Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant-Mother, Kayla Scocos, brought a post-decree motion in trial court to relocate with the parties' child from Oklahoma to Louisiana. Appellee-Father, Andrew Scocos, filed objection and sought immediate physical custody of the child. Trial court determined the move was not made in good faith and shifted primary physical custody to Father. Mother appealed. Father argued Mother purposely withheld her intentions to move to Louisiana during the negotiations of the Joint Custody Plan and that her actions should have been considered as bad faith under a request for relocation. Regardless of whether Mother knew during negotiations of the joint custody plan that a move might be imminent, Mother contended this had no bearing on whether her reasons for relocation constitute good faith. The Supreme Court agreed. "The record is devoid of evidence that Mother's proposed relocation was designed to purposely deprive Father of visitation which could give rise to bad faith." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case with instructions to allow Mother's proposed relocation. View "Scocos v. Scocos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael Reynolds sued the Defendants-appellees, Mary Fallin, Governor of the State of Oklahoma; Ken Miller, Treasurer of the State of Oklahoma; Preston Doerflinger, State Director of the Office of Management and Enterprise Services and various unnamed state attorneys for their alleged involvement with the three general appropriation bills. The state moved to dismiss the case which was later granted by the district court. Reynolds' principle argument on appeal was that three types of sections in the challenged general appropriation bills were substantive laws and did not constitute appropriations and were as a result, unconstitutional. Reynolds challenged the "TRANSFER" sections of the general appropriation bills that transferred money from one fund to the Special Cash Fund of the State Treasury. He also challenged sections of the three general appropriation bills that provided authorization to transfer money from one fund to another and those that provide authorization to expend money. Having found no merit as to any of Reynolds' assertions of unconstitutionality, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the district court's granting of Appellees' motion to dismiss. View "Reynolds v. Fallin" on Justia Law

The Warr Acres Nursing Center terminated plaintiff Donald Moore's employment after he called in sick with influenza. The employee sued, alleging that he had been fired in violation of public policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Nursing Center, and Moore appealed. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that terminating a licensed practical nurse for missing work in a nursing center while infected with influenza would violate public policy, but disputed facts existed as to the reason for termination which precluded summary judgment. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Moore v. Warr Acres Nursing Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Yaumary Torres, a former employee of Seaboard Foods, LLC, filed a workers' compensation claim alleging she was injured on-the-job and needed surgery. Seaboard argued that she was barred from receiving workers' compensation because she alleged a cumulative-trauma injury and she had not worked a continuous 180-day period for Seaboard. The administrative law judge denied her claim, finding she had not worked the 180-day period. The Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed the order of the administrative judge. The administrative order was appealed to the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Commission affirmed the order of the administrative judge. Petitioner then appealed the Commission's order to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held 85A O.S. sec. 2(14) violated the Due Process Section of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 2 section 7, when applied to petitioner because the statute's overinclusive and underinclusive classifications were not rationally related to legitimate State interests of: (1) preventing workers' compensation fraud; and (2) decreasing employers' costs. The Workers' Compensation commission was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Guardian Interlock Network, Inc. installed an ignition interlock device in plaintiff-appellant, Nathan Heath's car. The device allowed Heath to start the vehicle if his breath/alcohol concentration did not meet or exceed a pre-set amount. Because Heath's monthly payment for rental, insurance of the device, taxes, and monthly maintenance exceeded the $25.00 "maintenance fee" cap set forth in 47 O.S. Supp. 2013 section 6-212.3, he brought a class action lawsuit in the District Court of Oklahoma County against Guardian Interlock Inc., alleging that its fees were excessive. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit and Heath appealed. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the $25.00 maintenance fee cap set forth did not preclude the collection of other fees such as rental fees, taxes, or insurance/damage waiver fees. View "Heath v. Guardian Interlock Network, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted H.B. 1970, prohibiting the off-label use of Mifeprex (generally known as "mifepristone" or "RU-486") and misoprostol (brand name Cytotec) for use in abortions. The effect of H.B. 1970 was to ban medication abortions in Oklahoma. In the first pronouncement ("Cline I"), the Oklahoma Supreme Court, following "Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey," (505 U.S. 833 (1992)), affirmed the district court's decision that H.B. 1970 was unconstitutional. Appellees then filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition and certified two questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: whether H.B. 1970 prohibited "(1) the use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the use of methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies." In "Cline II," the Oklahoma Court answered both questions affirmatively. The U.S. Supreme Court then dismissed the petition for certiorari as improvidently granted. In 2014, in response to the Cline II decision, the Oklahoma Legislature passed H.B. 2684, amending Title 63, Section 1-729a of the Oklahoma Statutes. H.B. 2684 was approved by the Governor and became effective on November 1, 2014. The Bill restricted Mifeprex and misoprostol use for abortions to the FDA-approved final Mifeprex label, prohibits methotrexate use for abortions except to terminate ectopic pregnancies, provides for liability of physicians who knowingly or recklessly perform an abortion in violation of H.B. 2684, and makes doctors subject to discipline and liability for violating H.B. 2684. Plaintiffs the Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice and Nova Health Systems filed this challenge to H.B. 2684's restriction of off-label use of Mifeprex in the district court against the Oklahoma Commissioner of Health and the Executive Director of the Oklahoma State Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision (State). While this case was pending before the district court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court enjoined enforcement of H.B. 2684 until its constitutionality "is fully and finally litigated." The dispositive question presented was whether H.B. 2684, violated either of two sections of the Oklahoma Constitution: Article V, Section I or Article V, Section 59. The Court answered in the negative. View "Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Juctice v. Cline" on Justia Law

