Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When T.H. was three, the parental rights of her mother were terminated. Within a year, T.H. was adopted. T.H. lived with her adoptive parents until she was 15 years old, when she disclosed that her adoptive father had been sexually abusing her since she was five or six years of age. A deprived petition was filed, both adoptive parents consented to termination of their parental rights, and a trial court granted the petition in 2013. T.H. filed an application to reinstate the parental rights of her biological mother. In 2009, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted section 1-4-909, Okla. Stat. tit. 10A (Supp. 2009), which allowed a child to request a court to reinstate previously terminated parental rights under specified circumstances. T.H. filed her application based on section 1-4-909, alleging her circumstances satisfied all criteria for reinstatement of her biological mother's parental rights. The State objected arguing that one element of the statute had not been met. The trial court agreed with the State and entered an order denying the application. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding the statute to be ambiguous but applied an "as written" literal construction of the statute to hold that the application was properly denied. The issue this case raised on appeal to the Supreme Court was one of first impression, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court found that the lower courts failed to construe the statute in a manner consistent with the rules of construction and the legislative intent stated in the Children's Code. View "In the matter of T.H." on Justia Law

Petitioner Baby F., through his attorney, requested that the Oklahoma Supreme Court assume original jurisdiction and issue a writ of prohibition forbidding the trial court from authorizing a change in his resuscitation status from full code to allow-natural-death pursuant to 10A O.S. 2011 section 1-3-102(C)(2). Baby F was one of several siblings the State sought to take into its emergency custody in an Application to Take Minor Children Into Emergency Custody on April 4, 2013. At that time, three-month-old Baby F had allegedly been diagnosed with several anomalies and genetic issues. At the hearing, Baby F's attending doctor testified as to Baby F's deteriorating condition, noting the numerous conditions identified when Baby F was born prematurely, and his continued respiratory troubles. According to the doctor, Baby F's acute respiratory events began to increase over time, necessitating several transfers to another facility, and the staff began to feel conflicted that they might be doing more to Baby F than for Baby F. Baby F filed an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for a writ of prohibition, however, while this original action was pending, the State received a letter from Baby F's physician of record at The Children's Hospital at OU Medical Center, stating that Baby F's condition had deteriorated to the point where he could not survive without being in a medically induced coma and medically paralyzed on a life supporting ventilator, and there was no reason to suspect the situation would improve. The letter noted the child was suffering and that further life sustaining therapy was not appropriate. An emergency hearing was held, and based on the doctor's testimony, the State moved to dismiss Baby F. from a deprived petition and requested that the court place the child in the custody of his mother and father for purpose of their consent to the do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order, thereby negating the need for the trial court's approval under 10A O.S. 2011 sec. 1-3-102(C)(2). The State also requested the court vacate the stay it previously issued in order to proceed. The trial court vacated its previous stay and dismissed the deprived child proceeding only as to Baby F and returned Baby F to his parents' custody. Baby F died on January 10, 2015. Petitioner alleged that by failing to provide for an evidentiary standard and fact-finding, 10A O.S. 2011 sec. 1-3-102(C)(2) violated the requirements of substantive due process. The Supreme Court agreed, and determined: 1) that though Petitioner died during the pendency of these proceedings, this case fell within recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine; and 2) in order to comply with the requirements of due process, before a withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment or the denial of the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on behalf of a child in DHS custody could be authorized under 10A O.S. 2011 sec. 1-3-102(C)(2), the court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that doing so is in the best interest of the child. View "Baby F v. Oklahoma County Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2010, Denise Schweigert (Mother) filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Tony Schweigert (Father) and an application for a temporary order. Mother sought both temporary and permanent custody of the couple's two children with supervised visitation with Father. Father was personally served the summons, the petition for dissolution of marriage, the application for a temporary order, and the order for hearing. Father appeared at the hearing on August 9, 2010. However, he did not file an answer or entry of appearance. Approximately one year later, the August 9, 2010 order was filed, giving Mother temporary custody of the children, allowing Father supervised visitation as agreed by the parties, and setting the temporary child support of $283.01 per month. The temporary order acknowledged that the "Respondent, TONY W. SCHWEIGERT, appear[ed] in person and Pro se" at the hearing. The record did not show that Father saw the temporary order or had a chance to contest its contents before it was filed. The record also did not show that a copy of the temporary order was ever sent to Father. Mother did not file a motion for default, and neither the decree nor any other document in the record said anything about any attempt to serve Father with notice of the hearing on the default judgment or whether his address was unknown. Nonetheless, Mother was granted a divorce, custody of the minor children with supervised visitation with Father, and child support of $283.01. Further, neither the transcript of the hearing for a temporary order nor the transcript of the 2011 hearing was designated for inclusion in the record. In 2013, Father filed a motion to vacate based on fraud and lack of due process. He contended that Mother defrauded him into not filing an answer and that he did not receive notice of the default hearing as required by Rule 10. At the hearing on the motion to vacate the default judgment, the district court stated: "I don't think that just appearing in court triggers making an appearance." A district court order was filed stating the matter came before the judge on October 22, 2013, denying the motion to vacate and finding "Respondent failed to meet Rule 10 requirement of entry, therefore Petitioner was not required to provide notice of default hearing to Respondent." Respondent appealed the denial of the motion to vacate, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment. The dispositive question raised for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review was whether a party must file a motion for default and give the adverse party notice under Rule 10 of the Rules for District Courts, 12 O.S.2011, ch. 2, app., when the adverse party fails to file an answer or an entry of appearance but physically appears at a hearing. The Court answered "yes," reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schweigert v. Schweigert" on Justia Law

