Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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Kelly Jones was the biological mother of T.T.S. The State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate T.T.S. as a deprived child because the child "lacked 'appropriate parental care' and had been 'placed in threat of harm'" through mother's actions. Specifically, the state alleged the mother was a drug user and provided an unfit home environment for the child. In addition, the petition asserted that following a drug binge, mother was discovered by a law enforcement officer asleep with her boyfriend in a parking lot while T.T.S. slept nearby, unsupervised, in mother's car. Two windows had been broken on the vehicle and pieces of glass were located in T.T.S' child safety seat. The goal, according to the State's petition, was reunification of T.T.S. with mother. Throughout the pendency of this case, T.T.S. resided with foster parents. A subsequent Department of Human Services (DHS) progress report was filed with the trial court approximately a year later, and disclosed that mother had been arrested and was incarcerated in the Grayson County Jail in Sherman, Texas. A court minute filed after the review hearing suggested DHS intended to pursue termination of parental rights, which was ultimately granted. On appeal of the termination, mother challenged the trial court's failure to provide jurors with legally correct instructions and verdict forms. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the individualized service plan (ISP) contained an expansive list of remedial measures DHS desired mother to accomplish; some of the items were designated as mandatory, while others were characterized as desired. "What precisely was expected from mother in this case to re-establish physical custody of T.T.S. was less than clear." Moreover, the Court found that none of the State's applications to terminate mother's parental rights set forth the precise conditions mother failed to correct. Similarly, neither the jury instructions nor the verdict forms provided specificity with regard to the corrective measures mother had allegedly failed to ameliorate. Without this information mother could not effectively defend against the State's action to dissolve the parent-child relationship. "Due process requirements mandate reasonable notice of the conditions leading to a deprived adjudication, including jury instructions and verdict forms which outline a parent's purported noncompliance." View "In the matter of T.T.S." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Plaintiff Alan Benefiel and Christa Benefiel were divorced by a consent decree entered in 2005. Consistent with the terms of the parties' divorce decree, Plaintiff executed a quit claim deed, transferring title in the former marital residence to Christa. In exchange for relinquishing his ownership interest in the property, the decree required Christa to pay Plaintiff $25,000.00 as alimony in lieu of property division. Payments were structured incrementally over a period of four years; $10,000 was due in 2005, and $5,000 was payable on January 31 for years 2006, 2007, and 2008. As security for the property division judgment, Plaintiff was awarded a lien encumbering the residence. The lien was to remain in effect until all payments were completed. Further, the decree contained a clause which vested Plaintiff with the right to immediate title and possession of the property should Christa fail to timely remit any of the annual installments Prior to paying the final installment, Christa sold the subject real property to a third-party, Jewel Boulton. Boulton paid $17,000.00 as a down payment and financed the remainder of the purchase price. Though the divorce decree had not been filed with the local county clerk, it was made a part of the abstract of title. Despite its inclusion in the abstract, a title opinion issued prior to closing failed to identify the divorce judgment as a potential cloud or defect. Christa failed to make the final property division installment due on January 31, 2008. Plaintiff filed suit against both Boulton and Christa, asserting several claims, including demands to quiet title and to allow foreclosure of the lien. In her Answer, Boulton maintained that Plaintiff had no right, title, or interest in the house and that his lien from the divorce decree was ineffective and void. Both Boulton and Plaintiff sought summary judgment. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, finding: (1) the divorce decree created a valid "mortgage lien" against the property; (2) Christa defaulted on the property division obligation; and (3) in accordance with the divorce decree, Christa's default resulted in the automatic reversion of title to Plaintiff. In a prior appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals invalidated the reversionary clause, but found the property was subject to a valid lien. On remand, Boulton invoked her statutory right of redemption, under 42 O.S. 20, by paying the underlying obligation plus interest; however, Boulton's discharge of the lien was not accomplished for more than three years after litigation was commenced. Thus, Plaintiff was the prevailing party on the lien foreclosure claim. After its review, the Supreme Court held that Boulton's redemption of the subject property occurred when she tendered both the underlying $5,000.00 obligation and the accumulated interest owed thereon. The Court of Appeals' opinion was thus vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Benefiel v. Boulton" on Justia Law

