Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Plaintiff Marlene Harris purchased a car from Defendant David Stanley Chevrolet. Her purchase agreement contained an arbitration provision that applied to any "controversy, claim or dispute between the Purchaser and the Dealer arising out of, or related to this sale or transaction, including but not limited to, any and all issues or disputes arising as a result of this sale or transaction whether said issues arise prior to, during or subsequent to the sale or attempted sale of a vehicle." A few days after executing the purchase agreement, Plaintiff entered into a GAP insurance contract sold to her by an employee of the dealership (acting as an agent of the insurance company). In 2009, the car was a total loss. The GAP insurance company refused to pay the total difference between the insurance proceeds and the amount owed on the car, and Plaintiff sued to compel the GAP coverage. Plaintiff maintained that the purchase of the vehicle and the purchase of the policy were separate transactions, and that the arbitration clause of the purchase contract was inapplicable to the underpayment of coverage (GAP coverage). She argued no claim was brought against the GAP insurance company which was related to the sale or financing of the vehicle, conceding the arbitration clause would have applied to claims related to the sale or financing issues. After reviewing the motions of the parties, the trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Compel arbitration without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the two contracts involved two separate subjects, executed on different dates, and the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement did not mention or reference GAP insurance or any relationship between the two contracts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the evidentiary hearing and ruling that the arbitration clause did not apply as a matter of law.View "Harris v. David Stanley Chevrolet, Inc." on Justia Law

The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Seymour Law Firm, R. Thomas Seymour and Scott A. Graham, based on the legal theory that its failure to enforce an attorney's lien within one year after it became aware of a settlement precluded Plaintiff-Appellant Gina Cowley from enforcing a contract she held with co-counsel. Specifically, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the expiration of the lien prohibited Plaintiff's lawyer from suing her co-counsel for breach of contract over the distribution of attorney fees from the settlement of the underlying case. Upon review, the Court held that the applicable one-year statute of limitations did not preclude a lawsuit arising over a contract dispute between Plaintiff's lawyers. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cowley v. Seymour Law Firm" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust filed a foreclosure action against Defendant-Appellant Dennis Brumbaugh. Appellant and his wife Debra executed a note and mortgage with Long Beach Mortgage Company in 2002. In 2006, the Brumbaughs entered into a loan modification agreement with U.S. Bank, N.A., successor trustee to Wachovia Bank, N.A. Several months later, the Brumbaughs divorced, and in 2008, Debra executed a quitclaim deed to Defendant. Defendant defaulted on the note in 2009, and the bank shortly thereafter filed its petition to foreclose. Attached to the petition was a copy of the note, mortgage, loan modification agreement, and copies of statements of judgments and liens by other entities. Appellee claimed it was the present holder of the note and mortgage having received due assignment through assignments of record or conveyance via mortgage servicing transfer. The Appellant answered, denying Appellee owned any interest in the note and mortgage, and the copies attached to the petition were not the same as those he signed. He claimed Appellee lacked capacity to sue and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. He also denied being in default and asserted the Appellee/servicing agent caused the alleged default. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that there were significant questions of fact such that summary judgment was not an appropriate disposition of the case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Brumbaugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Eddie Lee Howard and Shane Schneider (Employees) entered an employment contract with Defendant-Appellee Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. For two years following termination, the contract prohibited employees from: working for, leasing to, or selling equipment to competitors. The contract contained an arbitration agreement requiring application of Louisiana law with disputes to be resolved in Houston, Texas. After the employees terminated their employment with Nitro-Lift, they went to work for a competitor in Arkansas. The employer filed an arbitration proceeding in Houston. Howard and Schneider filed an application for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in Oklahoma asserting that the non-competition agreement violated public policy. The district court initially granted the employees a temporary injunction, prohibiting Nitro-Lift from continuing the arbitration proceedings in Texas. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion to dismiss. After considering the parties' briefs and arguments, the district court found the arbitration clause to be valid on its face and reasonable in its terms, lifted the temporary restraining order, and granted the motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement; and as drafted, the non-competition covenants were void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma public policy. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) sought a declaratory judgment against Defendants Jeffery and Tracie Quine and Amanda Watkins. GEICO filed suit following a demand from Defendants' attorney seeking partial advance payment of underinsured motorist benefits available through a policy it issued. GEICO requested the federal court determine whether the subject policy or Oklahoma law obligated the company to unconditionally tender a partial payment of underinsured benefits when (1) a dispute had arisen between the insurer and its insured over the amount of underinsured motorist proceeds due; and (2) the parties had not arrived at a complete settlement agreement. The district court certified the question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that an insurer's refusal to unconditionally tender a partial payment of UIM benefits does not amount to a breach of the obligation to act in good faith and deal fairly under Oklahoma law when: (1) the insured's economic/special damages have been fully recovered through payment from the tortfeasor's liability insurance; (2) after receiving notice that the tortfeasor's liability coverage has been exhausted due to multiple claims, the UIM insurer promptly investigates and places a value on the claim; (3) there is a legitimate dispute regarding the amount of noneconomic/general damages suffered by the insured; and (4) the benefits due and payable have not been firmly established by either an agreement of the parties or entry of a judgment substantiating the insured's damages. View "Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Quine" on Justia Law

