Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Malinda Falcone brought an insurance claim against defendants-appellees for payment of her emergency room medical expenses. Her claim was made pursuant to the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist (UM) provisions of her mother's automobile insurance policy following the injuries she sustained as a passenger in her mother's car when an uninsured driver ran a stop sign and collided with them. Defendants initially questioned the decision to refer Plaintiff to the level 2 trauma center of the emergency room and refused to pay the bill Plaintiff received from the OU Medical Center trauma center. After nearly a year of offers and rejections, Plaintiff sued for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing for failing to pay her trauma room "compensatory damages" as required under the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and denied Plaintiff's motion for new trial. After review, the Supreme Court held that it was a question for the trier of fact whether defendants showed a lack of good faith in handling Plaintiff's claim for payment. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in defendants' favor, holding as a matter of law that defendants did not commit the tort of bad faith. View "Falcone v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Insured Kourtni Martin suffered serious injuries from an automobile collision in Oklahoma City with Nicholas Gray. At the time of the collision, Insured had UM coverage with Goodville Mutual Casualty Company. The policy was purchased by her parents while they lived in Kansas. She was, however, a listed/rated driver in the policy. Before the collision, Martin's parents notified the Kansas agent that she was moving to Oklahoma to live with her grandmother and that her vehicle would be garaged in Oklahoma. After the collision, the claim was reported to the agent in Kansas who then transmitted the claim to Insurer which was located principally in Pennsylvania. The claim was adjusted out of Pennsylvania. Martin was unable to locate Gray. Her attempts to serve Gray, or his insurer, in Oklahoma and Texas failed. Martin filed this lawsuit against Gray alleging negligence (later adding breach of contract and bad faith against her Insurer). After service by publication, Gray answered asserting a general denial. Martin sought compensation from the Insurer pursuant to her UM policy and negotiations began between Insured and Insurer regarding medical bills and projected future medical bills substantially in excess of $100,000. Insurer offered $27,000 for medical expenses under the "Kansas No Fault Benefits" and $10,000 in UM coverage. The trial court, after reviewing the policy at issue here, applied Kansas law to this case and dismissed Martin's bad faith claim against the Insurer (with prejudice). After review, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in applying Kansas law, finding that the actions by Insurer related to the bad-faith claim appear to have occurred primarily in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania: (1) any injury from the alleged bad faith occurred in Oklahoma where Insured is located; (2) the alleged conduct causing injury from bad faith occurred in Oklahoma or Pennsylvania, where the claim was handled; (3) the domicile of Insurer and Insured are Pennsylvania and Oklahoma, respectively, and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties occurred had yet to be determined. However, because the trial court did not apply the "most significant relationship test," there was no evaluation of these factors according to their relative importance. Despite the parties' voluntary settlement of this case, the Supreme Court nevertheless remanded this case for the trial court to make findings with respect to the "most significant relationship test," and then to dismiss. View "Martin v. Gray" on Justia Law

Appellant-plaintiff Robert Leritz was a Kansas resident whose motorcycle and two other vehicles were garaged in Kansas under an insurance policy issued by Appellee, Farmers Insurance Company (Farmers) in Kansas. Plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident in Oklahoma when Defendant Larry Yates made a left hand turn and collided with Plaintiff causing serious bodily injuries. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that he had incurred medical expenses and suffered damages exceeding Yates's liability coverage. There was a question as to whether he could stack his uninsured motorist (UM) coverage based on his ownership of policies on each of his three vehicles. Oklahoma allowed the practice, until the Oklahoma Legislature amended the UM provision in 2014. Kansas did not allow stacking. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, applying the insurer's proposed solution to a perceived conflict of laws issue. