Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kyle Trusty was arrested for driving under the influence after crashing his vehicle. Trusty was taken to the hospital where he consented to a blood test to determine his blood alcohol content. The blood was drawn by a nurse at the hospital, and the arresting officer sent the sample to the police lab. Upon receiving the results, the Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked Trusty's driver's license. Trusty appealed, and the trial court vacated the revocation because DPS did not call the nurse who drew the blood as a witness to establish that the withdrawal was done in compliance with rules and regulations of the Board of Tests for Alcohol and Drug Influence. DPS appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed. View "Trusty v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Jonnie Vasquez, a Dillard's store employee, injured her neck and shoulder as she lifted shoe boxes while working. She filed claims for benefits under Dillard's Opt-Out plan, which were ultimately denied. The employer sought removal to federal court on grounds that the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The United States District Court for the Western District disagreed and remanded the case to the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Commission found that the Opt Out Act: (1) constituted an unconstitutional special law; (2) denied equal protection to Oklahoma's injured workers; and (3) denied injured workers the constitutionally protected right of access to courts. Dillard's appealed. At issue was a challenge to the constitutionality of the Opt Out Act. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the core provision of the Opt Out Act, created impermissible, unequal, disparate treatment of a select group of injured workers. Therefore, the Court held that the Oklahoma Employee Benefit Injury Act was an unconstitutional special law under the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 2, section 59.3. View "Vasquez v. Dillard's Inc." on Justia Law

M.H.C. (child) was born in September of 2013. The Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) placed the child in protective custody on November 5, 2013. In the initial petition filed on November 18, 2013, the State declared the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) were applicable. On November 21, 2013, the Cherokee Nation appeared at the initial appearance, and the natural mother informed the court that she had a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood but was not currently a tribal member. Thereafter, the Cherokee Nation received official notice from the State that it planned to adjudicate the child as deprived. The Cherokee Nation sent DHS a response notifying DHS that the child was eligible for enrollment in the tribe and enclosing a tribal-enrollment application for DHS to complete. After the Cherokee Nation's initial attempt to have DHS complete the enrollment application, the Cherokee Nation sent DHS three additional enrollment applications. The district court ruled the ICWA inapplicable because the mother was not a registered tribal member, the child was not a member either. The natural mother was also told if ICWA applied, the child would likely have to leave foster mother's care because foster mother was a non-ICWA compliant placement. No party informed the natural mother of ICWA's benefits and protections. The natural mother declined to enroll at the time. The district court subsequently found the State broke confidentiality by allowing the Cherokee Nation to attend a family team meeting in a non-ICWA case. The district court granted the Cherokee Nation's motion to transfer the case to tribal court, finding the State failed to provide clear-and-convincing evidence of good cause to deny the transfer. The State and foster mother (together Appellants) appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal for disposition. Neither DHS, nor the natural mother, nor the child through her attorney objected to the transfer to tribal court jurisdiction. Only the State and the foster mother objected. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in finding ICWA applicable upon the natural mother's enrollment in the Cherokee Nation. ICWA applied to the proceedings prospectively from the date the record supports its application. Appellants failed to present clear-and-convincing evidence of "good cause" for the case to remain with the district court. Because the district court did not err in granting the motion to transfer to tribal court, the Court affirmed the order granting the motion to transfer. View "In the Matter of M.H.C." on Justia Law

On April 21 and April 29, 2015, the Oklahoma Senate and the Oklahoma House of Representatives, respectively, passed House Joint Resolution Number 1012, directing the Oklahoma Secretary of State to refer a proposed constitutional amendment to a vote of the people of Oklahoma. The proposed amendment would add a new section to Article II, prohibiting the Legislature from passing any law "which abridges the right of citizens and lawful residents of Oklahoma to employ agricultural technology and livestock production and ranching practices without a compelling state interest." Plaintiffs filed a petition in the district court, urging that the measure was facially unconstitutional. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, submitting that the challenge was untimely. The district court granted the motion to dismiss finding the challenge was timely and was not facially unconstitutional. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case, but on grounds that the district court should have abstained from review of a referendum before voted on by the people. View "Save the Illinois River, Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Election Board" on Justia Law