Several Oklahoma taxpayers filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a permanent injunction against Defendants, Joy Hofmeister, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Oklahoma State Department of Education; and the Oklahoma State Board of Education, (the "State") to enjoin the payment of tuition to private sectarian schools alleging the "Lindsey Nicole Henry Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Act" (or "Scholarship Program") violated several articles of the Oklahoma Constitution. Both parties filed for summary judgment. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the parties' motions, finding the Act was constitutional on all challenged grounds except for one. The trial court entered a narrow Order ruling the Act violated the Oklahoma Constitution, Article II, Section 5, only to the extent it authorized public funds to pay the cost for students to attend private sectarian schools. This provision of the Constitution has been referred to as the "no aid" clause, prohibiting public money from being used for the benefit or support of religion. An injunction was issued to prevent payment to private religious schools, with no impact on the payment to private non-sectarian schools. The State appealed, arguing: (1) the payment to a sectarian school was permitted because it was for a valid public purpose and in exchange for consideration; and (2) the district court's construction of the Act created a religiosity distinction violating the U.S. Constitution's freedom of religion clause. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision in part and found the Act did not violate the "no aid" clause. The Court did not reach defendants' second issue, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Oliver v. Hofmeister" on Justia Law

The district court ordered the transfer of a minor child, S.A.W., to a foster-adoption home that was in compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act, and in the bests interests of the child. Foster mother, natural mother, father, child, and the State appealed. After review of this matter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the proper standard for a party showing a need for an ICWA-noncompliant child placement is clear and convincing evidence; and the evidence presented by appellants was sufficient to satisfy their burden, regardless whether the Court applied abuse-of-discretion or clear-and-convincing standards. The Court held the circumstances of this case did not warrant reversal of the judge's order based upon 10A O.S. 1-4-812. Appellants failed to satisfy their burden challenging natural father's status as not a member of his tribe. The Cherokee Nation met its burden showing the child was subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act. The evidence was sufficient to show an ICWA-noncompliant temporary placement as in the best interests of the child. As such, the Court affirmed the district court's order in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the matter of M.K.T." on Justia Law

Carol Jean Carlson (Decedent) learned she was terminally ill in 2011, and retained an attorney to assist her in planning the disposition of her estate. Decedent executed three transfer-on-death deeds (TODDs) pursuant to the Nontestamentary Transfer of Property Act for real property she owned, as well as a Last Will and Testament. One of the pieces of real property transferred via TODD went to Debra Glover. The first of the other two TODDs named Appellee Clifford Cornish (Cornish) as grantee and the second named Eldin Lewis (collectively referred to as Grantees). Decedent died on August 29, 2011, five days after executing the TODDs and her Last Will and Testament. Prior to Decedent's estate planning and the execution of the TODD, Decedent executed a promissory note in the amount of $140,224.35 in 2006 in favor of The Margee and Robert W. Minter Living Trust. This note was secured by a mortgage, filed December 21, 2006, which encumbered the property conveyed to Lewis via the TODD. Lewis timely accepted the TODD. In 2011, Lewis filed a proof of claim with the Personal Representative for the remaining debt in the amount of $123,530.09. The Personal Representative rejected Lewis' claim on December 16, 2011. At issue in this cause is whether Carlson's estate was liable for the underlying debt on the mortgaged property transferred by TODD, when the grantor's will contained express instructions for the payment of all debts secured by mortgages. The Supreme Court determined that it was. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Carlson" on Justia Law

Initiative Petition No. 403 sought to amend the Oklahoma Constitution by adding a new Article 13-C. The proposed article would create the Oklahoma Education Improvement Fund, designed to provide for the improvement of public education in Oklahoma through an additional one-cent sales and use tax. Funds generated by the one-cent tax would be distributed to public school districts, higher education institutions, career and technology centers, and early childhood education providers for certain educational purposes outlined in the proposed article. Additionally, a percentage of the funds would be used to provide a $5,000.00 pay raise to all public school teachers. Opponents challenged the initiative, arguing it violated the one general subject rule of Art. 24, sec. 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Initiative Petition No. 403 did not violate the one general subject rule and was legally sufficient for submission to the people of Oklahoma. View "IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 403 STATE QUESTION NO. 779" on Justia Law