Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involves Jade P. Schiewe and Zachary Pfaff, who filed a lawsuit against the Cessna Aircraft Company, alleging negligence after a plane crash in September 2010. The plaintiffs were flying a Cessna 172RG when a fire erupted in the cockpit, leading to a crash landing. They claimed that Cessna was negligent in not updating its service manual to include a new part and its installation instructions. Cessna, however, filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an act that limits liability for aircraft manufacturers 18 years after the delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Cessna. The court held that the service manual was created by Cessna in its capacity as a manufacturer, and thus, was included within the limitation period provided in GARA. The court further found that Cessna had not added or omitted anything to the service manual that was a proximate cause of the accident, and thus, the GARA statute of repose did not restart. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were barred by GARA as the statute of repose had expired. View "SCHIEWE v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the termination of a mother's parental rights in a case concerning two deprived children. The mother, Brianna Tatum, had sought certiorari review from the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion which upheld the trial court's final order terminating her parental rights. On certiorari, Tatum claimed that the record did not support a finding that she had waived her right to a jury trial in a parental termination proceeding.The case hinged on two key questions: whether a Court Minute memorializing a contemporaneous court proceeding could support a party's oral consent to waive a jury trial in a parental termination proceeding, and whether a party who proceeds to trial without demanding a jury trial or objecting to a non-jury trial has waived any right to a jury trial. The Court answered both questions affirmatively.The Court found that Tatum had waived her right to a jury trial by her conduct, proceeding with the non-jury trial without any demand for a jury trial or raising an objection to the non-jury trial. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with a non-jury trial. Therefore, the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was vacated, and the judgment of the trial court terminating Tatum's parental rights was affirmed. View "IN THE MATTER OF E.J.T." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma considered whether an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges constituted a "pending charge" for the purposes of expungement. The appellant, Andrew Dale Brassfield, sought to expunge his arrest records under Oklahoma law. The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation objected, arguing that Brassfield was not qualified for expungement because he had pending charges against him due to an ongoing investigation by the federal government and the Cherokee Tribe. The district court and Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed these decisions. The court held that an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges is not a pending charge under the relevant Oklahoma statute, and therefore, the appellant qualified to seek expungement. The court reasoned that a criminal investigation into whether an individual's conduct is chargeable as a crime is not the same as the individual having a pending felony or misdemeanor charge. The court also found that the requirement that the prosecuting agency will not refile the charge is satisfied, as the State of Oklahoma lacks jurisdiction to do so in this case. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "BRASSFIELD v. STATE" on Justia Law

An ambulance, driven by an employee of the Jackson County Emergency Medical Services District (JCEMSD) in the State of Oklahoma, collided with a turnpike tollbooth, injuring the toll-worker. The toll-worker filed a lawsuit against the ambulance driver and the JCEMSD. The JCEMSD sought to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that it was entitled to governmental immunity under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA), and that the Act prohibited recovery because the toll-worker had already recovered workers compensation benefits. The trial court denied the dismissal, leading the JCEMSD to file an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from proceeding further.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction and granted the writ of prohibition. The court held that although the JCEMSD is a unique entity, it is subject to lawsuits through its board of trustees to the same extent as any Oklahoma municipality or county, pursuant to the Okla. Const. art. 10, §9C. The court also held that the GTCA is applicable to preclude recovery, as the toll-worker had already received workers compensation benefits. View "JACKSON COUNTY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE DISTRICT v. KIRKLAND" on Justia Law

The dispute revolves around which of two oil and gas leases controls the royalty payments for nine wells collectively called the Bernhardt Wells. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant, Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. The plaintiffs, trustees of The Eunice S. Justice Amended, Revised, and Restated 1990 Revocable Trust Agreement, argued that a 1978 Lease entitles them to a 3/16 royalty, while Devon maintained that a 1973 Lease, entitling the Trust to a 1/8 royalty, controls. The court found that the dispute over which lease controls is best characterized as a quiet title claim, subject to a 15-year statute of limitations, which began when the injury occurred in 1978. Thus, the Trust's quiet title claim, filed more than 15 years later, was time-barred. The court also held that the trial court did not err in denying the Trust's motion to compel the production of various title opinions in Devon's possession. View "BASE v. DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION" on Justia Law

