Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-claimant Jeanette Ball sought permanent total disability benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund. The Workers' Compensation Court held that a "Crumby" finding of preexisting disability made simultaneously with the adjudication of an on-the-job injury could be combined with the adjudicated injury to render the Claimant a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 sec. 171 and awarded Petitioner permanent total disability benefits. The Fund appealed, and a three-judge panel reversed. Claimant then appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the panel. After its review, the Supreme Court held that an employee must be a physically impaired person as defined by the applicable statute before he or she can seek benefits from the Fund. A "Crumby" finding of preexisting disability made simultaneously with an adjudication of an on-the-job injury could not be combined with such adjudicated injury to render the Claimant a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp 2005 sec. 171. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ball v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review centered on a dispute between Defendants-Appellants The Board of County Commissioners of Canadian County and certain citizens and officers of Canadian County, over the legal usage of funds generated from a sales tax enacted by the voters of Canadian County in 1996. In response to concerns raised over the legality of using funds generated by the Tax to pay for juvenile programs and services, in addition to the physical structures, an Attorney General Opinion was requested. The Attorney General issued an opinion concerning the matter in 2014. The Attorney General examined the resolution in question, Resolution No. 96-20, and determined that the language did not authorize use of the Tax for the funding of programs, salaries and expenses related to operation of the juvenile bureau, or even certain aspects of the physical facilities. In the wake of the Opinion, the Board ceased using the Tax for funding the programs, services, and salaries deemed outside the purpose of the Tax, and instead sought other funding sources for those items. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Board in the District Court in late 2014, seeking declaratory relief, a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction pending a declaratory ruling, and a writ of mandamus by way of ancillary relief. In an order filed on January 28, 2015, the trial court granted Citizens' request for a temporary injunction, determining: (1) Citizens were likely to prevail in their request for a declaratory judgment; (2) the Board would not suffer irreparable harm if the temporary injunction was issued; and (3) Citizens would suffer irreparable harm if the temporary injunction was not issued. The Board appealed, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof for a temporary injunction. After examining the available evidence, the Supreme Court determined that that the trial court's issuance of a temporary injunction was not an abuse of discretion or against the clear weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the order of the trial court granting a temporary injunction was affirmed. View "Edwards v. Bd. of Cty. Commr's." on Justia Law

Taxpayers Don and Mary Frankenberg made improvements to their home in 2001. The Garvin County Assessor did not increase the fair cash value of the property for the improvements until 2012 when she visually inspected the property and discovered the improvements. The Assessor notified the Taxpayers of a new assessed fair cash value, which was a substantial increase from the previous valuation in 1999. The Taxpayers protested the assessment, arguing that under Art. X, section 8B of the Oklahoma Constitution, the fair cash value of the property could not be increased more than 5% in any year. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Taxpayers, and the Assessor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the exception to the 5% cap for improvements to a property existed only for the year the improvements were made to the property and did not apply in the year when the Assessor first discovers the improvements. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Frankenberg v. Strickland" on Justia Law

The Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA) terminated the employment of petitioner Chester Rouse after several years of evaluations of inefficiency, incompetence, and misconduct, and after three significant events which occurred at its coal fired plant. Rouse appealed the termination to the Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission (OMPC) and then to the district court. The administrative appeal and the district court appeal each resulted in the affirmation of the termination. Rouse appealed to the Supreme Court, raising 16 issues of alleged error, some of which were found by the Court to be redundant, repetitive, related, or were not briefed on appeal. The Court consolidated the issues into four broader issues: (1) the trial court erred in its statutory interpretation of 74 O.S. 2011 section 840-6.5; (2) the trial court erred in determining that the reasons for termination were not pretextual or post hoc rationalizations; (3) the trial court erred in determining that plaintiff was estopped from challenging the level of discipline imposed (termination); and (4) its review of OMPC's ruling and the admission of certain evidence. After consideration of these issues, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the trial court. View "Rouse v. Oklahoma Merit Protection Comm'n" on Justia Law

According to appellant Robert Perry, he and his friends attended the Norman Music Festival in 2013. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on the early morning of April 27, 2013, Perry and his friends left the Festival on bicycles to go home. On the way home, a Norman police officer, also on a bicycle, approached Perry's friends. The officer began issuing citations to Perry's friends for running a stop sign on their bicycles. The officer also asked Perry if he was interfering with the traffic stop. Perry responded that he was just waiting for his friends so they could continue home. The officer then rapidly approached Perry and threw his arm, with nightstick in hand, around Perry's throat and placed him in a choke hold with extreme force to his neck. Perry, frightened, began fighting for air and struggled to get out of the choke hold in order to breathe. As more police officers arrived at the scene, they slammed Perry over onto his stomach with several officers' knees and elbows pressed into his back and limbs, forcing him to the ground. Perry had committed no crime and was not resisting arrest. While on the ground, an officer grabbed Perry's arm and violently and quickly twisted it back causing the bone behind his elbow to sustain a large fracture. Perry eventually became unconscious from the shock of the fracture and the lack of air due to the choke hold. The City successfully moved to dismiss the case, and Perry appealed. Perry argued that the Supreme Court's holding in "Bosh v. Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority,"305 P.3d 994, applied to this case and the trial court erred in dismissing his lawsuit. The City argued that "Bosh" did not apply because Perry had a remedy available pursuant to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (OGTCA). "The OGTCA cannot be construed as immunizing the state completely from all liability for violations of the constitutional rights of its citizens. To do so, would not only fail to conform to established precedent which refused to construe the OGTCA as providing blanket immunity, but would also render the Constitutional protections afforded the citizens of this State as ineffective." However, the Supreme Court held that under Bosh, claims for excessive force against a municipality may not be brought against a governmental entity when a cause of action under the OGTCA is available. Because appellant did not seek relief for his injuries under the OGTCA, the trial court did not err in dismissing his case. View "Perry v. City of Norman" on Justia Law

