Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in Family Law
In re Marriage of Rader
The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review centered on a child custody dispute between divorced parents where divorce actions were filed in two different states at different times. Petitioner-Appellant Ty Rader ("Father") appealed an Oklahoma trial court's order finding Kansas had exclusive, continuing child custody jurisdiction, and that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination under Oklahoma's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"). The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that because the Kansas child custody proceeding was dismissed by the parties, it was of no effect in the present matter, and the Oklahoma judge erred in failing to determine whether or not Oklahoma had become the minor child's new home state under the UCCJEA at the commencement of this proceeding. Thus, the Court reversed the part of the trial court's order finding the Oklahoma court did not have jurisdiction over child custody, and remanded to the trial court to consider whether or not Oklahoma became the minor child's new home state, and, if so, to consider Respondent-Appellee Brenda Rader's ("Mother") forum non conveniens argument, pursuant to 43 O.S. section 551-207. If Petitioner failed to establish Oklahoma as the new home state, the trial judge was ordered to transfer the matter to Kansas, pursuant to the UCCJEA. View "In re Marriage of Rader" on Justia Law
In the Matter of L.M.A.
This case involved three children and a district court's judgment finding the children were deprived and father's parental rights should be terminated. The children were taken into emergency custody in 2016. The mother had been incarcerated, and the father shortly thereafter, for violation of the terms of his probation. DHS determined the home was "inadequate, dangerous, and unfit," and that the children were neglected. Their condition evinced developmental delay, lack of medical care, lack of hygiene, and lack of food. The children were removed from their home. Their mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights. The petition to terminate father's parental rights was based in part on his previous conviction for two counts of first-degree rape dating back to 2005. Father also had a previous Alaska conviction for sexual assault. After a jury trial, the children were adjudicated deprived by the court and the jury's verdict found two reasons for terminating father's parental rights. Father appealed the judgment and the Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held the evidence was sufficient for the adjudication of deprived status and termination of father's parental rights. Accordingly, the Court upheld the district court's judgment. View "In the Matter of L.M.A." on Justia Law
In the Matter of K.H.
Appellants Taylor and Cody Hudson (Hudson/parents) were arrested and charged with felony criminal child abuse in relation to the alleged abuse of one of Cody Hudson's sons. Subsequently, the State sought to terminate the Hudsons' parental rights to the four children they had together. At trial, the parents sought to preclude any evidence of the criminal charges from being presented to the jury. The trial court limited evidence of the criminal charges to only inform the jury that charges had been filed, and nothing else. The jury rendered a verdict terminating parental rights as to both parents. The Hudsons appealed. After its review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the limited admission of evidence of the fact that parents have been charged with criminal felonies for child abuse (but not yet convicted) was made in error but did not warrant reversal; the jury's verdict was supported by the clear and convincing evidence that the abuse was heinous and shocking. View "In the Matter of K.H." on Justia Law
Metcalf v. Metcalf
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address a question of first impression: whether the presumption that the intent of an interspousal transfer of real property constitutes a gift may be rebutted when the admitted purpose of the transfer was to illegally allude any creditor's attempts to collect on a judgment. After petitioner-appellee, Lewis Metcalf transferred some of his separate, real property into the name of his wife, respondent-appellant Bonnie Watson Metcalf, he filed for divorce. When it came time to divide their property, the husband claimed this particular real property as his separate property, even though it was now held only in his wife's name. His explanation for placing the property into his wife's name was that he was trying to avoid creditors potentially collecting on a judgment in a lawsuit to which he was a party. The trial court determined that the property in question was his separate property, and divided the couple's remaining marital property, and denied support alimony. The wife appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held: (1) the presumption of an interspousal gift may not be overcome with evidence that the sole purpose for the transfer was to defraud creditors; (2) the trial court did not err in denying the wife support alimony; and (3) each party was responsible for their own appeal related attorney fees and costs. View "Metcalf v. Metcalf" on Justia Law
