Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-Appellants Carolyn Covel, Tonni Covel, Toby Keith Covel and Tracy Covel filed a wrongful death action against Defendants-Appellees Pedro Rodriguez (d/b/a Rodriguez Transportes) and Republic Western Insurance Company. In their suit, Plaintiffs asserted that defective brakes on Defendant Rodriguez's bus caused the death of their decedent, H.K. Covel. After a five-day jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $2.8 million dollars and $5,000.00 in punitive damages. The trial court denied Defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), remittitur or new trial. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals, with one judge dissenting, deemed the evidence of Plaintiffs' expert on causation to be legally insufficient on "Daubert" grounds and reversed with directions to enter judgment for the Defendants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and found that the testimony and conclusions of Plaintiffs' expert were not objected to or challenged on "Daubert" grounds when they were admitted, and were properly considered by the jury when it rendered its verdict, and by the trial judge in ruling on the JNOV. The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Covel v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Seymour Law Firm, R. Thomas Seymour and Scott A. Graham, based on the legal theory that its failure to enforce an attorney's lien within one year after it became aware of a settlement precluded Plaintiff-Appellant Gina Cowley from enforcing a contract she held with co-counsel. Specifically, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the expiration of the lien prohibited Plaintiff's lawyer from suing her co-counsel for breach of contract over the distribution of attorney fees from the settlement of the underlying case. Upon review, the Court held that the applicable one-year statute of limitations did not preclude a lawsuit arising over a contract dispute between Plaintiff's lawyers. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cowley v. Seymour Law Firm" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust filed a foreclosure action against Defendants-Appellants Natacha and Jevester Bryams, Jr. Deutsche Bank claimed at that time to hold the note and mortgage having received due assignment through mesne assignments of record or conveyance via mortgage servicing transfer. A review of the note showed no indorsement. In its brief in support of motion for summary judgment Deutsche Bank attached a document entitled "Assignment of Mortgage." This assignment of mortgage was acknowledged and stamped as being recorded with the County Clerk of Tulsa County on January 26, 2010--over one month after the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, and the Byrams appealed, arguing that the bank failed to demonstrate it had standing to bring the foreclosure action. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the bank needed to show it became "a person entitled to enforce" its note prior to foreclosing. There was a question of fact as to when and if the bank became so entitled, and the Court concluded summary judgement was not an appropriate disposition of the case. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Byrams" on Justia Law

Senator Jim Wilson filed suit in an attempt to have the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 declared invalid after the Supreme Court rejected his attempt to have the Act declared unconstitutional. In an earlier case, the Senator attached the Act as invalid because it "failed to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible preserve[d] the factors of 'compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests.'" In his petition in this case, he made "verbatim the same allegations as he did in [his earlier case]." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court properly dismissed Senator Wilson's petition because he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because his claim was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion having been adjudicated against him in "Wilson I." The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Wilson v. Oklahoma ex rel. State Election Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust filed a foreclosure action against Defendant-Appellant Dennis Brumbaugh. Appellant and his wife Debra executed a note and mortgage with Long Beach Mortgage Company in 2002. In 2006, the Brumbaughs entered into a loan modification agreement with U.S. Bank, N.A., successor trustee to Wachovia Bank, N.A. Several months later, the Brumbaughs divorced, and in 2008, Debra executed a quitclaim deed to Defendant. Defendant defaulted on the note in 2009, and the bank shortly thereafter filed its petition to foreclose. Attached to the petition was a copy of the note, mortgage, loan modification agreement, and copies of statements of judgments and liens by other entities. Appellee claimed it was the present holder of the note and mortgage having received due assignment through assignments of record or conveyance via mortgage servicing transfer. The Appellant answered, denying Appellee owned any interest in the note and mortgage, and the copies attached to the petition were not the same as those he signed. He claimed Appellee lacked capacity to sue and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. He also denied being in default and asserted the Appellee/servicing agent caused the alleged default. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that there were significant questions of fact such that summary judgment was not an appropriate disposition of the case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Brumbaugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Shelly Dilbeck initiated an action to enforce her 2001 divorce decree. Among the issues she raised, the district court decided that an acceleration clause on interest on the property division in a consent decree did not accelerate the property division payments as set out in the decree. On review of that issue, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The divorce decree required Mr. Dilbeck to pay property division alimony according to a schedule, and the judgment would not accumulate interest as long as it was paid in full according to the schedule. In the event he missed any payment the entire amount was to accumulate interest at the judgment rate. After some initial payments, Mr. Dilbeck did not pay the final payments. Upon review of the decree, the Supreme Court found that it did not provide that all property division installment payments would be accelerated when a payment was missed. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on each installment until their scheduled payment times. The Court affirmed part of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, and reversed its decision on property division. The case was remanded back to the trial court for review of the property division and a recalculation of the amounts due Plaintiff. View "Dilbeck v. Dilbeck" on Justia Law

