Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Tulsa County Assessor assessed ad valorem taxes on portions of real property owned by the respondent-appellees (and taxpayers) William Warren Medical Research Center and Montereau, Inc. The taxpayers challenged the assessment and the County Board of Equalization determined that the properties were not taxable. The Assessor appealed to the Tulsa County District Court which found in favor of the taxpayers. The Assessor again appealed but the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal because the Assessor was not represented by the district attorney, nor the State Attorney General. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that county assessors may employ counsel to represent them in court proceedings including appeals from the Board of Equalization. Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter to the Court of Civil Appeals to address the merits of the appeal. View "Yazel v. William K. Warren Medical Research Center" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a transfer of real property between affiliated business entities constituted a "sale" for purposes of the Documentary Stamp Tax Act. Defendants Homesales, Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and EMC Mortgage, LLC, f/k/a EMC Mortgage Corporation appealed an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Murray County, Oklahoma, County Commissioners ex rel. Murray County, Oklahoma and Johnston County, Oklahoma, County Commissioners ex rel. Johnston County, Oklahoma (the Counties). Chase filed four foreclosure cases and was the successful bidder at each sheriff's sale. Therefore, Chase was entitled to a sheriff's deed to each of the properties. However, Chase did not take title. Instead, sheriff's deeds were granted to Chase's affiliated entities. The deeds were recorded with the respective county clerks. The grantees noted on the conveyances that the deeds were exempt from documentary taxes. No documentary taxes were paid. The Counties contended the conveyances involved in this case were not exempt and filed suit to collect the applicable documentary taxes. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the Counties finding that the conveyances were not exempt from the DSTA, and that the Counties could sue to enforce the provisions of the DSTA and collect the documentary taxes that were not paid on these transactions. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the Counties were not authorized to prosecute violations of the DSTA. The Counties did have standing to challenge the exemptions from the documentary tax claimed for these conveyances. The Court reversed the order granting partial summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Murray County v. Homesales, Inc." on Justia Law

The Attorney General (AG) brought suit against Native Wholesale Supply alleging violations of the Oklahoma Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. In 1998, four of the largest tobacco product manufacturers and forty-six states entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) to settle litigation brought by the states to recoup health care expenses resulting from cigarette smoking. In 1999, the Legislature required tobacco product manufacturers who do not join the MSA and whose cigarettes were sold in Oklahoma to make annual payments into escrow accounts to cover health care expenses resulting from cigarette smoking. In August of 2006, the AG removed both Seneca brand cigarettes and their manufacturer, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., from the AG's directory. In 2007 and 2008, Native Wholesale Supply (NWS) caused Seneca cigarettes to be brought into Oklahoma knowing that the tobacco product manufacturer did not comply with the Escrow Statute or the Complementary Act and that the Seneca cigarette manufacturer and Seneca cigarettes were not on the AG's directory. In May of 2008, Oklahoma Attorney General Drew Edmondson, sought disgorgement and payment to the State of all gross proceeds realized by NWS from the sale of contraband Seneca cigarettes in violation of the Complementary Act. NWS removed the case to federal court asserting complete federal preemption of this state-law suit because NWS "is chartered by the Sac and Fox Nation, is wholly owned by a member of the Seneca Nation, and conducts business on Indian land with Native Americans." The federal court concluded the case was improperly removed and remanded it to the state court. The state district court then granted NWS' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied NWS' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The AG appealed the subject matter jurisdiction dismissal and NWS counter-appealed the personal jurisdiction ruling. The Supreme Court held that the State has personal jurisdiction over NWS based on the Company's purposeful availment of the Oklahoma cigarette marketplace and had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit. NWS filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and listed three states in the proceeding as having claims similar to Oklahoma's lodged against it. The three states jointly moved to lift the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay and directed that "information produced by [NWS] during discovery in the bankruptcy case shall be treated by the States as satisfying any request for such information in the State Litigation." The information NWS turned over to Oklahoma included documents showing the cigarette sales and shipping transactions between NWS and Muscogee Creek Nation Tobacco Wholesale and Bowen Wholesale from 2006 to 2010. The state district court case proceeded; and the AG moved for summary judgment. The district court sustained the AG's motion for summary judgment, denied NWS' cross-motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of Oklahoma. The district court denied NWS' motion for new trial. NWS appealed the summary judgment and denial of a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Oklahoma v. Native Wholesale Supply" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court centered on the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals' decision