Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellee Mark Muratore was arrested for driving under the influence. He submitted to a breathalyzer test, administered using the Intoxilyzer 8000. As a result of the test, the Department of Public Safety revoked plaintiff's driver's license for one year, and he appealed the revocation to the District Court of Oklahoma County on issues of the admissibility of the breathalyzer test. The trial court vacated the revocation of plaintiff's driver's license, finding that the Board of Tests had no rules in place governing maintenance procedures for the Intoxilyzer 8000 and that the manufacturer's certificate of calibration for this particular Intoxliyzer 8000 and the supplier's certificate of analysis for the gas canister used as a reference method for the Intoxilyzer 8000 were inadmissible hearsay. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the manufacturer's certificate of calibration and the supplier's certificate of analysis. Furthermore, the Court found that the Department of Public Safety did not meet its threshold burden of proving all the facts necessary to sustain the revocation of plaintiff's license, and the record supported the trial court's decision to vacate the revocation of plaintiff's license. View "Muratore v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellee, Jerry Butler pled guilty to two counts of "Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child" and received two five-year deferred sentences which ran consecutively. Sometime thereafter, Butler began registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act. The district court in Sequoyah County issued an order expunging Butler's plea from the record, deleting all references to his name from the docket sheet, deleting the public index of the filing of the charge, and providing no information concerning the file shall (unless ordered by the court). Butler filed a Petition for Injunction to permanently enjoin the Respondent-Appellant, Justin Jones ex rel., State of Oklahoma ex rel., Oklahoma Department of Corrections from requiring him to continue registering under SORA. He argued requiring him to register violated his rights to equal protection of the laws and to due process of law. The Department filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging Butler's deferred sentences and expungement were unlawful. The district court granted a permanent injunction against the Department, finding Butler's case presented an unusual and narrow circumstance and he was indeed denied equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court and reversed and remanded its decision for further proceedings. View "Butler v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Hedrick's driver's license for 180 days following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicants. He filed an appeal with the District Court and attached a photocopy of the order which DPS mailed to him when it revoked his license. DPS objected to the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that Hedrick had not provided the trial court with a certified copy of its revocation order. DPS refused to provide a certified copy, insisting that it was under no obligation to do so. The trial court dismissed the appeal, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a certified copy of a DPS order was required to perfect an appeal of a DPS revocation to the district court; and whether the appeal was timely. Upon review, the Court held that that 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 section 2-111 expressly deems photocopies of DPS records to be considered originals for all purposes and to be admissible as evidence in all courts. Also, pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 section 3004(3), a certified copy of the DPS order was not required. Furthermore, the appeal was timely. View "Hedrick v. Commissioner of Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Christopher Luster filed a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order, and Declaratory Relief to enjoin the State of Oklahoma ex rel., Department of Corrections, from enforcing the Sex Offenders Registration Act against him. The trial court consolidated this case with those of other plaintiffs filing similar actions and granted a permanent injunction to all the consolidated plaintiffs. On appeal the Department asserted the Legislature's intent was clear in applying the provisions of SORA retroactively. For the same reasons the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the provisions of SORA in effect upon a person being convicted in Oklahoma or entering Oklahoma were the only SORA provisions that should apply to the sex offender, the Court held the frequency of SORA verification in effect at that time was also the applicable provision. The correct registration requirements to apply are those in effect when the sex offender was either convicted in Oklahoma or when a sex offender convicted in another jurisdiction enters Oklahoma and becomes subject to those registration requirements. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's Order applying a blanket one-year registration frequency to the consolidated plaintiffs who must continue registering. View "Luster v. Oklahoma ex rel Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a Motion to Override Risk Level Classification under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). The trial court ruled it did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. The trial court record did not reflect when appellant was first required to register, but he began actual registration in the summer of 2007. Following appellant's initial registration, the State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, notified appellant that he had been assigned a numeric risk level of three and would thereafter have to register for life. Appellant claimed that prior to this determination of a level assignment he was only required to register for ten years. Appellant filed a Motion to Override Risk Level Classification and Brief in Support in 2009. Less than two weeks after appellant filed his motion, new amendments to SORA took effect. In light of the amendments, the trial court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to grant appellant relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Department could not retroactively increase his registration period. As such the trial court had jurisdiction over appellant's case. The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Burk v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joseph W. Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of the Sex Offenders Registration Act ("SORA") and its enforcement. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that applying SORA's requirements to sex offenders now residing in Oklahoma who were convicted in another jurisdiction prior to SORA's enactment but not applying the same requirements to a person convicted in Oklahoma of a similar offense prior to SORA's enactment, violates a person's equal protection guarantees. View "Hendricks v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael Bollin challenged the constitutionality of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) and its enforcement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that when Bollin entered Oklahoma in June 2004, the law did not require a person with a pre-SORA conviction in another jurisdiction to register. Therefore, Bollin should have been held to the law in effect at the time he entered Oklahoma and became subject to SORA. Therefore, Bollin was not required to register under SORA. View "Bollin v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sedrick Courtney filed for post-conviction relief based on exonerating DNA evidence. He asked the district court to vacate his robbery conviction and to determine his actual innocence for the robbery in order to pursue a claim for wrongful conviction. The court vacated the conviction but declined to determine actual innocence. Petitioner appealed this denial with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court (unsure which court to choose). The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction over the case (because review of requests to determine actual innocence fall within the Court's original jurisdiction). Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying petitioner's request for a threshold determination of actual innocence following the vacation of his criminal conviction in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Specifically, the Court held that the trial court erred in (1) ruling that petitioner had not presented clear and convincing evidence of his actual innocence in the face of the exonerating DNA evidence that supported the vacation of the conviction, and (2) dismissing petitioner's request to determine actual innocence without prejudice to pursuing such relief in a court of general jurisdiction. View "Courtney v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Appellants are a licensed bail bondsman and several insurance companies that issue bail bonds. They filed a complaint against defendant registered professional bail bondsman Curt Pletcher violated the Ten Bond Rule of the Oklahoma Bail Bondsmen Act by using a surety bondsman to write more than ten bonds per year in Oklahoma County. Pletcher filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition failed to state a claim because the Ten Bond Rule was held to be unconstitutional by the Sequoyah County district court. The district court judge enjoined the Insurance Commissioner from enforcing the Ten Bond Rule. Appellants argued that the Sequoyah County case was not binding on the Oklahoma County District Court because it did not involve any of the same parties and the decision was not appealed. The trial judge denied Pletcher's motion to dismiss. The trial court recognized that it was in the public interest to get the matter straightened out, but he did not believe that an injunction was the way to do so. He directed the parties to brief the constitutionality of the statute, the effect of the judge's ruling and whether the Insurance Commissioner was a necessary party. He advised the parties that in order to consider constitutionality he wanted a record made for the Supreme Court's review. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a temporary injunction to enforce the statute. View "Dowell v. Pletcher" on Justia Law

The biological father of H.M.W. and K.D.W. was in prison. He refused a writ of habeas corpus to attend the trial terminating his parental rights. When the case was called, Father's counsel requested a jury trial in absentia. In response, the State requested termination by default. Without ruling on these requests, the trial court heard testimony without a jury concerning the best interests of the children and potential harm to the children from continuing Father's parental relationship. In the end, the trial court denied the request for jury trial in absentia and granted the State's request for default termination. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the termination, but ruled that Father's refusal to appear resulted in a consent termination rather than a default judgment. Father appealed that outcome. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in terminating Father's parental rights without a jury trial, and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming that judgment. Accordingly, both courts' decisions were vacated or reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "In the matter of H.M.W." on Justia Law