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When T.H. was three, the parental rights of her mother were terminated. Within a year, T.H. was adopted. T.H. lived with her adoptive parents until she was 15 years old, when she disclosed that her adoptive father had been sexually abusing her since she was five or six years of age. A deprived petition was filed, both adoptive parents consented to termination of their parental rights, and a trial court granted the petition in 2013. T.H. filed an application to reinstate the parental rights of her biological mother. In 2009, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted section 1-4-909, Okla. Stat. tit. 10A (Supp. 2009), which allowed a child to request a court to reinstate previously terminated parental rights under specified circumstances. T.H. filed her application based on section 1-4-909, alleging her circumstances satisfied all criteria for reinstatement of her biological mother's parental rights. The State objected arguing that one element of the statute had not been met. The trial court agreed with the State and entered an order denying the application. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding the statute to be ambiguous but applied an "as written" literal construction of the statute to hold that the application was properly denied. The issue this case raised on appeal to the Supreme Court was one of first impression, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court found that the lower courts failed to construe the statute in a manner consistent with the rules of construction and the legislative intent stated in the Children's Code. View "In the matter of T.H." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Petitioner Baby F., through his attorney, requested that the Oklahoma Supreme Court assume original jurisdiction and issue a writ of prohibition forbidding the trial court from authorizing a change in his resuscitation status from full code to allow-natural-death pursuant to 10A O.S. 2011 section 1-3-102(C)(2). Baby F was one of several siblings the State sought to take into its emergency custody in an Application to Take Minor Children Into Emergency Custody on April 4, 2013. At that time, three-month-old Baby F had allegedly been diagnosed with several anomalies and genetic issues. At the hearing, Baby F's attending doctor testified as to Baby F's deteriorating condition, noting the numerous conditions identified when Baby F was born prematurely, and his continued respiratory troubles. According to the doctor, Baby F's acute respiratory events began to increase over time, necessitating several transfers to another facility, and the staff began to feel conflicted that they might be doing more to Baby F than for Baby F. Baby F filed an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for a writ of prohibition, however, while this original action was pending, the State received a letter from Baby F's physician of record at The Children's Hospital at OU Medical Center, stating that Baby F's condition had deteriorated to the point where he could not survive without being in a medically induced coma and medically paralyzed on a life supporting ventilator, and there was no reason to suspect the situation would improve. The letter noted the child was suffering and that further life sustaining therapy was not appropriate. An emergency hearing was held, and based on the doctor's testimony, the State moved to dismiss Baby F. from a deprived petition and requested that the court place the child in the custody of his mother and father for purpose of their consent to the do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order, thereby negating the need for the trial court's approval under 10A O.S. 2011 sec. 1-3-102(C)(2). The State also requested the court vacate the stay it previously issued in order to proceed. The trial court vacated its previous stay and dismissed the deprived child proceeding only as to Baby F and returned Baby F to his parents' custody. Baby F died on January 10, 2015. Petitioner alleged that by failing to provide for an evidentiary standard and fact-finding, 10A O.S. 2011 sec. 1-3-102(C)(2) violated the requirements of substantive due process. The Supreme Court agreed, and determined: 1) that though Petitioner died during the pendency of these proceedings, this case fell within recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine; and 2) in order to comply with the requirements of due process, before a withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment or the denial of the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on behalf of a child in DHS custody could be authorized under 10A O.S. 2011 sec. 1-3-102(C)(2), the court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that doing so is in the best interest of the child. View "Baby F v. Oklahoma County Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

