Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners-Appellees, Teryl Pearson and Robert Pearson (Pearsons) petitioned to adopt Teryl Pearson's (Pearson) grandson, G.D.J. The natural mother, Respondent-Appellant Tessia Bre Stubbs (Stubbs) contested the adoption. The trial court entered two orders on August 11, 2010, in favor of the Pearsons on their Application to Adjudicate Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother and in its Order Adjudicating Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother. Stubbs raised multiple issues in her attempt to block the adoption. Among them, she argued that the trial court erred in finding that she failed to contribute to the support of G.D.J., and failed to maintain a meaningful relationship with G.D.J. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court's decision to allow the adoption to proceed. View "In re Adoption of G.D.J." on Justia Law

Petitioner State Senator Jim Wilson sought review of the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011, pursuant to Section 11C, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Petitioner alleged the Act does not comply with the apportionment formula in Section 9A, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Specifically, Petitioner alleged the Act does not pass constitutional muster because it "fails to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible provide for compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests." Senator Wilson did not explicitly identify every district in the Redistricting Act that he contended was not in compliance with Section 9A but claimed that he identified such districts by the maps provided in the appendix of his petition. Upon review of the arguments submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner failed to show that the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 does not comply with the provisions of Section 9A of the Oklahoma Constitution. View "Wilson v. Fallin" on Justia Law

J.P. Fox is co-owner and general manager of Lumber 2, which is a retail home and ranch supply store. Fox and some company employees attended the Handy Hardware Show, a trade show in Houston, Texas, in 2003. They stopped at the "Hobart" booth of Defendant Illinois Tool Works (ITW) where they found Scott Massie, a sales representative of ITW. Massie showed Fox some new Hobart Champion 10,000 welder/generators ("Champ 10,000's) in which Fox had no interest because of the price. Massie asked if he would be interested in reconditioned units and handed him a list of items on a yellow legal pad. The list showed that ITW/ Hobart had eleven reconditioned Champ 10,000's for sale. The parties agreed orally that Fox would buy them for $1600.00 each. Upon returning to Oklahoma City, however, Fox received a telephone call from Massie who told him he could not deliver the Champ 10,000s to him because Hobart would not agree to sell them to Fox and Lumber 2. Massie told him the sales manager at Hobart refused to complete the sale because it would "screw up the whole territory" for its existing customers in the area. Thereafter, ITW/Hobart sold the welders to Atwood's, a much larger competitor of Lumber 2 which then sold them for $1800.00 each. Fox and Lumber 2 sued ITW for breach of contract, fraud, and for violations of the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act (OARA) and Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act (OCPA). A jury verdict was returned in favor of Lumber 2, and money damages were awarded on its claims for breach of contract and for violations of the OARA and the OCPA. The trial court denied ITW's motion for new trial. ITW appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the judgment on Lumber 2's breach of contract claim but reversed it on the award of damages for the OARA and OCPA claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court was asked to consider an issue of first impression whether Lumber 2, as a retailer and purchaser of merchandise intended for resale in its business, was a "consumer" for purposes of the Act. The Court held that Lumber 2 was not a consumer under the OCPA, and it reversed the trial court on that issue alone. The Court affirmed the trial court on all other issues. View "Lumber 2, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Brian and Patricia Shull filed a medical malpractice action against Respondents Monica Reid, Andrew Elimian, Andrew Wagner, Eric Knudston and the OU Medical Center, alleging that doctors failed to properly diagnose a cytomegalovirus infection that adversely impacted Mrs. Shull's pregnancy. Respondents moved for partial summary judgment, contending that the Shulls could only recover damages related to the medical cost of continuing the pregnancy offset by the cost of terminating the pregnancy. The district court found the issue was one of first impression, and that it lacked guidance because there were no published Supreme Court opinions addressing the damages available to parents of an unhealthy, abnormal child who brought claims for wrongful birth and medical malpractice. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in a wrongful birth action alleging malpractice, the measure of damages allowable is the extraordinary medical expenses and other pecuniary losses proximately caused by the negligence, and not the normal and foreseeable costs of raising a normal, healthy child until it reaches the age of majority. Parents cannot recover for emotional distress or loss of consortium. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Shull v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Publishing Company (The Oklahoman) and World Publishing Company (Tulsa World) (collectively, Publishers), filed open records requests with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of State Finance (OSF). Both the Oklahoman and Tulsa World sought to release of birth dates of all state employees. In addition, the Tulsa World requested employee identification numbers. The Oklahoma Public Employees Association (OPEA) filed two suits against OPM and OSF requesting declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to bar the release of employees' birth dates. The second suit also sought to bar employee identification numbers from disclosure. The district court consolidated the cases. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. Relying on an opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General, the trial court sustained OPEA's and OPM's motions. It ordered that the state agencies be given sixty days’ notice to report their decisions on whether disclosure of date of birth requests would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; whether public access could be denied to employee identification numbers; and that legislative staff records were exempt from disclosure under the Oklahoma Open Records Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Oklahoma law already contains a non-exclusive list of examples of information that if released, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of State employees' personal privacy. As guidance, the Court held that where a claim of invasion of privacy is made, courts should use a case-by-case balancing test to determine whether personal information is subject to release. If significant privacy interests are at stake while the public's interest in the disclosed information is minimal, release of that information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." View "Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Matthew Hamrick sued Oklahoma for wrongs he allegedly suffered during his employment with the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. Plaintiff initially asserted seven claims against the State, grounded on both federal and state law. Plaintiff later dismissed all of the state law claims except his claim for unpaid wages under the Protection of Labor Act. Throughout his service as an investigator, Plaintiff’s employment status was that of a full time "unclassified" state employee. During Plaintiff’s tenure with OCME, the agency's scheduling required that its investigators work day shifts in the office, overnight "on call" shifts, and weekend "on call" shifts on a rotating basis. During the time in question, an investigator's scheduled office hours combined with the hours the investigator was scheduled to be "on call" commonly exceeded forty hours in a week. Plaintiff contended that OCME's "on-call" system was onerous and that he should have been compensated for all time he was "on-call." Citing the absence of precedential authority on the rights of unclassified state employees to pursue a claim for unpaid wages, Plaintiff and the State jointly requested the federal court to certify a question of law to determine the applicability of section 165.9 to such a wage claim. The federal court granted the parties' request and remanded the case to the Supreme Court to answer whether an unclassified state employee who alleges his employer failed to pay him wages has a private right of action under section 165.9 of the Oklahoma Protection of Labor Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that an unclassified state employee can bring an action under sections 165.7(G) and 165.9 of the Protection of Labor Act to recover all wages, including overtime, that were due but not paid on one or more regular paydays as provided by section 165.2. Furthermore, the Court held that an unclassified state employee cannot recover liquidated damages as provided in section 165.3 based on any such unpaid wages, and therefore the language in section 165.9 allowing recovery of liquidated damages does not apply to an action brought by an unclassified state employee. View "Hamrick v. Oklahoma ex rel. Office of the Medical Examiner" on Justia Law

