Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue in this case was whether Father and Stepmother's adoption of the Child, at which proceedings the Child's biological maternal Grandmother did not appear, controlled the outcome of Grandmother's previously filed and pending visitation petition. The trial court ruled that Grandmother's nonappearance divested her right to seek visitation, and the opposition of both parents in this newly created intact nuclear family precluded the court from authorizing such a visitation. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this judgment, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari. Grandmother argued that she did not lose her right to seek visitation by not appearing at the adoption (at which she lacked standing to do so); her due process rights were violated by the trial court's sua sponte ruling; and the adoption--granted subsequent to and while her visitation petition remained pending--equally did not divest her of this right. The Supreme Court found that Grandmother's properly filed, undecided petition arrived to the court four months before Stepmother petitioned to adopt and six months before the court granted the adoption. Grandmother followed all required procedure by filing, providing notice, and awaiting her day in court. "She should not be penalized for another court's decision to resolve the separate and subsequently-filed action of adoption without reference to the impact of that ruling on her pending petition." Furthermore, by deciding the adoption prior to resolution of the visitation petition--thereby framing Grandmother's rights in reference to the subsequently filed, subsequently granted adoption--the trial court disposed of Grandmother's opportunity to ever obtain any "previously granted" visitation right. The court's determination of the adoption before resolution of the previously filed visitation effectively deprived Grandmother of her statutory right to seek visitation of the Child. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court to hear Appellant's petition for grandparental visitation. View "Birtciel v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellee Tracey Childers (wife) and Respondent-Appellant Kelly Childers (husband) were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage that distributed their marital estate. The husband appealed the Decree, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It concluded that the trial court's valuation of the marital estate was against the clear weight of evidence. It also ordered the trial court to rule on the husband's request for attorney fees on remand. The three dispositive questions presented for the Supreme Court's review were whether: (1) the trial court's valuation of the parties' marital estate was against the clear weight of evidence; (2) the trial court's distribution of the parties' marital estate was just and reasonable; and (3) the trial court's order that each party pay its own attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the trial court's valuation of the parties' marital estate was not against the clear weight of evidence, that its distribution of the parties' marital estate was just and reasonable, and that its order that each party pay its own attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion. View "Childers v. Childers" on Justia Law

