Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, a paramedic supervisor, defendant Ethan Barstow collided with a vehicle driven by the plaintiff-appellee Elizabeth Gowens resulting in damage to both vehicles and injury to Gowens. At the time of the collision, Barstow worked as a paramedic supervisor for the defendant-appellant EMSSTAT, which is a division of the defendant-appellant Norman Regional Hospital Authority, a public trust d/b/a Norman Regional Hospital (collectively, NRH). NRH was a political subdivision for purposes of the Government Tort Claims Act (GTCA). Gowens initially sued Barstow and the City of Norman ex rel. EMSSTAT for her injuries. Both Barstow and the City of Norman were later dismissed from the lawsuit. Central to this case was the intersection where the accident occurred, described as being "almost a five-way intersection" with no stop sign and a hill. At the close of the evidence, NRH moved for a directed verdict which the trial court overruled. In its order, the trial court found : (1) Barstow was an employee of NRH and was acting in that capacity when driving through the intersection; (2) Barstow was responding to a call for service and more likely than not had his lights and siren on while driving; (3) the fact that he most likely used his lights and sirens did not provide blanket protection under 47 O.S. 11-1062; (4) the unusual layout of the intersection required a heightened use of care by all; (5) in this situation Barstow's high rate of speed did endanger the life and property of Gowens; and (6) Mr. Barstow was a cause of the accident. The trial court ruled in plaintiff's favor, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that an entity covered under the GTCA, was immune from reckless acts committed by its emergency vehicle drivers and also such drivers, and therefore their employers, could not be held liable for mere negligence. The Supreme Court vacated the COCA's opinion, affirmed the trial court's decision and addressed other issues properly raised on appeal which were not addressed by the COCA. View "Gowens v. Barstow" on Justia Law

Claimant John McCauley sought permanent total disability benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund for three separately adjudicated cumulative trauma injuries. The Workers' Compensation Court found Claimant was a physically impaired person and awarded him permanent total disability benefits against the Fund. The Fund appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed but for different reasons. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a person who has a disability resulting from separately adjudicated injuries arising at the same time was a physically impaired person by statutory definition. The Court also concluded that the date of last exposure to the separately adjudicated but simultaneously occurring cumulative trauma injuries was the date to be used in fixing the Fund's liability. View "Multiple Injury Fund v. McCauley" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the plaintiff-appellant Sandra Vilarrubias Serra was covered under the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) and medical payments (medical pay) coverage of the automobile insurance policy issued to Traci Robertson by Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Serra was a foreign exchange student from Spain who was attending her senior year of high school in Pryor. She resided with Robertson in Pryor. As a passenger in the car of a friend, Andrea McNair, she sustained serious injuries when McNair's car collided with Donald Broughton, who was driving a motorcycle. Broughton was killed in the accident. Serra attempted to collect damages for her injuries by filing a claim against Robertson's automobile policy's uninsured motorist and medical payments coverage. State Farm denied coverage to Serra who then filed a lawsuit against the Personal Representative of Donald Broughton, Andrea McNair and State Farm. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court which was granted. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the trial court. In particular, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Serra was a "ward" of Robertson for purposes of coverage under the policy. The Court held that she was covered and reversed. View "Serra v. Estate of Broughton" on Justia Law

Joseph Parker was allegedly injured on the job. It was undisputed that Global Health Initiative (GHI), which at one time employed Parker, did not have workers' compensation insurance. Parker filed a workers' compensation claim in the Workers' Compensation Court. That court awarded Parker, by default judgment against GHI, $17,595.60 plus interest. Parker filed the judgment in the district court of Tulsa County in an attempt to collect the money awarded by the Workers' Compensation Court. After futile efforts to garnish the GHI bank accounts, Parker filed a motion to pierce the corporate veil and to proceed against individual GHI shareholders in an attempt to collect his compensation awards. The trial judge denied Parker's request due to lack of evidence. Thereafter, GHI filed notice of bankruptcy. By August of 2004, Parker had filed an appeal in which the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's determination that stockholders could not be held liable for the workers' compensation award and remanded the case to the trial court. GHI did not defend or participate in the case on appeal. Parker did not pursue collection against individual shareholders but, instead, returned to the Workers' Compensation Court seeking permanent partial and permanent total awards and an increase in his original award. GHI was not served notice of this proceeding and the cause was consequently undefended. The Workers' Compensation Court entered another award in favor of Parker and against GHI totaling $236,476.20. In June of 2009, Parker, through his counsel, sent letters to some of the GHI shareholders, seeking collection of the shareholders' pro rata share for payment of workers' compensation awards. However, for unexplained reasons, not all shareholders were asked to pay "their portion" of the judgment. The plaintiffs-appellants, doctors Thomas Kenkel and Robert Gold were two of the doctor stockholders, and they appealed seeking a declaration that: (1) Parker had no valid judgment against them; (2) Parker was not entitled to proceed against them for the injuries he sustained; (3) Parker was not entitled to collect the workers' compensation judgment; (4) they had the right to defend against any of Parker's claims ab initio; (5) they were not shareholders of GHI at all but if they were, they were merely minority shareholders; and (6) they were not liable for the debts Parker is attempting to collect. The trial court agreed and sustained the doctors' motion for summary judgment. Parker appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with directions for the trial court to enter judgment in the appellant's favor. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether a business' failure to secure workers' compensation insurance rendered its shareholders personally liable for a workers' compensation award to an employee. The Court held that it did not. View "Kenkel v. Parker" on Justia Law