On January 27, 2016, the proponents of Initiative Petition No. 404, State Question 780 and Initiative Petition No. 405, State Question 781 (collectively Petitioners), filed both petitions and their ballot titles with the Secretary of State. The Petitioners assert both rewritten ballot titles misrepresent the effect of the measures and are contrary to Oklahoma law. Initiative 404 sought to amend statutes to reform criminal sentences for certain property and drug offenses, making certain ones misdemeanors, such as simple drug possession. Initiative 405 sought to create the "County Community Safety Investment Fund," taking costs saved by reclassifying misdemeanors and redistributing them to the counties to fund rehabilitative programs. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the proposed and rewritten ballot titles deficient, and rewrote the ballot titles pursuant to 34 O.S. Supp. 2015, 10. View "Steele v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

In 2015, Respondents-Proponents Shawn Sheehan, Linda Reid, and Melvin Moran filed Initiative Petition No. 403 (State Question No. 779), with the Oklahoma Secretary of State. The petition sought to amend the Oklahoma Constitution by adding a new Article 13-C, creating the Oklahoma Education Improvement Fund. Funds generated by the one-cent tax would be distributed to public school districts, higher education institutions, career and technology centers, and early childhood education providers for certain educational purposes outlined in the proposed article. Petitioners filed suit to challenge the gist of the measure post-circulation and the sufficiency of the Attorney General's rewritten ballot title. After review of the matter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the time for challenging the gist of a measure had expired, and found that the Attorney General's rewritten ballot title was deficient. "We agree that the ballot title is misleading if it does not mention the Board of Equalization's role in limiting appropriations. In addition, the ballot title should refrain from partiality and should clarify the amount of the sales and use tax as well as its allocation." Pursuant to 34 O.S. Supp. 2015, sec. 10 (A)6 , the Court corrected and amended the ballot title. View "OCPA Impact, Inc v. Sheehan" on Justia Law

Appellant-plaintiff Robert Leritz was a Kansas resident whose motorcycle and two other vehicles were garaged in Kansas under an insurance policy issued by Appellee, Farmers Insurance Company (Farmers) in Kansas. Plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident in Oklahoma when Defendant Larry Yates made a left hand turn and collided with Plaintiff causing serious bodily injuries. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that he had incurred medical expenses and suffered damages exceeding Yates's liability coverage. There was a question as to whether he could stack his uninsured motorist (UM) coverage based on his ownership of policies on each of his three vehicles. Oklahoma allowed the practice, until the Oklahoma Legislature amended the UM provision in 2014. Kansas did not allow stacking. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, applying the insurer's proposed solution to a perceived conflict of laws issue. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found no conflict of laws issue on these facts because the policy specified which law would apply to an issue of stacking of policies. Giving the policy provisions effect made a choice of law analysis unnecessary; the Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leritz v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc." on Justia Law