M.H.C. (child) was born in September of 2013. The Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) placed the child in protective custody on November 5, 2013. In the initial petition filed on November 18, 2013, the State declared the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) were applicable. On November 21, 2013, the Cherokee Nation appeared at the initial appearance, and the natural mother informed the court that she had a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood but was not currently a tribal member. Thereafter, the Cherokee Nation received official notice from the State that it planned to adjudicate the child as deprived. The Cherokee Nation sent DHS a response notifying DHS that the child was eligible for enrollment in the tribe and enclosing a tribal-enrollment application for DHS to complete. After the Cherokee Nation's initial attempt to have DHS complete the enrollment application, the Cherokee Nation sent DHS three additional enrollment applications. The district court ruled the ICWA inapplicable because the mother was not a registered tribal member, the child was not a member either. The natural mother was also told if ICWA applied, the child would likely have to leave foster mother's care because foster mother was a non-ICWA compliant placement. No party informed the natural mother of ICWA's benefits and protections. The natural mother declined to enroll at the time. The district court subsequently found the State broke confidentiality by allowing the Cherokee Nation to attend a family team meeting in a non-ICWA case. The district court granted the Cherokee Nation's motion to transfer the case to tribal court, finding the State failed to provide clear-and-convincing evidence of good cause to deny the transfer. The State and foster mother (together Appellants) appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal for disposition. Neither DHS, nor the natural mother, nor the child through her attorney objected to the transfer to tribal court jurisdiction. Only the State and the foster mother objected. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in finding ICWA applicable upon the natural mother's enrollment in the Cherokee Nation. ICWA applied to the proceedings prospectively from the date the record supports its application. Appellants failed to present clear-and-convincing evidence of "good cause" for the case to remain with the district court. Because the district court did not err in granting the motion to transfer to tribal court, the Court affirmed the order granting the motion to transfer. View "In the Matter of M.H.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jackie Watkins ("Watkins"), in her capacity as guardian of her adult daughter, Jane Doe, sought damages against defendants, Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital ("Griffin"), Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services ("ODMHSAS") and Dr. Asma Mudassir, in her official capacity as a resident physician and individually. Plaintiff's allegations against defendants all sounded in tort. Doe was admitted to Griffin at 4:00 a.m. on March 19, 2011, for treatment of suicidal thoughts. At the time of admission, she was nineteen years old, five months pregnant and lived at home with her mother. Later that day, Doe told Nicholas Schiavo, R.N. she was having abdominal pain and was concerned she was having contractions. Schiavo took Doe into an exam room with no other witness present to check her for bleeding. He remained present in the room and watched while Doe removed her clothing from the waist down. Schiavo did not provide Ms. Doe with a sheet, drape or a gown. He then put on a glove, and conducted a pelvic exam while she was undressed on the exam table. No female staff was present. They were alone in the exam room for nine minutes. Sometime later, Schiavo asked Doe if she was still involved in a relationship with the father or interested in dating other people. He also offered to perform another pelvic exam when she felt better. Doe filed a complaint with Griffin prior to her March 21, 2011, discharge, claiming she felt violated by Schiavo conducting a "pelvic exam with no doctor or female present then joked and asked if [Doe] wasn't with the father was [she] looking to see other people and touched [her] shoulder". It was undisputed that Watkins knew about the specific concerns raised in the complaint submitted to Griffin. Watkins followed up with Griffin about the status of this complaint. She was told a formal investigation of the incident was being conducted. Unsatisfied with the results of the investigation, Watkins filed suit. Griffin and ODMHSAS were state institutions and argued claims against these defendants were subject to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act ("GTCA"). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to address two issues: (1) whether the limitations period in the GTCA tolled when state employees allegedly withheld facts critical to the analysis of potential negligence claims; and (2) whether the record contained disputed facts material to this analysis? The Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative, holding that the resolution of these issues contained questions for the trier of fact, making summary adjudication improper. View "Watkins v. Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Jimmy Pearman, Jr. (Pearman) and Theresa Pearman (Theresa) filed for divorce in 2012. The decree dissolving the marriage was memorialized in 2013, however, the parties continued their litigation over matters of child custody and support of their two children. By 2014, Pearman was awarded exclusive custody of the children and Theresa was granted standard visitation. Pearman became involved with Theresa's roommate, "Tess," which appeared from court records to have been a tumultuous relationship. Incidents in the Spring of 2014 ended with allegations of assault lodged against Pearman, and a trial court hearing Tess's petition for a Protective Order/VPO. Theresa's attorney represented Tess, and most of the hearing concerned many text messages between Theresa and Tess regarding the VPO and their friendship and sex lives. Because of concerns about attorney-client privilege, the text messages were examined by both attorneys during a recess. Pearman's attorney used the text messages to establish the motive for filing VPO as merely an attempt to affect the ex-wife's child custody case. Tess' attorney advised his client to drop the VPO petition, and the trial court granted the subsequent motion to withdraw. When asked to determine the matter frivolous and award attorney fees and costs, the trial court, remarked that, while the whole matter was a soap opera, embarrassing, and absurd, the ex-husband did not show that it was frivolously filed. Consequently, the trial court refused to award attorney fees and costs. Pearman appealed the decision not to grant him fees and costs, arguing this matter was indeed frivolous. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court, but the Supreme Court disagreed, held the matter was indeed frivolously filed and victimless, and that attorney fees and costs should have been awarded. View "Murlin v. Pearman" on Justia Law

Appellant-Mother, Kayla Scocos, brought a post-decree motion in trial court to relocate with the parties' child from Oklahoma to Louisiana. Appellee-Father, Andrew Scocos, filed objection and sought immediate physical custody of the child. Trial court determined the move was not made in good faith and shifted primary physical custody to Father. Mother appealed. Father argued Mother purposely withheld her intentions to move to Louisiana during the negotiations of the Joint Custody Plan and that her actions should have been considered as bad faith under a request for relocation. Regardless of whether Mother knew during negotiations of the joint custody plan that a move might be imminent, Mother contended this had no bearing on whether her reasons for relocation constitute good faith. The Supreme Court agreed. "The record is devoid of evidence that Mother's proposed relocation was designed to purposely deprive Father of visitation which could give rise to bad faith." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case with instructions to allow Mother's proposed relocation. View "Scocos v. Scocos" on Justia Law

