Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified questions of Oklahoma Law to the Supreme Court: (1) does the Okla. Const. art. 2, section 30 provide a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act?; (2) if such a right exists, is the cause of action recognized retrospectively? and (3) are the standards of municipal liability coterminous with a Federal section 1983 action or does the common law theory of respondeat superior apply to such action? The questions in this case arose from an altercation at the Cherokee County Detention Center (a facility operated by the Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority) whereby plaintiff Daniel Bosh was attacked while he was standing at the booking desk of the Detention Center with his hands secured in restraints behind his back. Video surveillance of the events captured images of one of the jailers, defendant Gordon Chronister, Jr., approaching the plaintiff and grabbing him behind his back. Plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of the altercation. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court against the Authority, the assistant jail administrator and the jailers who initiated the attack. He asserted federal Civil Rights claims against the individuals and state law claims against the Authority. The Authority removed the case to the United States District Court then filed a motion to dismiss the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the OGTCA). Upon review, the Supreme Court answered the questions: (1) the Okla. Const. art 2, section 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act; (2) the action is recognized retrospectively; and (3) the common law theory of respondeat superior applies to municipal liability under such an action. View "Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority." on Justia Law

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In a dispute over insurance coverage between the plaintiff-appellee City of Choctaw, and its insurer defendant-appellant Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group (OMAG), the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment for Choctaw. Both in the trial court and on appeal, the city argued that OMAG should cover an inverse condemnation judgment entered against the city in a suit brought by a landowner, even though the city admitted it obtained coverage from OMAG for liability imposed under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The OMAG appealed summary judgment granted in favor of the Choctaw on a claim which had been denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the summary judgment record disclosed neither a legal nor factual basis for applying any theory of estoppel to make OMAG liable for the inverse condemnation judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the city, and remanded the case with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of OMAG. View "City of Choctaw v. Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group " on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Ada Electric Cars, LLC filed suit against Defendants-Appellees Thomas Kemp Jr., Jerry Johnson, Dawn Cash, and Rick Miller, members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC), in their individual capacities, in response to the OTC's denial of a statutory tax credit for certain models of Tomberlin low-speed electric vehicles (LSVs) sold by the Appellant to its customers. The statutory tax credit provided for a one-time credit against income tax for investments in qualified electric motor vehicle property. The dispositive issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity from suit for their determination that LSVs sold by Appellant did not qualify for the tax credit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendants did qualify for immunity, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Ada Electric Cars, LLC v. Kemp" on Justia Law

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The Oklahoma Tax Commission appealed a ruling by the District Court of Grady County which found a decedent's outstanding 1978-1985 income tax liability was barred from collection through Decedent's probate case. The trial court's ruling was based on the ten-year limitation imposed by 68 O.S. 2001 section 223(A). The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding the statute operated as a statute of limitations and did not violate the Oklahoma Constitution. The Court also found that the Oklahoma probate code required satisfaction of the tax debt before distribution of the estate assets. The decedent's estate appealed that ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court correctly held that 68 O.S. 2001 section 223(A) was a statute of limitations and did not extinguish an underlying debt to the state in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. However, the Court concluded that neither 58 O.S. 2001 section 591 nor 58 O.S. 2001 section 635 of the probate code require payment of a debt otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. View "In the matter of the Estate of Bell-Levine" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Vincent James Hogg, Sr. sought review of a Workers' Compensation Court order which denied his workers' compensation benefits based upon the court's interpretation of 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). Petitioner was employed by the Oklahoma County Juvenile Detention Center when in late 2011, he sustained an injury to his right shoulder and neck while subduing an unruly and combative juvenile. Petitioner was given a post-accident drug screen and a follow-up screen the next day. Both screens showed a "positive" result for the presence of marijuana in his system. Petitioner did not dispute the test results but Petitioner denied ever smoking marijuana. The trial court ultimately found there was no evidence presented to establish Petitioner was "high," nor was there any evidence to establish the marijuana in his system was the "major cause" of the accidental injury. The trial court did, however, deny Petitioner's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits by reason of its interpretation of the newly created 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). The dispositive issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute. The trial court found the last sentence of paragraph 3 expressed the legislative intent of the entire paragraph without giving any weight to the other sentences in the same paragraph. In its order, the trial court indicated this sentence created an irrebuttable presumption. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court concluded that Petitioner overcame the rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hogg v. Oklahoma Cty. Juvenile Bureau" on Justia Law

