Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a licensed bail bondsman and several insurance companies that issue bail bonds, sued for an injunction against Curtis Pletcher, a registered professional bail bondsman. They argued he violated the "Ten Bond Rule" by using a surety bondsman to write more than ten bonds per year in violation of Oklahoma law. Plaintiffs argued that after Pletcher (or a surety bondsman) wrote bonds on ten defendants in Oklahoma County in one year, subsequent bonds written in that county were illegal and the Court Clerk should have refused to file them. The Court Clerk moved to dismiss because power and authority to enforce the Ten Bond Rule lies with the Insurance Commissioner. The trial judge granted the motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs' motion for new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding it correctly ruled that enforcement of the Ten Bond Rule lies with the Insurance Commissioner and not the Court Clerk. View "Dowell v. Pletcher" on Justia Law

The dispositive issue in this appeal was whether the trial judge erred in issuing a temporary injunction. The substantive issue in this appeal was whether the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association (OSSAA) acted in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner when he imposed a forfeiture penalty against Wright City Public School (Wright City) for violation of OSSAA's 22-game limit baseball rule. On April 30, 2013, the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association determined that the Wright City Public School violated the Association's rules when the varsity baseball team played the Idabel junior varsity team and the Valliant varsity team. The Executive Director imposed the penalty, requiring the Wright City team to forfeit the next two games. The penalty eliminated Wright City from the 2013 Class A state tournament scheduled for May 2 and 3, 2013. On May 1, the district court entered a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. The Supreme Court concluded "[a]ll the players in this controversy" erred: (1) the Executive Director should not have decided the alleged rule violation with Wright City's request for reconsideration pending and without allowing Wright City a meeting with the investigator; (2) Wright City should not have sought district court relief before the OSSAA Board of Directors denied it any relief; and (3) the district court should not have entertained the petition for injunctive relief before it had proof that the OSSAA Board of Directors refused to rule on the alleged rule violation and refused to extend the baseball season to allow Wright City to exercise its rights under the due process procedure in the OSSAA Constitution. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dissolved the district court's temporary injunction and remanded the case to the district court with directions to stay this proceeding until Wright City had an opportunity to challenge the allegations of rule violation before the OSSAA Board of Directors pursuant to OSSAA's Constitution. View "Wright City Public Schools v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Assn." on Justia Law

Petitioner Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Protection Federation of Oklahoma, Inc. sought writs of prohibition and mandamus to disqualify a hearing officer in an administrative proceeding conducted by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), to restart the proceeding with a new hearing officer, and to prohibit ex parte communications between the hearing officer and the OWRB and other agencies. The proceedings in question concern the Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Maximum Annual Yield (MAY) determination, made by OWRB on March 13, 2012. Upon review of the OWRB record, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner was entitled to a fair and impartial proceeding. While the Court did not find the hearing officer to be biased and would not order her disqualification, "in the interest of fairness and in order to remedy any appearance of impropriety," the Court issued a writ of mandamus to compel the hearing officer to notify the parties to the administrative proceeding of any and all ex parte communications that occurred between her and federal agencies and to include those communications in the record, so that the parties may have an opportunity to respond. The Court concluded that Petitioner satisfied the necessary requirements for a writ of mandamus, and therefore issued a writ compelling the hearing officer to provide notice of her ex parte communications to all parties, to disclose the contents of those communications to the parties, and incorporate those communications and responses to them into the record. View "Arbuckle Simpson Aquifier Protection Federation of Okla. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd." on Justia Law

The plaintiff-appellant sued the defendant-appellee for professional negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The appellant was a party to a divorce and child custody litigation. The appellee, a court-appointed psychologist, was to serve as an expert to conduct an evaluation of the parties and of their children. The appellant alleged that he paid the appellee for the evaluation and after several months, as a result of the inaction of the appellee, her report had not been provided as ordered. The appellant settled the divorce proceedings in a manner he claimed was injurious to him and his son. The trial court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss. The motion urged that as a court-appointed witness, the appellee was immune to liability in damages. Though after its review, the Supreme Court found that as a court-appointed expert, appellee was indeed immune to liability in damages, "her duty was to the court." However, because the appellant claimed that the appellee failed to provide any services whatsoever for the amount paid, the Court treated those allegations as true: "[a]n expert would not be entitled to claim a fee for a court-ordered service that was not provided. This does not mean the appellant must be satisfied with the fees, but the appellant has a right to have the court decide if the fees were earned, and whether there was a valid legal defense to the assertions of the appellant that the appellee neither completed the required report, nor testified." The appellant admitted that the underlying child custody was settled, so the trial court should have also considered the impact the settlement had on the appellee's opportunity to complete the report or to testify. Accordingly, the trial court's granting the appellee's motion to dismiss was reversed and remanded for further consideration. View "Simonson v. Schaefer" on Justia Law

