Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Yaumary Torres, a former employee of Seaboard Foods, LLC, filed a workers' compensation claim alleging she was injured on-the-job and needed surgery. Seaboard argued that she was barred from receiving workers' compensation because she alleged a cumulative-trauma injury and she had not worked a continuous 180-day period for Seaboard. The administrative law judge denied her claim, finding she had not worked the 180-day period. The Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed the order of the administrative judge. The administrative order was appealed to the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Commission affirmed the order of the administrative judge. Petitioner then appealed the Commission's order to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held 85A O.S. sec. 2(14) violated the Due Process Section of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 2 section 7, when applied to petitioner because the statute's overinclusive and underinclusive classifications were not rationally related to legitimate State interests of: (1) preventing workers' compensation fraud; and (2) decreasing employers' costs. The Workers' Compensation commission was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Guardian Interlock Network, Inc. installed an ignition interlock device in plaintiff-appellant, Nathan Heath's car. The device allowed Heath to start the vehicle if his breath/alcohol concentration did not meet or exceed a pre-set amount. Because Heath's monthly payment for rental, insurance of the device, taxes, and monthly maintenance exceeded the $25.00 "maintenance fee" cap set forth in 47 O.S. Supp. 2013 section 6-212.3, he brought a class action lawsuit in the District Court of Oklahoma County against Guardian Interlock Inc., alleging that its fees were excessive. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit and Heath appealed. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the $25.00 maintenance fee cap set forth did not preclude the collection of other fees such as rental fees, taxes, or insurance/damage waiver fees. View "Heath v. Guardian Interlock Network, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted H.B. 1970, prohibiting the off-label use of Mifeprex (generally known as "mifepristone" or "RU-486") and misoprostol (brand name Cytotec) for use in abortions. The effect of H.B. 1970 was to ban medication abortions in Oklahoma. In the first pronouncement ("Cline I"), the Oklahoma Supreme Court, following "Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey," (505 U.S. 833 (1992)), affirmed the district court's decision that H.B. 1970 was unconstitutional. Appellees then filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition and certified two questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: whether H.B. 1970 prohibited "(1) the use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the use of methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies." In "Cline II," the Oklahoma Court answered both questions affirmatively. The U.S. Supreme Court then dismissed the petition for certiorari as improvidently granted. In 2014, in response to the Cline II decision, the Oklahoma Legislature passed H.B. 2684, amending Title 63, Section 1-729a of the Oklahoma Statutes. H.B. 2684 was approved by the Governor and became effective on November 1, 2014. The Bill restricted Mifeprex and misoprostol use for abortions to the FDA-approved final Mifeprex label, prohibits methotrexate use for abortions except to terminate ectopic pregnancies, provides for liability of physicians who knowingly or recklessly perform an abortion in violation of H.B. 2684, and makes doctors subject to discipline and liability for violating H.B. 2684. Plaintiffs the Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice and Nova Health Systems filed this challenge to H.B. 2684's restriction of off-label use of Mifeprex in the district court against the Oklahoma Commissioner of Health and the Executive Director of the Oklahoma State Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision (State). While this case was pending before the district court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court enjoined enforcement of H.B. 2684 until its constitutionality "is fully and finally litigated." The dispositive question presented was whether H.B. 2684, violated either of two sections of the Oklahoma Constitution: Article V, Section I or Article V, Section 59. The Court answered in the negative. View "Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Juctice v. Cline" on Justia Law

Several Oklahoma taxpayers filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a permanent injunction against Defendants, Joy Hofmeister, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Oklahoma State Department of Education; and the Oklahoma State Board of Education, (the "State") to enjoin the payment of tuition to private sectarian schools alleging the "Lindsey Nicole Henry Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Act" (or "Scholarship Program") violated several articles of the Oklahoma Constitution. Both parties filed for summary judgment. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the parties' motions, finding the Act was constitutional on all challenged grounds except for one. The trial court entered a narrow Order ruling the Act violated the Oklahoma Constitution, Article II, Section 5, only to the extent it authorized public funds to pay the cost for students to attend private sectarian schools. This provision of the Constitution has been referred to as the "no aid" clause, prohibiting public money from being used for the benefit or support of religion. An injunction was issued to prevent payment to private religious schools, with no impact on the payment to private non-sectarian schools. The State appealed, arguing: (1) the payment to a sectarian school was permitted because it was for a valid public purpose and in exchange for consideration; and (2) the district court's construction of the Act created a religiosity distinction violating the U.S. Constitution's freedom of religion clause. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision in part and found the Act did not violate the "no aid" clause. The Court did not reach defendants' second issue, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Oliver v. Hofmeister" on Justia Law

The district court ordered the transfer of a minor child, S.A.W., to a foster-adoption home that was in compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act, and in the bests interests of the child. Foster mother, natural mother, father, child, and the State appealed. After review of this matter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the proper standard for a party showing a need for an ICWA-noncompliant child placement is clear and convincing evidence; and the evidence presented by appellants was sufficient to satisfy their burden, regardless whether the Court applied abuse-of-discretion or clear-and-convincing standards. The Court held the circumstances of this case did not warrant reversal of the judge's order based upon 10A O.S. 1-4-812. Appellants failed to satisfy their burden challenging natural father's status as not a member of his tribe. The Cherokee Nation met its burden showing the child was subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act. The evidence was sufficient to show an ICWA-noncompliant temporary placement as in the best interests of the child. As such, the Court affirmed the district court's order in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the matter of M.K.T." on Justia Law

