Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Claimant Charles Prince filed a claim in the Workers' Compensation Court in 2009 alleging a cumulative trauma employment-related injury to his right foot, with date of last exposure in late 2008. The trial court found Claimant sustained a cumulative trauma injury to his right foot and ordered Employer, Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc., to select a physician to treat Claimant and to provide "such medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, diagnostic testing and referral as may be deemed necessary by the treating physician to the claimant's right foot." The court found his date of last exposure was late 2008. Claimant sought compensation for injury to his right foot, and later for his low back arising from the same injury. The trial court of the Workers' Compensation Court denied his claim for the low back, and a three judge panel affirmed. On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) vacated the panel's order, holding the order was against the clear weight of the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the denial of the award for Claimant's lower back was supported by competent evidence. COCA found more evidence in support of Claimant's low back injury, but Employer presented evidence from its medical expert which denied that the injury to either the low back or the right foot arose out of Claimant's employment. "The date of the injury determines the law to be used in a workers' compensation claim and applies equally to employers and claimants alike." Based on the Supreme Court's decision in "Williams Companies, Inc. v. Dunkelgod," (2012 OK 96 (2012)), and the law on the date of Claimant's injury, the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was vacated. View "Prince v. Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Workers' compensation claimant Kristy Dunkelgod was injured in an employment-related accident in 2011 while working for Williams Companies, Inc. The Workers' Compensation Court entered several orders awarding claimant temporary total disability benefits. She was also awarded a "Go-Go" scooter and a lift van. On appeal by the employer, the Court of Civil Appeals vacated the awards, holding the court's finding the lift van was medically necessary was "against the clear weight of the evidence." The Court of Civil Appeals also held the claimant was limited to a maximum of 300 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and remanded for a determination of when she reached the maximum. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) err when it applied the "clear weight of the evidence" standard of review to the Workers' Compensation Court's order awarding a lift van; and (2) whether COCA erred when it held that Claimant's temporary total disability (TTD) award was limited to a maximum of 300 weeks. The Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative; COCA failed to apply the law in effect at the time of Claimant's injury. The Court vacated and remanded the case to the Workers' Compensation Court for further proceedings. View "Williams Companies, Inc v. Dunklegod" on Justia Law

David Jordan brought an intentional tort action against his employer, Western Farmers Electric Cooperative, for injury from on-the-job exposure to allegedly highly toxic fly ash. Jordan alleged Western's spread of this hazardous material on the premises was intentional and with knowledge to a substantial certainty that serious injury would occur to employees. Western moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. The trial court found the petition failed to allege facts which plausibly demonstrated Western's conduct was intentional under the then-existent substantial certainty standard. The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the petition pled sufficient facts to remove the claim from the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act. Upon review, the Court held that the petition sufficiently pled a claim under the intentional tort/substantial certainty exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court. The order of dismissal was reversed and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Jordan v. Western Farmers Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law

Claimant Barton J. Rodr was a full-time computer programmer employed by Yzer, Inc. He suffered a heart attack while doing lawn work for his employer on the employer's premises. He was not paid anything additional for the lawn work. Claimant sought workers' compensation benefits, which were denied: the employer denied that he was working as an employee at the time of injury and claimed that the injury was not incurred during the course and scope of his employment. Employer asserted that the claimant was acting as a volunteer when injured. The workers' compensation court awarded benefits, determining that Claimant was not acting as a volunteer arising out of and in the course of his employment. The three-judge panel unanimously affirmed. The employer appealed, asserting that Claimant did not meet the statutory definition of an employee under the workers' compensation act and that the accidental injury did not occur in the course and scope of employment. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the order, finding it to be against the clear weight of the evidence and contrary to law because Claimant's performance of lawn work at the time of his injury was outside his employment and was not related to or incidental to his computer programmer job, and was therefore not compensable. Claimant timely appealed. The Supreme Court found that the test here was whether the work was necessary for the benefit of the employer: "Here, the employer specifically asked for volunteers to help with the yard work to make the grounds look nice for the grand reopening of Automobile Alley. The claimant and his thirteen-year-old son performed those duties. The employer then hired claimant's thirteen-year-old son to continue the yard work. . . . The employer's yard crew had quit and the claimant was performing that task to help out the employer, at the employer's request. The yard work was for the benefit of the employer and was not in furtherance of a personal mission. The facts reflect that the claimant was performing a special task for his employer and that his accidental injury arose out of and was within the course of his employment." The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and sustained the award entered by the workers' compensation court. View "Yzer, Inc. v. Rodr" on Justia Law

Claimant Kelly Mowdy filed a workers' compensation claim after a spider bit him. Claimant worked as a floor hand for Petitioner Nomac Drilling, LLC when he noticed two red bumps on his knee. He reported the bumps to his supervisor, who seemed unconcerned about the injury. Over the course of a few days, the bumps grew swollen, infected, turned dark red and purple, and would later be diagnosed as an abscessed spider bite in which methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) cultures were found. Claimant underwent surgery to remove dead and infected tissue. Nomac denied Claimant's injury was the result of his employment. The case was tried, and testimony revealed that Claimant's living arrangements while working for Nomac were in a heavily wooded area that "was not real clean, not real kept up." A big hole underneath his bed lead all the way to the outdoors. The Workers' Compensation Court found Claimant's testimony was credible and persuasive. The court concluded that the incident was the predominant cause of Claimant's right leg injury, and awarded Claimant TTD benefits. Nomac appealed to the three-judge panel. The panel sustained the award. The Court of Civil Appeals, however, vacated the award and ordered the claim dismissed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "an appellate court must sustain the Workers' Compensation Court's decision where there is any competent evidence supporting the decision. Claimant's expert medical report [was] not defective, and there [was] sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the Claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment." View "Nomac Drilling, LLC v. Mowdy" on Justia Law

