Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Derrick Scott filed a petition to establish paternity. Respondent-Mother Candice Foster moved to dismiss, asserting that title 10, section 7700-609(B) required a party to commence an adjudication of paternity within two years of an acknowledgment of paternity. The district court granted Mother's motion to dismiss and ordered Petitioner to pay substantial attorney fees. Petitioner appealed and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, overturning the district court's order regarding attorney fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court previously granted certiorari to address whether the Court of Civil Appeals properly affirmed the district court in dismissing Petitioner's claim. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: "Contrary to COCA's recitation of the 'undisputed facts before the court,' the record does not show that Scott firmly believed that he was the biological father when Child was born. Rather, the record before this Court fails to show when the relationship between Scott and Mother actually took place or concluded, when Scott learned of Mother's pregnancy or childbirth, when he first thought that he was Child's father, when he became aware of the Acknowledgment of Paternity, or when he came to believe Mother committed fraud. The district court erred in granting summary judgment based on its determination that section 7700-609 is a statute of repose and erred in dismissing Scott's claim." View "Scott v. Foster" on Justia Law

Nicole Fitzpatrick obtained a dissolution of her marriage to Jeremy Fitzpatrick. The couple had minor children and significant marital assets, including real property, bank accounts, investments, and personal possessions. Among these were investments in oil and gas assets. The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s review centered on the Court of Civil Appeals decision regarding the division of the oil and gas assets. During the course of the marriage, Husband pursued a mutual goal of investments in oil and gas assets through two different ventures. He inextricably tied the Bakken and Energy deals and encumbered marital assets. The trial court found that all the A and B units of both the Bakken and Energy properties were acquired during the marriage through joint efforts of both parties, and were marital property subject to division. Because part of the properties' value lay in their future growth, the trial court considered the most equitable form of property division. The court ordered that future distributions and proceeds flowing from both sets of A and B units were to be held in constructive trust for both parties' benefit, and for Husband to distribute her equal marital share to Wife. COCA reversed the trial court's decisions regarding the Energy A and B units, finding that the trial court should have determined the units' value and set a valuation date. COCA also found that the trial court's use of a constructive trust for the Energy units was not proper. However, COCA did not disturb the trial court's use of a constructive trust with regard to the Bakken units. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s authority to distribute the assets although they could not be valued at the time of the divorce decree; the Court concurred with the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust to ensure protection of the assets’ future value. View "Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law

After the Carter County, Oklahoma District Court adjudicated S.J.W. (child) as deprived, Parents-appellants appealed. S.J.W., through child's attorney, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. S.J.W. claimed the Chickasaw Nation had exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) based on the plain language in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because S.J.W. resided within the Chickasaw reservation, notwithstanding the fact that S.J.W. was an Indian child and member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. Parents raised two issues to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: (1) whether Oklahoma courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian child's deprived case arising in Carter County, which was completely within the external, territorial boundaries of the Chickasaw reservation; and (2) if the court did have jurisdiction, whether a delay in the adjudication hearing deprived Parents of their due process rights. With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court held the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate S.J.W. deprived. Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), the State of Oklahoma shared concurrent territorial jurisdiction with an Indian child's tribe when the Indian child is not domiciled or residing on the Indian child's tribe's reservation. "In our dual federalism system, an Oklahoma district court's subject matter jurisdiction may be limited by the Oklahoma or U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. X; Okla. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 7(a)." In addition, the Supreme Court found no violation of the Parents' right to due process of law as any delay was not "arbitrary, oppressive or shocking to the conscience of the court," and Parents had a meaningful opportunity to defend throughout the proceeding. View "In the Matter of S.J.W." on Justia Law

Petitioners Grant and Kalan Lloyd sought to adopt minor child L.B.L. without Mother Sara Pollard's consent. The District Court found that Child was eligible for adoption without Mother's consent. Mother appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court. "Ideally, the child's best interests run together with the parent's. In practice these principles seldom conflict, because a trial court may usually give equal effect to both. Sometimes, this can only be done by ensuring the parent's due process rights are protected, then considering which outcome is in the child's best interests." Here, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the Court of Civil Appeals specifically acknowledged the best interests of the child standard, but allowed it to be outweighed by other considerations in reaching its conclusion. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, affirmed the trial court, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of L.B.L." on Justia Law

Respondent-appellant Wife appealed the property division incorporated into a divorce decree. The parties initially agreed to a settlement after mediation, but Wife later changed her mind. Petitioner-appellee Husband moved to enforce the settlement agreement, and the trial court held a hearing on the request. The trial court's divorce decree divided property between the parties based on information provided at the settlement conference and the hearing. Wife contended that the court's property division was unfair, and she appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court questioned the timeliness of Wife's appeal but allowed the appeal to proceed, reserving consideration of the timeliness issue until the decisional stage. After review, the Court determined Wife's appeal of the trial court's judgment was timely, and that the property division reached by the trial court was fair, just, and reasonable. Therefore judgment was affirmed. View "Owens v. Owens" on Justia Law