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In 2010, the Oklahoma Legislature amended the Oklahoma Tax Code to require municipalities to contract with the State of Oklahoma through the Oklahoma Tax Commission to assess, collect and enforce municipal taxes. Prior to the amendment becoming effective, the City of Tulsa contracted with a private company to collect municipal taxes. On August 19, 2010, Tulsa filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the District Court of Oklahoma County to challenge the statute's constitutionality. The trial court found the statute unconstitutional. The State appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Upon review, the Court held that the amendments requiring the Commission to collect municipal sales and use taxes do not unconstitutionally impair Tulsa's obligation of contracts or infringe its inherent powers granted by the Constitution or the City's charter. View "City of Tulsa v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

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Claimant Kelly Mowdy filed a workers' compensation claim after a spider bit him. Claimant worked as a floor hand for Petitioner Nomac Drilling, LLC when he noticed two red bumps on his knee. He reported the bumps to his supervisor, who seemed unconcerned about the injury. Over the course of a few days, the bumps grew swollen, infected, turned dark red and purple, and would later be diagnosed as an abscessed spider bite in which methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) cultures were found. Claimant underwent surgery to remove dead and infected tissue. Nomac denied Claimant's injury was the result of his employment. The case was tried, and testimony revealed that Claimant's living arrangements while working for Nomac were in a heavily wooded area that "was not real clean, not real kept up." A big hole underneath his bed lead all the way to the outdoors. The Workers' Compensation Court found Claimant's testimony was credible and persuasive. The court concluded that the incident was the predominant cause of Claimant's right leg injury, and awarded Claimant TTD benefits. Nomac appealed to the three-judge panel. The panel sustained the award. The Court of Civil Appeals, however, vacated the award and ordered the claim dismissed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "an appellate court must sustain the Workers' Compensation Court's decision where there is any competent evidence supporting the decision. Claimant's expert medical report [was] not defective, and there [was] sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the Claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment." View "Nomac Drilling, LLC v. Mowdy" on Justia Law

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The Oklahoma Tax Commission assessed corporate income taxes against Vermont Corporation Scioto Insurance Company for 2001 through 2005, based on payments Scioto received from the use of Scioto's intellectual property by Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma. In response, Scioto protested these assessments on the ground that it did not contract with the Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma for use of the property in question and did not conduct any business whatsoever in Oklahoma. The Tax Commission denied Scioto's protest and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court previously granted certiorari. Upon review, the Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, reversed the Tax Commission's denial of Scioto's protest and remanded the case with instructions to sustain Scioto's protest. View "In re Income Tax Protest of Scioto Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the first-impression question of whether a bail bondsman's failure to timely pay the order and judgment of forfeiture within ninety-one (91) days after receipt of notice prevents the bondsman from seeking remitter of forfeiture proceeds after returning Defendant to custody pursuant to section 1332(D)(2). Here, the bondsman paid the judgment of forfeiture on the ninety-second day after receipt of notice of forfeiture. The trial judge conducted a hearing at which she granted the bondsman's motion for remitter, ordered return of the money deposited and vacated the order and judgment of forfeiture. The State appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: the deposit of the face amount of the bond by the ninety-first day after notice of forfeiture, as required by 59 O.S. Supp. 2008 sec. 1332(D)(1) is a condition precedent to seeking the relief of remitter provided by section 1332 (D)(2). View "Oklahoma v. Tate" on Justia Law

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Senator Jim Wilson filed suit in an attempt to have the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 declared invalid after the Supreme Court rejected his attempt to have the Act declared unconstitutional. In an earlier case, the Senator attached the Act as invalid because it "failed to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible preserve[d] the factors of 'compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests.'" In his petition in this case, he made "verbatim the same allegations as he did in [his earlier case]." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court properly dismissed Senator Wilson's petition because he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because his claim was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion having been adjudicated against him in "Wilson I." The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Wilson v. Oklahoma ex rel. State Election Board" on Justia Law