The district court ordered the transfer of a minor child, S.A.W., to a foster-adoption home that was in compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act, and in the bests interests of the child. Foster mother, natural mother, father, child, and the State appealed. After review of this matter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the proper standard for a party showing a need for an ICWA-noncompliant child placement is clear and convincing evidence; and the evidence presented by appellants was sufficient to satisfy their burden, regardless whether the Court applied abuse-of-discretion or clear-and-convincing standards. The Court held the circumstances of this case did not warrant reversal of the judge's order based upon 10A O.S. 1-4-812. Appellants failed to satisfy their burden challenging natural father's status as not a member of his tribe. The Cherokee Nation met its burden showing the child was subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act. The evidence was sufficient to show an ICWA-noncompliant temporary placement as in the best interests of the child. As such, the Court affirmed the district court's order in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the matter of M.K.T." on Justia Law

Same sex couple planned to have a child and co-parent. Upon the termination of their relationship and following almost ten years of co-parenting, the biological mother denied plaintiff's status as a parent and sought to end all interaction between plaintiff and child. Couple did not have a written agreement regarding parenting. Plaintiff petitioned the District Court in Oklahoma County seeking a determination of parental rights and custody. The District Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction finding plaintiff lacked standing as a non-biological parent seeking custody and visitation. Specifically, the Court addressed: (1) whether the district court erred finding that a non-biological parent lacked standing because the same sex couple had not married and had no written parenting agreement; (2) whether a biological mother had the right as a parent to legally erase an almost ten year parental relationship that she voluntarily created and fostered with her same sex partner. The Court answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ramey v. Sutton" on Justia Law

Both parties in this matter sought dissolution of their marriage on grounds of incompatibility. The wife informed the trial court that she was terminally ill and wanted to finalize the divorce before her death as she wished to leave her part of the estate to her daughters. The judge granted the parties the divorce, and filed a Court Minute memorializing his ruling. The judge signed and dated the Court Minute and the attorneys who represented the parties also signed. The judge included an order in the Court Minute for mediation to resolve property issues and further ordered that a journal entry be presented to the court within five days. However, the wife died before reaching a property settlement with the husband. No journal entry was filed. The husband filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that after the wife died, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the dissolution of marriage action. The wife's successors filed a response objecting to dismissal of the action. The trial court granted the husband's motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, where both parties sought dissolution of their marriage, was effective at the time pronounced by the trial court even though property issues had not been settled and no journal entry had been filed. Although a judgment is generally not "enforceable in whole or in part unless or until it is signed by the court and filed," Oklahoma law carves out an exception for divorce proceedings, where the adjudication of any issue shall be "enforceable when pronounced by the court." The Court found that the husband did not oppose the dissolution of the marriage; what he opposed in essence was the bifurcation of the divorce between the dissolution of the marriage and the property settlement. The implications of this for proceedings in which a spouse dies before a journal entry is filed, was that a trial court may pronounce that the marriage is dissolved, effective immediately, but that decision is not appealable until it is filed. The district court erred in dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to divide the property and take such further actions as were necessary. View "Alexander v. Alexander" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review was whether the district court erred in sustaining a legal parent's motion to disqualify opposing counsel. More specifically, the question centered on whether the integrity of the judicial process was likely to suffer real harm when an attorney who represents a client in a proceeding to establish paternity and to determine custody of a minor child failed to report suspected child abuse to the proper authorities as required by statute, conducts a forensic interview of the child to obtain evidence to support the client's position, did not obtain the legal parent's permission prior to the interview, and filed his own affidavit attesting to the credibility of the child's affidavit. Brandy Poindexter (Mother) is the legal parent of a minor child (Child) born in 2005. On September 6, 2006, Michael Jensen (Client) filed a paternity action seeking joint custody of Child. William D. Thomas (Attorney) filed an entry of appearance on Client's behalf, becoming Client's fourth attorney in the paternity proceeding. The issue of paternity is not contested, but the district judge has yet to enter a final paternity decree. Child again alleged that he had been abused by Mother and her husband. This time, Client did not report the new allegations to DHS, but instead brought the Child to Attorney to be interviewed. On January 12, 2014, Attorney conducted a forensic interview of Child without seeking permission from Mother or securing independent counsel for Child. Only Attorney and Child were present during the interview. At a subsequent hearing on paternity, Mother moved to disqualify Attorney. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in sustaining the motion to disqualify opposing counsel when the attorney likely compromised the legal parent's right to a fair proceeding by contaminating the fact-finding procedure and by establishing a relationship of undue influence with the child. View "Jensen v. Poindexter" on Justia Law