Frank George, a student at the University of Oklahoma, was charged by the University with violating five provisions of the University's student code. The Campus Disciplinary Board (CDB) found that he was guilty of violating three provisions of the Code: 16.4 (Failing to Comply with Directions of Institutional Officials), 16.65 (Public Drunkenness), and 16.25 (Violating Applicable Local, State, or Federal Laws). He appealed to the University's Campus Disciplinary Council (CDC) and alleged that the evidence was insufficient for the administrative decisions that the student code had been violated. The CDC reviewed the statements of the witnesses and the student, and in its written decision concluded that the student had failed to meet his burden to show that the evidence against him was insufficient. The decision of the CDB was sustained by the CDC. George "appealed" the decision to the district court. The University filed a motion to dismiss the petition and argued that the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act did not authorize appellate jurisdiction in the District Court. The court denied the motion to dismiss, stayed proceedings, and certified the court's order for interlocutory certiorari review on the issue of the appellate jurisdiction exercised pursuant to the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) 75 O.S. 250.4(B)(12) does not expressly provide for application of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act when a student is subject to discipline less than expulsion for an institutional rule infraction; (2) the remedy of an independent District Court civil action is an adequate remedy for an alleged violation by the University of a student's rights to due process in a University disciplinary proceeding; (3) the possibility of a subsequent institutional offense that is subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act having an enhanced punishment because of former offenses does not require the former offenses to be also subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act; and (4) absent unusual circumstances not present here, the Court declined in a supervisory writ proceeding to adjudicate constitutional arguments that were not adjudicated in the District Court. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. Lucas" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified questions of Oklahoma Law to the Supreme Court: (1) does the Okla. Const. art. 2, section 30 provide a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act?; (2) if such a right exists, is the cause of action recognized retrospectively? and (3) are the standards of municipal liability coterminous with a Federal section 1983 action or does the common law theory of respondeat superior apply to such action? The questions in this case arose from an altercation at the Cherokee County Detention Center (a facility operated by the Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority) whereby plaintiff Daniel Bosh was attacked while he was standing at the booking desk of the Detention Center with his hands secured in restraints behind his back. Video surveillance of the events captured images of one of the jailers, defendant Gordon Chronister, Jr., approaching the plaintiff and grabbing him behind his back. Plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of the altercation. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court against the Authority, the assistant jail administrator and the jailers who initiated the attack. He asserted federal Civil Rights claims against the individuals and state law claims against the Authority. The Authority removed the case to the United States District Court then filed a motion to dismiss the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the OGTCA). Upon review, the Supreme Court answered the questions: (1) the Okla. Const. art 2, section 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act; (2) the action is recognized retrospectively; and (3) the common law theory of respondeat superior applies to municipal liability under such an action. View "Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority." on Justia Law

In a dispute over insurance coverage between the plaintiff-appellee City of Choctaw, and its insurer defendant-appellant Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group (OMAG), the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment for Choctaw. Both in the trial court and on appeal, the city argued that OMAG should cover an inverse condemnation judgment entered against the city in a suit brought by a landowner, even though the city admitted it obtained coverage from OMAG for liability imposed under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The OMAG appealed summary judgment granted in favor of the Choctaw on a claim which had been denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the summary judgment record disclosed neither a legal nor factual basis for applying any theory of estoppel to make OMAG liable for the inverse condemnation judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the city, and remanded the case with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of OMAG. View "City of Choctaw v. Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group " on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Ada Electric Cars, LLC filed suit against Defendants-Appellees Thomas Kemp Jr., Jerry Johnson, Dawn Cash, and Rick Miller, members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC), in their individual capacities, in response to the OTC's denial of a statutory tax credit for certain models of Tomberlin low-speed electric vehicles (LSVs) sold by the Appellant to its customers. The statutory tax credit provided for a one-time credit against income tax for investments in qualified electric motor vehicle property. The dispositive issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity from suit for their determination that LSVs sold by Appellant did not qualify for the tax credit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendants did qualify for immunity, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Ada Electric Cars, LLC v. Kemp" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Tax Commission appealed a ruling by the District Court of Grady County which found a decedent's outstanding 1978-1985 income tax liability was barred from collection through Decedent's probate case. The trial court's ruling was based on the ten-year limitation imposed by 68 O.S. 2001 section 223(A). The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding the statute operated as a statute of limitations and did not violate the Oklahoma Constitution. The Court also found that the Oklahoma probate code required satisfaction of the tax debt before distribution of the estate assets. The decedent's estate appealed that ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court correctly held that 68 O.S. 2001 section 223(A) was a statute of limitations and did not extinguish an underlying debt to the state in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. However, the Court concluded that neither 58 O.S. 2001 section 591 nor 58 O.S. 2001 section 635 of the probate code require payment of a debt otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. View "In the matter of the Estate of Bell-Levine" on Justia Law

Petitioner Vincent James Hogg, Sr. sought review of a Workers' Compensation Court order which denied his workers' compensation benefits based upon the court's interpretation of 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). Petitioner was employed by the Oklahoma County Juvenile Detention Center when in late 2011, he sustained an injury to his right shoulder and neck while subduing an unruly and combative juvenile. Petitioner was given a post-accident drug screen and a follow-up screen the next day. Both screens showed a "positive" result for the presence of marijuana in his system. Petitioner did not dispute the test results but Petitioner denied ever smoking marijuana. The trial court ultimately found there was no evidence presented to establish Petitioner was "high," nor was there any evidence to establish the marijuana in his system was the "major cause" of the accidental injury. The trial court did, however, deny Petitioner's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits by reason of its interpretation of the newly created 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). The dispositive issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute. The trial court found the last sentence of paragraph 3 expressed the legislative intent of the entire paragraph without giving any weight to the other sentences in the same paragraph. In its order, the trial court indicated this sentence created an irrebuttable presumption. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court concluded that Petitioner overcame the rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hogg v. Oklahoma Cty. Juvenile Bureau" on Justia Law