Partners in a civil union signed co-parenting agreements designating Plaintiff as the parent of Defendant's two biological children. Upon their separation and dissolution of the civil union, Plaintiff continued to act as a parent for the children. Defendant removed the children from Plaintiff's care, changed their last names, and planned to remove the children from Oklahoma. Plaintiff petitioned the District Court for, inter alia, a determination of her parental rights. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed. This was an issue of first impression in Oklahoma. Addressing the threshold issue of standing with regard to plaintiff's case, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff had standing to seek a best-interests-of-the-child hearing when the biological parent relinquished some of her parental rights through a co-parenting agreement. As such, the Court concluded the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss the case, and remanded the case to address other issues plaintiff raised on appeal. View "Eldredge v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the termination Respondent-appellant Billy McCall's (Father) parental rights to K.P.M.A. (Child). Child was born out-of-wedlock to T.Z. (Mother) in 2012. Prospective adoptive parents, petitioners-appellees Marshall and Toni Michelle Andrews had had physical custody of the child since she was released from the hospital after birth. On appeal of his termination, father argued: (1) whether his due process rights were violated; (2) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the termination proceedings; and (3) whether the trial court's determination was supported by clear and convincing evidence. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that termination of the natural father's parental rights was improper because the natural father's due process rights were violated, and the termination of the natural father's parental rights was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. View "In re Adoption of K.P.M.A." on Justia Law

A daughter was appointed special guardian for her parents. Two lawyers entered an appearance on behalf of the parents and alleged that the parents had selected them as nominated counsel. The daughter sought to be named guardian and then a nephew and niece of the parents sought to be named guardians. Upon agreement of the parties an independent guardian was named. Hearings were held and an order issued that: (1) rejected the two lawyers as nominated counsel for the parents; and (2) denied a motion to reconsider a previous denial of a motion for unsupervised visitation by the nephew and niece and change of guardian to the nephew and niece. The allegedly nominated attorneys commenced an appeal which the Supreme Court retained. The trial court also denied a motion for emergency relief to change supervised visitation. A request for extraordinary relief from supervised visitations was filed during the appeal and the request was consolidated with the appeal. Subpoenas duces tecum were quashed relating to the wards' trusts. An additional request for extraordinary relief was filed during the pendency of the appeal based upon the order quashing the subpoenas, and we treat that proceeding as a companion case. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision that nominated counsel had a conflict of interest and were not independent, and that Petitioners failed to show that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or acted in excess of its authority when it denied an emergency motion to modify the supervised visitation, and that while the trial court incorrectly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to issue subpoenas duces tecum to a trustee of a ward's trust, it must hold a hearing on the objections to the discovery request and adjudicate which parties are entitled to participate in the discovery and determine whether a sustainable objection to discovery exists pursuant to the Discovery Code. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Berry" on Justia Law

