Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of proponents filed an initiative petition seeking to repeal the existing constitutional provision governing Oklahoma’s primary elections and replace it with a new system. The proposed amendment would establish an “open primary” for certain state and federal offices, where all candidates appear on the same ballot regardless of party, and any qualified voter may vote for any candidate. The two candidates with the most votes would advance to the general election, regardless of party affiliation or endorsement. The ballot would display each candidate’s party registration or independent status, with a disclaimer clarifying that such registration does not imply party nomination or endorsement. The measure would not affect elections for presidential electors, municipal, judicial, or school board offices.After the petition was filed with the Secretary of State, the Oklahoma Republican Party and another petitioner protested its legal sufficiency before the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. They argued that the initiative was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, claiming it infringed on the right of political association and failed strict scrutiny. They also asserted that the gist and ballot title were misleading, particularly in their use of the term “open primary” and in the explanation of changes to general elections.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the petition. Applying its standard of review, the court found no clear or manifest facial constitutional infirmity, holding that the proposed system did not impose a severe burden on associational rights under relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedents. The court determined that the gist was not misleading, as it adequately described the practical effect of the measure. The challenge to the ballot title was deemed premature, as statutory procedure requires such review after the signature-gathering phase. The court held that the initiative petition was legally sufficient for circulation and signature gathering. View "IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 448, STATE QUESTION NO. 836: THE OKLAHOMA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SETTER" on Justia Law

The Governor of Oklahoma issued an executive order requiring all full-time employees of state agencies to return to in-person work, with limited exceptions. A member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives challenged this order, arguing that it improperly created new law and usurped legislative authority. The legislator sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate the order and an injunction to prevent its enforcement, claiming the order encroached on the legislature’s exclusive authority over personnel policy.The case was first heard in the District Court of Oklahoma County. The Governor moved to dismiss, arguing that the legislator lacked standing because he did not suffer a direct, concrete injury from the executive order, which applied only to executive branch employees and not to legislators or their staff. The district court agreed, finding that the legislator failed to establish a sufficient personal stake or injury in fact, and dismissed the case.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court held that the legislator did not meet the threshold requirements for standing, as he was not directly affected by the executive order, nor did the order impact his legislative votes or participation. The Court distinguished this case from prior precedent where a legislator’s vote was directly at issue. The Supreme Court concluded that the legislator failed to demonstrate an actual, concrete injury and that the executive order did not usurp legislative power. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the legislator lacked standing to challenge the executive order. View "Fugate v. Stitt" on Justia Law

An employee alleged a work-related knee injury and filed a timely claim for workers’ compensation benefits, including a request for a hearing. The employer denied the claim, asserting the injury was not work-related. After an independent medical evaluation found the knee pain was due to a preexisting condition, no further medical treatment was sought or provided through the workers’ compensation system for over nine months. The employer then moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the employee had failed to receive or seek benefits for a period exceeding six months, as required by Oklahoma law.An Administrative Law Judge denied the employer’s motion to dismiss, relying on precedent from the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, and held that because the employee had requested a hearing within six months of filing the claim, dismissal was not warranted. The Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed this decision, agreeing that the employee’s timely request for a hearing satisfied the statutory requirements and that further inquiry into whether benefits were sought or received was unnecessary.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and reversed the Commission’s order. The Court held that under 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4), an employee must not only make a timely request for a hearing but must also continue to actively pursue the claim by receiving or seeking benefits for any six-month period during the life of the claim. The Court found that the employee’s failure to seek or receive benefits for more than six months triggered the employer’s right to dismissal. The Court also held that the statute is constitutional, as it applies equally to all injured employees and does not violate due process or constitute a special law. The Commission’s order was vacated and the employer’s motion to dismiss was granted. View "OBI HOLDING COMPANY v. SCHULTZ-BUTZBACH" on Justia Law