Angela Schreiner drowned in May of 1999 after driving into twelve feet of flood water covering a roadway in Pawnee County. Plaintiff-Appellee Charles West (her father) filed a wrongful death action as the personal representative of Schreiner's estate against Board of County Commissioners of Pawnee County. After a trial spanning two days, the jury returned a verdict in the estate's favor for $13,663.00. Plaintiff moved for a new trial alleging the damages awarded were grossly inadequate. The trial court granted a new trial based on a determination that the jury's monetary award for the loss of a human life was unconscionable and shocked the conscience. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded finding that the trial court applied the wrong standard in granting the new trial motion and that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence. Under these facts, the Supreme Court held that the trial court was justified in ordering a new trial to address the damages issue. View "West v. Pawnee County Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant, Mary Roshawn Jones was a full-time classified employee of Defendant-Appellee Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs (OJA), working at the L.E. Rader Center (Center). Plaintiff was bitten by a spider while at work. She sought medical treatment for the spider bite at the Center. A Center nurse informed Plaintiff she would have to seek a drug test in connection with its "Review of Job-Related Accidental Injury or Illness." The OJA alleged that they repeatedly tried to get Plaintiff to complete paperwork relating to her injury. The OJA also alleged that Plaintiff's delay in completing the paperwork resulted in the delay in requesting the drug test. Plaintiff alleged that the reason for the required drug test was a series of harassing and threatening calls to the Center by a former boyfriend. Plaintiff was ultimately discharged. She filed no administrative appeal from the discharge but filed a civil case, seeking compensatory and punitive damages and lost wages, or in the alternative, restoration to employment. The issue of first impression before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions of the Oklahoma Standards for Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (SWDATA) permitted a classified state employee to file an action in district court prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Upon review, the Court held that SWDATA provides an independent cause of action which authorizes a classified state employee to file an action in the district court for a willful violation of the act without first exhausting the employee's administrative remedies. View "Jones v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Two chiropractors, Daniel Post, D.C., and Brad M. Hayes, D.C., and the Oklahoma State Chiropractic Independent Physicians Association (Chiropractors) filed an application requesting that the Supreme Court declare portions of 85 O.S. sections 329 and 333 to be unconstitutional. The legislature enacted a new Workers' Compensation Code (effective August 26, 2011). An independent medical examiner may only be a licensed medical doctor or a licensed doctor of osteopathy. If the court does not follow the opinion of the independent medical examiner on any issue, the court shall set out its reasons for deviating from the opinion of the independent medical examiner. The opinion of the independent medical examiner shall be followed unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The Chiropractors claim they are excluded from the workers' compensation system. The Chiropractors maintained that the new law disenfranchises them from being independent medical examiners. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the definition of "qualified independent medical examiner" to the extent it is limited to only a licensed medical doctor or doctor of Osteopathy in 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sec. 308(39) and the specifically mentioned portions of 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sections 329 and 333, are special laws in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held that the specifically mentioned portions of 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sections 326, 329 and 332 violate the separation of powers clause, Art. IV, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Therefore, these portions of the offending statutes were severed. View "Oklahoma State Chiropractic Indep. Physicians Assoc. v. Fallin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a governmental subdivision is equitably estopped from denying liability where it previously entered into an undisclosed oral contractual agreement regarding the maintenance of the county-line road, failed to advise the plaintiff that another county bore responsibility for the road maintenance at some point prior to the expiration of the limitations period. Plaintiff Paul McWilliams was injured when his motorcycle hit an area where the road had buckled causing his motorcycle to flip. The road in question adjoins Caddo and Comanche Counties. The precise location of the accident was in Caddo County. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Comanche and Caddo Counties entered into an oral contractual agreement regarding the maintenance of the county-line road more than twenty years ago. Pursuant to that agreement, Caddo County was responsible for maintaining the section of roadway where Plaintiff's accident occurred. However, the contractual agreement was oral, and no document was on file in the county records delineating the two counties' responsibilities. Immediately after receiving notice of Plaintiff's accident, Comanche County repaired the road. No one advised Plainitff that there was an agreement between the counties.Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record substantiated that the undisclosed agreement between Comanche County and Caddo County coupled with Comanche County's dilatory conduct, prevented Plaintiff of any means to discover Comanche County's true role in the litigation. As a matter of public policy, Comanche County was estopped to deny liability of Plaintiff's claim. View "McWilliams v. Comanche Cty. Bd of Comm'rs" on Justia Law