Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Senator Jim Wilson filed suit in an attempt to have the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 declared invalid after the Supreme Court rejected his attempt to have the Act declared unconstitutional. In an earlier case, the Senator attached the Act as invalid because it "failed to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible preserve[d] the factors of 'compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests.'" In his petition in this case, he made "verbatim the same allegations as he did in [his earlier case]." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court properly dismissed Senator Wilson's petition because he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because his claim was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion having been adjudicated against him in "Wilson I." The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Wilson v. Oklahoma ex rel. State Election Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust filed a foreclosure action against Defendant-Appellant Dennis Brumbaugh. Appellant and his wife Debra executed a note and mortgage with Long Beach Mortgage Company in 2002. In 2006, the Brumbaughs entered into a loan modification agreement with U.S. Bank, N.A., successor trustee to Wachovia Bank, N.A. Several months later, the Brumbaughs divorced, and in 2008, Debra executed a quitclaim deed to Defendant. Defendant defaulted on the note in 2009, and the bank shortly thereafter filed its petition to foreclose. Attached to the petition was a copy of the note, mortgage, loan modification agreement, and copies of statements of judgments and liens by other entities. Appellee claimed it was the present holder of the note and mortgage having received due assignment through assignments of record or conveyance via mortgage servicing transfer. The Appellant answered, denying Appellee owned any interest in the note and mortgage, and the copies attached to the petition were not the same as those he signed. He claimed Appellee lacked capacity to sue and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. He also denied being in default and asserted the Appellee/servicing agent caused the alleged default. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that there were significant questions of fact such that summary judgment was not an appropriate disposition of the case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Brumbaugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Shelly Dilbeck initiated an action to enforce her 2001 divorce decree. Among the issues she raised, the district court decided that an acceleration clause on interest on the property division in a consent decree did not accelerate the property division payments as set out in the decree. On review of that issue, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The divorce decree required Mr. Dilbeck to pay property division alimony according to a schedule, and the judgment would not accumulate interest as long as it was paid in full according to the schedule. In the event he missed any payment the entire amount was to accumulate interest at the judgment rate. After some initial payments, Mr. Dilbeck did not pay the final payments. Upon review of the decree, the Supreme Court found that it did not provide that all property division installment payments would be accelerated when a payment was missed. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on each installment until their scheduled payment times. The Court affirmed part of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, and reversed its decision on property division. The case was remanded back to the trial court for review of the property division and a recalculation of the amounts due Plaintiff. View "Dilbeck v. Dilbeck" on Justia Law

Angela Schreiner drowned in May of 1999 after driving into twelve feet of flood water covering a roadway in Pawnee County. Plaintiff-Appellee Charles West (her father) filed a wrongful death action as the personal representative of Schreiner's estate against Board of County Commissioners of Pawnee County. After a trial spanning two days, the jury returned a verdict in the estate's favor for $13,663.00. Plaintiff moved for a new trial alleging the damages awarded were grossly inadequate. The trial court granted a new trial based on a determination that the jury's monetary award for the loss of a human life was unconscionable and shocked the conscience. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded finding that the trial court applied the wrong standard in granting the new trial motion and that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence. Under these facts, the Supreme Court held that the trial court was justified in ordering a new trial to address the damages issue. View "West v. Pawnee County Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant, Mary Roshawn Jones was a full-time classified employee of Defendant-Appellee Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs (OJA), working at the L.E. Rader Center (Center). Plaintiff was bitten by a spider while at work. She sought medical treatment for the spider bite at the Center. A Center nurse informed Plaintiff she would have to seek a drug test in connection with its "Review of Job-Related Accidental Injury or Illness." The OJA alleged that they repeatedly tried to get Plaintiff to complete paperwork relating to her injury. The OJA also alleged that Plaintiff's delay in completing the paperwork resulted in the delay in requesting the drug test. Plaintiff alleged that the reason for the required drug test was a series of harassing and threatening calls to the Center by a former boyfriend. Plaintiff was ultimately discharged. She filed no administrative appeal from the discharge but filed a civil case, seeking compensatory and punitive damages and lost wages, or in the alternative, restoration to employment. The issue of first impression before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions of the Oklahoma Standards for Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (SWDATA) permitted a classified state employee to file an action in district court prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Upon review, the Court held that SWDATA provides an independent cause of action which authorizes a classified state employee to file an action in the district court for a willful violation of the act without first exhausting the employee's administrative remedies. View "Jones v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Two chiropractors, Daniel Post, D.C., and Brad M. Hayes, D.C., and the Oklahoma State Chiropractic Independent Physicians Association (Chiropractors) filed an application requesting that the Supreme Court declare portions of 85 O.S. sections 329 and 333 to be unconstitutional. The legislature enacted a new Workers' Compensation Code (effective August 26, 2011). An independent medical examiner may only be a licensed medical doctor or a licensed doctor of osteopathy. If the court does not follow the opinion of the independent medical examiner on any issue, the court shall set out its reasons for deviating from the opinion of the independent medical examiner. The opinion of the independent medical examiner shall be followed unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The Chiropractors claim they are excluded from the workers' compensation system. The Chiropractors maintained that the new law disenfranchises them from being independent medical examiners. