Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Claimant Charles Prince filed a claim in the Workers' Compensation Court in 2009 alleging a cumulative trauma employment-related injury to his right foot, with date of last exposure in late 2008. The trial court found Claimant sustained a cumulative trauma injury to his right foot and ordered Employer, Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc., to select a physician to treat Claimant and to provide "such medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, diagnostic testing and referral as may be deemed necessary by the treating physician to the claimant's right foot." The court found his date of last exposure was late 2008. Claimant sought compensation for injury to his right foot, and later for his low back arising from the same injury. The trial court of the Workers' Compensation Court denied his claim for the low back, and a three judge panel affirmed. On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) vacated the panel's order, holding the order was against the clear weight of the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the denial of the award for Claimant's lower back was supported by competent evidence. COCA found more evidence in support of Claimant's low back injury, but Employer presented evidence from its medical expert which denied that the injury to either the low back or the right foot arose out of Claimant's employment. "The date of the injury determines the law to be used in a workers' compensation claim and applies equally to employers and claimants alike." Based on the Supreme Court's decision in "Williams Companies, Inc. v. Dunkelgod," (2012 OK 96 (2012)), and the law on the date of Claimant's injury, the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was vacated. View "Prince v. Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc." on Justia Law

In May 2006, Appellant Samantha Million brought suit against her male cousin, Appellee Jay Scott Million, alleging multiple acts of sexual abuse against her when she was a minor, during the years1980 through 1983. The trial judge, acting as factfinder, concluded that the applicable statute of limitations had run and therefore the appellant's claim was untimely filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's ruling that the statute of limitations had indeed run in 1989, a year after Appellant reached the age of majority. View "Million v. Million" on Justia Law

Workers' compensation claimant Kristy Dunkelgod was injured in an employment-related accident in 2011 while working for Williams Companies, Inc. The Workers' Compensation Court entered several orders awarding claimant temporary total disability benefits. She was also awarded a "Go-Go" scooter and a lift van. On appeal by the employer, the Court of Civil Appeals vacated the awards, holding the court's finding the lift van was medically necessary was "against the clear weight of the evidence." The Court of Civil Appeals also held the claimant was limited to a maximum of 300 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and remanded for a determination of when she reached the maximum. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) err when it applied the "clear weight of the evidence" standard of review to the Workers' Compensation Court's order awarding a lift van; and (2) whether COCA erred when it held that Claimant's temporary total disability (TTD) award was limited to a maximum of 300 weeks. The Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative; COCA failed to apply the law in effect at the time of Claimant's injury. The Court vacated and remanded the case to the Workers' Compensation Court for further proceedings. View "Williams Companies, Inc v. Dunklegod" on Justia Law

The appellant wife and the appellee husband owned a business together. The business had been the sole property of the wife until shortly before the parties' marriage, when the husband bought a forty-nine percent interest in the business for five-thousand dollars. The wife filed for divorce five years later. During the pendency of the divorce, the wife terminated the husband from the marital business. Husband, still a co-owner of the marital business and receiving the benefits of this ownership, started a competing business. The trial court, in determining the value of the husband's share of the business did not consider any loss in value to the marital business because of the husband's competing business. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this matter and held that the trial court should have, in settling the value of the business for property settlement purposes, included any loss in business value because of the husband's competing business. The only issue presented on appeal was whether the trial court erred in its valuation of the marital business. The Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a valuation of the parties' marital business : "Such a determination must include its value as of the date that the husband purchased a share of the business, as well as any offset to the valuation of husband's share of the business because he received money from the business during the pendency of the divorce. . . .These questions must all be covered by the trial court the second time around. The evidence, taken as a whole, shows that the valuation of [the business], and thus the husband's portion of the property settlement, was against the clear weight of the evidence." View "Colclasure v. Colclasure" on Justia Law