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found no conflict of laws issue on these facts because the policy specified which law would apply to an issue of stacking of policies. Giving the policy provisions effect made a choice of law analysis unnecessary; the Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leritz v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the plaintiff-appellant Sandra Vilarrubias Serra was covered under the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) and medical payments (medical pay) coverage of the automobile insurance policy issued to Traci Robertson by Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Serra was a foreign exchange student from Spain who was attending her senior year of high school in Pryor. She resided with Robertson in Pryor. As a passenger in the car of a friend, Andrea McNair, she sustained serious injuries when McNair's car collided with Donald Broughton, who was driving a motorcycle. Broughton was killed in the accident. Serra attempted to collect damages for her injuries by filing a claim against Robertson's automobile policy's uninsured motorist and medical payments coverage. State Farm denied coverage to Serra who then filed a lawsuit against the Personal Representative of Donald Broughton, Andrea McNair and State Farm. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court which was granted. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the trial court. In particular, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Serra was a "ward" of Robertson for purposes of coverage under the policy. The Court held that she was covered and reversed. View "Serra v. Estate of Broughton" on Justia Law

Joseph Parker was allegedly injured on the job. It was undisputed that Global Health Initiative (GHI), which at one time employed Parker, did not have workers' compensation insurance. Parker filed a workers' compensation claim in the Workers' Compensation Court. That court awarded Parker, by default judgment against GHI, $17,595.60 plus interest. Parker filed the judgment in the district court of Tulsa County in an attempt to collect the money awarded by the Workers' Compensation Court. After futile efforts to garnish the GHI bank accounts, Parker filed a motion to pierce the corporate veil and to proceed against individual GHI shareholders in an attempt to collect his compensation awards. The trial judge denied Parker's request due to lack of evidence. Thereafter, GHI filed notice of bankruptcy. By August of 2004, Parker had filed an appeal in which the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's determination that stockholders could not be held liable for the workers' compensation award and remanded the case to the trial court. GHI did not defend or participate in the case on appeal. Parker did not pursue collection against individual shareholders but, instead, returned to the Workers' Compensation Court seeking permanent partial and permanent total awards and an increase in his original award. GHI was not served notice of this proceeding and the cause was consequently undefended. The Workers' Compensation Court entered another award in favor of Parker and against GHI totaling $236,476.20. In June of 2009, Parker, through his counsel, sent letters to some of the GHI shareholders, seeking collection of the shareholders' pro rata share for payment of workers' compensation awards. However, for unexplained reasons, not all shareholders were asked to pay "their portion" of the judgment. The plaintiffs-appellants, doctors Thomas Kenkel and Robert Gold were two of the doctor stockholders, and they appealed seeking a declaration that: (1) Parker had no valid judgment against them; (2) Parker was not entitled to proceed against them for the injuries he sustained; (3) Parker was not entitled to collect the workers' compensation judgment; (4) they had the right to defend against any of Parker's claims ab initio; (5) they were not shareholders of GHI at all but if they were, they were merely minority shareholders; and (6) they were not liable for the debts Parker is attempting to collect. The trial court agreed and sustained the doctors' motion for summary judgment. Parker appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with directions for the trial court to enter judgment in the appellant's favor. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether a business' failure to secure workers' compensation insurance rendered its shareholders personally liable for a workers' compensation award to an employee. The Court held that it did not. View "Kenkel v. Parker" on Justia Law

Petitioner-claimant Jeanette Ball sought permanent total disability benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund. The Workers' Compensation Court held that a "Crumby" finding of preexisting disability made simultaneously with the adjudication of an on-the-job injury could be combined with the adjudicated injury to render the Claimant a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 sec. 171 and awarded Petitioner permanent total disability benefits. The Fund appealed, and a three-judge panel reversed. Claimant then appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the panel. After its review, the Supreme Court held that an employee must be a physically impaired person as defined by the applicable statute before he or she can seek benefits from the Fund. A "Crumby" finding of preexisting disability made simultaneously with an adjudication of an on-the-job injury could not be combined with such adjudicated injury to render the Claimant a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp 2005 sec. 171. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ball v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund" on Justia Law