Fred Hodara filed a lawsuit against the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) for alleged violations of the Open Records Act, seeking access to records related to the drugs used in executions. Initially, the DOC claimed it had no responsive records, but later provided some documents, albeit heavily redacted. Hodara sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the DOC's refusal to provide the requested material was unlawful. The DOC moved to dismiss the case, citing a statutory exemption under Title 22, Section 1015(B), which was later amended in 2024 to broaden the scope of confidentiality.The district court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment due to unresolved factual disputes. However, after the statutory amendment, the DOC filed a second motion to dismiss, which the court granted, concluding that the amended statute precluded Hodara's Open Records Act claim. Hodara appealed the dismissal, challenging the retroactive application and constitutionality of the amended statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the October 4, 2024, order. The court found that the 2024 amendment to Section 1015(B) did not create a new confidentiality privilege but clarified the existing one. The court held that the amendment could be applied retroactively and did not violate the Oklahoma Constitution. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the DOC's refusal to provide the requested records was lawful under the amended statute. View "HODARA v. OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Oklahoma's H.B. 1775, which prohibits mandatory gender or sexual diversity training and restricts the teaching of certain concepts related to race and sex in public schools and higher education institutions. Plaintiffs, including the Black Emergency Response Team and other organizations, argue that the law is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming it is vague, overbroad, and imposes viewpoint-based restrictions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reviewed the case and certified several questions of state law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The district court granted in part and denied in part motions from both plaintiffs and defendants, enjoining certain provisions of the law as unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the court enjoined the enforcement of the second sentence of § 24-157(A)(1) and parts of § 24-157(B)(1).The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the certified questions, determining that the term "requirement" in § 24-157(A)(1) pertains only to orientation requirements and does not apply to classes, courses, or curricular speech. The court declined to answer the remaining certified questions related to § 24-157(B)(1), stating that the terms and phrases in question could be interpreted using their common, ordinary meanings and that the federal court could undertake this task. The court also noted that answering these questions would not avoid or alter the constitutional challenge to the statute and could result in an advisory opinion. View "BLACK EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM v. DRUMMOND" on Justia Law

A limited partnership, owning an apartment complex in Norman, Oklahoma, transferred its general and limited partnership interests to new owners in 2022. The Cleveland County Assessor subsequently increased the fair cash value of the property from $18,437,401 in 2022 to $42,500,000 in 2023, exceeding the constitutionally allowed 5% annual increase for ad valorem taxation. The partnership, Icon, protested this increase, arguing that the transfer of partnership interests did not constitute a transfer of property title.The Cleveland County Board of Equalization denied Icon's protest, and the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review granted summary judgment in favor of the Assessor, concluding that the transfer of partnership interests was equivalent to a transfer of property title, thus lifting the 5% cap on valuation increases. Icon appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the transfer of partnership interests should be treated as a transfer of property title under Okla. Const. art. 10, §8B. The court held that the transfer of partnership interests was a transfer of personal property, not real property, and did not constitute a transfer, change, or conveyance of the property title. Therefore, the 5% cap on annual increases in property valuation for ad valorem taxation should not have been lifted. The court vacated the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review's order and remanded the case. View "THE ICON AT NORMAN APTS, LP v. DOUGLAS WARR, CLEVELAND COUNTY ASSESSOR" on Justia Law

The case involves Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) and CKenergy Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CKenergy) regarding the provision of retail electric service to two facilities located in CKenergy's certified territory. OG&E began providing service to these facilities in 2017 and 2018, respectively. CKenergy filed an application with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the Commission) in 2019, requesting that OG&E be enjoined from continuing to serve the facilities, arguing that OG&E was in violation of the Retail Energy Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA). OG&E contended that it was allowed to serve the facilities under the one megawatt exception of RESCTA.The Commission found that the connected load for initial full operation did not meet or exceed 1,000 kW at either facility and enjoined OG&E from providing service. OG&E appealed the Commission's order. The Commission also issued an order granting OG&E's request for a stay upon posting a supersedeas bond, which CKenergy and the Oklahoma Association of Electric Cooperatives (OAEC) appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that the term "connected load for initial full operation" in the one megawatt exception of RESCTA refers to the total nameplate values of all connected electrical equipment when full operation of the facility commences. The Court found that the Commission's interpretation ignored the plain language of the statute and was not sustained by law. It was undisputed that the connected load for each facility exceeded 1,000 kW when full operation commenced. Therefore, the one megawatt exception applied, and the Commission improperly enjoined OG&E from providing service. The Court reversed the Commission's order and deemed the appeal regarding the stay moot. View "OG&E Co. v. OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION" on Justia Law

