Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant, Mary Roshawn Jones was a full-time classified employee of Defendant-Appellee Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs (OJA), working at the L.E. Rader Center (Center). Plaintiff was bitten by a spider while at work. She sought medical treatment for the spider bite at the Center. A Center nurse informed Plaintiff she would have to seek a drug test in connection with its "Review of Job-Related Accidental Injury or Illness." The OJA alleged that they repeatedly tried to get Plaintiff to complete paperwork relating to her injury. The OJA also alleged that Plaintiff's delay in completing the paperwork resulted in the delay in requesting the drug test. Plaintiff alleged that the reason for the required drug test was a series of harassing and threatening calls to the Center by a former boyfriend. Plaintiff was ultimately discharged. She filed no administrative appeal from the discharge but filed a civil case, seeking compensatory and punitive damages and lost wages, or in the alternative, restoration to employment. The issue of first impression before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions of the Oklahoma Standards for Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (SWDATA) permitted a classified state employee to file an action in district court prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Upon review, the Court held that SWDATA provides an independent cause of action which authorizes a classified state employee to file an action in the district court for a willful violation of the act without first exhausting the employee's administrative remedies. View "Jones v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Two chiropractors, Daniel Post, D.C., and Brad M. Hayes, D.C., and the Oklahoma State Chiropractic Independent Physicians Association (Chiropractors) filed an application requesting that the Supreme Court declare portions of 85 O.S. sections 329 and 333 to be unconstitutional. The legislature enacted a new Workers' Compensation Code (effective August 26, 2011). An independent medical examiner may only be a licensed medical doctor or a licensed doctor of osteopathy. If the court does not follow the opinion of the independent medical examiner on any issue, the court shall set out its reasons for deviating from the opinion of the independent medical examiner. The opinion of the independent medical examiner shall be followed unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The Chiropractors claim they are excluded from the workers' compensation system. The Chiropractors maintained that the new law disenfranchises them from being independent medical examiners. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the definition of "qualified independent medical examiner" to the extent it is limited to only a licensed medical doctor or doctor of Osteopathy in 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sec. 308(39) and the specifically mentioned portions of 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sections 329 and 333, are special laws in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held that the specifically mentioned portions of 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sections 326, 329 and 332 violate the separation of powers clause, Art. IV, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Therefore, these portions of the offending statutes were severed. View "Oklahoma State Chiropractic Indep. Physicians Assoc. v. Fallin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a governmental subdivision is equitably estopped from denying liability where it previously entered into an undisclosed oral contractual agreement regarding the maintenance of the county-line road, failed to advise the plaintiff that another county bore responsibility for the road maintenance at some point prior to the expiration of the limitations period. Plaintiff Paul McWilliams was injured when his motorcycle hit an area where the road had buckled causing his motorcycle to flip. The road in question adjoins Caddo and Comanche Counties. The precise location of the accident was in Caddo County. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Comanche and Caddo Counties entered into an oral contractual agreement regarding the maintenance of the county-line road more than twenty years ago. Pursuant to that agreement, Caddo County was responsible for maintaining the section of roadway where Plaintiff's accident occurred. However, the contractual agreement was oral, and no document was on file in the county records delineating the two counties' responsibilities. Immediately after receiving notice of Plaintiff's accident, Comanche County repaired the road. No one advised Plainitff that there was an agreement between the counties.Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record substantiated that the undisclosed agreement between Comanche County and Caddo County coupled with Comanche County's dilatory conduct, prevented Plaintiff of any means to discover Comanche County's true role in the litigation. As a matter of public policy, Comanche County was estopped to deny liability of Plaintiff's claim. View "McWilliams v. Comanche Cty. Bd of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Sheila Yvonne Berman sought assistance from the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) to determine paternity and to collect child support. She alleged Herbert White, Jr. was the father of her child. DHS brought an administrative action to determine paternity and arranged for Defendant-Appellee Laboratory Corporation of America (d/b/a Lab Corp, Inc.) to conduct the DNA test. LabCorp reported White was not the father of Berman's child. The test was performed a second time with similar results. After the DHS proceeding concluded, Berman submitted an envelope, purportedly containing White's DNA, to a different lab for DNA testing. This time the results were different. Berman filed a paternity action against White. He was ordered to submit to another paternity test. The test results were virtually identical to the DNA sample contained on the envelope, and White was judicially determined to be the father of Berman's child. White appealed, but the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the trial court. While the county court case was still pending, Berman filed this lawsuit in the district court seeking money damages from LabCorp for the negligent testing of White's DNA sample in the DHS administrative proceeding. In her petition, Berman alleged that as a result of LabCorp's negligence, she suffered damages in excess of $10,000.00 for the "loss of past and future child support payments that White would have been required to pay, had the paternity test results been correct, showing White to be the biological father of Plaintiff's child." Berman alleged LabCorp had the duty of care of a "reasonably prudent professional in the paternity testing field" and that its actions constituted a breach of that duty. The issue in this case was whether LabCorp owed Berman a duty of care. If so, Berman stated a claim for negligence against LabCorp, unrelated to the publication of the lab results. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, and reversed and remanded the case for trial. View "Berman v. Laboratory Corporation of America" on Justia Law

Appellants Wsbaldo Valdez and Linda Vargas owned property in joint tenancy and neglected to pay the 2005 property taxes. In 2006, Appellee Mae Ouellette purchased the property at a tax sale and later applied for a tax deed. She served notice on Vargas but not on Valdez. In 2008, Ouellette received a tax deed. Valdez and Vargas filed a petition to quiet title, for ejectment, and damages. They then filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting the tax deed was void for failure to serve Valdez, and Valdez could redeem the entire property. In Ouellette's counter-motion for summary judgment and response to Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, her two main assertions were: (1) Valdez and Vargas were either an unincorporated association or a partnership and service on Vargas was good service on Valdez; and (2) the service on Vargas was at least valid and the tax deed was effective as to her interest, thereby severing the joint tenancy. Ouellette argued she and Valdez were tenants in common. The trial court held that service on Valdez was ineffective but agreed with Ouellette that Valdez could not redeem the entire property, and Valdez and Ouellette were tenants in common. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that service of a notice for application of tax deed is mandatory and must be made on all parties according to the applicable statute. Failure to make such service will render any issued tax deed void in its entirety. Accordingly, Valdez had the right to redeem the entire property. The Court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Vargas v. Occupants of 3908 SW 24th St Oklahoma City" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Eddie Lee Howard and Shane Schneider (Employees) entered an employment contract with Defendant-Appellee Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. For two years following termination, the contract prohibited employees from: working for, leasing to, or selling equipment to competitors. The contract contained an arbitration agreement requiring application of Louisiana law with disputes to be resolved in Houston, Texas. After the employees terminated their employment with Nitro-Lift, they went to work for a competitor in Arkansas. The employer filed an arbitration proceeding in Houston. Howard and Schneider filed an application for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in Oklahoma asserting that the non-competition agreement violated public policy. The district court initially granted the employees a temporary injunction, prohibiting Nitro-Lift from continuing the arbitration proceedings in Texas. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion to dismiss. After considering the parties' briefs and arguments, the district court found the arbitration clause to be valid on its face and reasonable in its terms, lifted the temporary restraining order, and granted the motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement; and as drafted, the non-competition covenants were void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma public policy. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellee/Counter-appellant, Archie Dicksion filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of his brother. Subsequently, Thomas Powell asserted that he was a pretermitted heir of the deceased. With the family's cooperation, DNA genetic testing was conducted and the tests determined that Powell was indeed the son of the decedent. The trial court determined that Powell was an unintentionally omitted child and entitled to his statutory share of the estate. Powell and his half-sister, the decedent's daughter, also challenged the admittance of the holographic will to probate and to Appellant's appointment as the personal representative of the estate. A motion for new trial was denied. Both Powell and the Appellant appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the application of paternity testing to intestate and probate proceedings. Upon review, the Court held that: (1) under the facts presented, the objections to admission of the holographic will were not untimely; (2) the paternity statute, 84 O.S. 2001 sec. 215, applies to intestate and probate proceedings; and (3) 58 O.S. 2001 sec. 122 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a will. View "In re Estate of Dicksion" on Justia Law

