Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee/Counter-appellant, Archie Dicksion filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of his brother. Subsequently, Thomas Powell asserted that he was a pretermitted heir of the deceased. With the family's cooperation, DNA genetic testing was conducted and the tests determined that Powell was indeed the son of the decedent. The trial court determined that Powell was an unintentionally omitted child and entitled to his statutory share of the estate. Powell and his half-sister, the decedent's daughter, also challenged the admittance of the holographic will to probate and to Appellant's appointment as the personal representative of the estate. A motion for new trial was denied. Both Powell and the Appellant appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the application of paternity testing to intestate and probate proceedings. Upon review, the Court held that: (1) under the facts presented, the objections to admission of the holographic will were not untimely; (2) the paternity statute, 84 O.S. 2001 sec. 215, applies to intestate and probate proceedings; and (3) 58 O.S. 2001 sec. 122 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a will. View "In re Estate of Dicksion" on Justia Law

Appellants Eleanor and Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer petitioned the Supreme Court to challenge the Court of Civil Appeals' decision which upheld the trial court's determination regarding Appellee-Trustee JP Morgan Chase Bank's previously-adjudicated ability to draw on the trusts's principal. The trust in question named Appellant Eleanor Reed as beneficiary, and authorized payments of up to half of its income payable quarterly, for her support and well-being. In 1998, Reed filed a Petition for Instructions in district court in Tulsa County, requesting the court determine what distributions were permitted under the Trust. Specifically, Reed sought instructions for the co-trustee, Bank One Trust Company, N.A., to pay certain of Reed's expenses from the Trust's principal. In 2007, Reed and three of her four children, Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer, filed suit to modify the terms of the trust to allow Appellee JP Morgan Chase to make payments from the remaining half of the trust's principal. Appellants stated that Reed was "an incapacitated person afflicted with Alzheimer's disease, and her condition constitutes an emergency condition which will necessitate her being housed in a nursing home. She is wheel-chair bound, 84 years old, and in precarious health." Appellants maintained that Testator would have wanted Reed, his only child, to have the use of the remaining Trust funds to provide for her well-being. Appellees objected to the suit, arguing that the Testator's intent regarding the payment from principal had been determined in a 1998 Order and, as such, the claims asserted in the Amended Petition are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Upon review, the Supreme Court saw no connection between the 1998 Order and the issue presented to it on appeal: "[w]hile we agree that the subject matter, the parties, and the capacity of the parties remain the same, we cannot agree that the cause of the action is the same as that in the 1998 matter. The focus of the 1998 lawsuit was to provide instructions to the trustee to make payments from half of the Trust corpus on behalf of Reed. This payment was expressly provided for in the Trust instrument. In the present action, Appellants [sought] due to an unforeseen medical emergency, to modify the express terms of the Trust and to show that Testator would have intended Reed's present needs be cared for even if it meant invading the remaining half of the Trust corpus." The Court vacated the appellate court's opinion in this matter and remanded the case back to the trial court for determination of whether modification should be allowed under the terms of the trust. View "Reed v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank" on Justia Law

Prospective Adoptive Parents M.B. and V.B. and Baby Boy K.B. challenged a district court decision that denied the adoptive parents' motion to terminate the biological father's parental rights and petition for adoption. The district court ordered K.B. returned to his biological father. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether K.B. was eligible for adoption without the consent of his biological father. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that K.B. was not eligible for adoption because K.B.'s biological father exercised his parental rights regarding the child, including contributing to the support of the biological mother during pregnancy. The sufficiency of the support was a fact to be determined by the trial court, so the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision but remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Adoption of Baby Boy K.B." on Justia Law

