Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates
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The dispute revolves around which of two oil and gas leases controls the royalty payments for nine wells collectively called the Bernhardt Wells. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant, Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. The plaintiffs, trustees of The Eunice S. Justice Amended, Revised, and Restated 1990 Revocable Trust Agreement, argued that a 1978 Lease entitles them to a 3/16 royalty, while Devon maintained that a 1973 Lease, entitling the Trust to a 1/8 royalty, controls. The court found that the dispute over which lease controls is best characterized as a quiet title claim, subject to a 15-year statute of limitations, which began when the injury occurred in 1978. Thus, the Trust's quiet title claim, filed more than 15 years later, was time-barred. The court also held that the trial court did not err in denying the Trust's motion to compel the production of various title opinions in Devon's possession. View "BASE v. DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION" on Justia Law

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In Oklahoma, a woman suffering from various progressive, degenerative diseases executed an advance directive instructing that her life not be extended by life-sustaining treatment, including artificially administered nutrition and hydration. Later, she was hospitalized and a PEG tube was inserted to provide artificially administered nutrition and hydration, contrary to the terms of her advance directive. The woman's sister and children disagreed on whether to keep the PEG tube in place or follow the instructions in the advance directive. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that an incapacitated or incompetent person retains the legal right to revoke their advance directive and that revocation of an advance directive must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had found that the woman had not revoked her advance directive and that the insertion of the PEG tube violated the terms of her advance directive. View "IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF L.A.C." on Justia Law

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This case, delivered by The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, concerns the right of succession to the role of estate administrator, specifically in situations where a third-party administrator has been appointed. The deceased, George Landing, Jr., left behind two minor daughters and no will. His ex-wife initially served as the estate's administrator. She later voluntarily resigned and appointed Jim McGough, a local attorney and guardian to Landing's daughters, to the position.One of the daughters, Emma Landing, sought to replace McGough as the administrator of her father's estate upon reaching the age of majority. She argued that under 58 O.S. § 135, she had superior right to the role and the court could not refuse her request. The District Court of Tulsa County denied her request, prompting her appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court held that the trial court had discretion in appointing the estate's administrator and that it did not abuse this discretion in refusing Emma's request. The court rejected Emma's argument that she had an absolute right to replace the existing administrator. It noted that granting such a right would lead to uncertainty and confusion in probate matters and could undermine the orderly settlement of estates. The court also affirmed that the trial court had not found Emma incompetent to serve as administrator but had simply decided there was no good reason to replace McGough. The order of the District Court was therefore affirmed. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LANDING" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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An Oklahoma district court ordered the admission to probate of a will executed in 2018 by Velda Mae Rivenburg, after denying challenges to the will brought by the testator's son. Velda Mae was survived by one son, Appellant Earl Austin Rivenburg (Austin), and one daughter, Appellee Bridget Ciliberti (Bridget). In April 2018, Rivenburg fell ill. Bridget traveled from her home in Tennessee to help her mother. Austin, who was stationed overseas as a civilian employee with United States Government, obtained leave from his post to travel to Oklahoma. That summer, after Austin returned to his overseas job, he was contacted by a long-time friend of Rivenburg's, Karen Heizer. Heizer was concerned that Bridget might be manipulating their mother into selling or mortgaging real estate to help Bridget pay off debt. Austin called his mother in June 2018 and broached the subject. Rivenburg became angry and hung up. Within weeks of returning to his job, Austin received notice that Bridget had initiated guardianship proceedings for their mother. The topic had never been discussed while Austin was in Oklahoma. Writing to the court, Austin objected to Bridget being appointed guardian, listed examples of what he believed to be a history of Bridget's financial manipulation of their mother. The guardianship was abandoned as soon as Rivenburg decided to change her will in September 2018. This will differed considerably from one Rivenburg had made in 2014, substantially reducing the property bequeathed to Austin in favor of Bridget. After Rivenburg's death in early 2020, Bridget sought to probate the 2018 will and have herself named personal representative. Austin challenged the will, claiming it was the product of fraud and undue influence on Bridget's part. The trial court granted demurrers to both of Austin's claims and admitted Rivenburg's 2018 will to probate. Austin appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined the Court of Civil Appeals erred by conflating the concepts of fraud and undue influence, and by treating certain facts as essentially dispositive as to both. "While the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Austin as challenger to the will, the burden of producing evidence to rebut an inference of fraud shifted to Bridget. Accordingly, the trial court's order admitting Rivenburg's will to probate is reversed, and the case is remanded to give Bridget an opportunity to present evidence on the issue of fraud." View "Rivenburg v. Cilberti" on Justia Law