to reverse the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction against the Defendant-Appellant, the Oklahoma Military Department ("Department"), and the trial court's order overruling the Department's motion for new trial and to vacate the temporary injunction. The trial court temporarily restrained and enjoined the Department from making pay increases conditioned upon leaving the classified service. In 2011, 44 O.S. 2011, section 21.1 was amended to require personnel appointed as state employees in the Department to be in the unclassified service and to provide additional leave flexibility. To coincide with this amendment, the Department issued new policies on hiring, promotions and salary administration. The new policy references 74 O.S. 2011, section 840-4.2 (C), which provides existing classified employees may remain in the classified service when a classified position has been placed in the unclassified service. Section 7 of the new policy indicates this choice is only applicable to permanent classified employees. It also provided that permanent classified employees may choose to move to the unclassified service after submitting a written resignation from their classified position. Any future vacancies will be filled exclusively in the unclassified service. In late August 2012 a series of e-mails by the Department were sent detailing which classified employees would be eligible for a raise. The e-mails indicate a performance-based adjustment would be granted to those permanent classified employees who had received "exceeds standards" on their annual personal progress report. However, an additional condition excluded from the raise all permanent classified employees who did not elect to resign from the classified service and enter the unclassified service. These classified employees were required to submit their resignation letters by August 30, 2012, in order to accept the offer. Plaintiff-Appellee, the Oklahoma Public Employees Association ("OPEA"), on behalf of some of the Department's affected permanent and probationary classified employees, filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restraining and enjoining the Department from conditioning pay increases on declassification of permanent classified employees. The Court did, however, reverse the trial court's order as far as this provision of the order was applicable to probationary classified employees. The Court held that there was not the same protection to probationary classified employees as there was for permanent classified employees and the Department's actions concerning the probationary classified employee. The second provision of the trial court order enjoined the Department from: "[making] (2) an employee's raise or pay increase based solely upon such employee's status as a classified or unclassified employee." The meaning of this part of the order, the Supreme Court found, was unclear. The Supreme Court reversed this part of the trial court's order insofar as this provision could be interpreted to restrain and enjoin the Department from granting pay increases authorized by law. Furthermore, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Department's motion for new trial and to vacate the temporary order. View "Oklahoma Public Employees Assoc. v. Oklahoma Military Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Department of Transportation ("ODOT"), filed a condemnation proceeding against Lamar Advertising of Oklahoma Inc., and Lamar Central Outdoor, Inc., for the removal of an outdoor advertising sign and the acquisition of Lamar's leasehold interest associated with the sign. ODOT previously acquired the real property on which the sign was located as part of a highway improvement project and, as such, the sign needed to be removed. Lamar erected the sign on the underlying property pursuant to a written lease agreement with the owners of the land. Lamar removed the sign but kept it. ODOT argued that the sign was a trade fixture and that trade fixtures were personal property. As such, ODOT claims Lamar was only entitled to the depreciated reproduction costs of the sign or the costs associated with the sign's relocation. Furthermore, ODOT argued that Lamar's method of valuation improperly allowed for the recovery of lost business income and profits. Lamar argued that regardless of whether the sign is personal or real property, the only criteria was fair market value of the sign and its related interests. Lamar valued its property interests at $429,000 while ODOT valued the property significantly less (roughly $60,000). At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding Lamar $206,000 in just compensation for its interests. Lamar filed a motion for new trial and a motion to reconsider, both of which the trial court denied. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that there was competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury as to the amount of damages awarded Lamar. As such, the Court found no grounds for reversing the judgment of the lower court. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Transportaion v. Lamar Advertising of Oklahoma, Inc. " on Justia Law

Two customers of Wagoner County Rural Water District No. 2 contested the rate charged for providing water to their respective recreational vehicle parks. The customers complained they were charged more for water service than other businesses, and that this practice discriminated against their recreational park businesses and violated the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act. Over the objection of the District, the trial court submitted customers' antitrust claim to a jury who found in favor of the customers. Both the customers and the District appealed the judgment entered on the jury verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act did not apply to rates charged by a rural water district; and (2) a customer's relief to challenge a rate was to seek review by the water district and then to appeal to the district court any adverse decision. View "Sinor's Bay Marina, LLC v. Wagoner County Rural Water Dist. No. 2" on Justia Law