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In 2010, Denise Schweigert (Mother) filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Tony Schweigert (Father) and an application for a temporary order. Mother sought both temporary and permanent custody of the couple's two children with supervised visitation with Father. Father was personally served the summons, the petition for dissolution of marriage, the application for a temporary order, and the order for hearing. Father appeared at the hearing on August 9, 2010. However, he did not file an answer or entry of appearance. Approximately one year later, the August 9, 2010 order was filed, giving Mother temporary custody of the children, allowing Father supervised visitation as agreed by the parties, and setting the temporary child support of $283.01 per month. The temporary order acknowledged that the "Respondent, TONY W. SCHWEIGERT, appear[ed] in person and Pro se" at the hearing. The record did not show that Father saw the temporary order or had a chance to contest its contents before it was filed. The record also did not show that a copy of the temporary order was ever sent to Father. Mother did not file a motion for default, and neither the decree nor any other document in the record said anything about any attempt to serve Father with notice of the hearing on the default judgment or whether his address was unknown. Nonetheless, Mother was granted a divorce, custody of the minor children with supervised visitation with Father, and child support of $283.01. Further, neither the transcript of the hearing for a temporary order nor the transcript of the 2011 hearing was designated for inclusion in the record. In 2013, Father filed a motion to vacate based on fraud and lack of due process. He contended that Mother defrauded him into not filing an answer and that he did not receive notice of the default hearing as required by Rule 10. At the hearing on the motion to vacate the default judgment, the district court stated: "I don't think that just appearing in court triggers making an appearance." A district court order was filed stating the matter came before the judge on October 22, 2013, denying the motion to vacate and finding "Respondent failed to meet Rule 10 requirement of entry, therefore Petitioner was not required to provide notice of default hearing to Respondent." Respondent appealed the denial of the motion to vacate, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment. The dispositive question raised for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review was whether a party must file a motion for default and give the adverse party notice under Rule 10 of the Rules for District Courts, 12 O.S.2011, ch. 2, app., when the adverse party fails to file an answer or an entry of appearance but physically appears at a hearing. The Court answered "yes," reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schweigert v. Schweigert" on Justia Law

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Partners in a civil union signed co-parenting agreements designating Plaintiff as the parent of Defendant's two biological children. Upon their separation and dissolution of the civil union, Plaintiff continued to act as a parent for the children. Defendant removed the children from Plaintiff's care, changed their last names, and planned to remove the children from Oklahoma. Plaintiff petitioned the District Court for, inter alia, a determination of her parental rights. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed. This was an issue of first impression in Oklahoma. Addressing the threshold issue of standing with regard to plaintiff's case, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff had standing to seek a best-interests-of-the-child hearing when the biological parent relinquished some of her parental rights through a co-parenting agreement. As such, the Court concluded the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss the case, and remanded the case to address other issues plaintiff raised on appeal. View "Eldredge v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the termination Respondent-appellant Billy McCall's (Father) parental rights to K.P.M.A. (Child). Child was born out-of-wedlock to T.Z. (Mother) in 2012. Prospective adoptive parents, petitioners-appellees Marshall and Toni Michelle Andrews had had physical custody of the child since she was released from the hospital after birth. On appeal of his termination, father argued: (1) whether his due process rights were violated; (2) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the termination proceedings; and (3) whether the trial court's determination was supported by clear and convincing evidence. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that termination of the natural father's parental rights was improper because the natural father's due process rights were violated, and the termination of the natural father's parental rights was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. View "In re Adoption of K.P.M.A." on Justia Law

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A daughter was appointed special guardian for her parents. Two lawyers entered an appearance on behalf of the parents and alleged that the parents had selected them as nominated counsel. The daughter sought to be named guardian and then a nephew and niece of the parents sought to be named guardians. Upon agreement of the parties an independent guardian was named. Hearings were held and an order issued that: (1) rejected the two lawyers as nominated counsel for the parents; and (2) denied a motion to reconsider a previous denial of a motion for unsupervised visitation by the nephew and niece and change of guardian to the nephew and niece. The allegedly nominated attorneys commenced an appeal which the Supreme Court retained. The trial court also denied a motion for emergency relief to change supervised visitation. A request for extraordinary relief from supervised visitations was filed during the appeal and the request was consolidated with the appeal. Subpoenas duces tecum were quashed relating to the wards' trusts. An additional request for extraordinary relief was filed during the pendency of the appeal based upon the order quashing the subpoenas, and we treat that proceeding as a companion case. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision that nominated counsel had a conflict of interest and were not independent, and that Petitioners failed to show that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or acted in excess of its authority when it denied an emergency motion to modify the supervised visitation, and that while the trial court incorrectly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to issue subpoenas duces tecum to a trustee of a ward's trust, it must hold a hearing on the objections to the discovery request and adjudicate which parties are entitled to participate in the discovery and determine whether a sustainable objection to discovery exists pursuant to the Discovery Code. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Berry" on Justia Law

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Debbie Roca (Houston) and Carlos Roca divorced in 1990. The decree of divorce included a child support computation which obligated Roca to pay the sum of $403.70 each month. After ten years of non-payment Houston cited Roca for contempt, alleging Roca had willfully failed to comply with the decree's child support mandates. A jury found the defendant guilty of indirect civil contempt, and he was sentenced to six months incarceration. Additionally, the trial judge imposed a judgment for past due child support in the amount of $85,392.77. In a 2000 judgment, the trial court determined that the principal arrearage owed was $55,400.27. This sum was set as the purge amount. Additionally, the judgment imposed statutory interest on the principal arrearage at a rate of ten percent per year. Neither party appealed this ruling. Following his incarceration, Roca paid $5,000 of the purge fee and was released from custody. The trial court conditioned Roca's release on his payment of $850.00 per month toward current and past due child support. Roca made payments for approximately two years, and on April 16, 2003, the trial court entered an order establishing a reduced purge fee of $40,215.87. The parties also entered into an agreed order lowering Roca's monthly child support payment to $193.74 per month. This order became effective May 1, 2003. The trial court lowered the cumulative monthly payment for current and past due child support from $850.00 to $600.00. The Oklahoma Department of Human Services began administering child support collections for the Roca case in 2003. Roca made monthly payments of $600.00 between June 2003 and August 2009. His support obligation terminated at the end of May 2005, when the parties' child reached the age of majority. In 2009, Roca filed a motion asking the district court to enter an order finding he had satisfied the principal child support arrearage; he further requested termination of the wage assignment. Roca later withdrew the motion and submitted a notice which asserted "all of his court-ordered child support payments" had been paid. The notice acknowledged owing some amount of accrued interest, but maintained that the remainder of his child support obligation had been paid in full. Houston filed an objection, claiming for the first time that all of Roca's previous payments should have been applied in the following order: (1) current child support, (2) interest on the judgment, and finally (3) the principal arrearage. According to Houston's calculations, Roca still owed $84,147.26. A default order was entered adopting the figures presented by Houston. The trial court sustained Roca's motion to vacate. Houston appealed the lower court's ruling and COCA reversed. COCA concluded that the facts of this case required application of the common law rule also known as the United States Rule. By applying the United States Rule, COCA found that Roca's payments should be credited first to current child support, second to accrued interest, and last to the principal balance of past-due child support. Roca appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated COCA's order, finding that Title 43 O.S. Supp. 2002 section 413 and DHS rules required payments made through the Centralized Support Registry in this case to be allocated first to current obligations, second to past due amounts, and finally to interest on the principle balance. View "Roca v. Roca" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Parents who adopted special needs children challenged decision by the Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide a lower assistance subsidy for the children than the assistance subsidy that would be paid if the children were in a foster placement. The decision was upheld upon administrative review by DHS and sustained by the district court and Court of Civil Appeals. Parents filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded DHS was attempting to apply a predetermined fixed amount of subsidy without allowing adoptive parents to show greater need up to the amount provided for special needs children in foster care. This was contrary to the policy and purpose of the statutory law providing and regulating financial assistance to people who undertake parental responsibility and care of special needs children. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was therefore vacated and the district court order sustaining the decision of the Department of Human Services was reversed. The case was remanded to the Department of Human Services for redetermination of the monthly subsidy amount. View "Troxell v. Oklahoma Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law