In Oklahoma, a woman suffering from various progressive, degenerative diseases executed an advance directive instructing that her life not be extended by life-sustaining treatment, including artificially administered nutrition and hydration. Later, she was hospitalized and a PEG tube was inserted to provide artificially administered nutrition and hydration, contrary to the terms of her advance directive. The woman's sister and children disagreed on whether to keep the PEG tube in place or follow the instructions in the advance directive. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that an incapacitated or incompetent person retains the legal right to revoke their advance directive and that revocation of an advance directive must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had found that the woman had not revoked her advance directive and that the insertion of the PEG tube violated the terms of her advance directive. View "IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF L.A.C." on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Gary Stricklen, filed a claim for permanent total disability with the Workers' Compensation Commission, which was dismissed by an administrative law judge. The Multiple Injury Trust Fund (MITF) argued it was not liable because all of Stricklen's injuries occurred while he was employed by the same employer. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the phrase "subsequent employer" in 85A O.S.Supp.2019 § 32 refers to the employer at the time of the employee's "subsequent injury" referenced in the same statute, which is used for the purpose of that statute for a claim against the MITF. The court reversed the Commission's order that was based on the erroneous view of the statutory language and remanded the case for further proceedings. The petitioner's constitutional issue was not addressed because the court's interpretation of the statutory language did not require it. View "STRICKLEN v. MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND" on Justia Law

In a collision involving a sedan owned by Murray State College and a semi truck and trailer owned by Frank Bartel Transportation (FBT), the college employee driving the sedan was killed and the FBT vehicle was destroyed. FBT submitted a claim under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) to the State of Oklahoma Risk Management Department of the Office of Management and Enterprise Services (OMES), which offered to settle for $25,000. FBT refused the offer, arguing that it sustained additional consequential damages of $68,636.61 for towing, vehicle storage, and vehicle rental. In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that these consequential damages fell within the "any other loss" provision of Section 154(A)(2) of the GTCA, and thus FBT's recovery was subject to that statute's $125,000 cap. The court reversed the trial court's decision which found that FBT's damages were all for loss of property and subject to the Section 154(A)(1) cap of $25,000. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "FRANK BARTEL TRANSPORTATION v. STATE" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the plaintiffs, Mohammad Amoorpour and Maryam Amnifar, trustees of the Amoorpour Family Trust, sought to quiet title to a piece of property against Brenda J. Kirkham, a neighboring landowner who counterclaimed, alleging adverse possession. After a bench trial, the district court awarded title to the plaintiffs and denied their requests for money damages and a writ of assistance.Kirkham appealed the decision, asserting that she had proven adverse possession of the property. The plaintiffs counter-appealed, challenging the denial of their requests for financial compensation and a writ of assistance.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the district court's decision to quiet title to the plaintiffs, noting that Kirkham had failed to prove the necessary elements to claim adverse possession. Specifically, Kirkham had not continuously, exclusively, openly, notoriously, and hostilely possessed the land for the required 15 years. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for money damages, stating that a quiet title action does not inherently provide for a monetary award of damages.However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for a writ of assistance. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the property and the power to issue a writ of assistance after determining and settling the parties' title to the property. The case was remanded back to the district court with instructions to proceed in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "AMOORPOUR v. KIRKHAM" on Justia Law

In this case, a mother and her husband (the appellants) sought to adopt the mother's biological child, A.J.B., born out of wedlock, without the consent of the child's biological father. The biological father (the appellee) was incarcerated for a significant portion of the statutory period under consideration. The appellants claimed that the biological father failed to maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child and failed to contribute to the child's support, both of which would allow for adoption without his consent under Oklahoma law. The trial court denied the adoption, finding that the evidence was insufficient to grant an adoption without the biological father's consent. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals agreed that the father did not willfully fail to support the child, but found that the appellants had established a prima facie case that the father did not maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the father's defenses.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma disagreed with the Court of Civil Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the mother had intentionally concealed her and the child's whereabouts from the biological father, thus making it impossible for him to maintain a relationship with the child. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgement, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the adoption without the father's consent because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the application for adoption without consent. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF A.J.B." on Justia Law