Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Plaintiff-Appellant Tracy Smith, an officer with the Oklahoma City Police Department, sought treatment from Defendant-Appellee Dr. Robert Hines after suffering problems with her left knee and hearing it "pop" when she walked downstairs. Officer Smith was diagnosed with chondromalacia, a softening of cartilage under the kneecap. After a course of "conservative treatment," Dr. Hines performed arthroscopic surgery in January 2006. Immediately after the surgery, it became apparent that the Officer Smith's quadriceps muscles were not functioning normally. Between January and August 2006, Officer Smith saw the surgeon for eight post-surgical visits. She also underwent physical therapy. However, her left thigh muscle never returned to normal function and it began to atrophy -- so much so that it appeared visibly smaller than her right thigh. In July 2007, Officer Smith filed a lawsuit against her surgeon alleging that the surgeon was negligent, and as a result of his negligence, she suffered permanent injury. The surgeon filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Officer Smith failed to prove her case against him. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Hines without explanation. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. Under Oklahoma law, a physician's negligence is ordinarily established by expert medical testimony. However, when a physician's lack of care is so grossly apparent that laymen would have no difficulty recognizing it, expert testimony is not necessary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Officer Smith presented evidence to make a prima facie case that she was injured during knee surgery and that the surgeon caused the injury. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Doctor. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Hines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Thomas filed suit in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that H.B.1804, the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizens Protection Act of 2007, was unconstitutional. Plaintiff sued Brad Henry, Governor of Oklahoma, and the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue. The trial judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial judge partially granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that part of the Act violated the single-subject rule. The trial judge severed that portion from the remainder of H.B.1804 and held that the remainder of H.B.1804 did not violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions urged by the plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed and Defendant filed a counter-appeal, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the Act. Upon careful consideration of the arguments by both sides, and of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's assessment that H.B.1804 does not otherwise violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions as urged by Plaintiff. The Court declined "to concern itself with a statute's propriety, desirability, wisdom or its practicality as a working proposition; such questions are plainly and definitely established by fundamental law as functions of the legislative branch of government." The Court affirmed the trial court's holding for all but one section of H.B.1804, and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Thomas v. Henry" on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiff-Appellant Vick Hubbard filed suit against Defendants Kaiser-Francis Oil Company, Texas Southwest Gas and GBK Corporation for breach of an oil and gas lease and a gas purchase contract. Pursuant to 12 OS Supp. Sec. 1101.1(B), Defendants offered Plaintiff $275 for each of the seven alleged breaches. Plaintiff did not accept the offers and did not submit a counteroffer. By the statute, the offers were deemed rejected. Defendants moved for summary judgment that was granted and entered by the trial court. Plaintiffs appealed. Thereafter, Defendants filed a joint motion to recover their costs and fees based on Plaintiff's failure to obtain a judgment for more that the combined amount of Defendants' offers. In 2005, the parties reached an agreement on litigation costs and attorney fees that were to be paid by Plaintiff. Plaintiff paid that amount and Defendants withdrew their motion. Because of Plaintiff's appeal, the case was remanded to district court. The parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted Defendants' motion. Judgment for Defendants was entered in 2007. Defendants subsequently filed a supplemental joint combined motion for attorney fees for costs they incurred since 2005. In 2008, the district court granted Defendants' motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the issues presented for review were matters of first impression. Of import in this case was: (1) whether Defendants were entitled to attorney fees under Sec. 1101.1 because they received a summary judgment, and (2) whether a judgment that was appealed and remanded negated Defendants' 1101.1 offer of judgment made prior to the appeal. Upon careful consideration of the arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions in this case. The Court held that Defendants were entitled to litigation costs, and that the offer of judgment was applicable throughout the case, including through any appeals and remand. View "Hubbard v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pamela Casey filed a petition for divorce in 2003. The district court entered a decree of dissolution and divided the marital property. Defendant William Casey appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the lower court to adjust the division of the marital property. The trial judge remembered hearing an earlier case involving Plaintiff when he worked at the Garvin County district attorneyâs office. In that case, Defendantâs new wife sought a protective order against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was charged with felony malicious injury to property. The judge recused himself from hearing that case. The charges were eventually dropped. The judge still felt strongly about the disposition of that earlier case, but he felt he could be objective enough to hear Plaintiffâs divorce case and divide the marital property as ordered by the appellate court. Plaintiffâs divorce counsel asked the judge to recuse himself again, and the judge refused. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to step aside. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that âbased on the facts and circumstances in this case, and in fairness and justice to the Plaintiff, the trial judge was obligated to recuse.â The Court vacated the appellate courtâs decision, reversed the trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Camran Durham appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant McDonaldâs Restaurants of Oklahoma, Inc. Plaintiff alleged that his supervising manager denied his three requests to take prescription anti-seizure medication, and called plaintiff a âf***ing retard.â Plaintiff stated he was sixteen years old at the time, and that the managerâs refusals caused him to fear he would suffer a seizure. Plaintiff sued for âintentional infliction of emotional distress.â Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the managerâs conduct did not rise to the level of âextreme and outrageousâ conduct in order for Plaintiff to succeed on his claim. The trial court agreed, and ruled in favor of Defendant. The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that there was a âsubstantial controversyâ on whether conduct like the managerâs and Plaintiffâs subsequent reaction was âextreme emotional distress.â Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court. The Court found that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to Defendant, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Raymond and Eva England sought the Supreme Courtâs review of an appellate decision that dismissed their case. The appellate court reversed the trial courtâs refusal to vacate a judgment that was signed by a trial judge one day after his term had expired. Plaintiffs argued that the judgment was void because the judge lacked authority when his term expired. The successor judge denied their motion and ordered that the leaving-judgeâs decision should stand without modification. The appellate court determined the judgment was void. The Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

If funds are available, the Educational Leadership Oklahoma Act (Act) provides for bonuses to eligible teachers who attain national certification. In the past, the State Board of Education provided the full amount of bonuses and any additional amounts necessary to cover the payroll withholding taxes on the bonuses. In 2010, the Board didnât pay the withholding taxes. Teachers filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board should have paid the withholding taxes on their bonuses. The trial court found that because the School District was not liable for the bonus payments under the Act, the State Department of Education was, and payment of the bonuses was conditioned on the availability of funds to pay them from State. The court determined that the School District was required to use some of the allocated bonus money from the State to fund the Districtâs tax obligations. Furthermore, the court concluded that the Teachers sued the wrong party by suing the School District, so that it could not enter a judgment in their favor. Accordingly, district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that because the Teachers were State employees, and State was responsible for paying employer withholding taxes for the bonuses, the School District had to pay them. However, the Court found that the State did not have enough money to pay both the bonuses and the withholding taxâit only had enough to pay the bonuses. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision to dismiss the case.