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The parents of Elliott Williams created their individual wills and joint trust after Elliott died. A wrongful death lawsuit was filed on Elliott's behalf, and the Williamses were statutory beneficiaries to proceeds from the lawsuit. Before they received any such proceeds, they attempted to transfer them into their trust for estate planning purposes. Both parents subsequently died before the proceeds were determined or distributed. The petitioner, the personal representative of Elliott's mother's estate, then sought to have Elliott's mother's share judicially determined to belong in the trust. The trial court determined they belonged in the trust. The personal representative of the father's estate appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. In an issue of first impression, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered whether proceeds from a wrongful death case could be transferred into a trust before they are obtained by the trust settlor. The Court held that they can, and if they were, they belonged in the trust. View "Hamilton v. Welsh" on Justia Law

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Ronald W. Parker (Decedent) died on April 3, 2020, as a resident of Pittsburg County, Oklahoma. He left behind two adult daughters, Mandy Allford and Shila Pirpich, and a brother, Herman Parker (Herman). A little more than one-year before Decedent's death, he executed a holographic will. A dispute over the disposition of the estate arose between the Decedent's adult children and his brother. A provision in the will conferred a specific bequest of an expected worker's compensation settlement to Decedent's brother. After reviewing pleadings submitted by the parties and stipulations, the trial court determined the decedent's holographic failed to intentionally omit his adult children, and therefore, they were deemed pretermitted heirs by operation of law. Additionally, the lower court concluded that as pretermitted heirs, the daughters were entitled to an intestate share of Decedent's estate pursuant to 84 O.S.2011, § 132. Finally, the trial judge found that 84 O.S.2011, § 133 did not apply to the facts of this case. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the interplay between 84 O.S.2011, § 132 and 84 O.S.2011, § 133. The Supreme Court found that nothing in § 133 limited its application to those cases in which a will provides for one or more lineal descendants or a surviving spouse. "It broadly applies to apportionment of shares payable to pretermitted heirs from all devisees and/or legatees. The terms lineal descendant are never mentioned in § 133. To interpret the relevant statutes as the trial court and the COCA did would render Decedent's will and § 133 meaningless." However, the Court found that awarding almost the entirety of Decedent's estate to Herman would also eviscerate the purpose of the pretermitted heir statutes. Thus, the Court held § 132 and § 133 were both applicable to the facts of this case. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the proper manner of apportioning the pretermitted shares awarded to Allford and Pirpich, while still recognizing the testator's intent to provide a specific bequest to his brother. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Parker" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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Appellees Jean Norris a/k/a Jeannie Norris, Carol Mikles, and Kenneth Hopcus (collectively Cousins) brought this action seeking an order declaring them as the primary beneficiaries of an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) belonging to their cousin, Sandra Pool (Decedent), based on the IRA plan language and a beneficiary designation executed by Decedent. Appellant Steven Pool, the son of Decedent (Son), sought an order declaring him the sole beneficiary of the IRA based on a change of beneficiary form received by the IRA custodian, Stifel Nicolaus & Company (Stifel), after Decedent's death. The district court granted summary declaratory judgment in favor of Cousins, determining they were the beneficiaries of the IRA. Son timely appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed. The very narrow question in this case for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's resolution was whether Stifel had to be in possession of the executed change of beneficiary form prior to Decedent's death to constitute a valid change of beneficiary. To this, the Court answered in the negative: Decedent substantially complied with all the requirements of the IRA plan language to designate Son as the beneficiary of her IRA account except for Stifel receiving the form in the mail prior to her death. The Court exercised its equitable powers to disburse the IRA funds per Decedent's intent. View "Norris v. Pool" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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Appellants Amy Gray, Jerry Dickman, Jeffrey Dickman, and Deborah Henderson (collectively Children) brought an action seeking an order declaring Children as the primary beneficiaries of a