Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Claimant Kelly Mowdy filed a workers' compensation claim after a spider bit him. Claimant worked as a floor hand for Petitioner Nomac Drilling, LLC when he noticed two red bumps on his knee. He reported the bumps to his supervisor, who seemed unconcerned about the injury. Over the course of a few days, the bumps grew swollen, infected, turned dark red and purple, and would later be diagnosed as an abscessed spider bite in which methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) cultures were found. Claimant underwent surgery to remove dead and infected tissue. Nomac denied Claimant's injury was the result of his employment. The case was tried, and testimony revealed that Claimant's living arrangements while working for Nomac were in a heavily wooded area that "was not real clean, not real kept up." A big hole underneath his bed lead all the way to the outdoors. The Workers' Compensation Court found Claimant's testimony was credible and persuasive. The court concluded that the incident was the predominant cause of Claimant's right leg injury, and awarded Claimant TTD benefits. Nomac appealed to the three-judge panel. The panel sustained the award. The Court of Civil Appeals, however, vacated the award and ordered the claim dismissed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "an appellate court must sustain the Workers' Compensation Court's decision where there is any competent evidence supporting the decision. Claimant's expert medical report [was] not defective, and there [was] sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the Claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment." View "Nomac Drilling, LLC v. Mowdy" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Tax Commission assessed corporate income taxes against Vermont Corporation Scioto Insurance Company for 2001 through 2005, based on payments Scioto received from the use of Scioto's intellectual property by Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma. In response, Scioto protested these assessments on the ground that it did not contract with the Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma for use of the property in question and did not conduct any business whatsoever in Oklahoma. The Tax Commission denied Scioto's protest and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court previously granted certiorari. Upon review, the Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, reversed the Tax Commission's denial of Scioto's protest and remanded the case with instructions to sustain Scioto's protest. View "In re Income Tax Protest of Scioto Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants John and Lisa Alexander appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for for Credit Suisse First Boston HEAT 2005-4. Defendants executed a note to MILA, Inc., DBA Mortgage Investment Lending Associates, Inc. and a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for MILA and its successors and assigns. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a foreclosure petition on in 2009, alleging Appellants defaulted on the note. The petition further states Wells Fargo was the present holder of the note and mortgage, and Wells Fargo took the note and mortgage for good and valuable consideration from the original lender. A copy of the note and part of the mortgage was attached to the original petition. The note attached to the original petition contained no indorsements. An Order Granting Motion for Substitution of Plaintiff and Modification of Caption was filed. Appellee, U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee, for Credit Suisse First Boston HEAT 2005-4 was substituted in place of Wells Fargo. The motion stated Wells Fargo had subsequently assigned all of its rights in the mortgage to Appellee. Appellee also filed its First Amended Petition which re-alleged all of the allegations of Wells Fargo's petition and identified additional defendants as parties who may have an interest in the property. Appellee attached to the amended petition, a copy of the same unindorsed note and mortgage originally executed by Appellant John W. Alexander, III, in 2005. Appellants never answered the petition and a judgment was entered against then in April 2010. A day later, Appellants' counsel made an entry of appearance and the judgment was vacated. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellee claimed in its motion for summary judgment that it was the holder of the note and mortgage, and that Appellants had been in constant default since the July 1, 2009, installment payment was due. Appellants filed an objection to Appellee's motion for summary judgment and later filed a supplement to the objection. Appellants challenged certain comments in Wells Fargo's motion to substitute which stated Wells Fargo subsequently assigned its rights under the mortgage to Appellee after the filing of the original petition. Appellants assert the note provided by Appellee does not have an indorsement and they claim such indorsement is necessary under the Uniform Commercial Code. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellee did not have the proper supporting ducomentation in hand when it filed its foreclosure suit. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "U.S. Bank, NA v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Appellants Cindy and Theron Tacker appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of NTex Realty, LP. In 2007, Appellants executed a promissory note payable to Home Funds Direct, Inc. Appellants executed a mortgage and delivered it to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Home Funds. Appellants defaulted on the note in 2010, and NTex initiated foreclosure proceedings against them several months later. In their answer, Appellants denied that Appellee owned any interest in the Note and Mortgage, and challenged the authenticity of the documents included in the petition. Appellants then demanded production of the original Note and Mortgage. Appellee moved for summary judgment. In an attached affidavit, Appellee asserted that it currently held both the Note and Mortgage at issue, and again produced a copy of both the unindorsed Note and Mortgage. In response, Appellants argued that Appellee's motion for summary judgment was improper because the Note had never been negotiated. Appellants also asserted that because the copy of the Note was purportedly a "full, true, and correct copy of said Note," the original must also not be indorsed. Based on these reasons, Appellants concluded Appellee could not be the holder of the Note and, therefore, was not the proper party to bring a foreclosure proceeding. Appellee thereafter moved the district court by supplement to its motion, to view the original Note and Mortgage at the hearing for summary judgment. The supplemented motion incorporated an undated allonge, which transferred the Note from Lender to Appellee. The allonge was not included in the original petition for foreclosure. The motion also included a document entitled "Assignment of Mortgage," which transferred the "described mortgage together with the certain note(s) described therein," to Appellee from MERS. The Assignment was acknowledged on November 19, 2009, and recorded by the County Clerk of Rogers County, Oklahoma, on June 8, 2011. The district court granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and entered an order for the sale of the real property located in Rogers County, Oklahoma. The Appellants now appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment, arguing NTex Realty, LP, failed to demonstrate standing. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, finding that NTex indeed failed to show "if and when NTex became a person entitled to enforce the note." View "NTex Realty, LP v. Tacker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Guy and Midge Ledbetter sued Defendant-Appellant Derek Howard and his employer Radiology Services of Ardmore, Inc. for malpractice. Plaintiffs alleged that the doctor misread an x-ray which caused delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot. A jury found in favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The trial court denied the judgment but granted a new trial when evidence of juror misconduct surfaced. Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. The foreperson assured the trial court in voir dire that she would not allow her expertise and experience to override the evidence presented at trial. Nevertheless, she not only did so on a personal level, but went further by communicating her alleged professional knowledge and experiences to her fellow jurors with the apparent intent to sway their votes in favor of Defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the juror's affidavit was admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 2606(B); and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations. View "Ledbetter v. Howard" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned a petition for rehearing a prior Supreme Court order that granted Appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal because of an untimely filed petition in error. Appellants' Appletree Enterprise, Inc.'s Petition in Error was filed January 4, 2012, and Appellee Whitehall Homeowners Association, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Journal Entry was filed in the District Court on December 2, 2011 and mailed to Appellants' counsel on that date. Appellee argued that the Journal Entry was mailed within three days as required by 12 O.S.2011 Sections 696.2 and 990A(A), and that the date for Appellants to bring an appeal commenced on December 2, 2011. Appellee argued on rehearing that predecisional orders are not subject to rehearing. Further, Appellee argued that the Supreme Court's dismissal order was one of those predecisional orders and thus not subject to a petition for rehearing. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded Appellee's argument was incorrect. The Court concluded that noncompliance with 990A (A) results in a time to commence the appeal starting when Appellants received actual notice. Appellants' petition in error was timely filed. The motion to dismiss filed by Appellee, Whitehall Homeowners Association, Inc., based upon allegations of untimely filing of the petition in error, was denied with prejudice to its reconsideration or renewal in this appeal. View "Whitehall Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Appletree Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the first-impression question of whether a bail bondsman's failure to timely pay the order and judgment of forfeiture within ninety-one (91) days after receipt of notice prevents the bondsman from seeking remitter of forfeiture proceeds after returning Defendant to custody pursuant to section 1332(D)(2). Here, the bondsman paid the judgment of forfeiture on the ninety-second day after receipt of notice of forfeiture. The trial judge conducted a hearing at which she granted the bondsman's motion for remitter, ordered return of the money deposited and vacated the order and judgment of forfeiture. The State appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: the deposit of the face amount of the bond by the ninety-first day after notice of forfeiture, as required by 59 O.S. Supp. 2008 sec. 1332(D)(1) is a condition precedent to seeking the relief of remitter provided by section 1332 (D)(2). View "Oklahoma v. Tate" on Justia Law

