Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Charles Sheffer, Jennifer Sheffer, and their minor son, J.S., were injured when their tractor trailer collided with a rental vehicle leased to William Garris and driven by David Billups, employees of Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C. Plaintiffs sued Carolina Forge on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. They also sued the Buffalo Run Casino, the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, and PTE, Inc. for dram-shop liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Carolina Forge, finding as a matter of law Carolina Forge was not liable for its employees' actions under a theory of respondeat superior and did not negligently entrust the rental vehicle to its employees. The trial court also dismissed, sua sponte, the Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., and the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, determining that injunctions issued by the Western District of Oklahoma prohibited suit for any tort claims against a tribe or a tribal entity. Plaintiffs appealed both orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Peoria Tribe was immune from suit in state court for compact-based tort claims because Oklahoma state courts are not courts of competent jurisdiction as the term is used in the model gaming compact. Furthermore, the Court found that because Congress has not expressly abrogated tribal immunity from private, state court dram-shop claims and because the Peoria Tribe and its entities did not expressly waive their sovereign immunity by applying for and receiving a liquor license from the State, the tribe was immune from dram-shop liability in state court. View "Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino" on Justia Law

In 2009, respondent Adrian Melton suffered an on-the-job accident while working for his employer, Joe Brown Company, Inc. He was awarded eleven weeks of temporary total disability, granted permanent partial disability, and a psychological overlay. The employer appealed the award, which vacated some parts and sustained others. In 2011, the employer appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) which vacated the permanent partial impairment award because it failed to comply with the AMA Guides (5th Edition), and that an "any competent evidence" standard of review was inconsistent with 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340, so the court used the "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard which had recently been revised. Respondent petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the COCA decision, arguing that the appellate court should have used the "any competent evidence" standard. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that because respondent's injury happened before the new standard went into effect, the "any competent evidence" standard should have been applied. With regard to respondent's awards of disability, the Court found that psychological overlay was not supported by appropriate expert testimony. Accordingly, the benefits as they related to the overlay were vacated. View "Joe Brown Company, Inc. v. Melton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (the Sheffer family) were injured when their truck collided with a rental vehicle leased to and driven by employees of Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C. Plaintiffs sued Carolina Forge on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Carolina Forge, finding as a matter of law that Carolina Forge was not liable for its employees' actions under that theory, and did not negligently entrust the rental to the employees. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded reasonable minds could have differed on whether the employees were in the course and scope of their employment at the time of the accident and whether Carolina Forge negligently entrusted the vehicle to them. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sheffer v. Carolina Forge Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Wall (Patient) filed a petition for medical negligence against Dr. John S. Marouk, D.O. (Physician). Wall alleged that the physician negligently cut the median nerve in his right arm during a carpal tunnel surgery, resulting in loss of feeling in his right fingers. The patient did not attach an affidavit of merit as required by 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19. The physician filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the patient failed to include the affidavit of merit. In response to the physician's motion to dismiss, the patient argued that 12 O.S 2011 sec.19 was unconstitutional based on this court's holding in "Zeier v. Zimmer." The trial court entered a certified interlocutory order denying the physician's motion to dismiss, and giving the patient twenty days from the date of the order to file an affidavit of merit or face dismissal of the cause. The trial court subsequently entered an amended certified interlocutory order stating that 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19 required an affidavit of merit finding the patient's arguments unpersuasive. The Supreme Court granted the patient's Petition for Certiorari to consider the constitutionality of 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Title 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19 created a monetary barrier to access the court system, and then applied that barrier only to a specific subclass of potential tort victims, those who are the victims of professional negligence. The result was a law that was unconstitutional both as a special law, and as an undue financial barrier on access to the courts. "Although we express no opinion on the viability of the patient's claim, because we hold 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19 to be unconstitutional, an affidavit of merit is not required." The district court's order requiring submission of an affidavit of merit was overruled, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wall v. Marouk" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Claimant Nancy Bertrand injured her right foot when she slipped on a wet floor while employed as a child care worker for Respondent Laura Dester Center (Employer). She sought certiorari review of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) which sustained the Workers' Compensation Court's (WCC) denial of her request for travel costs to and from a vocational rehabilitation facility. Claimant contended that her allowance for travel expenses was effectively eliminated under the new Workers' Compensation Code, enacted August 26, 2011, which set a minimum for reimbursement of twenty miles round-trip. Claimant's total round-trip mileage was fourteen miles for which she was previously paid prior to the effective date of the Code. The trial court ordered the new law was procedural and could be applied retroactively. But after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCC ordered vocational rehabilitation before August 26, 2011, and the treatment facility was outside the city limits of Claimant's hometown. As such, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Bertrand v. Laura Dester Center" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified questions of Oklahoma Law to the Supreme Court: (1) does the Okla. Const. art. 2, section 30 provide a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act?; (2) if such a right exists, is the cause of action recognized retrospectively? and (3) are the standards of municipal liability coterminous with a Federal section 1983 action or does the common law theory of respondeat superior apply to such action? The questions in this case arose from an altercation at the Cherokee County Detention Center (a facility operated by the Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority) whereby plaintiff Daniel Bosh was attacked while he was standing at the booking desk of the Detention Center with his hands secured in restraints behind his back. Video surveillance of the events captured images of one of the jailers, defendant Gordon Chronister, Jr., approaching the plaintiff and grabbing him behind his back. Plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of the altercation. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court against the Authority, the assistant jail administrator and the jailers who initiated the attack. He asserted federal Civil Rights claims against the individuals and state law claims against the Authority. The Authority removed the case to the United States District Court then filed a motion to dismiss the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the OGTCA). Upon review, the Supreme Court answered the questions: (1) the Okla. Const. art 2, section 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act; (2) the action is recognized retrospectively; and (3) the common law theory of respondeat superior applies to municipal liability under such an action. View "Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority." on Justia Law