Profit-Sharing Plan (PSP) and an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) belonging to their father, J. Jerry Dickman (Decedent), based on the language in an antenuptial agreement and two beneficiary designations executed by Decedent. Appellee Linda Dickman, the wife of Decedent (Wife), sought an order declaring her the sole beneficiary based on the order of succession. The district court granted summary declaratory judgment in favor of Wife, determining she was the sole beneficiary of both the PSP and IRA. Children appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed and remanded with instructions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address: (1) whether the antenuptial agreement between Wife and Decedent was broad enough to cover the PSP and to waive any right Wife had to consent to the rollover of assets from the PSP to an IRA and to designate beneficiaries; (2) whether despite the antenuptial agreement, Wife's consent was necessary under federal law to roll over the plan's assets to an IRA and designate beneficiaries; (3) whether the Court should reform the IRA beneficiary designations to give effect to Decedent's intent; and (4) whether the Supreme Court should transfer the remaining assets maintained in the PSP to the IRA. The Supreme Court held that the antenuptial agreement between Wife and Decedent covered the PSP, making it Decedent's separate property. Decedent had exclusive rights to the PSP, including the right to designate beneficiaries. Wife's consent was not necessary under federal law because the PSP was not an ERISA plan. The Supreme Court further held Decedent substantially complied with all the requirements to designate beneficiaries to his IRA account, and the Court exercised its equitable powers to reform the beneficiary designations to disburse the IRA funds per Decedent's intent. However, Decedent never initiated the process of transferring to the IRA the remaining assets maintained in the PSP. The remaining assets should therefore be distributed per the PSP beneficiary designation. View "Gray v. Fidelity Brokerage Services" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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While divorce proceedings between plaintiff-appellee Arnold Johnson (Husband) and Jacquelyn Johnson (Wife) were pending, Wife changed the primary beneficiary of her individual retirement account (IRA) from Husband to her adult children, defendants-appellants Dirk Snow and Duff Snow (collectively, Children). She also opened a new individual transfer on death (TOD) account and designated Children as the primary beneficiaries. Wife died before the divorce was granted, and the action abated. Thereafter, Husband filed the underlying declaratory judgment action to enforce the automatic temporary injunction entered in the divorce action. The district court concluded that the IRA and the funds used to open the TOD account were marital property and, therefore, Wife's acts violated the automatic temporary injunction, 43 O.S.2011 § 110(A)(1)(a), and were ineffective. The district court granted summary judgment to Husband and ordered that he be reinstated as the primary beneficiary of Wife's IRA and awarded the proceeds of the TOD account. Children appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that when the dissolution of marriage action abated, the district court was deprived of its jurisdiction to enforce the automatic temporary injunction. "It is undisputed that Children were designated as the primary beneficiaries at the time of Wife's death and, therefore, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." View "Johnson v. Snow" on Justia Law

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Appellant Marie Yammine, as former wife and primary beneficiary of a two million dollar life insurance policy issued by Respondent ReliaStar Life Insurance Company to her former husband, Dr. Jean Bernard, appealed a declaratory judgment finding the contingent beneficiary, Appellee Roland Ghoussoub, was entitled to the policy's death benefit. Dr. Bernard died after the trial court granted the parties' divorce but prior to final judgment on all issues. The trial court declared Yammine and Bernard were divorced and that 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A) operated to revoke her beneficiary designation to the death benefits. Whether Oklahoma's revocation-upon-divorce statute, 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A), applied when one party dies after the granting of the divorce but prior to final judgment on all issues, was a matter of first impression for the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Court concluded Section 178(A) required a final judgment on all issues, and that the trial court erred by interpreting 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A) to revoke Yammine's beneficiary designation in Bernard's life insurance policy based on an order granting divorce when the final judgment on all issues remained pending at husband's death. The trial court's declaratory judgment was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ghoussoub v. Yammine" on Justia Law