Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellee HSBC Bank USA, NA, claimed to be the holder of a note and mortgage on Defendants-Appellants Wesley and Pamela Lyon's house, and initiated foreclosure proceedings against them. HSBC filed a first amended petition late 2008, adding additional defendants, but continued to assert its status as the "present holder of said note and mortgage." The Lyons, noting the facial deficiencies of the unindorsed note filed in the original action, asserted HSBC's lack of standing. The trial court denied HSBC's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court allowed the bank time to file an amended petition. HSBC filed its second amended petition again asserting its status as the holder of the note by reason of an indorsement and the assignment of the mortgage. A review of the note attached to the second amended petition demonstrated a blank indorsement from the original lender "without recourse to the bearer" and signed by a vice president of the assigning bank. HSBC then filed a renewed Motion for Summary Judgment in early 2011, which was granted two months later by the trial court. Defendants argued on appeal that the bank still lacked standing to bring suit, and that the summary judgment ruling was in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly granted the bank's motion for summary judgment because it had established in its amended petition that it was the current holder of the note, and that the Lyons had not made any payments on the house since 2008. View "HSBC Bank, NA v. Lyon" on Justia Law

Tracy Stanfield was injured in 1992. A settlement relating to his injuries resulted in an annuity providing periodic payments to Stanfield from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife). Stanfield assigned certain annuity payments, and the assignee in turn assigned them to J. G. Wentworth S.S.C. Limited Partnership (Wentworth). Stanfield later caused MetLife to ignore the assignments to Wentworth. Wentworth filed an action in a Pennsylvania state court and obtained a judgment against Stanfield. Wentworth then filed a motion for a judgment against MetLife for the same amount. A Pennsylvania court granted the motion. Soon thereafter, Stanfield's mother Mildred filed a petition in an Oklahoma district court to be appointed guardian of her son's estate. MetLife filed an interpleader action in a Pennsylvania federal district court and named Wentworth and Mildred in her capacity as guardian of her son's estate as defendants. Mildred asked attorney Loyde Warren to accept service of process on her behalf, and he agreed. Stanfield signed Warren's contingency fee agreement; Warren then engaged local counsel in Pennsylvania. At the settlement conference the parties agreed that Wentworth's judgment would be withdrawn; payments would be paid from Stanfield's annuity payments to Wentworth; the annuity assignment was rescinded; and future annuity payments from MetLife to Stanfield, as guardian, would be made payable in care of Warren. In 2009, Warren filed a motion in the open and continuing guardianship case before the Oklahoma district court for approval of both the 2001 contract for legal representation and the payment of legal fees made pursuant to that contract. Mildred objected and among her arguments, she maintained that a contingency fee for successfully defending a client from a judgment was improper, and that the fee agreement was unenforceable because it had not been approved by the guardianship court. The district court denied Warren's motion, "[b]ecause the application was not filed prior to payment of the fee and was not filed until nearly eight years after the contract was executed." The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and Warren appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that (1) the district court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate a guardianship proceeding a motion seeking court approval of a lawyer's contingent fee contract; (2) the guardian's failure to obtain court approval of a contingent fee agreement prior to payment pursuant to that agreement is not, by itself, a legally sufficient reason for a court to deny a motion to approve the agreement; and (3) the mere passage of time between creation of a contingent fee agreement and when it is presented to a court for approval in an open and continuing guardianship proceeding is not a legally sufficient reason to deny approval of that agreement. View "In the matter of the Guardianship of Stanfield" on Justia Law