David Jordan brought an intentional tort action against his employer, Western Farmers Electric Cooperative, for injury from on-the-job exposure to allegedly highly toxic fly ash. Jordan alleged Western's spread of this hazardous material on the premises was intentional and with knowledge to a substantial certainty that serious injury would occur to employees. Western moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. The trial court found the petition failed to allege facts which plausibly demonstrated Western's conduct was intentional under the then-existent substantial certainty standard. The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the petition pled sufficient facts to remove the claim from the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act. Upon review, the Court held that the petition sufficiently pled a claim under the intentional tort/substantial certainty exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court. The order of dismissal was reversed and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Jordan v. Western Farmers Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the good faith requirement of 12A O.S. 2011 section 2-403 extended to third parties and requires that the third party be notified of a debtor's financial condition. The trial court found the interest of Plaintiff-Appellee Bank of Beaver City (Bank) in the livestock of cattle operation and debtor Lucky Moon Land and Livestock, Inc. (Lucky Moon) to be superior to that of another creditor of Lucky Moon, Defendant-Appellant Barretts' Livestock, Inc. (Barretts). The Bank alleged that in 2004 it perfected a security interest in all of Lucky Moon's livestock, including all after-acquired livestock, giving it a superior claim to cattle purchased by Lucky Moon from Barretts to satisfy the debt owed by Lucky Moon to the Bank. Barretts asserted that the Bank did not have priority over it because the Bank was not a good faith secured creditor. The trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment, finding that the Bank's perfected security interest had preference over Barretts' unperfected security interest. Barretts appealed, contending that Bank did not have a superior security interest because: 1) the Bank's security interest never attached; and 2) the Bank had not acted in good faith. The Court of Civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Bank sought certiorari, contending that: 1) the case presents an issue of first impression as to when good faith under 12A O.S. 2011 section 2-403 should be determined; 2) Bank's security interest never attached; and 3) the Court of Civil Appeals' decision was inconsistent with a different decision of the Court of Civil Appeals on which the court relied. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that 12A O.S. 2011 section 2-403 did not extend to third parties nor require that the third party be notified of a debtor's financial condition. View "Bank of Beaver City v. Barretts' Livestock, Inc." on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Department of Human Services filed a "Motion to Determine [Child Support] Arrearage" and a "Motion to Modify [reduce] Child Support" in its administrative court on behalf of the father of children receiving child support services. The mother moved to dismiss the motion to modify based on provisions of the parties' settlement agreement which had been incorporated into their divorce decree. The administrative law judge issued an order transferring the matter to the district court and filed it in the divorce action. Mother moved to dismiss the motion to modify in the district court. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the parties' agreement failed to demonstrate an intent to be free from the statutory provisions governing modification of child support. The order was certified for immediate appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari review to resolve the following issues: (1) was a motion to modify properly before the district court; and (2) did the four corners of the divorce decree in this matter demonstrate the parties' intent to be free of the statutory provisions concerning modification of support? The Supreme Court concluded that the procedural vehicle utilized to place the motion to modify child support before the district court was authorized by statute. Additionally, the parties clearly demonstrated their intent that there be no modification of child support without their mutual assent and it was error for the district court to hold to the contrary. View "Scungio v. Scungio" on Justia Law

Claimant Barton J. Rodr was a full-time computer programmer employed by Yzer, Inc. He suffered a heart attack while doing lawn work for his employer on the employer's premises. He was not paid anything additional for the lawn work. Claimant sought workers' compensation benefits, which were denied: the employer denied that he was working as an employee at the time of injury and claimed that the injury was not incurred during the course and scope of his employment. Employer asserted that the claimant was acting as a volunteer when injured. The workers' compensation court awarded benefits, determining that Claimant was not acting as a volunteer arising out of and in the course of his employment. The three-judge panel unanimously affirmed. The employer appealed, asserting that Claimant did not meet the statutory definition of an employee under the workers' compensation act and that the accidental injury did not occur in the course and scope of employment. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the order, finding it to be against the clear weight of the evidence and contrary to law because Claimant's performance of lawn work at the time of his injury was outside his employment and was not related to or incidental to his computer programmer job, and was therefore not compensable. Claimant timely appealed. The Supreme Court found that the test here was whether the work was necessary for the benefit of the employer: "Here, the employer specifically asked for volunteers to help with the yard work to make the grounds look nice for the grand reopening of Automobile Alley. The claimant and his thirteen-year-old son performed those duties. The employer then hired claimant's thirteen-year-old son to continue the yard work. . . . The employer's yard crew had quit and the claimant was performing that task to help out the employer, at the employer's request. The yard work was for the benefit of the employer and was not in furtherance of a personal mission. The facts reflect that the claimant was performing a special task for his employer and that his accidental injury arose out of and was within the course of his employment." The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and sustained the award entered by the workers' compensation court. View "Yzer, Inc. v. Rodr" on Justia Law

This case concerned a summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellee RAHI Real Estate Holdings, LLC, against the Defendants-Appellants Vincent and Leslie Adams. The original plaintiff, Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, filed a petition to foreclose in 2009, claiming Appellants defaulted on their note. Residential attached a copy of the subject note and mortgage to the petition. The note has a special indorsement from Gateway which states "Pay to The Order Of: Option One Mortgage Without Recourse." Also attached to the note was a blank indorsement by Option One Mortgage Corporation. The district court granted a motion to substitute RAHI as plaintiff in place of Residential in this foreclosure action and ordered that the caption be modified to reflect RAHI as plaintiff. One day after the order granting substitution, Residential as plaintiff filed its first amended petition. Defendants filed their answer admitting that a note and mortgage were executed but denied that the note and mortgage attached to the petition are the ones they signed. Further, they denied default and demanded strict proof. Appellants also attacked plaintiff's standing and the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment alleging there is no controversy as to any material facts and attached an affidavit. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was no transcript of a June 29, 2010 hearing in the record, so the Court could not determine what evidence was presented, including any concerning whether or not the substitution of parties gave Option One Mortgage and Option One Mortgage Corporation the right to enforce the note. It did appear from the filed record that there was at least one issue of material fact and summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Adams" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Oklahoma Legislature amended the Oklahoma Tax Code to require municipalities to contract with the State of Oklahoma through the Oklahoma Tax Commission to assess, collect and enforce municipal taxes. Prior to the amendment becoming effective, the City of Tulsa contracted with a private company to collect municipal taxes. On August 19, 2010, Tulsa filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the District Court of Oklahoma County to challenge the statute's constitutionality. The trial court found the statute unconstitutional. The State appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Upon review, the Court held that the amendments requiring the Commission to collect municipal sales and use taxes do not unconstitutionally impair Tulsa's obligation of contracts or infringe its inherent powers granted by the Constitution or the City's charter. View "City of Tulsa v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law