Claimant Viola Sugg sought permanent total disability benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund. The Workers' Compensation Court held that claimant's combined injures did not constitute permanent total disability and denied benefits against the Fund. Claimant appealed, and a three-judge panel reversed, finding that Claimant was a physically impaired person at the time of her last injury by reason of her 1989 adjudicated work-related injury and was entitled to permanent total disability benefits from the Fund. The Fund appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision of the three-judge panel. Upon review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed that claimant was permanently and totally disabled and was entitled to benefits from the Fund. View "Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Sugg" on Justia Law

Same sex couple planned to have a child and co-parent. Upon the termination of their relationship and following almost ten years of co-parenting, the biological mother denied plaintiff's status as a parent and sought to end all interaction between plaintiff and child. Couple did not have a written agreement regarding parenting. Plaintiff petitioned the District Court in Oklahoma County seeking a determination of parental rights and custody. The District Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction finding plaintiff lacked standing as a non-biological parent seeking custody and visitation. Specifically, the Court addressed: (1) whether the district court erred finding that a non-biological parent lacked standing because the same sex couple had not married and had no written parenting agreement; (2) whether a biological mother had the right as a parent to legally erase an almost ten year parental relationship that she voluntarily created and fostered with her same sex partner. The Court answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ramey v. Sutton" on Justia Law

This appeal was one of many concerning natural gas wells operated from 1978 to 1998 in Beckham County, Oklahoma. In the immediately preceding appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for damages for breach of drilling leases for $3,650,000, but reversed two other jury awards in the amounts of $4,055,000.00 and $6,845,000.00. The trial court denied prejudgment interest and the royalty owners appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) review of the issue of prejudgment interest is not precluded by the settled-law-of-the-case doctrine; (2) the Production Revenue Standards Act, 52 O.S. 2011 sec. 570 et seq., was inapplicable to the facts presented; and (3) because the plaintiff's claims were unliquidated, prejudgment interest was not recoverable pursuant to 23 O.S. 2011 sec. 6. View "Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc." on Justia Law

The Kirks purchased a house in Osage County from Buel and Peggy Neece in 1987. The Kirks signed a Contract for Deed that required monthly payments of $400 to the Neeces. In 1998, the Neeces sold their property to Thomas and Claudia McGinnity and assigned the Contract for Deed to the McGinnitys. The McGinnitys brought claims against the Kirks based upon breach of contract and a foreclosure of the contract for deed. They asserted that the contract for deed was breached by the Kirks due to (1) failing to keep the property insured for full replacement value, (2) conveying an interest in the property to Mary Komonce without express written consent, (3) committing and permitting waste of the real property, (4) failing to keep the buildings and improvements in good repair, and (5) failing to begin immediate restoration. The McGinnitys sought foreclosure as their remedy, with attorney's fees and costs, but did not seek damages. The Kirks asserted estoppel, waiver, duress, accord and satisfaction, laches and claims based upon breach of contract and abuse of process. The trial court denied the McGinnitys' request for judgment at the conclusion of their case in chief. Ultimately, the trial court determined that the Kirks breached the terms of the contract for deed. The trial court granted foreclosure on the real property in rem, quieted title in and to the McGinnitys against any claim of the Kirks and Komonce. The trial court reserved the issue of attorney's fees and costs to be presented to the trial court by a separate motion. The trial court found in favor of the McGinnitys on all of the Kirks' defenses and counterclaims. The Kirks appealed and the trial court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. The Kirks petitioned for certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals’ judgment. The Supreme Court held that the value of the property exceeded the amount due on the mortgage and no waste was present, but the District Court's finding that the Kirks breached the contract for deed was not against the clear weight of the evidence on the McGinnitys' claims of failure to maintain insurance and the property. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the McGinnitys and against the Kirks on their counterclaims. View "McGinnity v. Kirk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellees filed wage claim actions before the Oklahoma Department of Labor (ODOL), alleging their employer had refused to pay their wages for a substantial period of time. The Department of Labor ruled in favor of claimants and ordered employer to pay the wages owed. After an appeal to the district court which affirmed the order of the Department of Labor, the Employers-appellants appealed. The two issues raised on appeal were: (1) whether ODOL erred when it allowed Appellee-wage claimant Christopher Holland's joinder of multiple employers in a single wage claim; and (2) whether the ODOL court erred in prohibiting Appellants/Employers from presenting evidence at the Administrative Hearing. The Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative and affirmed the district court. View "Agrawal v. Ok. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Petitioner-claimant Jeanette Ball sought permanent total disability benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund. The Workers' Compensation Court held that a "Crumby" finding of preexisting disability made simultaneously with the adjudication of an on-the-job injury could be combined with the adjudicated injury to render the Claimant a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 sec. 171 and awarded Petitioner permanent total disability benefits. The Fund appealed, and a three-judge panel reversed. Claimant then appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the panel. After its review, the Supreme Court held that an employee must be a physically impaired person as defined by the applicable statute before he or she can seek benefits from the Fund. A "Crumby" finding of preexisting disability made simultaneously with an adjudication of an on-the-job injury could not be combined with such adjudicated injury to render the Claimant a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp 2005 sec. 171. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ball v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund" on Justia Law