In 2005, Plaintiff Marlene Harris purchased a car from Defendant David Stanley Chevrolet. Her purchase agreement contained an arbitration provision that applied to any "controversy, claim or dispute between the Purchaser and the Dealer arising out of, or related to this sale or transaction, including but not limited to, any and all issues or disputes arising as a result of this sale or transaction whether said issues arise prior to, during or subsequent to the sale or attempted sale of a vehicle." A few days after executing the purchase agreement, Plaintiff entered into a GAP insurance contract sold to her by an employee of the dealership (acting as an agent of the insurance company). In 2009, the car was a total loss. The GAP insurance company refused to pay the total difference between the insurance proceeds and the amount owed on the car, and Plaintiff sued to compel the GAP coverage. Plaintiff maintained that the purchase of the vehicle and the purchase of the policy were separate transactions, and that the arbitration clause of the purchase contract was inapplicable to the underpayment of coverage (GAP coverage). She argued no claim was brought against the GAP insurance company which was related to the sale or financing of the vehicle, conceding the arbitration clause would have applied to claims related to the sale or financing issues. After reviewing the motions of the parties, the trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Compel arbitration without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the two contracts involved two separate subjects, executed on different dates, and the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement did not mention or reference GAP insurance or any relationship between the two contracts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the evidentiary hearing and ruling that the arbitration clause did not apply as a matter of law.View "Harris v. David Stanley Chevrolet, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Carolyn Covel, Tonni Covel, Toby Keith Covel and Tracy Covel filed a wrongful death action against Defendants-Appellees Pedro Rodriguez (d/b/a Rodriguez Transportes) and Republic Western Insurance Company. In their suit, Plaintiffs asserted that defective brakes on Defendant Rodriguez's bus caused the death of their decedent, H.K. Covel. After a five-day jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $2.8 million dollars and $5,000.00 in punitive damages. The trial court denied Defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), remittitur or new trial. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals, with one judge dissenting, deemed the evidence of Plaintiffs' expert on causation to be legally insufficient on "Daubert" grounds and reversed with directions to enter judgment for the Defendants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and found that the testimony and conclusions of Plaintiffs' expert were not objected to or challenged on "Daubert" grounds when they were admitted, and were properly considered by the jury when it rendered its verdict, and by the trial judge in ruling on the JNOV. The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Covel v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Seymour Law Firm, R. Thomas Seymour and Scott A. Graham, based on the legal theory that its failure to enforce an attorney's lien within one year after it became aware of a settlement precluded Plaintiff-Appellant Gina Cowley from enforcing a contract she held with co-counsel. Specifically, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the expiration of the lien prohibited Plaintiff's lawyer from suing her co-counsel for breach of contract over the distribution of attorney fees from the settlement of the underlying case. Upon review, the Court held that the applicable one-year statute of limitations did not preclude a lawsuit arising over a contract dispute between Plaintiff's lawyers. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cowley v. Seymour Law Firm" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust filed a foreclosure action against Defendants-Appellants Natacha and Jevester Bryams, Jr. Deutsche Bank claimed at that time to hold the note and mortgage having received due assignment through mesne assignments of record or conveyance via mortgage servicing transfer. A review of the note showed no indorsement. In its brief in support of motion for summary judgment Deutsche Bank attached a document entitled "Assignment of Mortgage." This assignment of mortgage was acknowledged and stamped as being recorded with the County Clerk of Tulsa County on January 26, 2010--over one month after the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, and the Byrams appealed, arguing that the bank failed to demonstrate it had standing to bring the foreclosure action. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the bank needed to show it became "a person entitled to enforce" its note prior to foreclosing. There was a question of fact as to when and if the bank became so entitled, and the Court concluded summary judgement was not an appropriate disposition of the case. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Byrams" on Justia Law

Senator Jim Wilson filed suit in an attempt to have the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 declared invalid after the Supreme Court rejected his attempt to have the Act declared unconstitutional. In an earlier case, the Senator attached the Act as invalid because it "failed to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible preserve[d] the factors of 'compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests.'" In his petition in this case, he made "verbatim the same allegations as he did in [his earlier case]." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court properly dismissed Senator Wilson's petition because he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because his claim was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion having been adjudicated against him in "Wilson I." The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Wilson v. Oklahoma ex rel. State Election Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust filed a foreclosure action against Defendant-Appellant Dennis Brumbaugh. Appellant and his wife Debra executed a note and mortgage with Long Beach Mortgage Company in 2002. In 2006, the Brumbaughs entered into a loan modification agreement with U.S. Bank, N.A., successor trustee to Wachovia Bank, N.A. Several months later, the Brumbaughs divorced, and in 2008, Debra executed a quitclaim deed to Defendant. Defendant defaulted on the note in 2009, and the bank shortly thereafter filed its petition to foreclose. Attached to the petition was a copy of the note, mortgage, loan modification agreement, and copies of statements of judgments and liens by other entities. Appellee claimed it was the present holder of the note and mortgage having received due assignment through assignments of record or conveyance via mortgage servicing transfer. The Appellant answered, denying Appellee owned any interest in the note and mortgage, and the copies attached to the petition were not the same as those he signed. He claimed Appellee lacked capacity to sue and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. He also denied being in default and asserted the Appellee/servicing agent caused the alleged default. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that there were significant questions of fact such that summary judgment was not an appropriate disposition of the case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Brumbaugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Shelly Dilbeck initiated an action to enforce her 2001 divorce decree. Among the issues she raised, the district court decided that an acceleration clause on interest on the property division in a consent decree did not accelerate the property division payments as set out in the decree. On review of that issue, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The divorce decree required Mr. Dilbeck to pay property division alimony according to a schedule, and the judgment would not accumulate interest as long as it was paid in full according to the schedule. In the event he missed any payment the entire amount was to accumulate interest at the judgment rate. After some initial payments, Mr. Dilbeck did not pay the final payments. Upon review of the decree, the Supreme Court found that it did not provide that all property division installment payments would be accelerated when a payment was missed. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on each installment until their scheduled payment times. The Court affirmed part of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, and reversed its decision on property division. The case was remanded back to the trial court for review of the property division and a recalculation of the amounts due Plaintiff. View "Dilbeck v. Dilbeck" on Justia Law

Angela Schreiner drowned in May of 1999 after driving into twelve feet of flood water covering a roadway in Pawnee County. Plaintiff-Appellee Charles West (her father) filed a wrongful death action as the personal representative of Schreiner's estate against Board of County Commissioners of Pawnee County. After a trial spanning two days, the jury returned a verdict in the estate's favor for $13,663.00. Plaintiff moved for a new trial alleging the damages awarded were grossly inadequate. The trial court granted a new trial based on a determination that the jury's monetary award for the loss of a human life was unconscionable and shocked the conscience. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded finding that the trial court applied the wrong standard in granting the new trial motion and that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence. Under these facts, the Supreme Court held that the trial court was justified in ordering a new trial to address the damages issue. View "West v. Pawnee County Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law