Appellants Eleanor and Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer petitioned the Supreme Court to challenge the Court of Civil Appeals' decision which upheld the trial court's determination regarding Appellee-Trustee JP Morgan Chase Bank's previously-adjudicated ability to draw on the trusts's principal. The trust in question named Appellant Eleanor Reed as beneficiary, and authorized payments of up to half of its income payable quarterly, for her support and well-being. In 1998, Reed filed a Petition for Instructions in district court in Tulsa County, requesting the court determine what distributions were permitted under the Trust. Specifically, Reed sought instructions for the co-trustee, Bank One Trust Company, N.A., to pay certain of Reed's expenses from the Trust's principal. In 2007, Reed and three of her four children, Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer, filed suit to modify the terms of the trust to allow Appellee JP Morgan Chase to make payments from the remaining half of the trust's principal. Appellants stated that Reed was "an incapacitated person afflicted with Alzheimer's disease, and her condition constitutes an emergency condition which will necessitate her being housed in a nursing home. She is wheel-chair bound, 84 years old, and in precarious health." Appellants maintained that Testator would have wanted Reed, his only child, to have the use of the remaining Trust funds to provide for her well-being. Appellees objected to the suit, arguing that the Testator's intent regarding the payment from principal had been determined in a 1998 Order and, as such, the claims asserted in the Amended Petition are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Upon review, the Supreme Court saw no connection between the 1998 Order and the issue presented to it on appeal: "[w]hile we agree that the subject matter, the parties, and the capacity of the parties remain the same, we cannot agree that the cause of the action is the same as that in the 1998 matter. The focus of the 1998 lawsuit was to provide instructions to the trustee to make payments from half of the Trust corpus on behalf of Reed. This payment was expressly provided for in the Trust instrument. In the present action, Appellants [sought] due to an unforeseen medical emergency, to modify the express terms of the Trust and to show that Testator would have intended Reed's present needs be cared for even if it meant invading the remaining half of the Trust corpus." The Court vacated the appellate court's opinion in this matter and remanded the case back to the trial court for determination of whether modification should be allowed under the terms of the trust. View "Reed v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank" on Justia Law

Prospective Adoptive Parents M.B. and V.B. and Baby Boy K.B. challenged a district court decision that denied the adoptive parents' motion to terminate the biological father's parental rights and petition for adoption. The district court ordered K.B. returned to his biological father. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether K.B. was eligible for adoption without the consent of his biological father. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that K.B. was not eligible for adoption because K.B.'s biological father exercised his parental rights regarding the child, including contributing to the support of the biological mother during pregnancy. The sufficiency of the support was a fact to be determined by the trial court, so the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision but remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Adoption of Baby Boy K.B." on Justia Law

Petitioners-Appellants Donald and Paula Thompson appealed a district court's decision that affirmed the Board of the Public Employees Retirement System's ruling to forfeit Mr. Thompson's retirement benefits earned in his state retirement account. The district court determined that Mr. Thompson's state retirement benefits had to be forfeited after he was convicted of felonies that violated his oath of office as a district court judge. The court determined that Mrs. Thompson did not have standing in the administrative proceedings and was not a proper party therein. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Thompson alleged the Board violated the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act when it forced him to forfeit his retirement benefits without proper notice. In addition, he argued he did not receive an individual proceeding to provide him an opportunity to proffer evidence and present witnesses pursuant to the Act. Furthermore, Mr. Thompson alleged that the strict construction of the applicable forfeiture statute requires that it apply only to the last oath of office he took. According to this logic, Mr. Thompson argued he should have only been forced to forfeit the benefits he would have earned from his last term in office. Upon review, the Supreme Court found none of Mr. Thompson's arguments persuasive, and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Thompson v. Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law