Wilson Paving & Excavating, Inc. was one of several subcontractors retained to perform services in connection with a renovation project at Sand Springs Memorial Stadium at Charles Page High School. Specifically, Wilson Paving contracted to dig trenches and lay pipe for a storm drainage system being installed under the athletic field. Wilson Paving utilized a local staffing agency, Labor Ready, to secure temporary workers to assist on the project. Steven Broom went to the offices of Labor Ready to obtain employment. Broom was directed by Labor Ready to work with Wilson Paving at Sand Springs High School. He reported to the high school and, at the instruction of Wilson Paving, began work laying pipe. The trench in which Broom was working collapsed twice - the first time covering him in dirt to his waist and the second time covering him in dirt to his neck. People on the job site freed Broom from the neck to the waist while waiting on emergency personnel to arrive. Once on the scene, emergency personnel could not enter the trench to rescue Broom until the trench was safely reinforced. During this time, Broom remained buried from the waist down. Emergency personnel eventually removed Broom from the trench, and he was transported to the hospital where he was treated for serious injuries, including rib fractures, collapsed lungs, pulmonary contusions, blood within the chest, fluid around the spleen and kidney, and a left kidney laceration. Before the trench collapsed, one of Wilson Paving's employees, Jack Bailey, was using a backhoe to dig the trench and to retrieve pipe from an area adjacent to the trench. Wilson Paving believed the trench collapse was due to the work of another contractor who had allegedly removed a monument and flag pole near the area of the collapse but failed to alert Bailey of such before he began digging the trench. Broom pursued and received workers' compensation benefits from Labor Ready for the injuries he sustained in the accident. Broom also sued Wilson Paving for his injuries in a third-party action to collect for his injuries as a result of Wilson's employee. The trial court found in favor of Broom and entered judgment against Wilson Paving for $1,150,000.00. Broom then sought post-judgment garnishment of Wilson Paving's Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Mid-Continent Casualty Company. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Mid-Continent, finding that coverage for Broom's injuries was precluded under the "earth movement" exclusion clause in Mid-Continent's policy. The Court of Civil Appeals found that the earth movement exclusion clause did not prevent coverage for Broom's injuries, but affirmed summary judgment on different grounds. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Mid-Continent's Commercial General Liability Policy provided coverage for Broom's injuries. View "Broom v. Wilson Paving & Excavating" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether certain provisions of The Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA), specifically 51 O.S. 2011 sections 158(E) & 162(D), permitted the State of Oklahoma or a political subdivision to set off from liability amounts previously paid to a GTCA tort claimant from the claimant's own insurer, thereby abrogating the collateral source rule for claims arising under the GTCA with respect to these insurance benefits. Plaintiff-appellee Carolyn Mariani was injured when her vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer operated by an employee of defendant-appellant Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma State University. Mariani filed suit under the GTCA, alleging the driver's negligence, that the driver was an employee of the State of Oklahoma, and that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the negligent acts occurred. Mariani admitted that her insurer, AAA, had compensated her in underinsured/uninsured (UM) motorist benefits and medical payment coverage. The State moved for an interlocutory order ruling it had the right to set off Mariani's insurance receipts from its total liability pursuant to 51 O.S. 2011 sections 158(E) & 162(D). Mariani objected, and the trial court issued an interlocutory order denying the State's motion for the right to a setoff. The trial court certified its order for immediate review and the State filed a Petition for Certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the State's petition to review the interlocutory order. At trial, the State once again asserted it was entitled to a setoff of Mariani's insurance benefits pursuant to the GTCA. The State renewed its motion for a setoff at the conclusion of evidence, but the trial court denied the State's renewed motion. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed the trial court: "[a]n interpretation that Sections 158(E) and 162(D) serve to abrogate the collateral source rule for claims under the GTCA, allowing the State to set off collateral source benefits received by claimants from those claimants' own insurers, punishes those claimants for their foresight in procuring coverage. Such an interpretation is also contrary to the plain meaning of the sections when read in their entirety and in the context of the GTCA itself. We will not carve out an exception to the collateral source rule where the plain and clear language of the law does not provide for one." View "Mariani v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma State Univ." on Justia Law