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the definition of "qualified independent medical examiner" to the extent it is limited to only a licensed medical doctor or doctor of Osteopathy in 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sec. 308(39) and the specifically mentioned portions of 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sections 329 and 333, are special laws in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held that the specifically mentioned portions of 85 O.S. Supp. 2011 sections 326, 329 and 332 violate the separation of powers clause, Art. IV, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Therefore, these portions of the offending statutes were severed. View "Oklahoma State Chiropractic Indep. Physicians Assoc. v. Fallin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a governmental subdivision is equitably estopped from denying liability where it previously entered into an undisclosed oral contractual agreement regarding the maintenance of the county-line road, failed to advise the plaintiff that another county bore responsibility for the road maintenance at some point prior to the expiration of the limitations period. Plaintiff Paul McWilliams was injured when his motorcycle hit an area where the road had buckled causing his motorcycle to flip. The road in question adjoins Caddo and Comanche Counties. The precise location of the accident was in Caddo County. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Comanche and Caddo Counties entered into an oral contractual agreement regarding the maintenance of the county-line road more than twenty years ago. Pursuant to that agreement, Caddo County was responsible for maintaining the section of roadway where Plaintiff's accident occurred. However, the contractual agreement was oral, and no document was on file in the county records delineating the two counties' responsibilities. Immediately after receiving notice of Plaintiff's accident, Comanche County repaired the road. No one advised Plainitff that there was an agreement between the counties.Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record substantiated that the undisclosed agreement between Comanche County and Caddo County coupled with Comanche County's dilatory conduct, prevented Plaintiff of any means to discover Comanche County's true role in the litigation. As a matter of public policy, Comanche County was estopped to deny liability of Plaintiff's claim. View "McWilliams v. Comanche Cty. Bd of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Sheila Yvonne Berman sought assistance from the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) to determine paternity and to collect child support. She alleged Herbert White, Jr. was the father of her child. DHS brought an administrative action to determine paternity and arranged for Defendant-Appellee Laboratory Corporation of America (d/b/a Lab Corp, Inc.) to conduct the DNA test. LabCorp reported White was not the father of Berman's child. The test was performed a second time with similar results. After the DHS proceeding concluded, Berman submitted an envelope, purportedly containing White's DNA, to a different lab for DNA testing. This time the results were different. Berman filed a paternity action against White. He was ordered to submit to another paternity test. The test results were virtually identical to the DNA sample contained on the envelope, and White was judicially determined to be the father of Berman's child. White appealed, but the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the trial court. While the county court case was still pending, Berman filed this lawsuit in the district court seeking money damages from LabCorp for the negligent testing of White's DNA sample in the DHS administrative proceeding. In her petition, Berman alleged that as a result of LabCorp's negligence, she suffered damages in excess of $10,000.00 for the "loss of past and future child support payments that White would have been required to pay, had the paternity test results been correct, showing White to be the biological father of Plaintiff's child." Berman alleged LabCorp had the duty of care of a "reasonably prudent professional in the paternity testing field" and that its actions constituted a breach of that duty. The issue in this case was whether LabCorp owed Berman a duty of care. If so, Berman stated a claim for negligence against LabCorp, unrelated to the publication of the lab results. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, and reversed and remanded the case for trial. View "Berman v. Laboratory Corporation of America" on Justia Law

Appellants Wsbaldo Valdez and Linda Vargas owned property in joint tenancy and neglected to pay the 2005 property taxes. In 2006, Appellee Mae Ouellette purchased the property at a tax sale and later applied for a tax deed. She served notice on Vargas but not on Valdez. In 2008, Ouellette received a tax deed. Valdez and Vargas filed a petition to quiet title, for ejectment, and damages. They then filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting the tax deed was void for failure to serve Valdez, and Valdez could redeem the entire property. In Ouellette's counter-motion for summary judgment and response to Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, her two main assertions were: (1) Valdez and Vargas were either an unincorporated association or a partnership and service on Vargas was good service on Valdez; and (2) the service on Vargas was at least valid and the tax deed was effective as to her interest, thereby severing the joint tenancy. Ouellette argued she and Valdez were tenants in common. The trial court held that service on Valdez was ineffective but agreed with Ouellette that Valdez could not redeem the entire property, and Valdez and Ouellette were tenants in common. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that service of a notice for application of tax deed is mandatory and must be made on all parties according to the applicable statute. Failure to make such service will render any issued tax deed void in its entirety. Accordingly, Valdez had the right to redeem the entire property. The Court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Vargas v. Occupants of 3908 SW 24th St Oklahoma City" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Eddie Lee Howard and Shane Schneider (Employees) entered an employment contract with Defendant-Appellee Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. For two years following termination, the contract prohibited employees from: working for, leasing to, or selling equipment to competitors. The contract contained an arbitration agreement requiring application of Louisiana law with disputes to be resolved in Houston, Texas. After the employees terminated their employment with Nitro-Lift, they went to work for a competitor in Arkansas. The employer filed an arbitration proceeding in Houston. Howard and Schneider filed an application for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in Oklahoma asserting that the non-competition agreement violated public policy. The district court initially granted the employees a temporary injunction, prohibiting Nitro-Lift from continuing the arbitration proceedings in Texas. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion to dismiss. After considering the parties' briefs and arguments, the district court found the arbitration clause to be valid on its face and reasonable in its terms, lifted the temporary restraining order, and granted the motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement; and as drafted, the non-competition covenants were void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma public policy. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law