Duke v. Duke
A husband and wife each requested sole custody of their minor child during divorce proceedings. Trial was held and following a hearing, sole custody of the parties' minor child was awarded to the father. Mother appealed. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the parties had an opportunity at trial to present their evidence and make a complete trial court record and a complete appellate record. But Mother failed to preserve her challenge to the trial court's conclusion it was in the child's best interests for custody to be awarded to Father. Therefore, the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "Duke v. Duke" on Justia Law
Schneller v. Platt
Lori and Heather, a same-sex couple, conceived a child ("J.L.") through artificial insemination and co-parented together as a family for eight years. J.L. recognized Lori as her "momma" or "Momma Lori." For the first eight years of J.L.'s life, Lori was a parent to her in every respect. By Heather's own admission, Lori provided "food, clothing, and shelter" for J.L. and "supplied all the financial stability" for the entire family. Moreover, her contributions to J.L.'s wellbeing were not limited to financial support: Lori was a full and active participant in J.L.'s emotional, social, and intellectual development. The couple separated; Heather left the home they had shared, and took J.L. with her. In the initial months following their separation, Lori and Heather adhered to a regular visitation schedule for J.L. This arrangement seemed workable for seven months, until Heather suddenly denied Lori any further contact with their daughter. Since that time, Lori has neither seen nor spoken with J.L. Lori, as the non-biological parent, petitioned for shared legal custody and physical visitation under the doctrine of in loco parentis. Heather, as the biological mother, objected, asserting that the couple's genetic donor, who had never sought any determination of his own parental rights, was a necessary party to the proceedings. Agreeing that the donor's consent was a necessary requirement, the trial court dismissed Lori's petition for lack of standing. Lori appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of standing. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the legal rights of non-biological co-parents in same-sex relationships, and reversed. "Lori did not act in the place of a parent; she is a parent. The record in this case cannot reasonably be read otherwise. Lori has emphatically demonstrated standing to seek a determination of visitation and custody of J.L. under the Ramey test. Consistent with the best interests of children in similar scenarios, we hold that non-biological same-sex parents may attain complete parity with biological parents." View "Schneller v. Platt" on Justia Law
Velasco v. Ruiz
A Mother filed a paternity petition seeking a determination of parentage, custody, visitation and child support. Attempts to serve alleged father were fraught with procedural errors. The trial court authorized service by publication; however, mother's publication notice did not comply with the timing requirements outlined in 12 O.S.Supp. 2017 section 2004(C)(3)(c). Finally, after attempting service by publication, mother's counsel filed a motion seeking a default but failed to serve the motion on father's attorney. After the trial court issued a default paternity ruling, father sought to vacate the judgment. Cumulative problems with service of process and notice warranted vacating the judgment but the trial court refused to set it aside. Father filed the underlying appeal. Considering the multitude of legal errors, weighing public policy and other equitable factors, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the trial court erred in denying Father's timely Motion to Vacate Default Judgment. The order was vacated and the matter remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Velasco v. Ruiz" on Justia Law
In the Matter of: A.A.