In 2005, Plaintiff-Appellant Tracy Smith, an officer with the Oklahoma City Police Department, sought treatment from Defendant-Appellee Dr. Robert Hines after suffering problems with her left knee and hearing it "pop" when she walked downstairs. Officer Smith was diagnosed with chondromalacia, a softening of cartilage under the kneecap. After a course of "conservative treatment," Dr. Hines performed arthroscopic surgery in January 2006. Immediately after the surgery, it became apparent that the Officer Smith's quadriceps muscles were not functioning normally. Between January and August 2006, Officer Smith saw the surgeon for eight post-surgical visits. She also underwent physical therapy. However, her left thigh muscle never returned to normal function and it began to atrophy -- so much so that it appeared visibly smaller than her right thigh. In July 2007, Officer Smith filed a lawsuit against her surgeon alleging that the surgeon was negligent, and as a result of his negligence, she suffered permanent injury. The surgeon filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Officer Smith failed to prove her case against him. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Hines without explanation. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. Under Oklahoma law, a physician's negligence is ordinarily established by expert medical testimony. However, when a physician's lack of care is so grossly apparent that laymen would have no difficulty recognizing it, expert testimony is not necessary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Officer Smith presented evidence to make a prima facie case that she was injured during knee surgery and that the surgeon caused the injury. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Doctor. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Hines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Thomas filed suit in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that H.B.1804, the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizens Protection Act of 2007, was unconstitutional. Plaintiff sued Brad Henry, Governor of Oklahoma, and the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue. The trial judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial judge partially granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that part of the Act violated the single-subject rule. The trial judge severed that portion from the remainder of H.B.1804 and held that the remainder of H.B.1804 did not violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions urged by the plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed and Defendant filed a counter-appeal, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the Act. Upon careful consideration of the arguments by both sides, and of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's assessment that H.B.1804 does not otherwise violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions as urged by Plaintiff. The Court declined "to concern itself with a statute's propriety, desirability, wisdom or its practicality as a working proposition; such questions are plainly and definitely established by fundamental law as functions of the legislative branch of government." The Court affirmed the trial court's holding for all but one section of H.B.1804, and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Thomas v. Henry" on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiff-Appellant Vick Hubbard filed suit against Defendants Kaiser-Francis Oil Company, Texas Southwest Gas and GBK Corporation for breach of an oil and gas lease and a gas purchase contract. Pursuant to 12 OS Supp. Sec. 1101.1(B), Defendants offered Plaintiff $275 for each of the seven alleged breaches. Plaintiff did not accept the offers and did not submit a counteroffer. By the statute, the offers were deemed rejected. Defendants moved for summary judgment that was granted and entered by the trial court. Plaintiffs appealed. Thereafter, Defendants filed a joint motion to recover their costs and fees based on Plaintiff's failure to obtain a judgment for more that the combined amount of Defendants' offers. In 2005, the parties reached an agreement on litigation costs and attorney fees that were to be paid by Plaintiff. Plaintiff paid that amount and Defendants withdrew their motion. Because of Plaintiff's appeal, the case was remanded to district court. The parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted Defendants' motion. Judgment for Defendants was entered in 2007. Defendants subsequently filed a supplemental joint combined motion for attorney fees for costs they incurred since 2005. In 2008, the district court granted Defendants' motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the issues presented for review were matters of first impression. Of import in this case was: (1) whether Defendants were entitled to attorney fees under Sec. 1101.1 because they received a summary judgment, and (2) whether a judgment that was appealed and remanded negated Defendants' 1101.1 offer of judgment made prior to the appeal. Upon careful consideration of the arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions in this case. The Court held that Defendants were entitled to litigation costs, and that the offer of judgment was applicable throughout the case, including through any appeals and remand. View "Hubbard v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co." on Justia Law