Claimant Carl Wynne was a truck driver. While he was in Tennessee driving a truck for his former employer, he heard that Triad Transport, Inc. was hiring. Claimant called Triad’s headquarters in McAlester and spoke to a recruiter who had hiring authority. Claimant requested that an application be sent by fax to Odessa, Texas, where he lived. He completed the application and sent it by fax to McAlester. A week or so later, the recruiter phoned while Claimant was driving somewhere between Georgia and Arizona that his application had been approved. Claimant agreed to travel to McAlester for orientation. He returned his prior employer's truck to a terminal in Tuscon, Arizona, and a Triad employee gave him a ride to a Triad satellite terminal in Laveen, Arizona. There, he passed a drug test, was provided a fuel card, and dispatched to Rockwall, Texas with a load. In 2010, Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Colorado while he was driving Triad’s truck. He filed a Form 3 claim for benefits in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court which Triad opposed. The trial tribunal conducted a hearing solely on the issue of the court's jurisdiction. Two witnesses were presented, Claimant and the President of Employer. Claimant testified concerning when and where he was actually hired, and Employer's President testified to the general hiring practices of his company. The recruiter was not called to testify. The trial tribunal made several findings of fact and concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the case of Claimant's subsequent injury as Claimant's hiring and final assent to permanent employment relationship between claimant and respondent occurred in Oklahoma. A three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court unanimously affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court’s de novo review of the record, the testimony of the witnesses, and the arguments of the parties lead to the conclusion that Claimant's final assent to employment did not occur until he attended the orientation in Oklahoma, “[t]hat process began when Claimant first made contact with [Triad’s] recruiter, but it did not end until Claimant gave his final assent to employment during the orientation in Oklahoma. The Workers' Compensation Court did not err in determining that it has jurisdiction to hear the claim.” View "Triad Transport v. Wynne" on Justia Law

Appellants David and Barbara Moore defaulted on the Note to their mortgage in 2008. U.S. Bank, National Association, commenced foreclosure proceedings later that year, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee on behalf of GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6 (Appellee). According to the verified petition, the Appellee was "the present holder of said Note and Mortgage having received due assignment through mesne assignments of record or conveyance via mortgaging servicing transfer." The original petition did not attach a copy of the note in question sued upon. Appellants answered, pro se in 2009, disputing all allegations and requesting that the Appellee "submit additional documentation to prove [its] claims including the representation that they were the "present holder of said Note." Appellee subsequently filed an amended petition and a second amended petition to add additional defendants. Neither of these amendments included a copy of the note. Appellee submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment to the court, again representing that it was the holder of the Note. Documentation attached to the Motion attempted to support this representation: including the Mortgage, the Note, an Assignment of Mortgage, and an Affidavit in Support of Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the first time, Appellee submitted the Note and Mortgage to the trial court. The note was indorsed in blank and contained no date for the indorsement. Appellants did not respond to Appellee's Motion, and the trial court entered a default judgment against them. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the Appellee. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no evidence in the record establishing that Appellee had standing to commence its foreclosure action: “[t]he trial court's granting of a default judgment in favor of Appellee could not have been rationally based upon the evidence or Oklahoma law.” The Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "U.S. Bank v. Moore" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellants David and Mary Eldridge executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. In both the Note and the Mortgage, "JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." was explicitly designated as the lender and payee, or entity to whom payment under the Note and Mortgage was due. Appellants voluntarily filed bankruptcy in 2009. In their amended statement of intentions, Appellants agreed to reaffirm the outstanding balance on the Note. Shortly thereafter, the Note went into default. Appellee Chase Home Finance Milwaukee initiated foreclosure proceedings in 2010, claiming to be the present holder of the Note and Mortgage. Chase Home Finance Milwaukee claimed to have acquired the Note and Mortgage by assignment from J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. in their motion for summary judgment filed several months later. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Bank, finding the Bank was the undisputed owner and holder of the Note and Mortgage. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of the Bank and Appellants' counterclaims were dismissed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellants argued the trial court erred ruling in favor of the Bank. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no evidence in the record to support the Bank's contention that it was the holder of the Note. Therefore, the Court reversed the granting of summary judgment by the trial court and remanded the case back for further proceedings. View "J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A. v. Eldridge" on Justia Law