A.A. (Child) was born in August 2014. Father was present in the hospital on the day of her birth. At that time, Child and Mother tested positive for phencyclidine (PCP). The Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) was notified, and the case was referred to Family Centered Services. Mother entered a residential drug treatment facility, and Child was temporarily placed with a friend until Child later joined Mother at the facility. Shortly after completing treatment, Mother tested positive for PCP and marijuana. In June 2015, when Child was nine (9) months old, DHS removed Child from Mother's home and two (2) months later placed Child with her current kinship foster parent. During that time, Father was incarcerated. When released, Father was "mostly consistent" in following the court-approved individualized service plan with respect to Child. However, on the first scheduled day of unsupervised visitation, Father abandoned the opportunity to visit, and instead, stabbed a man in the chest with a knife. Upon his arrest, Father had six (6) individually wrapped bags of marijuana. After he was released on bond on May 20, 2017, Father met with DHS on May 26th to discuss reengaging in services and scheduling visitation. On June 6, 2017, Father had a supervised visit with Child but chose not to schedule further visits due to the uncertainty of his schedule. On June 9, 2017, DHS submitted referrals for Father to resume work on his ISP. Father never contacted DHS again. Father was ultimately sentenced to ten years for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. When termination of parental rights proceedings were initiated against him, Father agreed that it was unfair for Child to have to wait for his release from prison, but he stated that he also thought it would be unfair if he did not receive another opportunity to correct conditions. Father testified that he was participating in a step-down program, which would move him to a halfway house by the end of the year and allow early release within three (3) to five (5) years based on good behavior. Father admitted that he did not try to call or visit Child or DHS from June to November 2017, even though he was released on bond during that time. Nevertheless, his parental rights were terminated. He appealed, challenging whether the State presented clear and convincing evidence to support the termination. Finding the evidence sufficient to support termination, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of: A.A." on Justia Law
Antini v. Antini
Appellant Angela Antini and Appellee Matthew Antini were parents to two children. In 2013, the parties were divorced under New York law. In the decree, the New York court awarded Appellant physical custody over the children with the parties sharing joint legal custody. Appellee was granted visitation rights and ordered to pay child support. Prior to the entry of the Judgment of Divorce, Appellant moved with the children from New York to Maine. In April 2014, Appellee picked the children up in Maine for visitation but transported them to Oklahoma and, despite Appellant's requests and her subsequent trip to Oklahoma to recover the children, Appellee refused to return them. After it became apparent that Appellee was not going to return the children, Appellant registered the New York divorce decree as a foreign judgment in a Maine court and filed a motion for contempt against Appellee. Appellee did not return the children, so the Maine court found Appellee in contempt. He ignored an offer to purge his contempt by returning both children; Appellee never returned the children to Maine. Because of this failure to return the children, the Maine court issued a bench warrant for Appellee. In December 2014, Appellee filed a petition in the District Court of Stephens County, Oklahoma, to register the New York divorce decree in Oklahoma and asked the court to assume custody jurisdiction. Appellee's petition did not reference the Maine proceedings. Appellant filed a special appearance to object to the registration of the New York divorce and also sought a writ of habeas corpus requesting custody of the children. The trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over Appellee's petition, Maine retained child custody jurisdiction, and ordered the return of the children to Appellant. The Oklahoma court also denied and dismissed the petition to register the New York decree in Oklahoma. Appellant filed a pro se motion to modify custody to the Maine court, requesting sole custody of the children and granting Appellee supervised visitation. Appellee responded with an answer and counterclaim, but then failed to appear. The Maine court then granted Appellant's motion and ruled it had exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the children. No appeal of the Maine court's decision was entered and the decision is now final under Maine law. Appellant thereafter moved for costs and attorney's fees in Oklahoma, which was denied. She appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined Appellant was entitled to reasonable and necessary expenses including attorney fees borne by her counsel. View "Antini v. Antini" on Justia Law
Kohler v. Chambers
Kelley Kohler (Father) and Carolynn Chambers (Mother) were the biological parents of R.L.K., born April 17, 2012. Father received orders directing him to report for basic training and advanced individual training with the United States Army National Guard. Prior to leaving, Father filed a motion seeking an order authorizing the temporary transfer of his custody and visitation rights with R.L.K. to his spouse. Father maintained he was a "deploying parent" under the Oklahoma Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act. The trial court found the ODPCVA was controlling and vested Father's wife with the right to exercise visitation with R.L.K. during his absence. Mother appealed the judgment arguing the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding Father was a "deploying parent" as defined by the ODPCVA. In a case of first impression for the Oklahoma Supreme Court, it reversed the trial court, finding Father was not a "deploying parent" because his temporary transfer was not "in support of combat, contingency operation, or natural disaster" as mandated by 43 O.S.2011 section 150.1. View "Kohler v. Chambers" on Justia Law