Justia Oklahoma Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Howard Berkson, Esq. ("Lawyer") filed an action to challenge a ten-dollar fee collected for the Lengthy Trial Fund ("LTF") when a new case is filed. State defendants the administrative director of Oklahoma Courts and other district court clerks, all moved to dismiss. The Tulsa County District Court granted the two motions to dismiss and Lawyer appealed. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded Berkson's petition failed to state a claim that 28 O.S. § 86 was an unconstitutional special law and the trial court properly granted the two motions to dismiss filed by the two defendants. View "Berkson v. Oklahoma ex rel. Administrative Director of the Courts" on Justia Law

TOCH, LLC, the owner and operator of Aloft Hotel, alleged that the Tulsa Tourism Improvement District No. 1 was allegedly improperly created because fifty percent or more of the affected hotel owners protested in writing prior to its creation. City of Tulsa and Tulsa Hotel Partners sought summary judgment on this issue and disputed this material fact by submitting affidavits to disprove TOCH's allegation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the trial court erred when it made a factual determination on this controverted fact. "Weighing disputed evidence is not proper on summary judgment." The trial court's decision was therefore reversed. View "TOCH, LLC v. City of Tulsa, et al." on Justia Law

In 2004, the Defendants-appellees Joe and Cindy Witherspoon obtained an installment loan in the amount of $66,400.00 from a mortgage company. The promissory note was secured by a standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform security instrument containing an optional acceleration clause. In July 2014, Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM), as the holder of the Note, filed a petition to foreclose the Mortgage. BNYM alleged that the Witherspoons defaulted on the Note and Mortgage by failing to pay the monthly installment due on December 1, 2010 and that they had failed to make any subsequent payments. BNYM asserted it elected to accelerate the debt and declare the entire balance due and payable. On October 13, 2014, BNYM voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure action without prejudice. After a series of transfers and assignments, Plaintiff-appellant MTGLQ Investors, L.P. became the holder of the Note and Mortgage on June 4, 2018. By August, MTGLQ sent the Witherspoons a Notice of Intent to Foreclose. The letter informed the Witherspoons they had defaulted on the Note and Mortgage by failing to pay the monthly installment due on January 1, 2013 and that failure to cure the default by paying all past due payments on or before September 25, 2018 might accelerate sums secured by the Mortgage and, ultimately, sale of the property. MTGLQ and the Witherspoons filed motions for summary judgment. The Witherspoons argued BNYM already accelerated the loan when they defaulted in 2010 and that MTGLQ filed its petition to foreclose on December 7, 2018, which was more than six years later, therefore, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. MTGLQ responded that when BNYM dismissed the foreclose action, the note decelerated as a matter of law. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Witherspoons. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded: (1) pursuant to 12A O.S.2011, § 3-118(a), the statute of limitations began to run when the note holder exercised the option to accelerate an installment note; and (2) voluntary dismissal of a foreclosure action decelerates the loan as a matter of law. As a result, the foreclosure action was not barred by the statute of limitations, and the Witherspoons were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "MTGLQ Investors v. Witherspoon" on Justia Law

In August 2015, Plaintiff-appellant, TIB-The Independent Bankers Bank ("TIB"), filed a foreclosure action against Kyle Goerke, based on a mortgage executed and recorded in 2007. TIB also included claims against Kyle Goerke's brother, defendant-appellee, Joseph Goerke ("Goerke"), and several of their family members because they possessed a right of first refusal recorded in the chain of title. At the time, Goerke also possessed a second interest in the property, a mortgage recorded in 2015. Although the title report ordered by TIB reflected both of Goerke's interests, TIB only named him as a defendant in the 2015 foreclosure based on his right of first refusal--and not on his mortgage interest. Goerke, an attorney, filed an answer in the 2015 foreclosure on behalf of himself and the other family members, noting that their right of first refusal had expired. Accordingly, Goerke claimed they had been improperly named as defendants and demanded that the claims against them be dismissed with prejudice. Goerke did not assert or reference his mortgage interest in his answer. TIB complied with Goerke's demand and dismissed the claims against him and his family members with prejudice. Kyle Goerke later resolved the default, and TIB dismissed the 2015 foreclosure action. Kyle Goerke defaulted again shortly thereafter, and TIB initiated a second foreclosure action. In the 2016 foreclosure, TIB discovered Goerke's mortgage interest and named him as a defendant on that basis. Goerke filed an answer to the 2016 foreclosure, claiming TIB was barred from bringing further claims against him because TIB dismissed him with prejudice from the 2015 foreclosure. Both TIB and Goerke filed motions for summary judgment. The district court entered an order denying TIB's motion for summary judgment and a journal entry granting Goerke's motion. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. On certiorari, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Plaintiff's claim against Goerke was not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. View "TIB-The Independent Bankers Bank v. Goerke" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed this original proceeding objecting to two pieces of legislation passed by the Oklahoma legislature during the 2022 legislative session: S.B. 1503 and H.B. 4327. Both acts prohibited abortion after certain cutoff points while providing for a civil enforcement mechanism; both acts prohibited enforcement by the State, its subdivisions, and its agents--instead, the bills created a cause-of-action maintainable by any person for performing, or aiding and abetting the performance of, an abortion in violation of the acts. Petitioners challenged the bills on many grounds, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not address them here. The Court held both bills were unconstitutional; the Court found it unnecessary to address the Petitioners' request for injunctive relief and/or writ of prohibition or Respondents' claims that Petitioners did not have a justiciable claim against them. Petitioners' request for injunctive relief and/or a writ of prohibition was denied. View "Oklahoma Call for Reproductive Justice v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

