Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant, Mary Roshawn Jones was a full-time classified employee of Defendant-Appellee Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs (OJA), working at the L.E. Rader Center (Center). Plaintiff was bitten by a spider while at work. She sought medical treatment for the spider bite at the Center. A Center nurse informed Plaintiff she would have to seek a drug test in connection with its "Review of Job-Related Accidental Injury or Illness." The OJA alleged that they repeatedly tried to get Plaintiff to complete paperwork relating to her injury. The OJA also alleged that Plaintiff's delay in completing the paperwork resulted in the delay in requesting the drug test. Plaintiff alleged that the reason for the required drug test was a series of harassing and threatening calls to the Center by a former boyfriend. Plaintiff was ultimately discharged. She filed no administrative appeal from the discharge but filed a civil case, seeking compensatory and punitive damages and lost wages, or in the alternative, restoration to employment. The issue of first impression before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions of the Oklahoma Standards for Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (SWDATA) permitted a classified state employee to file an action in district court prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Upon review, the Court held that SWDATA provides an independent cause of action which authorizes a classified state employee to file an action in the district court for a willful violation of the act without first exhausting the employee's administrative remedies. View "Jones v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Two chiropractors, Daniel Post, D.C., and Brad M. Hayes, D.C., and the Oklahoma State Chiropractic Independent Physicians Association (Chiropractors) filed an application requesting that the Supreme Court declare portions of 85 O.S. sections 329 and 333 to be unconstitutional. The legislature enacted a new Workers' Compensation Code (effective August 26, 2011). An independent medical examiner may only be a licensed medical doctor or a licensed doctor of osteopathy. If the court does not follow the opinion of the independent medical examiner on any issue, the court shall set out its reasons for deviating from the opinion of the independent medical examiner. The opinion of the independent medical examiner shall be followed unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The Chiropractors claim they are excluded from the workers' compensation system. The Chiropractors maintained that the new law disenfranchises them from being independent medical examiners. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the definition of "qualified independent medical examiner" to the extent it is limited to only a licensed medical doctor or doctor of Osteopathy in 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sec. 308(39) and the specifically mentioned portions of 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sections 329 and 333, are special laws in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held that the specifically mentioned portions of 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sections 326, 329 and 332 violate the separation of powers clause, Art. IV, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Therefore, these portions of the offending statutes were severed. View "Oklahoma State Chiropractic Indep. Physicians Assoc. v. Fallin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a governmental subdivision is equitably estopped from denying liability where it previously entered into an undisclosed oral contractual agreement regarding the maintenance of the county-line road, failed to advise the plaintiff that another county bore responsibility for the road maintenance at some point prior to the expiration of the limitations period. Plaintiff Paul McWilliams was injured when his motorcycle hit an area where the road had buckled causing his motorcycle to flip. The road in question adjoins Caddo and Comanche Counties. The precise location of the accident was in Caddo County. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Comanche and Caddo Counties entered into an oral contractual agreement regarding the maintenance of the county-line road more than twenty years ago. Pursuant to that agreement, Caddo County was responsible for maintaining the section of roadway where Plaintiff's accident occurred. However, the contractual agreement was oral, and no document was on file in the county records delineating the two counties' responsibilities. Immediately after receiving notice of Plaintiff's accident, Comanche County repaired the road. No one advised Plainitff that there was an agreement between the counties.Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record substantiated that the undisclosed agreement between Comanche County and Caddo County coupled with Comanche County's dilatory conduct, prevented Plaintiff of any means to discover Comanche County's true role in the litigation. As a matter of public policy, Comanche County was estopped to deny liability of Plaintiff's claim. View "McWilliams v. Comanche Cty. Bd of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Sheila Yvonne Berman sought assistance from the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) to determine paternity and to collect child support. She alleged Herbert White, Jr. was the father of her child. DHS brought an administrative action to determine paternity and arranged for Defendant-Appellee Laboratory Corporation of America (d/b/a Lab Corp, Inc.) to conduct the DNA test. LabCorp reported White was not the father of Berman's child. The test was performed a second time with similar results. After the DHS proceeding concluded, Berman submitted an envelope, purportedly containing White's DNA, to a different lab for DNA testing. This time the results were different. Berman filed a paternity action against White. He was ordered to submit to another paternity test. The test results were virtually identical to the DNA sample contained on the envelope, and White was judicially determined to be the father of Berman's child. White appealed, but the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the trial court. While the county court case was still pending, Berman filed this lawsuit in the district court seeking money damages from LabCorp for the negligent testing of White's DNA sample in the DHS administrative proceeding. In her petition, Berman alleged that as a result of LabCorp's negligence, she suffered damages in excess of $10,000.00 for the "loss of past and future child support payments that White would have been required to pay, had the paternity test results been correct, showing White to be the biological father of Plaintiff's child." Berman alleged LabCorp had the duty of care of a "reasonably prudent professional in the paternity testing field" and that its actions constituted a breach of that duty. The issue in this case was whether LabCorp owed Berman a duty of care. If so, Berman stated a claim for negligence against LabCorp, unrelated to the publication of the lab results. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, and reversed and remanded the case for trial. View "Berman v. Laboratory Corporation of America" on Justia Law

Petitioners-Appellants Donald and Paula Thompson appealed a district court's decision that affirmed the Board of the Public Employees Retirement System's ruling to forfeit Mr. Thompson's retirement benefits earned in his state retirement account. The district court determined that Mr. Thompson's state retirement benefits had to be forfeited after he was convicted of felonies that violated his oath of office as a district court judge. The court determined that Mrs. Thompson did not have standing in the administrative proceedings and was not a proper party therein. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Thompson alleged the Board violated the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act when it forced him to forfeit his retirement benefits without proper notice. In addition, he argued he did not receive an individual proceeding to provide him an opportunity to proffer evidence and present witnesses pursuant to the Act. Furthermore, Mr. Thompson alleged that the strict construction of the applicable forfeiture statute requires that it apply only to the last oath of office he took. According to this logic, Mr. Thompson argued he should have only been forced to forfeit the benefits he would have earned from his last term in office. Upon review, the Supreme Court found none of Mr. Thompson's arguments persuasive, and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Thompson v. Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appearance of impartiality/conflict of interest in disciplinary proceedings before the Oklahoma Real Estate Appraiser Board (the Board) required invalidation of the proceedings. In December of 2005, Appellee real estate appraiser Beverly Bowen appraised a parcel of real property for her client BancFirst (Bank). By July of 2007, after having sat vacant for 19 months, the property sold at a sheriff's sale which resulted in a loss to the private mortgage insurer (insurer). The insurer filed a grievance against the appraiser with the Board alleging possible appraisal fraud. The insurer hired another local appraiser, JoElla Jones (Jones/review appraiser), to reappraise the property nineteen months after Bowen's initial appraisal. Apparently, the property remained unoccupied the entire time, and it may have been vandalized. Jones reviewed Bowen's work. She valued the property at $197,000.00 or $58,000 below Bowen's appraisal. While the dispute between the bank and the insurer regarding the property's value was ongoing, the bank discovered that Jones had a personal and direct history with Bowen: the appraisers had known one another for more than 26 years. Learning this information prompted the bank to write a letter to the insurer notifying them of the unmistakable conflict of interest and alleging that if a mistake in an appraisal occurred, it was made by the review appraiser. Soon thereafter, the Board brought disciplinary proceedings against Bowen. Notwithstanding the conflict of interest, a probable cause committee (committee) of the Board held a hearing. The Board adopted the committee's findings of fact and conclusions of law but modified the disciplinary recommendation. The trial court held another hearing reversing the Board's discipline, finding that the appearance of impropriety was so apparent on the face of the record that reversible legal error occurred. The Board appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the fact of this case, the disciplinary proceedings required invalidating proceedings because of the appearance of impartiality. The Court affirmed the trial court. View "Bowen v. Oklahoma Real Estate Appraisal Bd." on Justia Law