Kyle Smith was allegedly drag racing on a motorcycle. A Stillwater police officer attempted to stop Smith. When he failed to stop, several Payne County and City of Stillwater law enforcement officers pursued Smith. In the course of the pursuit, Smith drove his motorcycle into the edge of a "T" intersection, resulting in a crash into a creek where he struck a tree and was killed. Petitioner-appellant Randy Smith (Kyle's Father) brought action against the state and political subdivisions alleging tortious conduct on the part of law enforcement in pursuing Kyle. The trial court dismissed the Board of County Commissioners on grounds of sovereign immunity, denied Smith's request to reconsider, and granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Stillwater after determining its officers owed no legal duty to Decedent. Smith appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Both Smith and the County filed Petitions for Certiorari. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address: (1) whether the County was immune from suit for the actions taken by its law enforcement officers in pursuit of Kyle; and (2) whether the City and County owed a legal duty to Kyle. The Court answered both questions with a "no:" negligent performance of law enforcement function is not shielded from immunity; the provisions of 51 O.S. 155 do not immunize the State or its political subdivisions for the actions taken by their law enforcement officers engaged in police pursuits. Though the district court's dismissal of the County on the grounds of immunity was based upon an erroneous legal conclusion (and therefore its refusal to reconsider was an abuse of discretion), neither the County's nor the City's law enforcement personnel owed a duty of care to the decedent. This case was remanded back to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the County. View "Smith v. City of Stillwater" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified three questions of Oklahoma law to the state Supreme Court. Plaintiff, a probationary police trainee, filed suit in the federal court pertaining his status as a probationary trainee under the terms of the municipality's collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Supreme Court reformulated the first question, and answered questions one and two in the negative. Question three was not answered because it was dependent on an affirmative answer to question two. The questions certified to the Court were: (1) whether a probationary police officer in a municipality that has entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with a recognized bargaining agent under the Fire and Police Arbitration Act,who is excluded by the terms of the CBA from having access to the grievance/arbitration process contained in the CBA in connection with the termination of his/her employment due to his/her probationary status, but who was also a member of the Police Pension and Retirement Systems, at the time of the termination of his employment, has a right to be terminated only for cause by OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, sec. 50-123(B) and, thus, was entitled to due process in connection with the termination of his/her employment; (2) whether the probationary police officer under that scenario had a statutory right to a hearing before a Police Pension Review Board as provided for by statute; and (3) if a probationary police officer had a statutory right to a hearing before a Police Pension Board of Review, must the officer request a hearing and when must the officer request a hearing, or must the municipality offer a hearing and when must the municipality offer a hearing? View "Brewer v. City of Seminole" on Justia Law

Employee Chester Rouse filed a wrongful termination suit against the Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA) and Daniel S. Sullivan. The petition alleged GRDA and Mr. Sullivan terminated him in retaliation for filing an overtime complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Rouse also alleged the termination of his employment for filing this complaint violated Oklahoma public policy protecting whistleblowers who make external reports of unlawful activity by their employers. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, ruling: (1) sovereign immunity barred Rouse's claim based on the federal Fair Labor Standards Act; and (2) the Oklahoma Whistleblower Act provided employee's remedy for the alleged wrongful termination, not state tort law. Rouse appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly ruled that Rouse failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and properly dismissed this suit. View "Rouse v. Grand River Dam Authority" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a delay of approximately twenty months in scheduling a driver's license revocation hearing was a violation of the driver's constitutional right to a speedy trial (as guaranteed by the State Constitution). Plaintiff-driver Phillip Pierce appealed the suspension of his driver's license in an administrative proceeding for driving under the influence (DUI). The trial court agreed that plaintiff's constitutional right was violated and set aside the revocation order and reinstated Pierce's driving privileges. A divided Court of Civil Appeals reversed. Although expressing its concern related to the inordinate delay in the proceedings, the appellate court determined that Pierce had not asserted his right to a speedy resolution of his cause, was not prejudiced by the postponement, and that the Department did not abuse its discretion in waiting almost two years to finalize the charges in the cause. Knowing that its complaining witness was scheduled to be deployed to serve his country, the Department of Public Safety intentionally postponed the proceeding and did not schedule a hearing to allow the driver to be heard either on the merits or on the delay. These delays occurred despite the driver's timely request for a hearing. Under those unique facts, the Supreme Court held that the driver's right to a speedy hearing was violated and ordered reinstatement of his driving privileges. View "Pierce v. Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law