Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The trial judge denied the appellants' motion to compel arbitration on the ground that there was no binding arbitration agreement. The trial judge ruled that Tamera Nelson did not have authority to sign an arbitration agreement on behalf of her grandmother, Arda Lee Churchill (who was a resident of the Grace Living Center-Chikasha until her death), so no valid arbitration agreement existed. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that no valid arbitration agreement existed because Tamera Nelson was not authorized to make health care decisions for her grandmother under the circumstances. The Health Care Power of Attorney required that Arda Lee Churchill's physician certify that she was not capable of making her own health care decisions and no such certification was made. View "Johnson v. Convalescent Center of Grady, LLC" on Justia Law

The main issue on appeal in this case was whether the purchase of electricity and natural gas utility services qualifies for a sales tax exemption. Appellant-taxpayer American Airlines, Inc., ("AA") was denied a refund for the sales tax it paid on its purchases of electricity and natural gas utility services during the 2006 calendar year. The Account Maintenance and Compliance Division of the Oklahoma Tax Commission denied the request. Appellant timely protested the denial. The Oklahoma Tax Commission, by order, adopted the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the administrative law judge finding taxpayer failed to prove the denial was incorrect. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the Services Exemption (68 O.S. Supp. 2006, section 1357 (28)) provided an exemption for electricity and natural gas utility services used by AA during 2006 in aircraft repair and maintenance activities. The remaining issue concerned the appropriate methodology for determining the amount of the sales tax refund AA should have received on its 2006 purchases of utility services. The adopted Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations did not make a specific finding concerning an appropriate methodology. The Court remanded the case back to the Oklahoma Tax Commission for further proceedings. View "American Airlines, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Partners in a civil union signed co-parenting agreements designating Plaintiff as the parent of Defendant's two biological children. Upon their separation and dissolution of the civil union, Plaintiff continued to act as a parent for the children. Defendant removed the children from Plaintiff's care, changed their last names, and planned to remove the children from Oklahoma. Plaintiff petitioned the District Court for, inter alia, a determination of her parental rights. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed. This was an issue of first impression in Oklahoma. Addressing the threshold issue of standing with regard to plaintiff's case, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff had standing to seek a best-interests-of-the-child hearing when the biological parent relinquished some of her parental rights through a co-parenting agreement. As such, the Court concluded the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss the case, and remanded the case to address other issues plaintiff raised on appeal. View "Eldredge v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Appellants Homesales, Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and Jason L. Howell, appealed the district court's order certifying this case as a class action at the request of Appellee Marshall County. This case centered on the Documentary Stamp Tax Act, and its applicability to a sheriff's deed granted to Homesales in a mortgage foreclosure action prosecuted by JPMorgan. Homesales claimed that the transaction was exempt from documentary tax. The County disagreed and sued to collect the tax it claimed was due. The County also moved to certify the case as a class action in which all Oklahoma counties would join as plaintiffs. The district court granted the County's motion and certified the case pursuant to Title 12 O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 2023 (B)(3) and the defendants appealed. Because the County was precluded by the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in "Murray Cnty. v. Homesales, Inc.," (330 P.3d 519) from suing to collect unpaid taxes allegedly due pursuant to the DSTA, the district court's class certification order was reversed and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Marshall County v. Homesales, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Shaloa Edwards brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City of Sallisaw, the city manager, and the mayor. Plaintiff was the elected police chief of Sallisaw, Oklahoma, and just prior to Plaintiff bringing suit, the board of commissioners passed an ordinance removing Plaintiff's supervisory and management authority over the police department. The district court found that the ordinance improperly removed the police chief's authority to supervise and manage the police department and deprived the police chief of his due process protections by circumventing statutory and local removal procedures and effectively removing him from office. A home-rule city has a sovereign right to govern itself in purely municipal matters. Here, the Sallisaw Board of Commissioners had the ability to set out the duties and authority of a police chief's day-to-day responsibilities. The Supreme Court held that it would not question how a city charter allocated the authority to set the police chief's duties and responsibilities if not contrary to statute, precedent, or Constitution. The Sallisaw city charter granted that authority to the board of commissioners. The district court's order and permanent injunction was therefore vacated. View "EDWARDS v. CITY OF SALLISAW" on Justia Law

After settling a federal lawsuit brought by plaintiffs for $13,500,000.00, the sheriff of Delaware County and the County Commissioners demanded that the Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma Self Insurance Group indemnify Delaware County for that amount. The insurance group agreed to contribute $1,000,000.00, less the defense costs already incurred, which amount was the per occurrence limit. Delaware County filed a lawsuit for breach of contract, and subsequently moved to amend its petition to add a bad faith claim, after the lawsuit had been transferred to Rogers County. The trial court granted the motion and subsequently denied the insurance group's motion to dismiss the bad faith claim. The trial court certified for immediate interlocutory appeal the order denying that motion to dismiss to the Supreme Court. The questions that appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review were: (1) whether the Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma Self-Insurance Group was an insurer pursuant to 36 O.S.2011, sec. 607.1; and (2) whether, pursuant to the Governmental Tort Claims Act, that organization was immune from tort liability for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. After its review, the Supreme Court held that under the statutes the organization was an insurance company for some purposes, but was a governmental entity immune from a tort claim for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. View "BD. OF CTY. COMMISSIONERS v. ASSOC. OF CTY. COMMISSIONERS OF OKLA. SELF-INSUR. GROUP" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the termination Respondent-appellant Billy McCall's (Father) parental rights to K.P.M.A. (Child). Child was born out-of-wedlock to T.Z. (Mother) in 2012. Prospective adoptive parents, petitioners-appellees Marshall and Toni Michelle Andrews had had physical custody of the child since she was released from the hospital after birth. On appeal of his termination, father argued: (1) whether his due process rights were violated; (2) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the termination proceedings; and (3) whether the trial court's determination was supported by clear and convincing evidence. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that termination of the natural father's parental rights was improper because the natural father's due process rights were violated, and the termination of the natural father's parental rights was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. View "In re Adoption of K.P.M.A." on Justia Law