The City Council of Tulsa decided to encourage the initiation of new direct nonstop airline service to business centers on the East and West coasts, and voted to approve a Memorandum between the Tulsa Industrial Authority (TIA) and the City which would convey certain real property (Property) for that purpose. The transfer would allow TIA to mortgage the Property to the Bank of Oklahoma (BOK) in support of a non-recourse loan so that TIA could, in turn, make an aggregate loan (Great Plains Loan) to Great Plains Airlines, Inc. (Great Plains). This transfer would allow the Tulsa Airports Improvement Trust (TAIT) to enter into a Support Agreement, pursuant to which TIA, in the event of a default would have the option of selling the Property to TAIT under the direction of the BOK. Upon exercise of such option, the TIA would sell, transfer and convey the property to TAIT to satisfy the outstanding loan balance. Great Plains subsequently defaulted under the terms of the Great Plains Loan, and left a balance owed to the Bank. Ultimately TAIT did not purchase the Property. TIA and the Bank sued TAIT. TAIT alleged the Support Agreement was unlawful and an unenforceable contract because TAIT could not purchase the Great Plains Loan and Property by reason that all of TAIT's funds were airport revenues and such purchases would violate the FAA Revenue Use Policy. To resolve the matter, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement which provided the City would pay BOK. The City and its Mayor asked the trial court to determine that the settlement agreement was a lawful contract executed by the City, and the settlement payment made pursuant to the settlement agreement was a lawful expenditure of public funds. Taxpayers intervened, and asked the trial court to determine that the payment of money to the Bank of Oklahoma pursuant to the settlement agreement was an illegal transfer of public funds made pursuant to an unlawful settlement agreement. In granting the City's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the settlement agreement was a lawful and the settlement payment was a lawful expenditure of funds. Upon its review, the Supreme Court concluded the settlement was not based on a contract, but rather under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment to the City of Tulsa, and as such, the City had authority to enter into the Settlement Agreement. However, the Court found that the unjust enrichment claim was unviable and the Statute of Limitations would have barred the unjust enrichment claim against the City. The Court remanded the matter back to the District Court to direct the repayment of the settlement funds from BOK back to the City of Tulsa. View "City of Tulsa v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A." on Justia Law

Petitioner State Senator Jim Wilson sought review of the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011, pursuant to Section 11C, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Petitioner alleged the Act does not comply with the apportionment formula in Section 9A, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Specifically, Petitioner alleged the Act does not pass constitutional muster because it "fails to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible provide for compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests." Senator Wilson did not explicitly identify every district in the Redistricting Act that he contended was not in compliance with Section 9A but claimed that he identified such districts by the maps provided in the appendix of his petition. Upon review of the arguments submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner failed to show that the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 does not comply with the provisions of Section 9A of the Oklahoma Constitution. View "Wilson v. Fallin" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Publishing Company (The Oklahoman) and World Publishing Company (Tulsa World) (collectively, Publishers), filed open records requests with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of State Finance (OSF). Both the Oklahoman and Tulsa World sought to release of birth dates of all state employees. In addition, the Tulsa World requested employee identification numbers. The Oklahoma Public Employees Association (OPEA) filed two suits against OPM and OSF requesting declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to bar the release of employees' birth dates. The second suit also sought to bar employee identification numbers from disclosure. The district court consolidated the cases. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. Relying on an opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General, the trial court sustained OPEA's and OPM's motions. It ordered that the state agencies be given sixty days’ notice to report their decisions on whether disclosure of date of birth requests would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; whether public access could be denied to employee identification numbers; and that legislative staff records were exempt from disclosure under the Oklahoma Open Records Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Oklahoma law already contains a non-exclusive list of examples of information that if released, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of State employees' personal privacy. As guidance, the Court held that where a claim of invasion of privacy is made, courts should use a case-by-case balancing test to determine whether personal information is subject to release. If significant privacy interests are at stake while the public's interest in the disclosed information is minimal, release of that information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." View "Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma " on Justia Law