Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Debtor Jennifer Lynn Jackson purchased a horse trailer in 2003 for personal use with the proceeds of a purchase-money loan from Defendant Arvest Bank. The Oklahoma Tax Commission issued a certificate of title for the trailer. The bank filed a UCC-1 financing statement for the collateral in 2003, and a UCC continuation statement in 2008. The central issue to this case was the issuance of title by the Oklahoma Tax Commission to the debtor and the title's implications on the perfection of the bank's security interest in the trailer. That security interest was not recorded on the face of the certificate of title, nor did the bank take steps to record the security interest. The debtor did not request that a title be issued. The manufacturer of the trailer had forwarded a statement of origin to an Oklahoma tag agent, who then issued the title. Susan Manchester, as the trustee of record, sought to avoid the perfected security interest by the bank in the trailer. She asserted that because title was issued and the lien was not noted on the title, the bank did not perfect its security interest and does not have a priority position in the bankruptcy proceeding. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified a question of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: "May a certificate of title for a vehicle issued by the Oklahoma Tax Commission be deemed to have been 'properly issued', within the meaning of OKLA. STAT. tit. 47 section 1110.A.1, even though the vehicle was not one for which a certificate of title is required as proof of ownership under applicable Oklahoma law?" The Supreme Court did not believe that answering the question as formulated by the Bankruptcy Court settled the underlying issue of whether the bank properly perfected its security interest the trailer. The Court reformulated the question to: "Does the filing of a UCC-1 financing statement for a personal/recreational use horse trailer perfect the creditor's security interest where the Oklahoma Tax Commission has issued a discretionary certificate of title, and the creditor is not named on the title?" The Court answered: title may be properly issued by the Oklahoma Tax Commission to non-required trailers for the convenience of showing ownership. The use of title beyond this single purpose for non-required vehicles would be contrary to the general scheme and purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Oklahoma. The proper method for perfecting a security interest in collateral that is not required to be titled (but may be titled at the discretion of the owner) still is, and has been by the filing of a UCC-1 financing statement.View "Manchester v. Arvest Bank" on Justia Law

A Decree of Divorce entered August 1, 2008, granted the parties a divorce and awarded the appellee (Mother) alimony, to be paid periodically for seventy-two months, plus child support. The appellant (Father) lost his job and had not found other employment. Father filed a motion to modify the Decree of Divorce to reduce the amount of child support and to discontinue the support alimony. Father requested that his income be imputed at minimum wage. Mother objected on the grounds that Father either resigned his job voluntarily or committed acts that led to his dismissal, such as failing to appear at work for three days. Mother's position was that because Father's actions caused his changed circumstances, he should not be relieved of his court ordered obligations. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the decrease in income was temporary and was due to appellant's voluntary act of resigning his job. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, stating that appellant's voluntary decision to resign based on his own misconduct did not relieve him of his obligation to pay child support. The Supreme Court granted the appellant's petition for certiorari and found that the trial court made no finding that Father acted in bad faith and there was no evidence that Father resigned his job in order to avoid his support obligations under the divorce decree. The court's denial of the motion to modify was against the clear weight of the evidence. The order denying the motion to modify was therefore reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for recalculation of the Father's support obligations in light of his changed circumstances. View "Garcia v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former spouse, seeking rescission and damages arising out of an allegedly fraudulent real estate sales agreement. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's lawsuit for failing to issue summons or file a waiver within ninety days of bringing the action as required by Rule 9(a), Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a discord between Rule 9(a) and 12 O.S.Supp. 2002 section 2004(I), and found the two provisions were in direct conflict to the extent Rule 9(a) shortened plaintiff's allotted time for service of summons. View "Cornett v. Carr" on Justia Law

