Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were allegedly injured from a collision with an Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) Trooper. Less than three weeks after the accident, plaintiffs' lawyer sent the OHP a letter asking it to preserve any evidence relating to the incident, and to request some additional information. OHP forwarded the letter to the Oklahoma Office of Management & Enterprise Services (OMES) and OMES unilaterally determined that the request letter was the statutory notice of a governmental tort claim, triggering the time limits within the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the Act). Plaintiffs' lawyer disagreed. Less than one year after the accident, the lawyer sent a notice of governmental tort claim to OMES. Five months later, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the OHP, seeking recovery for their injuries. OHP filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the letter requesting the preservation of evidence was notice of a governmental tort claim triggering time limits which had already expired by the time plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. The trial court agreed, and dismissed the cause. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted review to determine whether plaintiffs' letter requesting the preservation of evidence constituted the required statutory notice of a governmental tort claim. The Court held that it did not. View "Ullman v. Oklahoma Highway Patrol" on Justia Law

Oklahoma counties were required to house state prison inmates in certain instances. In turn, Oklahoma law required the state to reimburse counties twenty-seven Dollars ($27.00) per day per state inmate for the cost of housing, unless the "actual daily cost" exceeded $27. The primary issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court concerned the meaning of "actual daily cost" as provided in 57 O.S. 2017, § 38.2. The Court held "actual daily cost" included both consumable costs as well as those additional costs that were directly attributable to housing a DOC inmate. View "Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections v. Byrd" on Justia Law

Petitioners Debbie Leo d/b/a Miller Lake Retreat, LLC, Larinda McClellan, Louise Redman Trust, Walter Myrl Redman, and Kenneth Roberts appealed a district court's order affirming the Oklahoma Water Resources Board's (the OWRB) final order granting a permit to The City of Oklahoma City (the City) to divert stream water from the Kiamichi River in Pushmataha County, Oklahoma. The City cross-appealed the district court's order denying its motion to dismiss Petitioners' petition for judicial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The City contended Petitioners' failure to name the City as a respondent in their petition for judicial review of the OWRB's order was a fatal, jurisdictional flaw under the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act, (OAPA). The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 75 O.S.2011, § 318(B)(2) required that the agency (here, the OWRB) be named as a respondent in the caption of the petition for review for the district court to acquire jurisdiction to review a final agency order. However, Section 318(B)(2) of the OAPA did not require the City be named as a respondent in the petition. Therefore, the district court's order finding it had jurisdiction to review the final agency order was affirmed. The Supreme Court further held the district court properly applied the Four Points of Law in O.A.C. § 785:20-5-4, including using the OWRB's calculation of available stream water and evaluation of beneficial use, which was based on substantial evidence in the record, with no findings of prejudicial error. Therefore, the district court's order affirming the OWRB's order was affirmed. View "Leo v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Steven Bird, an independent contractor hired to install a new checkout lane at Defendant Pruett's Food store, was injured after falling off a ladder Defendant had supplied to aid Plaintiff in completing the work. Plaintiff initiated a negligence action, seeking damages from his injuries and lost wages. Plaintiff presented his case at trial, after which Defendant demurred to Plaintiff's evidence. The trial court sustained the demurrer. Plaintiff appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant owed him a duty of care. View "Bird v. Pruett's Food, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Oil Valley Petroleum, LLC and defendant Clay Moore (Moore) sought equitable relief to adjudicate title based upon two oil and gas leases. Plaintiff requested the trial court to quiet title, cancel an oil and gas lease, and declare its top-lease to be in force and effect. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the district court and directed judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sought certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held: (1) exhibits presented during summary judgment proceedings were insufficient to show a material fact that a well was commercially profitable for the purpose of the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease; (2) an overriding royalty interest may be extinguished by an extinguishment of the working interest from which it was carved by a lessee's surrender of the lease in substantial compliance with the lease, unless the surrender is the result of fraud or breach of a fiduciary relationship; and (3) prevailing party status for the purpose of an attorney fee is determined by the trial court when not determined on appeal. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was vacated and the Court reversed the order granting Moore a partial summary judgment and remanded for additional proceedings. View "Oil Valley Petroleum v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Malcolm Penney left a wedding which was held at The Springs Event Venue and proceeded to drive the wrong way down a highway. He crashed head-on into a vehicle driven by Marissa Murrow, killing her. Murrows' parents sued The Springs. They did not allege that The Springs over-served Penney. Rather, they alleged The Springs had a duty to prevent Penney from leaving, and to enforce their policies which prohibited outside alcohol from being brought onto the premises. The trial court determined that the event venue had no duty to prevent harm to third-parties such as the deceased, and it granted summary judgment to The Springs. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Oklahoma law did not recognize a duty on the part of a private event venue extending to third parties killed by a voluntarily intoxicated adult who attended, but was not "over-served" by the event venue. The trial court therefore did not err in denying the parents' Motion to Vacate/Modify. View "Murrow v. Penney" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Defendant-appellee Carmela Hill (Hill) pursued counterclaims against U.S. Bank and its mortgage servicer Nationstar following bank's dismissal of its foreclosure action against Hill. A jury returned a verdict against bank on borrower's wrongful foreclosure claim and a verdict against the mortgage servicer on multiple claims including violations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act (OCPA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The trial court awarded attorney's fees and costs to Hill. The Bank and mortgage servicer appealed and Hill counter-appealed. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals dismissed in part borrower's appeal and found neither the OCPA or the FDCPA was applicable. It reversed the attorney's fee award and reduced the amount of awarded costs. In addition, it reversed the wrongful foreclosure judgment against bank and affirmed the remainder of the judgment which concerned breach of contract and tort claims against the mortgage servicer. The Oklahoma Supreme Court dismissed that portion of Hill's appeal seeking review of the trial court's Category II punitive damages ruling; reversed Hill's wrongful foreclosure judgment against U.S. Bank; reversed the OCPA portion of the judgment against Nationstar; affirmed the FDCPA portion of the judgment against Nationstar, including the $1,000.00 award under the FDCPA; reversed the award of attorney's fees and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine a reasonable attorney's fee consistent with the Court's opinion; and reversed $1,223.39 of the costs awarded to Hill. The remainder of the judgment was affirmed. View "U.S. Bank National Assoc. v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (OTA) brought an original proceeding to the Oklahoma Supreme Court asking the Court approve revenue bonds to finance the construction of three turnpike projects, update and repair turnpike facilities and infrastructure, refund prior revenue bonds and notes, and pay other costs. Protestants challenged the proposed bonds on several grounds, arguing that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority lacked legislative authority to construct the three turnpikes. Title 69 O.S.2021, § 1718 provided that if the Court was satisfied that the bonds have been properly authorized in accordance with Article 17 of the Oklahoma Highway Code of 1968, 69 O.S.2021, § 1701 et seq., the Court would render its written opinion approving the revenue bonds. The OTA properly exercised its authority to determine the route for the South Extension. Further, the OTA has legislative authority pursuant to 69 O.S.2021, §§ 1705(f) and 1709(A) to issue additional bonds to finalize the Loop. Accordingly, the Supreme Court approved the revenue bonds. View "In the Matter of the Application of the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority" on Justia Law