Debbie Roca (Houston) and Carlos Roca divorced in 1990. The decree of divorce included a child support computation which obligated Roca to pay the sum of $403.70 each month. After ten years of non-payment Houston cited Roca for contempt, alleging Roca had willfully failed to comply with the decree's child support mandates. A jury found the defendant guilty of indirect civil contempt, and he was sentenced to six months incarceration. Additionally, the trial judge imposed a judgment for past due child support in the amount of $85,392.77. In a 2000 judgment, the trial court determined that the principal arrearage owed was $55,400.27. This sum was set as the purge amount. Additionally, the judgment imposed statutory interest on the principal arrearage at a rate of ten percent per year. Neither party appealed this ruling. Following his incarceration, Roca paid $5,000 of the purge fee and was released from custody. The trial court conditioned Roca's release on his payment of $850.00 per month toward current and past due child support. Roca made payments for approximately two years, and on April 16, 2003, the trial court entered an order establishing a reduced purge fee of $40,215.87. The parties also entered into an agreed order lowering Roca's monthly child support payment to $193.74 per month. This order became effective May 1, 2003. The trial court lowered the cumulative monthly payment for current and past due child support from $850.00 to $600.00. The Oklahoma Department of Human Services began administering child support collections for the Roca case in 2003. Roca made monthly payments of $600.00 between June 2003 and August 2009. His support obligation terminated at the end of May 2005, when the parties' child reached the age of majority. In 2009, Roca filed a motion asking the district court to enter an order finding he had satisfied the principal child support arrearage; he further requested termination of the wage assignment. Roca later withdrew the motion and submitted a notice which asserted "all of his court-ordered child support payments" had been paid. The notice acknowledged owing some amount of accrued interest, but maintained that the remainder of his child support obligation had been paid in full. Houston filed an objection, claiming for the first time that all of Roca's previous payments should have been applied in the following order: (1) current child support, (2) interest on the judgment, and finally (3) the principal arrearage. According to Houston's calculations, Roca still owed $84,147.26. A default order was entered adopting the figures presented by Houston. The trial court sustained Roca's motion to vacate. Houston appealed the lower court's ruling and COCA reversed. COCA concluded that the facts of this case required application of the common law rule also known as the United States Rule. By applying the United States Rule, COCA found that Roca's payments should be credited first to current child support, second to accrued interest, and last to the principal balance of past-due child support. Roca appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated COCA's order, finding that Title 43 O.S. Supp. 2002 section 413 and DHS rules required payments made through the Centralized Support Registry in this case to be allocated first to current obligations, second to past due amounts, and finally to interest on the principle balance. View "Roca v. Roca" on Justia Law

Parents who adopted special needs children challenged decision by the Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide a lower assistance subsidy for the children than the assistance subsidy that would be paid if the children were in a foster placement. The decision was upheld upon administrative review by DHS and sustained by the district court and Court of Civil Appeals. Parents filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded DHS was attempting to apply a predetermined fixed amount of subsidy without allowing adoptive parents to show greater need up to the amount provided for special needs children in foster care. This was contrary to the policy and purpose of the statutory law providing and regulating financial assistance to people who undertake parental responsibility and care of special needs children. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was therefore vacated and the district court order sustaining the decision of the Department of Human Services was reversed. The case was remanded to the Department of Human Services for redetermination of the monthly subsidy amount. View "Troxell v. Oklahoma Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

The biological father of H.M.W. and K.D.W. was in prison. He refused a writ of habeas corpus to attend the trial terminating his parental rights. When the case was called, Father's counsel requested a jury trial in absentia. In response, the State requested termination by default. Without ruling on these requests, the trial court heard testimony without a jury concerning the best interests of the children and potential harm to the children from continuing Father's parental relationship. In the end, the trial court denied the request for jury trial in absentia and granted the State's request for default termination. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the termination, but ruled that Father's refusal to appear resulted in a consent termination rather than a default judgment. Father appealed that outcome. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in terminating Father's parental rights without a jury trial, and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming that judgment. Accordingly, both courts' decisions were vacated or reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "In the matter of H.M.W." on Justia Law

A Decree of Divorce entered August 1, 2008, granted the parties a divorce and awarded the appellee (Mother) alimony, to be paid periodically for seventy-two months, plus child support. The appellant (Father) lost his job and had not found other employment. Father filed a motion to modify the Decree of Divorce to reduce the amount of child support and to discontinue the support alimony. Father requested that his income be imputed at minimum wage. Mother objected on the grounds that Father either resigned his job voluntarily or committed acts that led to his dismissal, such as failing to appear at work for three days. Mother's position was that because Father's actions caused his changed circumstances, he should not be relieved of his court ordered obligations. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the decrease in income was temporary and was due to appellant's voluntary act of resigning his job. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, stating that appellant's voluntary decision to resign based on his own misconduct did not relieve him of his obligation to pay child support. The Supreme Court granted the appellant's petition for certiorari and found that the trial court made no finding that Father acted in bad faith and there was no evidence that Father resigned his job in order to avoid his support obligations under the divorce decree. The court's denial of the motion to modify was against the clear weight of the evidence. The order denying the motion to modify was therefore reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for recalculation of the Father's support obligations in light of his changed circumstances. View "Garcia v. Garcia" on Justia Law