Petitioner Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Protection Federation of Oklahoma, Inc. sought writs of prohibition and mandamus to disqualify a hearing officer in an administrative proceeding conducted by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), to restart the proceeding with a new hearing officer, and to prohibit ex parte communications between the hearing officer and the OWRB and other agencies. The proceedings in question concern the Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Maximum Annual Yield (MAY) determination, made by OWRB on March 13, 2012. Upon review of the OWRB record, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner was entitled to a fair and impartial proceeding. While the Court did not find the hearing officer to be biased and would not order her disqualification, "in the interest of fairness and in order to remedy any appearance of impropriety," the Court issued a writ of mandamus to compel the hearing officer to notify the parties to the administrative proceeding of any and all ex parte communications that occurred between her and federal agencies and to include those communications in the record, so that the parties may have an opportunity to respond. The Court concluded that Petitioner satisfied the necessary requirements for a writ of mandamus, and therefore issued a writ compelling the hearing officer to provide notice of her ex parte communications to all parties, to disclose the contents of those communications to the parties, and incorporate those communications and responses to them into the record. View "Arbuckle Simpson Aquifier Protection Federation of Okla. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a dispute over the title to real property along the Red River in Tillman County, Oklahoma. Plaintiff-Appellee, Chad H. Akin asserted title by adverse possession, even though he also insisted that he owned the property through a deed given to him by his father Hugh in 1975. Defendants-Appellees, Don S. Castleberry, Sam D. Castleberry, Terry G. Castleberry, denied Akin's assertion of adverse possession and, instead, insisted that they owned the property through a deed obtained from their aunt in 1986. The trial court determined that Akin neglected to prove title by adverse possession and Akin appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the trial court because title by adverse possession was not proven under the facts presented.View "Akin v. Castleberry" on Justia Law

Oklahoma Department of Corrections inmate Sonny Lauren Harmon brought an action against three employees of the John Lilley Correctional Center, Paul Cradduck, Warden Glynn Booher, and Alice Turner, following the seizure and alleged conversion of a gold wedding ring. The District Court of Oklahoma County entered summary judgment on behalf of each defendant. Harmon appealed the decision. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether summary judgment was supported by the record. After reviewing the record, the Court found that the settled-law-of-the-case-doctrine precluded reconsideration of Harmon's compliance with administrative exhaustion requirements, and it was error to hold otherwise. In addition, the existence of a factual dispute mandated the Court's reversal of summary judgment in favor of defendant Paul Cradduck on Harmon's conversion claim. However, the Court concluded the district court properly awarded summary judgment to each of the defendants for any claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Further, any claims based on the purported tortious conduct of Booher and Turner were properly disposed of by the trial judge and COCA.View "Harmon v. Cradduck" on Justia Law

Zaloudek Grain Company held a workers' compensation policy with CompSource Oklahoma for approximately ten years prior to 2011. Zaloudek was required each year to provide payroll audit information to CompSource. The audit information was used to determine the proper premium for each year. CompSource sent a notice in late 2010 to Zaloudek requesting audit information. In January, 2011, Zaloudek's policy was renewed for all of 2011 through January 1, 2012. On January 18, 2011, CompSource sent another letter requesting Zaloudek provide the necessary payroll audit information, but Zaloudek was unresponsive. Subsequently, CompSource sent Zaloudek a notification to inform the company that the process of canceling its policy would begin if CompSource did not receive the audit information. The audit information was not provided; CompSource ultimately canceled the policy when Zaloudek ignored several subsequent requests. CompSource issued a refund for payments made under the policy. Later that summer, two teenage workers were seriously injured in the grain auger at Zaloudek's facility. CompSource did not accept the company's new insurance application because it was incomplete and was not signed by an owner of Zaloudek. Zaloudek sued a few weeks following the rejection of its application, asking for a judgment against CompSource for breach of contract and bad faith and further requested declaratory relief in the form of an order requiring CompSource to provide workers' compensation coverage. Zaloudek filed a motion for summary judgment claiming CompSource lacked legal justification for terminating its policy and requested orders to establish there was no lapse in coverage and requiring CompSource to provide coverage for its two injured employees. Zaloudek further requested a finding that CompSource was in breach of contract. CompSource moved for summary judgment, arguing Zaloudek was not covered at the time of the incident and its policy was properly canceled. Zaloudek filed a counter-motion for summary judgment asserting CompSource should be estopped from denying coverage because it retained premiums and acted in a manner toward Zaloudek consistent with continued coverage. The trial court issued an order dismissing Zaloudek's bad faith claim but left pending its claims for breach of contract and declaratory relief. CompSource appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that CompSource was authorized to cancel a policy for an insured's failure to participate in the audit. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings on the other contract issues raised.View "Zaloudek Grain Co. v. CompSource Oklahoma" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the parties' dispute over a provision in their lease for a shopping center store had to be resolved under the arbitration provision in the lease or whether it could have been resolved by a proceeding in district court. The disputed provision provided that landlord KWD River City Investments, L.P. would not alter the exterior of the shopping center without the consent of tenant Ross Dress for Less. KWD admitted that it allowed another tenant to alter the shopping center's exterior at that tenant's store location without Ross' consent. However, KWD maintained that Ross unreasonably withheld its consent in violation of the consent provision. KWD contended that the unreasonableness of Ross' refusal to consent was demonstrated by Ross conditioning its consent upon KWD making exterior alterations to benefit Ross. KWD then filed declaratory judgment action in district court to resolve the dispute. Ross filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. KWD petitioned the Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. Upon review, the Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion and affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "KWD River City Investments, LP v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc." on Justia Law