In November 2005, petitioner Barbara Shepard was working for the Oklahoma Department of Corrections when she was injured. The Workers' Compensation Court found that Shepard had sustained a permanent partial disability. The court ordered the respondent Department of Corrections and/or its insurance carrier "to provide the claimant with reasonable and necessary continuing medical maintenance limited to prescription medications and four (4) visits per year to monitor same with Dr. M." There was no limit imposed on the doctor's exercise of a medical judgment as to which prescriptions were needed by Shepard, except those that were medically reasonable and necessary. The court also directed payment of reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred by Shepard as a result of her injury. In 2010, Shepard moved to reopen her claim based upon a change of condition for the worse. In 2011, the Workers' Compensation Court reopened the claim and determined that Shepard had a change of condition for the worse and allowed additional compensation for the worsening of her left shoulder. The order of the Workers' Compensation Court en banc stated that respondent/insurance carrier "shall pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred by claimant as a result of said injury through the date of this order." The previous award of continuing medical maintenance was not disturbed by the order that reopened her claim. The order on reopening was appealed to the Court en banc which affirmed in part and modified in part the previous order. In 2011, the Court en banc modified a provision relating to temporary total disability, and two provisions of attorney's fees. The award of reasonable and necessary medical expenses was not modified. The previous award of continuing medical maintenance was not disturbed. In 2012, Respondents sought a hearing to "discuss prescriptions." They objected one of Dr. M.'s medical reports. The court ordered Shepard to submit to a medical examination by Dr. Y., and directed this doctor to determine whether Shepard needed pain management and the nature and extent of necessary continuing medical maintenance. The order also directed Dr. Y. to determine if Shepard's current continuing medical maintenance by Dr. M. was within the Oklahoma Treatment Guidelines. The court also directed Dr. Y. to determine whether Shepard's continuing medical maintenance was within the Oklahoma Treatment Guidelines; and if not, to advise whether her continuing medical maintenance in her best interest. Respondents then sought an order that would have the effect of terminating Shepard's medical prescriptions. In June 2014, the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims ordered that Dr. M. could provide continuing medical maintenance to the Shepard. In July 2014, Shepard sought review of this decision by by the Supreme Court, arguing that respondents made an impermissible retroactive application of a new workers' compensation law. Respondents argued that application of the new law to medical benefits currently being provided was not a retroactive application, and that even if the application was a retroactive application, such application was permissible. The Supreme Court held that 85 O.S.2011 section 326(G) and the statutorily incorporated Guidelines were unconstitutionally applied retroactively to employee's previous award for medical treatment that predated section 326. View "Shepard v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an action for auto negligence arising out of injuries sustained by Plaintiffs Rachael Montgomery and her three year old son, Noah Orcutt. Montgomery was rear-ended by Defendant Morgan Potter, who claims that her car brakes failed. As a result of Defendant's negligence, Montgomery claimed she sustained a severe back injury that required surgery. Among other damages sought Montgomery sought damages for her pain and suffering. Montgomery was an uninsured driver at the time of the accident. Citing 47 O.S. Supp. 2011, section 7-116, which prevents uninsured motorists from recovering certain non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, Defendant denied that Montgomery was entitled to damages for pain and suffering. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that section 7-116 was a special law in violation of art. 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution and filed a motion for declaratory relief declaring the statute unconstitutional. The trial court ruled in Plaintiffs' favor. The Supreme Court agreed: because 47 O.S.2011, section 7-116 impacted less than an entire class of similarly situated claimants it was under-inclusive and, therefore, the Court found it to be an unconstitutional special law prohibited by the Oklahoma Constitution. View "Montgomery v. Potter" on Justia Law