Petitioners-Appellants Donald and Paula Thompson appealed a district court's decision that affirmed the Board of the Public Employees Retirement System's ruling to forfeit Mr. Thompson's retirement benefits earned in his state retirement account. The district court determined that Mr. Thompson's state retirement benefits had to be forfeited after he was convicted of felonies that violated his oath of office as a district court judge. The court determined that Mrs. Thompson did not have standing in the administrative proceedings and was not a proper party therein. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Thompson alleged the Board violated the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act when it forced him to forfeit his retirement benefits without proper notice. In addition, he argued he did not receive an individual proceeding to provide him an opportunity to proffer evidence and present witnesses pursuant to the Act. Furthermore, Mr. Thompson alleged that the strict construction of the applicable forfeiture statute requires that it apply only to the last oath of office he took. According to this logic, Mr. Thompson argued he should have only been forced to forfeit the benefits he would have earned from his last term in office. Upon review, the Supreme Court found none of Mr. Thompson's arguments persuasive, and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Thompson v. Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) sought a declaratory judgment against Defendants Jeffery and Tracie Quine and Amanda Watkins. GEICO filed suit following a demand from Defendants' attorney seeking partial advance payment of underinsured motorist benefits available through a policy it issued. GEICO requested the federal court determine whether the subject policy or Oklahoma law obligated the company to unconditionally tender a partial payment of underinsured benefits when (1) a dispute had arisen between the insurer and its insured over the amount of underinsured motorist proceeds due; and (2) the parties had not arrived at a complete settlement agreement. The district court certified the question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that an insurer's refusal to unconditionally tender a partial payment of UIM benefits does not amount to a breach of the obligation to act in good faith and deal fairly under Oklahoma law when: (1) the insured's economic/special damages have been fully recovered through payment from the tortfeasor's liability insurance; (2) after receiving notice that the tortfeasor's liability coverage has been exhausted due to multiple claims, the UIM insurer promptly investigates and places a value on the claim; (3) there is a legitimate dispute regarding the amount of noneconomic/general damages suffered by the insured; and (4) the benefits due and payable have not been firmly established by either an agreement of the parties or entry of a judgment substantiating the insured's damages. View "Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Quine" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appearance of impartiality/conflict of interest in disciplinary proceedings before the Oklahoma Real Estate Appraiser Board (the Board) required invalidation of the proceedings. In December of 2005, Appellee real estate appraiser Beverly Bowen appraised a parcel of real property for her client BancFirst (Bank). By July of 2007, after having sat vacant for 19 months, the property sold at a sheriff's sale which resulted in a loss to the private mortgage insurer (insurer). The insurer filed a grievance against the appraiser with the Board alleging possible appraisal fraud. The insurer hired another local appraiser, JoElla Jones (Jones/review appraiser), to reappraise the property nineteen months after Bowen's initial appraisal. Apparently, the property remained unoccupied the entire time, and it may have been vandalized. Jones reviewed Bowen's work. She valued the property at $197,000.00 or $58,000 below Bowen's appraisal. While the dispute between the bank and the insurer regarding the property's value was ongoing, the bank discovered that Jones had a personal and direct history with Bowen: the appraisers had known one another for more than 26 years. Learning this information prompted the bank to write a letter to the insurer notifying them of the unmistakable conflict of interest and alleging that if a mistake in an appraisal occurred, it was made by the review appraiser. Soon thereafter, the Board brought disciplinary proceedings against Bowen. Notwithstanding the conflict of interest, a probable cause committee (committee) of the Board held a hearing. The Board adopted the committee's findings of fact and conclusions of law but modified the disciplinary recommendation. The trial court held another hearing reversing the Board's discipline, finding that the appearance of impropriety was so apparent on the face of the record that reversible legal error occurred. The Board appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the fact of this case, the disciplinary proceedings required invalidating proceedings because of the appearance of impartiality. The Court affirmed the trial court. View "Bowen v. Oklahoma Real Estate Appraisal Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Troy Kimble, brought a small claims action against his ex-wife and her daughter to recover certain property awarded to him following their divorce. He had previously filed a contempt citation which was concluded before the filing of the small claims action. The trial court sua sponte ruled that the Plaintiff's claim was thus barred by the statute of limitations and had preclusive effect on the contempt proceeding. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in applying the applicable statute of limitations to the evidence adduced at the small claims proceeding to resolve the case. Accordingly the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Kimble v. Kimble" on Justia Law