Claimant Carl Wynne was a truck driver. While he was in Tennessee driving a truck for his former employer, he heard that Triad Transport, Inc. was hiring. Claimant called Triad’s headquarters in McAlester and spoke to a recruiter who had hiring authority. Claimant requested that an application be sent by fax to Odessa, Texas, where he lived. He completed the application and sent it by fax to McAlester. A week or so later, the recruiter phoned while Claimant was driving somewhere between Georgia and Arizona that his application had been approved. Claimant agreed to travel to McAlester for orientation. He returned his prior employer's truck to a terminal in Tuscon, Arizona, and a Triad employee gave him a ride to a Triad satellite terminal in Laveen, Arizona. There, he passed a drug test, was provided a fuel card, and dispatched to Rockwall, Texas with a load. In 2010, Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Colorado while he was driving Triad’s truck. He filed a Form 3 claim for benefits in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court which Triad opposed. The trial tribunal conducted a hearing solely on the issue of the court's jurisdiction. Two witnesses were presented, Claimant and the President of Employer. Claimant testified concerning when and where he was actually hired, and Employer's President testified to the general hiring practices of his company. The recruiter was not called to testify. The trial tribunal made several findings of fact and concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the case of Claimant's subsequent injury as Claimant's hiring and final assent to permanent employment relationship between claimant and respondent occurred in Oklahoma. A three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court unanimously affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court’s de novo review of the record, the testimony of the witnesses, and the arguments of the parties lead to the conclusion that Claimant's final assent to employment did not occur until he attended the orientation in Oklahoma, “[t]hat process began when Claimant first made contact with [Triad’s] recruiter, but it did not end until Claimant gave his final assent to employment during the orientation in Oklahoma. The Workers' Compensation Court did not err in determining that it has jurisdiction to hear the claim.” View "Triad Transport v. Wynne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant, Mary Roshawn Jones was a full-time classified employee of Defendant-Appellee Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs (OJA), working at the L.E. Rader Center (Center). Plaintiff was bitten by a spider while at work. She sought medical treatment for the spider bite at the Center. A Center nurse informed Plaintiff she would have to seek a drug test in connection with its "Review of Job-Related Accidental Injury or Illness." The OJA alleged that they repeatedly tried to get Plaintiff to complete paperwork relating to her injury. The OJA also alleged that Plaintiff's delay in completing the paperwork resulted in the delay in requesting the drug test. Plaintiff alleged that the reason for the required drug test was a series of harassing and threatening calls to the Center by a former boyfriend. Plaintiff was ultimately discharged. She filed no administrative appeal from the discharge but filed a civil case, seeking compensatory and punitive damages and lost wages, or in the alternative, restoration to employment. The issue of first impression before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions of the Oklahoma Standards for Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (SWDATA) permitted a classified state employee to file an action in district court prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Upon review, the Court held that SWDATA provides an independent cause of action which authorizes a classified state employee to file an action in the district court for a willful violation of the act without first exhausting the employee's administrative remedies. View "Jones v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Eddie Lee Howard and Shane Schneider (Employees) entered an employment contract with Defendant-Appellee Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. For two years following termination, the contract prohibited employees from: working for, leasing to, or selling equipment to competitors. The contract contained an arbitration agreement requiring application of Louisiana law with disputes to be resolved in Houston, Texas. After the employees terminated their employment with Nitro-Lift, they went to work for a competitor in Arkansas. The employer filed an arbitration proceeding in Houston. Howard and Schneider filed an application for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in Oklahoma asserting that the non-competition agreement violated public policy. The district court initially granted the employees a temporary injunction, prohibiting Nitro-Lift from continuing the arbitration proceedings in Texas. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion to dismiss. After considering the parties' briefs and arguments, the district court found the arbitration clause to be valid on its face and reasonable in its terms, lifted the temporary restraining order, and granted the motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement; and as drafted, the non-competition covenants were void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma public policy. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ruben Espinosa sought permanent partial disability benefits for injuries to his hands, arms, and shoulders. The Workers' Compensation Court awarded benefits, but a three-judge en banc panel reduced the award to account for Petitioner's previously awarded benefits for injuries to other parts of his body. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the panel, determining that both the trial court and the panel misapplied the applicable statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between two Court of Civil Appeals' opinions with differing interpretations of the limitations provided in the applicable statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when the Workers' Compensation Court awards compensation for an accidental personal injury or occupational disease, pursuant to 85 O.S. 2001 Sec. 22(7), the sum of all permanent partial disability awards is limited to a total of 100% or 520 weeks (10 years) for any individual, but awards against the Multiple Injury Trust Funds, or awards for amputations and surgeries are excluded from both limitations. View "Evans & Assoc. Utility Svcs. V. Espinoza" on Justia Law

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma " on Justia Law