The City Council of Tulsa decided to encourage the initiation of new direct nonstop airline service to business centers on the East and West coasts, and voted to approve a Memorandum between the Tulsa Industrial Authority (TIA) and the City which would convey certain real property (Property) for that purpose. The transfer would allow TIA to mortgage the Property to the Bank of Oklahoma (BOK) in support of a non-recourse loan so that TIA could, in turn, make an aggregate loan (Great Plains Loan) to Great Plains Airlines, Inc. (Great Plains). This transfer would allow the Tulsa Airports Improvement Trust (TAIT) to enter into a Support Agreement, pursuant to which TIA, in the event of a default would have the option of selling the Property to TAIT under the direction of the BOK. Upon exercise of such option, the TIA would sell, transfer and convey the property to TAIT to satisfy the outstanding loan balance. Great Plains subsequently defaulted under the terms of the Great Plains Loan, and left a balance owed to the Bank. Ultimately TAIT did not purchase the Property. TIA and the Bank sued TAIT. TAIT alleged the Support Agreement was unlawful and an unenforceable contract because TAIT could not purchase the Great Plains Loan and Property by reason that all of TAIT's funds were airport revenues and such purchases would violate the FAA Revenue Use Policy. To resolve the matter, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement which provided the City would pay BOK. The City and its Mayor asked the trial court to determine that the settlement agreement was a lawful contract executed by the City, and the settlement payment made pursuant to the settlement agreement was a lawful expenditure of public funds. Taxpayers intervened, and asked the trial court to determine that the payment of money to the Bank of Oklahoma pursuant to the settlement agreement was an illegal transfer of public funds made pursuant to an unlawful settlement agreement. In granting the City's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the settlement agreement was a lawful and the settlement payment was a lawful expenditure of funds. Upon its review, the Supreme Court concluded the settlement was not based on a contract, but rather under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment to the City of Tulsa, and as such, the City had authority to enter into the Settlement Agreement. However, the Court found that the unjust enrichment claim was unviable and the Statute of Limitations would have barred the unjust enrichment claim against the City. The Court remanded the matter back to the District Court to direct the repayment of the settlement funds from BOK back to the City of Tulsa. View "City of Tulsa v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A." on Justia Law

J.P. Fox is co-owner and general manager of Lumber 2, which is a retail home and ranch supply store. Fox and some company employees attended the Handy Hardware Show, a trade show in Houston, Texas, in 2003. They stopped at the "Hobart" booth of Defendant Illinois Tool Works (ITW) where they found Scott Massie, a sales representative of ITW. Massie showed Fox some new Hobart Champion 10,000 welder/generators ("Champ 10,000's) in which Fox had no interest because of the price. Massie asked if he would be interested in reconditioned units and handed him a list of items on a yellow legal pad. The list showed that ITW/ Hobart had eleven reconditioned Champ 10,000's for sale. The parties agreed orally that Fox would buy them for $1600.00 each. Upon returning to Oklahoma City, however, Fox received a telephone call from Massie who told him he could not deliver the Champ 10,000s to him because Hobart would not agree to sell them to Fox and Lumber 2. Massie told him the sales manager at Hobart refused to complete the sale because it would "screw up the whole territory" for its existing customers in the area. Thereafter, ITW/Hobart sold the welders to Atwood's, a much larger competitor of Lumber 2 which then sold them for $1800.00 each. Fox and Lumber 2 sued ITW for breach of contract, fraud, and for violations of the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act (OARA) and Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act (OCPA). A jury verdict was returned in favor of Lumber 2, and money damages were awarded on its claims for breach of contract and for violations of the OARA and the OCPA. The trial court denied ITW's motion for new trial. ITW appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the judgment on Lumber 2's breach of contract claim but reversed it on the award of damages for the OARA and OCPA claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court was asked to consider an issue of first impression whether Lumber 2, as a retailer and purchaser of merchandise intended for resale in its business, was a "consumer" for purposes of the Act. The Court held that Lumber 2 was not a consumer under the OCPA, and it reversed the trial court on that issue alone. The Court affirmed the trial court on all other issues. View "Lumber 2, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc." on Justia Law

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma " on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiff-Appellant Vick Hubbard filed suit against Defendants Kaiser-Francis Oil Company, Texas Southwest Gas and GBK Corporation for breach of an oil and gas lease and a gas purchase contract. Pursuant to 12 OS Supp. Sec. 1101.1(B), Defendants offered Plaintiff $275 for each of the seven alleged breaches. Plaintiff did not accept the offers and did not submit a counteroffer. By the statute, the offers were deemed rejected. Defendants moved for summary judgment that was granted and entered by the trial court. Plaintiffs appealed. Thereafter, Defendants filed a joint motion to recover their costs and fees based on Plaintiff's failure to obtain a judgment for more that the combined amount of Defendants' offers. In 2005, the parties reached an agreement on litigation costs and attorney fees that were to be paid by Plaintiff. Plaintiff paid that amount and Defendants withdrew their motion. Because of Plaintiff's appeal, the case was remanded to district court. The parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted Defendants' motion. Judgment for Defendants was entered in 2007. Defendants subsequently filed a supplemental joint combined motion for attorney fees for costs they incurred since 2005. In 2008, the district court granted Defendants' motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the issues presented for review were matters of first impression. Of import in this case was: (1) whether Defendants were entitled to attorney fees under Sec. 1101.1 because they received a summary judgment, and (2) whether a judgment that was appealed and remanded negated Defendants' 1101.1 offer of judgment made prior to the appeal. Upon careful consideration of the arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions in this case. The Court held that Defendants were entitled to litigation costs, and that the offer of judgment was applicable throughout the case, including through any appeals and remand. View "Hubbard v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co." on Justia Law