This case arose from a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Marsha Schubert, operating as "Schubert and Associates" (Schubert). Defendants Marvin and Pamela Wilcox were among the appellants in an earlier case that appealed summary judgments obtained by the plaintiffs on the theory of unjust enrichment against 158 "relief" defendants who had received more money than they invested in the scheme. Plaintiffs had sought to recover all amounts the relief defendants had received from the scheme in excess of their original investment. On remand, the state Department of Securities and the Receiver (Department) moved for summary judgment against the Wilcoxes on grounds that they were not entitled to the equitable relief provided for innocent investors because they were partners with Schubert and were actively involved in the check-kiting scheme operated by Schubert that supported the Ponzi scheme. In response, the Wilcoxes disputed that they were partners with Schubert. They stated that they were not aware of the existence of a Ponzi scheme in their dealings with Schubert. The trial judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of liability, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact pertaining to the liability of the Wilcoxes on the Department's unjust enrichment claim. The trial judge found that by virtue of their participation in the Schubert check-kiting scheme, the Wilcoxes were not innocent investors. The trial court found that the Wilcoxes were unjustly enriched by all monies netted from their association with Schubert's Ponzi and check-kiting schemes. The Wilcoxes appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidentiary material provided by the Wilcoxes failed to raise disputes to meet their burden to overcome the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Depart. of Securities ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

The City Council of Tulsa decided to encourage the initiation of new direct nonstop airline service to business centers on the East and West coasts, and voted to approve a Memorandum between the Tulsa Industrial Authority (TIA) and the City which would convey certain real property (Property) for that purpose. The transfer would allow TIA to mortgage the Property to the Bank of Oklahoma (BOK) in support of a non-recourse loan so that TIA could, in turn, make an aggregate loan (Great Plains Loan) to Great Plains Airlines, Inc. (Great Plains). This transfer would allow the Tulsa Airports Improvement Trust (TAIT) to enter into a Support Agreement, pursuant to which TIA, in the event of a default would have the option of selling the Property to TAIT under the direction of the BOK. Upon exercise of such option, the TIA would sell, transfer and convey the property to TAIT to satisfy the outstanding loan balance. Great Plains subsequently defaulted under the terms of the Great Plains Loan, and left a balance owed to the Bank. Ultimately TAIT did not purchase the Property. TIA and the Bank sued TAIT. TAIT alleged the Support Agreement was unlawful and an unenforceable contract because TAIT could not purchase the Great Plains Loan and Property by reason that all of TAIT's funds were airport revenues and such purchases would violate the FAA Revenue Use Policy. To resolve the matter, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement which provided the City would pay BOK. The City and its Mayor asked the trial court to determine that the settlement agreement was a lawful contract executed by the City, and the settlement payment made pursuant to the settlement agreement was a lawful expenditure of public funds. Taxpayers intervened, and asked the trial court to determine that the payment of money to the Bank of Oklahoma pursuant to the settlement agreement was an illegal transfer of public funds made pursuant to an unlawful settlement agreement. In granting the City's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the settlement agreement was a lawful and the settlement payment was a lawful expenditure of funds. Upon its review, the Supreme Court concluded the settlement was not based on a contract, but rather under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment to the City of Tulsa, and as such, the City had authority to enter into the Settlement Agreement. However, the Court found that the unjust enrichment claim was unviable and the Statute of Limitations would have barred the unjust enrichment claim against the City. The Court remanded the matter back to the District Court to direct the repayment of the settlement funds from BOK back to the City of Tulsa. View "City of Tulsa v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A." on Justia Law

Petitioner Ruben Espinosa sought permanent partial disability benefits for injuries to his hands, arms, and shoulders. The Workers' Compensation Court awarded benefits, but a three-judge en banc panel reduced the award to account for Petitioner's previously awarded benefits for injuries to other parts of his body. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the panel, determining that both the trial court and the panel misapplied the applicable statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between two Court of Civil Appeals' opinions with differing interpretations of the limitations provided in the applicable statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when the Workers' Compensation Court awards compensation for an accidental personal injury or occupational disease, pursuant to 85 O.S. 2001 Sec. 22(7), the sum of all permanent partial disability awards is limited to a total of 100% or 520 weeks (10 years) for any individual, but awards against the Multiple Injury Trust Funds, or awards for amputations and surgeries are excluded from both limitations. View "Evans & Assoc. Utility Svcs. V. Espinoza" on Justia Law