A contractor, Flintco, LLC, entered into a subcontract with Total Installation Management Specialists, Inc. (Total) for flooring work on a construction project at Oklahoma State University. Total was required to secure a performance bond from Oklahoma Surety Company (OSC). Flintco later supplemented Total's workforce due to delays and performance issues but did not notify OSC until five weeks after taking over the work.The Tulsa County District Court ruled in favor of Flintco, awarding damages against Total and OSC. OSC appealed, arguing that Flintco failed to meet the performance bond's conditions requiring a declaration of default and reasonable notice before assuming control of the work. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the district court's judgment, finding that the notice requirement was a mandatory condition precedent, and Flintco's failure to provide timely notice relieved OSC of liability.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Civil Appeals. The court held that the performance bond's notice requirement constituted a mandatory condition precedent. Flintco's failure to provide timely notice to OSC so it could exercise its performance options under the bond relieved OSC from liability. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, reversed the district court's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment consistent with this decision. The trial court's judgments against Total were not affected by this decision. View "Flintco, LLC v Total Installation Management Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

The Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority (OCCJA) filed a petition in the District Court of Oklahoma County seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction against the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) to prevent unannounced jail inspections and an administrative proceeding based on an Administrative Compliance Order. The OCCJA argued that the OSDH exceeded its authority by demanding unannounced access for inspections and issuing compliance orders sooner than the statutory 60-day correction period. The OCCJA also contended that the statutes and administrative rules did not authorize unannounced inspections and that such inspections were unreasonable due to staffing and safety concerns.The District Court for Oklahoma County, presided over by Judge C. Brent Dishman, granted the OSDH's motion to dismiss in part, finding that the OSDH had statutory authority to perform unannounced inspections. The OCCJA appealed this decision. Concurrently, the OSDH filed an application in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to assume original jurisdiction and sought a writ of mandamus/prohibition and declaratory relief against the OCCJA. The Supreme Court denied the OSDH's application to assume original jurisdiction in No. 122,524 and recast the OCCJA's appeal in No. 122,775 into an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for a writ of prohibition.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction in No. 122,775 on the single issue of whether the OSDH has the authority to perform unannounced jail inspections. The Court concluded that the OSDH does have such authority, as unannounced inspections are a reasonable means to ensure compliance with legislative jail standards. The Court found that the District Court's interlocutory order was not contrary to law or an abuse of discretion and denied the OCCJA's petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Oklahoma State Department of Health v Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority" on Justia Law

Treyton Bailey was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested for suspicion of DUI after officers observed signs of impairment. Although Bailey consented to a blood test, the result was excluded due to a discrepancy in the chain of custody. Despite the lack of a valid test result, Service Oklahoma revoked Bailey's license. Bailey argued that Service Oklahoma lacked statutory authority to mail the revocation notice by regular mail, that revocation is invalid absent a certificate or affidavit of mailing even where the licensee received and acted upon the notice, and that revocation cannot be sustained without a valid test result when the driver did not refuse testing.The district court rejected Bailey's arguments, finding that Section 2-116 applies to Service Oklahoma and authorizes the agency to serve revocation notice by regular mail. The court also found that the State's proof of service was admissible and sufficient to establish adequate proof that notice was properly served. Additionally, the court determined that despite the exclusion of the blood result, the State met its burden of proof based on other competent evidence. The district court entered a Final Order Sustaining Revocation, which Bailey appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the district court's order. The court held that Service Oklahoma is authorized to provide revocation notice by regular mail under Title 47, Section 2-116, and that this interpretation is necessary to preserve the coherence of the statutory scheme following the Legislature's transfer of authority to Service Oklahoma. The court also held that Bailey's due process challenge failed, as the record reflected that he received written notice of the revocation and acted upon it by filing a petition for judicial review. Finally, the court held that the district court properly sustained the revocation of Bailey's license based on the officer's sworn report and other competent evidence, despite the exclusion of the blood test result. View "Bailey v State of Oklahoma ex rel. Service Oklahoma" on Justia Law