A. Todd Holliman worked as a Floor Hand on a four man crew for Twister Drilling Company (Employer) on a drilling rig. Holliman lived in Holdenville and the rig was located approximately forty miles away in Maud. Three crews worked eight hours each to service the well 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Employer had no housing at the drill site, therefore; employees were required to find transportation to and from the drill site. In May 2013, Holliman and his supervisor were traveling home from the drill site after completing their shift when they were involved in a double fatality car crash. Holliman's supervisor was killed as was the driver of the other vehicle. The car belonged to Holliman, but his supervisor was driving. Holliman was a passenger and was sleeping at the time of the collision. Holliman filed a Form 3 alleging he sustained a single-event injury to his neck, back, left arm, and psychological overlay arising from injuries sustained from the motor vehicle accident. In its Form 10 Answer, first filed on October 2, 2013, Employer admitted that Holliman was an employee but denied the injuries were compensable or work-related because Holliman was not engaged in the performance of his job duties when he was injured. The trial tribunal found that Holliman's injuries were compensable and work related and awarded benefits. The tribunal found that under the circumstances the accident came within the special task exception to the general going and coming rule. Employer appealed. A three-judge panel reversed the order finding that Holliman was not injured while performing unusual duties and therefore was not entitled to benefits. Holliman appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) sustained the three-judge panel's denial of benefits finding that not only was Holliman not performing a special task, but there was no agreement between the crew members to share the travel pay. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that Holliman's injury was a compensable injury under the travel exception to the going and coming rule. Therefore, Holliman was entitled to benefits. View "Holliman v. Twister Drilling Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Annette Legarde-Bober was employed by Employer Oklahoma State University at the Oklahoma City campus. She was a teacher at the child development lab (a childcare facility on the campus of OSU/OKC). The building where the lab is located is surrounded by a sidewalk and parking lot. The parking lot and sidewalk surrounding the building where Petitioner worked was owned and maintained by the University, and Petitioner testified she had previously seen OSU employees working in that parking lot. Petitioner was given a parking permit by her Employer, which gave her permission, and in fact, required her to park in this particular parking lot. On the morning of March 4, 2014, Petitioner arrived at the OSU/OKC campus around 8:55 a.m. because she was required by her Employer to begin her shift at 9:00 a.m. She testified that on that morning, the weather was cold and icy. Petitioner did not have the option to work remotely and was required to report to the child development lab on campus in order to perform her job duties. Although other businesses were closed that day due to the weather conditions, the OSU/OKC campus was open, and students and parents had already begun dropping their children off at the child development lab for childcare. Petitioner testified that after parking in the designated parking lot, she got out of her car, walked across the parking lot, and stepped up onto the curb to go into the building. The Employer's security camera video for the day in question shows that as Petitioner stepped up onto the curb, she slipped and fell on the ice. Petitioner sought treatment and compensation from OSU/OKC. Employer denied compensability, arguing Petitioner's injury did not arise in the course and scope of her employment under 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 2(13). The administrative law judge determined Petitioner's injury did not occur in the course and scope of employment, and the Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed. Petitioner appealed the decision of the Commission. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Petitioner was in the course and scope of her employment as the term is defined in 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 2(13) because her actions at the time of her injury were related to and in furtherance of the business of her Employer OSU/OKC, and she was on the premises of her Employer when she fell. View "Bober v. Oklahoma State Univ." on Justia Law

In 2008, a field engineer for Verdigris Valley Electric Cooperative (Employer) met with a contract electrician for Integrated Service Company LLC (INSERV) in Catoosa, concerning the installation of additional underground electrical service. They discussed the location of the additional service to the building and decided to use an existing junction box which the engineer observed was surrounded by a yellow metal barricade. He would later note: "I normally recommend that our members [customers] install a protective post an [sic] each corner of a pad mounted device in high traffic areas such as the INSERV plant, to help protect from getting ran [sic] over by vehicles or other equipment. I would never suggest having a barrier of any kind in front of any opening or door on VVEC equipment." Employer's work crew, consisting of Employer was dispatched to install additional underground electrical service to INSERV. The four-man crew consisted of Jones, Jackson, Day, and Tiger. Jones and Jackson were journeymen electricians and Jones was the foreman. Day and Jason Tiger were apprentices. Tiger had been in the journeyman apprentice program for approximately nine months of a four-year program. At the time of his death, Tiger had been certified only in the climbing school portion of his journeyman training. Day had worked for Employer only one month. When the crew arrived at the work site, they found the junction box surrounded by a yellow painted steel barricade, erected presumably to protect it from being struck by vehicles or trailers. The record did not establish who erected or owned the barricade, but Employer owned the junction box and associated electrical equipment. Affixed to the junction box was a warning concerning hazardous voltage and underground power cables and a notice from Employer. Despite this, Tiger was electrocuted attempting to make a connection to the junction box. His widow sued Employer and INSERV pursuant to "Parret v. UNICCO Service Co.," (127 P.3d 572), asserting that Employer knew that injury or death was substantially certain to result from the task Tiger and his coworkers were directed to complete and the conditions in which they were required to work. The District Court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment but granted a second motion for summary judgment after additional discovery. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after its review of the trial court record, finding material issues of fact remained in dispute. View "Tiger v. Verdigris Valley Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law