A group of Oklahoma landowners petitioned for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claiming that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority violated the Open Meeting Act, 25 O.S.2021, §§ 301 to 314, regarding its notice to the public of the ACCESS Oklahoma Program. Both parties sought summary judgment. The district court rendered summary judgment in the landowners' favor, finding that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority willfully violated the Open Meeting Act. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority gave sufficient notice of the agenda items that the landowners challenged. Furthermore, the Court found that the lack of notice regarding the announcement of the ACCESS Oklahoma Program at the February 2022 meeting did not violate the Open Meeting Act because the announcement was for informational purposes only. View "Hirschfeld, et al. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority" on Justia Law

Appellants Pike Off OTA, Inc., Amy Cerato, Mike Leary, Vince Dougherty, Terrie Club, Mike Club, Twyla Smith, Cali Coward, Karen Powell, Mike Powell, Cedric Leblanc, Darla Leblanc, Claudette Wispe, Mark Dooling, Nate Piel, Kara Piel, Nikki Whitson, John Whitson, Robert Wallace, Chelsea Wallace, Robin Stead, Anna Olson, Tassie Hirschfeld, Ice Blast LLC, and Janette Ward (collectively Appellants) brought claims challenging the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority's (OTA) authority to construct three proposed turnpikes: the Tri-City Connector, the East-West Connector, and the South Extension. The OTA moved to dismiss these claims, arguing that Appellants' claims were within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The district court granted the OTA's motion to dismiss, and Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court concurred it had exclusive original jurisdiction to determine whether the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority is authorized to construct the proposed turnpikes in the bond validation matter. The Court further ruled that appellants failed to establish that they had a clear legal right to the injunctive and/or mandamus relief sought. View "Pike Off OTA v. Okla. Turnpike Auth." on Justia Law

Ronald W. Parker (Decedent) died on April 3, 2020, as a resident of Pittsburg County, Oklahoma. He left behind two adult daughters, Mandy Allford and Shila Pirpich, and a brother, Herman Parker (Herman). A little more than one-year before Decedent's death, he executed a holographic will. A dispute over the disposition of the estate arose between the Decedent's adult children and his brother. A provision in the will conferred a specific bequest of an expected worker's compensation settlement to Decedent's brother. After reviewing pleadings submitted by the parties and stipulations, the trial court determined the decedent's holographic failed to intentionally omit his adult children, and therefore, they were deemed pretermitted heirs by operation of law. Additionally, the lower court concluded that as pretermitted heirs, the daughters were entitled to an intestate share of Decedent's estate pursuant to 84 O.S.2011, § 132. Finally, the trial judge found that 84 O.S.2011, § 133 did not apply to the facts of this case. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the interplay between 84 O.S.2011, § 132 and 84 O.S.2011, § 133. The Supreme Court found that nothing in § 133 limited its application to those cases in which a will provides for one or more lineal descendants or a surviving spouse. "It broadly applies to apportionment of shares payable to pretermitted heirs from all devisees and/or legatees. The terms lineal descendant are never mentioned in § 133. To interpret the relevant statutes as the trial court and the COCA did would render Decedent's will and § 133 meaningless." However, the Court found that awarding almost the entirety of Decedent's estate to Herman would also eviscerate the purpose of the pretermitted heir statutes. Thus, the Court held § 132 and § 133 were both applicable to the facts of this case. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the proper manner of apportioning the pretermitted shares awarded to Allford and Pirpich, while still recognizing the testator's intent to provide a specific bequest to his brother. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Parker" on Justia Law

Respondent Oklahoma State Board of Equalization, assessed an ad valorem tax concerning on the property of Complainant Terral Telephone Company. The Company protested the assessment, and the Board moved to dismiss the protest, alleging the protest was non-compliant and untimely. The Court of Tax Review agreed and ruled that the protest did not comply with the statutes and rules necessary to invoke its jurisdiction. The Company appealed the ruling to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which after review, affirmed the Court of Tax Review. View "Terral Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma St. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

After the Carter County, Oklahoma District Court adjudicated S.J.W. (child) as deprived, Parents-appellants appealed. S.J.W., through child's attorney, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. S.J.W. claimed the Chickasaw Nation had exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) based on the plain language in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because S.J.W. resided within the Chickasaw reservation, notwithstanding the fact that S.J.W. was an Indian child and member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. Parents raised two issues to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: (1) whether Oklahoma courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian child's deprived case arising in Carter County, which was completely within the external, territorial boundaries of the Chickasaw reservation; and (2) if the court did have jurisdiction, whether a delay in the adjudication hearing deprived Parents of their due process rights. With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court held the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate S.J.W. deprived. Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), the State of Oklahoma shared concurrent territorial jurisdiction with an Indian child's tribe when the Indian child is not domiciled or residing on the Indian child's tribe's reservation. "In our dual federalism system, an Oklahoma district court's subject matter jurisdiction may be limited by the Oklahoma or U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. X; Okla. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 7(a)." In addition, the Supreme Court found no violation of the Parents' right to due process of law as any delay was not "arbitrary, oppressive or shocking to the conscience of the court," and Parents had a meaningful opportunity to defend throughout the proceeding. View "In the Matter of S.J.W." on Justia Law