This appeal was the second appeal in a dispute between Taxpayer-appellant J. Clark Bundren, M.D. and appellees City of Tulsa and Tulsa Hills, LLC. The two issues in that case were: (1) whether Taxpayer should have been allowed to intervene in a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the legality of certain public expenditures and financing; and (2) whether the appeal was moot because the appellees, Tulsa Industrial Authority, City of Tulsa Oklahoma, and Tulsa Hills, L.L.C. (TIA, City, and TH, respectively), obtained a declaratory judgment after Taxpayer was prohibited by the trial court from intervening. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness and held that Taxpayer's claim for equitable relief presented by a motion to intervene was not made moot by the judgment rendered during the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order that denied Taxpayer's motion to intervene as a qui tam plaintiff, but reversed the trial court's order denying a motion to intervene in which Taxpayer sought equitable relief. The case what then remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court ordered Taxpayer to file his "Petition in Intervention" on or before August 16, 2012. On August 15, 2012, Taxpayer complied with the order by filing the petition. On September 14, 2012, the appellees each filed separate motions to dismiss, and asserted that the bondholders were necessary parties. Several months later, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss and allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition. The court included the requirement that if Taxpayer filed an amended petition seeking to enjoin the City from making payments to the bondholders who purchased the bonds used to finance the underlying transaction, then the Taxpayer must provide notice of the amended petition to the bondholders and file proof of such notice with the court. Taxpayer filed an amended petition, and the appellees responded with separate motions to dismiss. The trial court again dismissed Taxpayer's petition on the basis that Taxpayer did not provide notice to bondholders as necessary parties to the lawsuit, and that Taxpayer did not state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court found that the bondholders were necessary parties to the action and if not joined, the present parties to the action would face a substantial risk of incurring multiple and potentially inconsistent obligations. The court again dismissed without prejudice the causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief for failure to comply with the court's prior order and for failure to join all parties necessary "to a just adjudication of this matter." The court allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition, and ordered that if Taxpayer did not amend the petition within that time, the action would be dismissed with prejudice to all the claims. Instead of amending the petition, Taxpayer filed an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Mandamus to the Supreme Court. The trial court entered a final order of dismissal. The dispositive issue of this matter was whether Taxpayer had to include bondholders as necessary parties to this case. The Supreme Court concluded he did, and affirmed the trial court. View "Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

Cleo Boler was admitted to Grace Living Center - Norman, in January 2010 and was a resident there until January 2012. Judy Little, as Cleo Boler's attorney in fact, signed the admission documents which included a three-page Dispute Resolution Provision. The arbitration agreement provided that any claim, controversy, dispute or disagreement arising out of or in connection with the care rendered to Cleo Boler would be determined by submission to neutral, binding arbitration. It purported to bind not only Cleo Boler, but any future legal representatives, heirs, successors, etc., who might assert a claim against Grace. Cleo Boler, individually, and Judy Little and Johnnie Boler as attorneys in fact, sued Grace and others for negligence, violation of the Nursing Home Care Act and breach of contract regarding the care and treatment of Cleo Boler. Grace filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, asserting that the contract was one involving interstate commerce and was valid and enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which preempted contrary state law. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in denying the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration. The trial judge held that the wrongful death claim belonging to Cleo Boler's statutory claim was not subject to an agreement to arbitrate contained in her nursing home's admission contract. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held that the personal representative and the next of kin were not bound by the arbitration agreement in the contract signed on Cleo Boler's behalf. They did not sign the nursing home contract in their personal capacities and their claim was not wholly derivative of Cleo Boler's claim. View "Boler v. Security Health Care, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Erica Wood sued Mercedes-Benz of Oklahoma City for injuries she suffered after she slipped and fell on ice that had accumulated on sidewalks, pavement, and grass surrounding the Defendant's automobile dealership. The icy conditions were caused by Defendant's sprinkler system which activated during freezing temperatures. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Mercedes-Benz had a duty to take precautionary measures with regard to the sprinkler system particularly in light of cold temperatures and pooling water caused by the system. Furthermore, there was a question of fact regarding whether Mercedes-Benz breached its duty toward Wood, making summary judgment inappropriate, and requiring the matter be submitted to a jury. View "Wood v. Mercedes-Benz of Oklahoma City" on Justia Law