W.R. Allison Enterprises, Inc. was a small business operated by a sole owner. Allison hired an employee in early 2009 and secured workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance from CompSource. Allison prepaid the estimated annual premium. The employee only worked for Allison for approximately one month. Allison asked its insurance agent to cancel the workers' compensation insurance policy. CompSource acknowledged the cancellation request and advised that it would issue a ten-day notice of cancellation on a short rate basis in conformance with the insurance policy. CompSource prepared a final audit report, calculating the gross premium, short rate cancellation penalty, and a catastrophe premium. CompSource subtracted the audit amount from the estimated prepaid annual premium and refunded the remainder as the unearned premium calculated on a short rate basis. Allison took the position that the short rate penalty charge conflicted with 85 O.S.2001, section 67.1 which expressly required the insurance company to refund a pro rata share of the prepaid premium if it canceled a policy and that the policy's short rate penalty provision was changed, by operation of law, to comply with section 67.1. Allison filed suit against CompSource on behalf of itself and other similarly situated employers to recover the short rate penalties charged by CompSource, alleging CompSource's refusal to return the short rate penalty charge constituted a breach of the insurance policy as impliedly amended by law. The trial court overruled CompSource's counter motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and certified an interlocutory order that decided that when an insured employer requests that a workers' compensation insurance policy be canceled, the insurer must refund the prepaid premium on a pro rata basis pursuant to 85 O.S.2001, 67.1. The insurer filed a petition for certiorari review arguing that the pro rata refund provisions in the statute apply only when the insurer initiates the cancellation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the statute was ambiguous as to insured-initiated cancellations of workers' compensation insurance policies; (2) the state insurance department has applied the statute only to insurer-initiated cancellations; and (3) plaintiff respondent did not establish any cogent reason why the Court should not defer to the department's longstanding application. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed. Section 67.1 did not require CompSource to make a pro rata refund of unearned prepaid premium to Allison. View "W.R. Allison Enterprises, Inc. v. CompSource of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

The plaintiff-appellant sued the defendant-appellee for professional negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The appellant was a party to a divorce and child custody litigation. The appellee, a court-appointed psychologist, was to serve as an expert to conduct an evaluation of the parties and of their children. The appellant alleged that he paid the appellee for the evaluation and after several months, as a result of the inaction of the appellee, her report had not been provided as ordered. The appellant settled the divorce proceedings in a manner he claimed was injurious to him and his son. The trial court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss. The motion urged that as a court-appointed witness, the appellee was immune to liability in damages. Though after its review, the Supreme Court found that as a court-appointed expert, appellee was indeed immune to liability in damages, "her duty was to the court." However, because the appellant claimed that the appellee failed to provide any services whatsoever for the amount paid, the Court treated those allegations as true: "[a]n expert would not be entitled to claim a fee for a court-ordered service that was not provided. This does not mean the appellant must be satisfied with the fees, but the appellant has a right to have the court decide if the fees were earned, and whether there was a valid legal defense to the assertions of the appellant that the appellee neither completed the required report, nor testified." The appellant admitted that the underlying child custody was settled, so the trial court should have also considered the impact the settlement had on the appellee's opportunity to complete the report or to testify. Accordingly, the trial court's granting the appellee's motion to dismiss was reversed and remanded for further consideration. View "Simonson v. Schaefer" on Justia Law