Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellee Shelly Dilbeck initiated an action to enforce her 2001 divorce decree. Among the issues she raised, the district court decided that an acceleration clause on interest on the property division in a consent decree did not accelerate the property division payments as set out in the decree. On review of that issue, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The divorce decree required Mr. Dilbeck to pay property division alimony according to a schedule, and the judgment would not accumulate interest as long as it was paid in full according to the schedule. In the event he missed any payment the entire amount was to accumulate interest at the judgment rate. After some initial payments, Mr. Dilbeck did not pay the final payments. Upon review of the decree, the Supreme Court found that it did not provide that all property division installment payments would be accelerated when a payment was missed. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on each installment until their scheduled payment times. The Court affirmed part of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, and reversed its decision on property division. The case was remanded back to the trial court for review of the property division and a recalculation of the amounts due Plaintiff. View "Dilbeck v. Dilbeck" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Sheila Yvonne Berman sought assistance from the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) to determine paternity and to collect child support. She alleged Herbert White, Jr. was the father of her child. DHS brought an administrative action to determine paternity and arranged for Defendant-Appellee Laboratory Corporation of America (d/b/a Lab Corp, Inc.) to conduct the DNA test. LabCorp reported White was not the father of Berman's child. The test was performed a second time with similar results. After the DHS proceeding concluded, Berman submitted an envelope, purportedly containing White's DNA, to a different lab for DNA testing. This time the results were different. Berman filed a paternity action against White. He was ordered to submit to another paternity test. The test results were virtually identical to the DNA sample contained on the envelope, and White was judicially determined to be the father of Berman's child. White appealed, but the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the trial court. While the county court case was still pending, Berman filed this lawsuit in the district court seeking money damages from LabCorp for the negligent testing of White's DNA sample in the DHS administrative proceeding. In her petition, Berman alleged that as a result of LabCorp's negligence, she suffered damages in excess of $10,000.00 for the "loss of past and future child support payments that White would have been required to pay, had the paternity test results been correct, showing White to be the biological father of Plaintiff's child." Berman alleged LabCorp had the duty of care of a "reasonably prudent professional in the paternity testing field" and that its actions constituted a breach of that duty. The issue in this case was whether LabCorp owed Berman a duty of care. If so, Berman stated a claim for negligence against LabCorp, unrelated to the publication of the lab results. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, and reversed and remanded the case for trial. View "Berman v. Laboratory Corporation of America" on Justia Law

Prospective Adoptive Parents M.B. and V.B. and Baby Boy K.B. challenged a district court decision that denied the adoptive parents' motion to terminate the biological father's parental rights and petition for adoption. The district court ordered K.B. returned to his biological father. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether K.B. was eligible for adoption without the consent of his biological father. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that K.B. was not eligible for adoption because K.B.'s biological father exercised his parental rights regarding the child, including contributing to the support of the biological mother during pregnancy. The sufficiency of the support was a fact to be determined by the trial court, so the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision but remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Adoption of Baby Boy K.B." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Troy Kimble, brought a small claims action against his ex-wife and her daughter to recover certain property awarded to him following their divorce. He had previously filed a contempt citation which was concluded before the filing of the small claims action. The trial court sua sponte ruled that the Plaintiff's claim was thus barred by the statute of limitations and had preclusive effect on the contempt proceeding. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in applying the applicable statute of limitations to the evidence adduced at the small claims proceeding to resolve the case. Accordingly the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Kimble v. Kimble" on Justia Law

Petitioners-Appellees, Teryl Pearson and Robert Pearson (Pearsons) petitioned to adopt Teryl Pearson's (Pearson) grandson, G.D.J. The natural mother, Respondent-Appellant Tessia Bre Stubbs (Stubbs) contested the adoption. The trial court entered two orders on August 11, 2010, in favor of the Pearsons on their Application to Adjudicate Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother and in its Order Adjudicating Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother. Stubbs raised multiple issues in her attempt to block the adoption. Among them, she argued that the trial court erred in finding that she failed to contribute to the support of G.D.J., and failed to maintain a meaningful relationship with G.D.J. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court's decision to allow the adoption to proceed. View "In re Adoption of G.D.J." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pamela Casey filed a petition for divorce in 2003. The district court entered a decree of dissolution and divided the marital property. Defendant William Casey appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the lower court to adjust the division of the marital property. The trial judge remembered hearing an earlier case involving Plaintiff when he worked at the Garvin County district attorneyâs office. In that case, Defendantâs new wife sought a protective order against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was charged with felony malicious injury to property. The judge recused himself from hearing that case. The charges were eventually dropped. The judge still felt strongly about the disposition of that earlier case, but he felt he could be objective enough to hear Plaintiffâs divorce case and divide the marital property as ordered by the appellate court. Plaintiffâs divorce counsel asked the judge to recuse himself again, and the judge refused. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to step aside. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that âbased on the facts and circumstances in this case, and in fairness and justice to the Plaintiff, the trial judge was obligated to recuse.â The Court vacated the appellate courtâs decision, reversed the trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.