Carol Jean Carlson (Decedent) learned she was terminally ill in 2011, and retained an attorney to assist her in planning the disposition of her estate. Decedent executed three transfer-on-death deeds (TODDs) pursuant to the Nontestamentary Transfer of Property Act for real property she owned, as well as a Last Will and Testament. One of the pieces of real property transferred via TODD went to Debra Glover. The first of the other two TODDs named Appellee Clifford Cornish (Cornish) as grantee and the second named Eldin Lewis (collectively referred to as Grantees). Decedent died on August 29, 2011, five days after executing the TODDs and her Last Will and Testament. Prior to Decedent's estate planning and the execution of the TODD, Decedent executed a promissory note in the amount of $140,224.35 in 2006 in favor of The Margee and Robert W. Minter Living Trust. This note was secured by a mortgage, filed December 21, 2006, which encumbered the property conveyed to Lewis via the TODD. Lewis timely accepted the TODD. In 2011, Lewis filed a proof of claim with the Personal Representative for the remaining debt in the amount of $123,530.09. The Personal Representative rejected Lewis' claim on December 16, 2011. At issue in this cause is whether Carlson's estate was liable for the underlying debt on the mortgaged property transferred by TODD, when the grantor's will contained express instructions for the payment of all debts secured by mortgages. The Supreme Court determined that it was. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Carlson" on Justia Law

Initiative Petition No. 403 sought to amend the Oklahoma Constitution by adding a new Article 13-C. The proposed article would create the Oklahoma Education Improvement Fund, designed to provide for the improvement of public education in Oklahoma through an additional one-cent sales and use tax. Funds generated by the one-cent tax would be distributed to public school districts, higher education institutions, career and technology centers, and early childhood education providers for certain educational purposes outlined in the proposed article. Additionally, a percentage of the funds would be used to provide a $5,000.00 pay raise to all public school teachers. Opponents challenged the initiative, arguing it violated the one general subject rule of Art. 24, sec. 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Initiative Petition No. 403 did not violate the one general subject rule and was legally sufficient for submission to the people of Oklahoma. View "IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 403 STATE QUESTION NO. 779" on Justia Law

In 2007, a paramedic supervisor, defendant Ethan Barstow collided with a vehicle driven by the plaintiff-appellee Elizabeth Gowens resulting in damage to both vehicles and injury to Gowens. At the time of the collision, Barstow worked as a paramedic supervisor for the defendant-appellant EMSSTAT, which is a division of the defendant-appellant Norman Regional Hospital Authority, a public trust d/b/a Norman Regional Hospital (collectively, NRH). NRH was a political subdivision for purposes of the Government Tort Claims Act (GTCA). Gowens initially sued Barstow and the City of Norman ex rel. EMSSTAT for her injuries. Both Barstow and the City of Norman were later dismissed from the lawsuit. Central to this case was the intersection where the accident occurred, described as being "almost a five-way intersection" with no stop sign and a hill. At the close of the evidence, NRH moved for a directed verdict which the trial court overruled. In its order, the trial court found : (1) Barstow was an employee of NRH and was acting in that capacity when driving through the intersection; (2) Barstow was responding to a call for service and more likely than not had his lights and siren on while driving; (3) the fact that he most likely used his lights and sirens did not provide blanket protection under 47 O.S. 11-1062; (4) the unusual layout of the intersection required a heightened use of care by all; (5) in this situation Barstow's high rate of speed did endanger the life and property of Gowens; and (6) Mr. Barstow was a cause of the accident. The trial court ruled in plaintiff's favor, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that an entity covered under the GTCA, was immune from reckless acts committed by its emergency vehicle drivers and also such drivers, and therefore their employers, could not be held liable for mere negligence. The Supreme Court vacated the COCA's opinion, affirmed the trial court's decision and addressed other issues properly raised on appeal which were not addressed by the COCA. View "Gowens v. Barstow" on Justia Law

Claimant John McCauley sought permanent total disability benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund for three separately adjudicated cumulative trauma injuries. The Workers' Compensation Court found Claimant was a physically impaired person and awarded him permanent total disability benefits against the Fund. The Fund appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed but for different reasons. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a person who has a disability resulting from separately adjudicated injuries arising at the same time was a physically impaired person by statutory definition. The Court also concluded that the date of last exposure to the separately adjudicated but simultaneously occurring cumulative trauma injuries was the date to be used in fixing the Fund's liability. View "Multiple Injury Fund v. McCauley" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the plaintiff-appellant Sandra Vilarrubias Serra was covered under the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) and medical payments (medical pay) coverage of the automobile insurance policy issued to Traci Robertson by Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Serra was a foreign exchange student from Spain who was attending her senior year of high school in Pryor. She resided with Robertson in Pryor. As a passenger in the car of a friend, Andrea McNair, she sustained serious injuries when McNair's car collided with Donald Broughton, who was driving a motorcycle. Broughton was killed in the accident. Serra attempted to collect damages for her injuries by filing a claim against Robertson's automobile policy's uninsured motorist and medical payments coverage. State Farm denied coverage to Serra who then filed a lawsuit against the Personal Representative of Donald Broughton, Andrea McNair and State Farm. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court which was granted. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the trial court. In particular, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Serra was a "ward" of Robertson for purposes of coverage under the policy. The Court held that she was covered and reversed. View "Serra v. Estate of Broughton" on Justia Law