After Appellant Crystal Guilbeau suffered a miscarriage, Hospital employees photographed the child's remains and presented the images to her as part of Hospital's bereavement program. Appellant sued Hospital and unnamed employees on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The trial court dismissed the negligence claims. Appellant later dismissed the remaining IIED claim without prejudice, and without appealing the trial court's dismissal of her negligence claims. In a subsequent lawsuit, Appellant re-alleged all of her original claims, added a new claim of invasion of privacy, and added Armor, a Hospital employee, as a defendant. The trial court granted Defendants' partial motions to dismiss. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, finding that: (1) Appellant was precluded from re-asserting her negligence claims in the second lawsuit, because she never sought review of the trial court's dismissal of those claims in the first lawsuit; (2) Appellant's addition of an invasion-of-privacy claim in the second lawsuit was not time-barred; however, (3) the invasion-of-privacy claim was properly dismissed because Appellant had no personal cause of action on these facts; and finally, (4) the addition of Armor as a defendant in the second lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the Court of Civil Appeals correctly decided the procedural claims, but erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, no claim for invasion of privacy could lie on the available facts. View "Guilbeau v. Durant, HMA" on Justia Law

Nicole Fitzpatrick obtained a dissolution of her marriage to Jeremy Fitzpatrick. The couple had minor children and significant marital assets, including real property, bank accounts, investments, and personal possessions. Among these were investments in oil and gas assets. The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s review centered on the Court of Civil Appeals decision regarding the division of the oil and gas assets. During the course of the marriage, Husband pursued a mutual goal of investments in oil and gas assets through two different ventures. He inextricably tied the Bakken and Energy deals and encumbered marital assets. The trial court found that all the A and B units of both the Bakken and Energy properties were acquired during the marriage through joint efforts of both parties, and were marital property subject to division. Because part of the properties' value lay in their future growth, the trial court considered the most equitable form of property division. The court ordered that future distributions and proceeds flowing from both sets of A and B units were to be held in constructive trust for both parties' benefit, and for Husband to distribute her equal marital share to Wife. COCA reversed the trial court's decisions regarding the Energy A and B units, finding that the trial court should have determined the units' value and set a valuation date. COCA also found that the trial court's use of a constructive trust for the Energy units was not proper. However, COCA did not disturb the trial court's use of a constructive trust with regard to the Bakken units. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s authority to distribute the assets although they could not be valued at the time of the divorce decree; the Court concurred with the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust to ensure protection of the assets’ future value. View "Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law