Vandelay Entertainment, LLC d.b.a. The Lost Ogle filed suit in district court to obtain records that the Governor withheld when responding to Vandelay's Open Records Act request. The district court ruled the Governor had a common law privilege to withhold the records in question. In conclusion, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that the Governor has a privilege to protect confidential advice solicited or received from "senior executive branch officials" for use in deliberating policy and making discretionary decisions. We disagree, however, with the trial court's conclusion that this privilege rests solely upon common law. We hold that this privilege is a "power properly belonging" to the Governor's constitutional office as head of the executive branch and is protected by the separation of powers clause in Article 4, section 1. The need for confidential advice from "senior executive branch officials" for use in the Governor's deliberations and decision-making is "essential to the existence, dignity and functions" of the executive branch. Also, the need to protect such confidential advice is so ultimately connected and bound up with the executive function that the right to regulate disclosure of such confidential advice by way of a privilege naturally and logically belongs to the executive branch. This privilege is not absolute, however, and is subject to the check and balance of in camera judicial review, in lieu of legislatively-mandated public disclosure. The Governor has the burden upon in camera judicial review to demonstrate that any material relating to such confidential advice satisfies the criteria set forth in this opinion. Even confidential advice that satisfies this criteria can be subject to disclosure where (1) the requesting party can show a substantial or compelling need for disclosure and (2) the need for disclosure outweighs the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the advice. View "Vandelay Entertainment, LLC v. Fallin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jerry Fent, challenged Senate Bill No. 1246, alleging that because it was a revenue bill and subject to the requirements of the Oklahoma Constitution art. 5, sec. 33, was unconstitutional because the Legislature did not follow the Constitution when it was enacted. The parties conceded that the bill did not meet the requirements of art. 5. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the ballot title indicated that the measure was aimed at only bills "intended to raise revenue" and "revenue raising bills," the obvious meaning of raising revenue in this context was to increase revenue. Senate Bill 1246 was not unconstitutional, and the Court denied petitioner's request for declaratory relief. View "Fent v. Fallin" on Justia Law

The main issue on appeal in this case was whether the purchase of electricity and natural gas utility services qualifies for a sales tax exemption. Appellant-taxpayer American Airlines, Inc., ("AA") was denied a refund for the sales tax it paid on its purchases of electricity and natural gas utility services during the 2006 calendar year. The Account Maintenance and Compliance Division of the Oklahoma Tax Commission denied the request. Appellant timely protested the denial. The Oklahoma Tax Commission, by order, adopted the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the administrative law judge finding taxpayer failed to prove the denial was incorrect. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the Services Exemption (68 O.S. Supp. 2006, section 1357 (28)) provided an exemption for electricity and natural gas utility services used by AA during 2006 in aircraft repair and maintenance activities. The remaining issue concerned the appropriate methodology for determining the amount of the sales tax refund AA should have received on its 2006 purchases of utility services. The adopted Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations did not make a specific finding concerning an appropriate methodology. The Court remanded the case back to the Oklahoma Tax Commission for further proceedings. View "American Airlines, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Appellants Homesales, Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and Jason L. Howell, appealed the district court's order certifying this case as a class action at the request of Appellee Marshall County. This case centered on the Documentary Stamp Tax Act, and its applicability to a sheriff's deed granted to Homesales in a mortgage foreclosure action prosecuted by JPMorgan. Homesales claimed that the transaction was exempt from documentary tax. The County disagreed and sued to collect the tax it claimed was due. The County also moved to certify the case as a class action in which all Oklahoma counties would join as plaintiffs. The district court granted the County's motion and certified the case pursuant to Title 12 O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 2023 (B)(3) and the defendants appealed. Because the County was precluded by the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in "Murray Cnty. v. Homesales, Inc.," (330 P.3d 519) from suing to collect unpaid taxes allegedly due pursuant to the DSTA, the district court's class certification order was reversed and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Marshall County v. Homesales, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Shaloa Edwards brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City of Sallisaw, the city manager, and the mayor. Plaintiff was the elected police chief of Sallisaw, Oklahoma, and just prior to Plaintiff bringing suit, the board of commissioners passed an ordinance removing Plaintiff's supervisory and management authority over the police department. The district court found that the ordinance improperly removed the police chief's authority to supervise and manage the police department and deprived the police chief of his due process protections by circumventing statutory and local removal procedures and effectively removing him from office. A home-rule city has a sovereign right to govern itself in purely municipal matters. Here, the Sallisaw Board of Commissioners had the ability to set out the duties and authority of a police chief's day-to-day responsibilities. The Supreme Court held that it would not question how a city charter allocated the authority to set the police chief's duties and responsibilities if not contrary to statute, precedent, or Constitution. The Sallisaw city charter granted that authority to the board of commissioners. The district court's order and permanent injunction was therefore vacated. View "EDWARDS v. CITY OF SALLISAW" on Justia Law