit against Real Parties in Interest, including Fogg, for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, and civil conspiracy. Phillips entered its appearance in the suit on behalf of the Real Parties in Interest. Miami then filed a motion to disqualify Phillips, claiming that Phillips had a conflict of interest which violated Rules 1.7 and 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, stemming from Phillips' involvement with both Miami and Real Party in Interest Asset Group, Inc. The trial judge denied Miami's motion and Miami appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court recast Miami's appeal as an application for original jurisdiction and petition for mandamus. In granting the petition, the Court held that denial of a motion to disqualify was immediately appealable as a final order affecting the substantial rights of a party pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 953 and that the addition of Comment 3 to Rule 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct did not alter the requirement for an evidentiary hearing on motions to disqualify counsel for conflicts of interest based upon possession of confidential information. View "Miami Business Services, LLC v. Davis" on Justia Law

Frank George, a student at the University of Oklahoma, was charged by the University with violating five provisions of the University's student code. The Campus Disciplinary Board (CDB) found that he was guilty of violating three provisions of the Code: 16.4 (Failing to Comply with Directions of Institutional Officials), 16.65 (Public Drunkenness), and 16.25 (Violating Applicable Local, State, or Federal Laws). He appealed to the University's Campus Disciplinary Council (CDC) and alleged that the evidence was insufficient for the administrative decisions that the student code had been violated. The CDC reviewed the statements of the witnesses and the student, and in its written decision concluded that the student had failed to meet his burden to show that the evidence against him was insufficient. The decision of the CDB was sustained by the CDC. George "appealed" the decision to the district court. The University filed a motion to dismiss the petition and argued that the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act did not authorize appellate jurisdiction in the District Court. The court denied the motion to dismiss, stayed proceedings, and certified the court's order for interlocutory certiorari review on the issue of the appellate jurisdiction exercised pursuant to the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) 75 O.S. 250.4(B)(12) does not expressly provide for application of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act when a student is subject to discipline less than expulsion for an institutional rule infraction; (2) the remedy of an independent District Court civil action is an adequate remedy for an alleged violation by the University of a student's rights to due process in a University disciplinary proceeding; (3) the possibility of a subsequent institutional offense that is subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act having an enhanced punishment because of former offenses does not require the former offenses to be also subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act; and (4) absent unusual circumstances not present here, the Court declined in a supervisory writ proceeding to adjudicate constitutional arguments that were not adjudicated in the District Court. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. Lucas" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified questions of Oklahoma Law to the Supreme Court: (1) does the Okla. Const. art. 2, section 30 provide a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act?; (2) if such a right exists, is the cause of action recognized retrospectively? and (3) are the standards of municipal liability coterminous with a Federal section 1983 action or does the common law theory of respondeat superior apply to such action? The questions in this case arose from an altercation at the Cherokee County Detention Center (a facility operated by the Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority) whereby plaintiff Daniel Bosh was attacked while he was standing at the booking desk of the Detention Center with his hands secured in restraints behind his back. Video surveillance of the events captured images of one of the jailers, defendant Gordon Chronister, Jr., approaching the plaintiff and grabbing him behind his back. Plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of the altercation. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court against the Authority, the assistant jail administrator and the jailers who initiated the attack. He asserted federal Civil Rights claims against the individuals and state law claims against the Authority. The Authority removed the case to the United States District Court then filed a motion to dismiss the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the OGTCA). Upon review, the Supreme Court answered the questions: (1) the Okla. Const. art 2, section 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act; (2) the action is recognized retrospectively; and (3) the common law theory of respondeat superior applies to municipal liability under such an action. View "Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority." on Justia Law