In 2005, Applicant Michael Benson made an application to Leader Life for a life insurance policy, naming his wife Shannon, as Beneficiary. The application asked if the applicant had ever been treated for liver disease, had any medical or surgical treatment in the last five years or any departure from good health and whether or not the applicant had ever had an alcohol or drug problem. Applicant answered yes to the departure from good health question and told the insurance company that he had a blood clot in his leg 2003. Applicant answered no to the Liver disease question and no to the alcohol question. Leaders Life accepted his answers and issued the underlying policy in this action. In 2006, Applicant was on foot, pushing a stalled car out of the street when he was struck by another vehicle which eventually resulted in his death. His wife filed for benefits under the policy. Leaders investigated the claim. They received the hospital records pertaining to his death, which also noted his blood alcohol at his time of death, although the owner of the car testified that he smelled no alcohol on the applicant. After reviewing the records, Leaders Life's underwriter concluded that Applicant falsified his answers on his application and rescinded the policy due to Applicant's alcoholism. Certiorari was granted to review the Court of Civil Appeals opinion that reversed and remanding the case following a jury verdict in Applicant's favor. Leaders Life appealed the trial court and won on appellate review. After its review, the Supreme Court found that at trial, Leaders Life made clear that they believed there were material misrepresentations made by Applicant, and that he attempted to deceive them. However, the trier of fact, the jury did not find that such a misrepresentation had been made. They decided in favor of the beneficiary, and awarded her actual and in punitive damages. The Supreme Court declined substitute its judgment for that of the jury under the case law presented by this suit. Accordingly, the Court reinstated the trial court's judgment and vacated the appellate court's opinion. View "Benson v. Leaders Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Vincent James Hogg, Sr. sought review of a Workers' Compensation Court order which denied his workers' compensation benefits based upon the court's interpretation of 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). Petitioner was employed by the Oklahoma County Juvenile Detention Center when in late 2011, he sustained an injury to his right shoulder and neck while subduing an unruly and combative juvenile. Petitioner was given a post-accident drug screen and a follow-up screen the next day. Both screens showed a "positive" result for the presence of marijuana in his system. Petitioner did not dispute the test results but Petitioner denied ever smoking marijuana. The trial court ultimately found there was no evidence presented to establish Petitioner was "high," nor was there any evidence to establish the marijuana in his system was the "major cause" of the accidental injury. The trial court did, however, deny Petitioner's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits by reason of its interpretation of the newly created 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). The dispositive issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute. The trial court found the last sentence of paragraph 3 expressed the legislative intent of the entire paragraph without giving any weight to the other sentences in the same paragraph. In its order, the trial court indicated this sentence created an irrebuttable presumption. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court concluded that Petitioner overcame the rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hogg v. Oklahoma Cty. Juvenile Bureau" on Justia Law

Claimant Charles Prince filed a claim in the Workers' Compensation Court in 2009 alleging a cumulative trauma employment-related injury to his right foot, with date of last exposure in late 2008. The trial court found Claimant sustained a cumulative trauma injury to his right foot and ordered Employer, Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc., to select a physician to treat Claimant and to provide "such medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, diagnostic testing and referral as may be deemed necessary by the treating physician to the claimant's right foot." The court found his date of last exposure was late 2008. Claimant sought compensation for injury to his right foot, and later for his low back arising from the same injury. The trial court of the Workers' Compensation Court denied his claim for the low back, and a three judge panel affirmed. On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) vacated the panel's order, holding the order was against the clear weight of the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the denial of the award for Claimant's lower back was supported by competent evidence. COCA found more evidence in support of Claimant's low back injury, but Employer presented evidence from its medical expert which denied that the injury to either the low back or the right foot arose out of Claimant's employment. "The date of the injury determines the law to be used in a workers' compensation claim and applies equally to employers and claimants alike." Based on the Supreme Court's decision in "Williams Companies, Inc. v. Dunkelgod," (2012 OK 96 (2012)), and the law on the date of Claimant's injury, the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was vacated. View "Prince v. Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Workers' compensation claimant Kristy Dunkelgod was injured in an employment-related accident in 2011 while working for Williams Companies, Inc. The Workers' Compensation Court entered several orders awarding claimant temporary total disability benefits. She was also awarded a "Go-Go" scooter and a lift van. On appeal by the employer, the Court of Civil Appeals vacated the awards, holding the court's finding the lift van was medically necessary was "against the clear weight of the evidence." The Court of Civil Appeals also held the claimant was limited to a maximum of 300 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and remanded for a determination of when she reached the maximum. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) err when it applied the "clear weight of the evidence" standard of review to the Workers' Compensation Court's order awarding a lift van; and (2) whether COCA erred when it held that Claimant's temporary total disability (TTD) award was limited to a maximum of 300 weeks. The Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative; COCA failed to apply the law in effect at the time of Claimant's injury. The Court vacated and remanded the case to the Workers' Compensation Court for further proceedings. View "Williams Companies, Inc v. Dunklegod" on Justia Law