Raisa Pinto ("Mother") and Sailesh Arulkumar ("Father") were married in 2015. Both parents were trained physicians who attended medical school in India. In the summer of 2017, the couple moved to Oklahoma to allow Mother to attend a three-year Hematology and Oncology fellowship at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center ("OUHSC"). In July 2017, shortly after beginning her fellowship, Mother gave birth to the couple's only child. At the time, Father was working in Tulsa, commuting from the couple's home in Oklahoma City. He later took a job in Oklahoma City to reduce his commute time. In April 2018, Mother filed for divorce in Oklahoma County. The trial court granted the couple's divorce on the grounds of incompatibility. In its order, the trial court designated Mother as the custodial parent, but ordered equal visitation time. The couple has adhered to the custody plan and split time with their child equally since the divorce. While completing the final year of her fellowship, Mother began her search for employment. During her job search, Mother applied to 120 positions and underwent thirty interviews. Of those interviews, Mother received seven job offers for positions located in California, New York, and Pennsylvania. Mother did not receive any job offers in Oklahoma. Prior to accepting an out of state job offer, Mother contacted Father to inquire if he knew of any job openings in Oklahoma. The next day Mother accepted an offer from a hospital in New York. Later that month, Mother notified Father of her intent to relocate to which Father timely objected. Although finding Mother's request was made in good faith, the trial court denied the relocation request finding Father met his burden showing relocation was not in the child's best interest. Mother appealed the trial court's ruling. After its review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's proposed relocation. View "Arulkumar v. Arulkumar" on Justia Law

Appellee Andrea Milne dated Appellant Howard Hudson. During an argument, Hudson became violent with Milne. Milne sought a civil protection order from the McIntosh County district court, as the couple dated in in Eufaula, Oklahoma. She stated in her application, and testified at a hearing, that Hudson first attacked her in a car, slamming her head into the dashboard. When they got to her house, he hit her and threw her across her yard. Finally, he pushed his way into her house, grabbed some of his belongings, and struck her in front of her children. When the children came to her aid, he absconded, but returned later and threatened to burn the house down. Milne testified that after the afternoon of violent acts, he stalked her at home, around town, and at her workplace. This application and testimony, though not tested by investigation or cross-examination, "were certainly enough to justify an order of protection." Hudson objected, claiming that the district court had no jurisdiction to enter the eventual order. Hudson argued that because McIntosh County was within the boundaries of the Muscogee Reservation, Milne was a member of the Muscogee Nation, and Hudson was a member of the Cherokee Nation, the McIntosh District Court had no jurisdiction to enter a civil protective order against him. The trial court denied the objection and entered the civil protection order. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Milne v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Pro Se respondent-appellant Anthony Hammer (Father) was a member of the Cherokee Nation. His parental rights to his children were terminated, and he sought to collaterally attack the termination order using: McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020); the United States' 1866 treaty with the Cherokee, Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799; and the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Father argued the district court never acquired jurisdiction because the children were domiciled or resided within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation's reservation. The district court implicitly found Children were not residents or domiciliaries of a reservation. At no point in the original proceedings did Father or the tribe allege otherwise. No direct appeal was filed from the original order. Instead, Father brought a claim to vacate more than a year after the judgment terminating his parental rights became final. "A motion to vacate is not a substitute for a timely appeal. A judgment will only be vacated as void if the lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears on the face of the judgment roll." Because Father failed to demonstrate the judgment was void, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Father's motion to vacate. View "Hammer v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

After appellant Paul Laubach (father), and the appellee Maria Laubach (mother) divorced, the mother sought approval from the trial court to move across the state with their children. The father objected. Among the numerous orders issued by the trial court in this case was a minute order filed April 17, 2018. After the father's appeal culminated in two consolidated cases, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals dismissed a portion of the appeals when it held that the April 17, 2018, minute order was an appealable order which was appealed out of time. Consequently, it dismissed the portion of the father's appeals which transpired from that order. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari for the limited purpose of addressing whether written instruments titled "court minute," "minute order," "minute," or "summary order," could ever serve as an appealable order, so as to trigger the time to appeal. To this, the Court held that they did not. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, and remanded this case to the Court of Civil Appeals for further proceedings. View "Laubach v. Laubach" on Justia Law

Appellant Marie Yammine, as former wife and primary beneficiary of a two million dollar life insurance policy issued by Respondent ReliaStar Life Insurance Company to her former husband, Dr. Jean Bernard, appealed a declaratory judgment finding the contingent beneficiary, Appellee Roland Ghoussoub, was entitled to the policy's death benefit. Dr. Bernard died after the trial court granted the parties' divorce but prior to final judgment on all issues. The trial court declared Yammine and Bernard were divorced and that 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A) operated to revoke her beneficiary designation to the death benefits. Whether Oklahoma's revocation-upon-divorce statute, 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A), applied when one party dies after the granting of the divorce but prior to final judgment on all issues, was a matter of first impression for the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Court concluded Section 178(A) required a final judgment on all issues, and that the trial court erred by interpreting 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A) to revoke Yammine's beneficiary designation in Bernard's life insurance policy based on an order granting divorce when the final judgment on all issues remained pending at husband's death. The trial court's declaratory judgment was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ghoussoub v. Yammine" on Justia Law